- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF MARCH, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 940 OF 2012 (DEC) C/W RFA CROSS OBJECTION NO. 26 OF 2012 IN RFA No. 940/2012 BETWEEN: SRI R. JAGANNATH RAO S/O LATE K. RAMACHANDRA RAO SINCE DEAD REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS 1(a) SMT. PREETHI RAO W/O LATE SRI. JAGANNATH RAO AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS 1(b) KUM. J. SHRADDHA RAO D/O LATE SRI. JAGANNATH RAO AGED ABOUT 10 YEARS 1(c) MASTER DEV RAO S/O LATE SRI. JAGANNATH RAO AGED ABOUT 8 YEARS APPELLANT NO. 1b AND 1c ARE MINOR REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN SMT. PREETHI RAO ALL ARE R/AT NO.1-10/89/3 STREET NO.12 CHIKKALAPALLI POST OFFICE Digitally signed by SUMA B N Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 ASHOK NAGAR, HYDERABAD TELANGANA - 500 020 NOW AT BANGALORE. …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. D N MANJUNATH.,ADVOCATE) AND: SRI V KRISHNOJI RAO SINCE DECEASED REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS 1(a) SRI JAYAPRAKASH RAO S/O LATE V. KRISHNOJI RAO, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS R/AT NO. 2, 15TH BLOCK, NANDI SANKERANA POLICE QUARTERS, C.A.R. SOUTH, ADUGODI, BANGALORE - 560 030. 1(b) SMT LAKSHMI BAI AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS W/O LATE V KRISHNOJI RAO 1(c) SRI K SURESH AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS W/O LATE V KRISHNOJI RAO 1(d) SMT K PARVATHI AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS D/O LATE V KRISHNOJI RAO RESPONDENTS 1(b) TO 1(d) ARE R/AT CHIKKA KUNTHUR MALUR TALUK, KOLAR DISTRICT. 2. SRI R.M. SRINIVAS AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 S/O SRI MUDALAGIRIYAPPA R/AT NO. 1, "H" BLOCK, ADUGODI POLICE QUARTERS BANGALORE. 3. SRI VENKOBA RAO S/O SRI YELLAPPA REDDY ,MAJOR BASAVESHWARA TEMPLE ROAD, BANGALORE- 560 095. 4. SRI GOPALA RAO S/O LATE NANJUNDA RAO NO. 506, ABBAIAH COMPOUND, KORAMANGALA VILLAGE BANGALORE- 560 095. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. SUNIL S. RAO .,ADVOCATE FOR R2; V/O DATED 18.0.2012, NOTICE TO R1(a) TO (d) IS DISPENSED WITH; V/O DATED 20.08.2014, APPEAL AGAINST R3 IS DISMISSED; R4 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED) THIS RFA IS FILED U/SEC.96 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 20.04.2012 PASSED IN 5366/1997 ON THE FILE OF THE VIII-ADDL. CITY CIVIL JUDGE, BANGALORE, DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND POSSESSION. IN RFA.CROB NO. 26/2012 BETWEEN: SRI R M SRINIVAS S/O MUDALAGIRIYAPPA AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS R/AT NO.1, "H" BLOCK ADUGODI, POLICE QUARTERS BANGALORE-560 030 … CROSS OBJECTOR - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 (BY SRI. SUNIL S. RAO., ADVOCATE FOR SRI. SRIKANTH M.,CROSS OBJECTOR) AND: 1. SRI R JAGANNATHA RAO S/O LATE K RAMACHANDRARAO SINCE DEAD REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS 1(a) SMT. J. PREETHI RAO W/O LATE SRI. JAGANNATH RAO AGED ABOURT 38 YEARS 1(b) KUM. J. SHRADDHA RAO D/O LATE SRI. JAGANATH RAO AGED ABOUT 10 YEARS 1(c) MASTER DEV RAO S/O LATE SRI. JAGANNATH RAO AGED ABOUT 8 YEARS RESPONDENT NO.1B AND 1C ARE MINORS REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN SMT. PREETHI RAO ALL ARE R/AT NO.1-10/89/3 STREET NO.12, CHIKKALAPPALLI POST OFFICE ASHOK NAGAR, HYDERABAD TELANGANA - 500 020 NOW AT BANGALORE. 2. SRI V KRISHNOJI RAO S/O LATE VENKOJI RAO SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS 2(a) SRI JAYAPRAKASH RAO S/O LATE V KRISHNOJI RAO AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS R/O NO.2, 15TH BLOCK - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 NANDI SANKERANA, POLICE QUARTERS C A R SOUTH, ADUGODI BANGALORE-560 030. 2(b) SMT. LAKSHMI BAI W/O LATE V KRISHNOJI RAO DEAD AND D 1(A), (C) AND (D) ARE HER LRS 2(c) SRI K SURESH S/O LATE V KRISHNOJI RAO AGED MAJOR R/AT CHIKKA KUNTUR VILLAGE MALUR TALUK KOLAR DISTRICT. 2(d) SMT. K PARVATI D/O LATE V KRISHNOJI RAO AGED MAJOR R/AT CHIKKA KUNTUR VILLAGE MALUR TALUK KOLAR DISTRICT. 3. SRI VENKOBA RAO S/O YELLAPPA REDDY AGED MAJOR BASAVESHWARA TEMPLE ROAD KORAMANGALA VILLAGE BANGALORE. 4. SRI GOPALA RAO S/O LATE NANJUNDA RAO AGED MAJOR R/AT NO. 506, ABBAIAH COMPOUND KORAMANGALA VILLAGE BANGALORE-560 095. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 ...RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. D.N. MANJUNATH.,ADVOCATE FOR R1(a) TO (c); V/O DATED 05.03.2024, NOTICE TO R2 (A TO C), R3 & R4 IS DISPENSED WITH) THIS RFA.CROB FILED U/O-41, RULE-22(1) OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 20.04.2012 PASSED IN O.S.5356/1997 ON THE FILE OF THE VIII- ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE, BENGALURU, DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND POSSESION. THIS APPEAL AND CROSS OBJECTION COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL ORAL JUDGMENT Appeal in RFA No.940/2012 is filed by the plaintiff being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 20.04.2012 passed in O.S.No.5356/1997 passed on the file of the VIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, (CCH-15), Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trial Court'), by which the suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed. 2. RFA Cross-objection No.26/2012 is filed by the defendant No.2 aggrieved by the findings given by the trial Court on issue Nos.1, 2, 3, 5 and additional issue Nos.1 and 2 in said O.S.No.5356/1997. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 3. Subject matter of the suit is the property bearing No.597/605 presently bearing No.506, measuring 30'X30' together with two residential houses, situated at Koramangala Village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit schedule property'). 4. For convenience, the parties are referred to based on their rankings before the trial Court. The appellant is the plaintiff and the respondents are the defendants. 5. Brief facts of the case are that; 5.1 Plaintiff is the son of one Late K. Ramachandra Rao and Smt. S.Sumithra Bai. Defendant No.1-Sri. V.Krishnoji Rao, is the paternal grandfather of the plaintiff. Defendant No.2 is the purchaser of the suit schedule property from defendant No.1. That the suit schedule property was originally acquired by the plaintiff during his minority, represented by his guardian and paternal grandfather defendant No.1-Sri. V.Krishnoji Rao in terms of registered deed of sale dated 07.02.1981 from Sri. K.V. Abbaiah @ Abbaiah Reddy. - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 5.2 That the said property was purchased by defendant No.1 for the welfare of the minor to safeguard and protect his interest. That father of plaintiff Sri. K.Ramachandra Rao was though alive, was not looking after the plaintiff. As there was domestic disharmony and misunderstanding between father of the plaintiff and his mother which resulted in dissolution of their marriage by decree of divorce. Thus, the father of the plaintiff had completely deserted the plaintiff. The mother of the plaintiff not being worldly wise due to lack of education. It was under these circumstances, the property was purchased. 5.3 That the mother of the plaintiff was not in a position to understand the transactions that transpired in respect of the suit schedule property. Plaintiff on attaining majority requested his grandfather Sri. V.Krishnoji Rao - defendant No.1 to hand over the documents of title related to suit schedule property and also requested that the tenants in occupation of the portion of the suit property be directed to pay the rents to plaintiff directly. Defendant No.1, on the said request, gave evasive reply. That the mother of the plaintiff had also requested defendant No.1, which also met with the evasive reply from - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 defendant No.1. In fact, mother of the plaintiff in the year 1993 having learnt about the defendant No.1's attempt to misappropriate the property of the minor, by alienating the same to the third party, had even filed a suit in O.S.No.6379/1993, for the relief of permanent injunction in which an interim order had been granted restraining defendant No.1 from alienating the suit schedule property. Despite, there being an interim order, defendant No.1, without having any right, title and interest, fraudulently and by mis-representation sold the suit property in favour of defendant No.2 in terms of deed of sale dated 23.02.1994 which is of no consequences. 5.4 That the plaintiff on attaining the age of majority filed the suit. The said suit was initially dismissed by judgment and decree dated 19.03.2004. Aggrieved by which the plaintiff had preferred a Regular First Appeal in RFA No.454/2004. During the pendency of the said appeal, an application was filed on 29.01.2008, seeking amendment to the plaint incorporating the relief of possession. That by order dated 18.11.2010 matter was remanded back to the trial Court with a direction to decide the application for amendment. Thereafter the said application - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 came to be allowed by the trial court on 17.02.2011. In consequence thereof, paragraph No.11(a) to the plaint was incorporated to the effect that defendant No.2 has obtained the vacant physical possession of the suit property from the defendant Nos.3 and 4 who were the earlier tenants. Thus, contending as above plaintiff sought for following reliefs: '' a) For declaration to declare that the sale deed executed by the 1st defendant dated 23.02.1994 in favour of the 2nd defendant is null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. A [a] For a judgment and decree by way of consequential relief as against the second respondent or any person or persons claiming through under him by delivering vacant physical possession of the suit schedule property and put the plaintiff in possession thereof. b) For cost of the suit. c) For such other relief or reliefs this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant under the facts and circumstances of this case '' 6. Defendant No.2 has filed written statement on two occasions, the first written statement was filed on 19.12.1997. The additional written statement was filed on 14.06.2011. Except defendant No.2 no other defendants has contested the suit. - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 7. In his written statement defendant No.2 has specifically and categorically denied the claim of the plaintiff being the owner of the suit property having purchased the same through his guardian and paternal grandfather-defendant No.1. It is contented that to the best of the knowledge of defendant No.2, the suit schedule property was the self- acquired property of defendant No.1. It is however admitted that the suit schedule property was in the possession of defendant Nos.3 and 4 as tenants. 7.1 As regards findings in the suit in O.S.No.6379/1993 filed by the mother of the plaintiff and passing of the interim order therein the defendant No.2 has pleaded ignorance as he was not part of the said proceedings. 7.2 Allegation of fraud and misrepresentation practiced on the plaintiff in selling the suit property is denied. It is contented that the defendant No.1 is the absolute owner having unfettered right to convey the suit property. That Defendant No.2 is a bonafide purchaser of the suit property without any notice as such his right to suit property protected under law. - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 That the plaintiff was aware of the sale transaction by defendant No.1 in favour defendant No.2 on 23.02.1994 and suit property was never purchased for the benefit of plaintiff by defendant No.1 and as such plaintiff cannot claim himself to be the owner of the suit property. Hence sought for dismissal of the suit. 7.3 In the additional written statement filed on 14.06.2011, it is contented that defendant No.2 has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property ever since the date of purchase on 23.02.1994. The suit was filed on 16.07.1997. That since the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, if at all he has right to recover the possession of the property he would have to file the suit within three years from the date of attaining the age of majority or 12 years from the date of sale, whichever was later. The sale deed was effected on 23.02.1994, plaintiff had right to recover the possession of the property on or before 23.02.2006. However, he has sought possession only on 29.01.2008 by virtue of making an amendment application and on the date when the application was filed the remedy to recover the possession of the suit - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 property was barred or rather extinguished as contemplated under Section 27 of the Limitation Act. As such the plaintiff is not entitled to seek possession since it is barred by limitation, Section 6, 8 and 27 of the Limitation Act is squarely applicable to the facts of the case, it bars the remedy. As such, plaintiff is neither entitled for relief of declaration nor for possession and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 7.4 That the suit property was purchased by defendant No.1 on behalf of plaintiff under the deed of sale dated 07.02.1981 and it has been in his possession which was delivered to the defendant No.1 on 23.02.1994. The defendant No.1 never declared that he purchased the suit schedule property for the benefit of the minor grandson i.e., plaintiff. In the absence of such a declaration, intention of the parties would have to be gathered from the other circumstances. No evidence can be adduced contrary to the recitals of the registered document. That neither in the recitals of the sale deed dated 07.02.1981 nor in the recitals of the deed of sale dated 23.02.1994, it is disclosed that the suit schedule property was purchased for the benefit of the minor and in the absence - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 of the same, contention of the plaintiff that the suit schedule property was a minor's estate is misplaced and misconceived. That after purchase of the property, defendant No.2 made application to the concerned authorities for transferring of the Water Supply and Electricity Connection in his name, which were effected accordingly. Defendant No.2 had purchased the property out of his own savings. 7.5 At paragraph No.9 of the additional written statement, defendant No.2 has averred that since plaintiff was aware of the defendant No.2 purchasing the suit schedule property on 23.02.1994 and he being in possession thereof exercising his right as owner openly, his possession becomes adverse to that of the plaintiff on the expiry of 23.02.2006. Thus, in view of the said long undisturbed and open possession by the defendant No.2 from the date of purchase till date, the defendant No.2 had perfected his adverse possession. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit. 8. Based on the pleadings, trial Court framed the following issues and additional issues: - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 ISSUES '' 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that first defendant has no manner of right, title and interest to alienate suit property detrimental to his interest? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the so called sale transaction in favour of 2nd defendant was neither for legal necessity nor for family benefit? 3. Whether the 2nd defendant proves that the sale deed executed in his favour is legally valid and is binding on the plaintiff as well? 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 5. Whether the suit is properly valued? 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief as prayed? 7. To what reliefs the parties are entitled to? 8. What order or decree?'' ADDITIONAL ISSUES 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule property was purchased by the defendant No.1 for the benefit of minor grandson? (Recasted Additional Issue-1.) 2. Whether the Court fee paid by the plaintiff is sufficient? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of possession as prayed?" 4. Does the defendant No.2 prove that his possession over the suit schedule property by passage of time has become adverse to the interest of the plaintiff? 9. Plaintiff has examined himself as PW.1 and he got marked 6 documents as Ex.P1 to Ex.P6. Defendant No.2 got - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 examined himself as DW.1 and one additional witness as DW.2 and he got marked 12 documents as Ex.D1 to Ex.D12. 10. On appreciation of evidence, the trial Court answered Issue Nos.1, 2, 4, 5 and additional issue Nos.1, 2 and 4 in the affirmative. Issue Nos.3, 6 and additional issue No.3 in the negative. Consequently, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff is before this Court in RFA No.940/2012. While, defendant No.2 is before this Court, in the RFA Crob No.26/2012. 11. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant taking this Court through the pleadings, evidence and the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court contented that; a. the trial Court has erred in dismissing of suit by wrongly applying the provisions of the Limitation Act without adverting to the facts and circumstances of the case. That when the suit schedule property was purchased, in the name of the plaintiff by defendant No.1 on 07.02.1981, he had no right, title or interest - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 to sell the same in favour of defendant No.2 in terms of deed of sale dated 23.02.1994. b. Despite the pendency of suit in O.S.No.6379/1993 filed by the mother of the plaintiff and an interim order was passed therein was still operating, defendant No.1 could not have sold the suit schedule property representing the same to be his own self-acquired property. The transaction is thus void-ab-initio, not binding on the plaintiff. c. The contents of deed of sale dated 07.02.1981 produced at Ex.P1, would indicate that the plaintiff was minor being just '2' years old as on the date of purchase, which was accepted and upheld by the trial Court even on earlier occasion when the judgment and decree was passed on 19.03.2004. However, the said suit was dismissed for plaintiff not seeking consequential relief. That when this Court in RFA No.454/2004 filed by the plaintiff, remanded the matter by its order dated 18.11.2010, for - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 reconsideration only to the extent of accepting the application in I.A.No.10 filed by the plaintiff for amendment of plaint seeking consequential relief of possession, trial Court ought not to have revisited the issue that was concluded and not reversed even in the Regular First Appeal. d. That even the question regarding validity of the order dated 17.02.2011 passed by the trial court allowing application for amendment, was put to test by the defendant No.2 preferring writ petition in W.P.No.9688/2011, which was dismissed, confirming the order of the trial Court and the said order was carried on by the defendant No.2 before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing a Special Leave Petition, which was also dismissed. As such, the trial Court ought to have construed that on and from the date of the said application having been allowed for amendment, the plaintiff was entitled for the relief of declaration and consequential relief. - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 e. That though the trial Court has come to the conclusion that the sale made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 as null and void and the application seeking for amendment of the plaint for consequential relief was well within the limitation as contemplated under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the trial Court however has erred in holding that the suit is barred by limitation. That the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is based on irrelevant facts. f. The trial Court has failed to taking into consideration that the defendant No.2 in order to fill up the lacuna of pleading had himself sought for amendment to the written statement by introducing paragraph No.9(a), for the first time on 09.06.2011 which is after the remand of the matter. g. The case put forth that the defendant No.2 of he having perfected the title by adverse possession from the date of sale in his favour from 23.02.1994, - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 openly and continuously to the knowledge of plaintiff was wrongly accepted by the trial Court, merely based on production of documents at Exs.D1 to 5 and D9 to D11 namely the tax credit receipts, receipts for having paid water charges and agreement of construction. The trial court without there being any specific plea or evidence by the Defendant No.2 with regard to his continuous and uninterrupted possession has come to a erroneous conclusion of he having perfected the title of his possession. h. The trial Court has also erred in coming into the conclusion of defendant No.1 also having perfected the title of his possession as against the plaintiff during his minority by alienating the property in favour of defendant No.2 by erroneously applying the doctrine of "tacking''. i. The trial Court has not appreciated the contents of deed of sale dated 07.02.1981, produced - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 at Ex.P1, so also the deed of sale dated 23.02.1994 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2. Wherein the defendant No.1 has represented himself to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule property as if the same was his self-acquired property. j. The trial Court has not adverted to the law governing the claim for adverse possession. The trial Court has failed to appreciate that in the case of this nature where the transaction is null and void and not binding on the plaintiff, period of limitation to file a suit for declaration and also to seek possession of the property is governed under Article 65 of the Limitation Act for which 12 years is the limitation period. The suit is filed within three years from the date of plaintiff attaining age of majority which complies with the requirement of Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act and as regards the possession since the application of amendment was made on 29.01.2008, which is 10 years and 6 months from - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 the date of he attaining age of majority, the suit was well within time. k. Thus he submits that the trial Court has failed to appreciate these facts and legal aspects of the matter while dismissing the suit on erroneous premise. He relies upon the following judgments in support of his contentions: 1. Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) Through Lrs. Goran Vs. Jagan Devi and others reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1961. 2. Neelam Gupta and others Vs. Rajendra Kumar Gupta and others reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2824. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.2/defendant No.2, who is also cross-objector in RFA. Crob. No.26/2012, submits that; a. the limitation for the purpose of filing a suit of possession would commence in terms of provisions of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, that the day when - 23 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 the sale took place between defendant No.1 and defendant No.2. b. He reads into Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act to submit that minority is a disability contemplated under Section 6 of the Limitation Act, which ceases to exist after plaintiff attaining the age of majority. Therefore in terms of Section 8 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff was required to file the suit within three years or 12 years from the date of transaction whichever was later. He submits that period of limitation reckoned in this manner, the suit for possession ought to have been filed on or before a period of 12 years from the date of transaction i.e., 23.02.2006, whereas in the instant case the amendment application itself was filed on 29.01.2008, which clearly stood barred by limitation by two years. c. Referring to the averments made in paragraph Nos.9 and 9(a) from the additional written statement - 24 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 he contends that the defendant No.2 has categorically pleaded of his possession being adverse to the interests of the plaintiff and the same has also been admitted by the plaintiff in his cross examination recorded on 15.06.2011. d. Drawing attention of this Court to the paragraph No.18 of the said cross examination, he submits that the plaintiff has admitted the suit schedule property to be in possession of a tenant who was paying the rent to defendant No.1. Thus he submits that since the plaintiff was completely aware of the fact of defendant No.2 being in possession of the property from the date of purchase, the requirement of pleading and proof of adverse possession stands complied with. e. Referring to the grounds urged in the cross objections, he submits that after codification of Hindu law there was no possibility or requirement of defendant No.1 being the grandfather to be the defacto guardian of the plaintiff. Even if such a transaction was made, the same was void and the - 25 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 plaintiff would not get any right, title or interest over the suit property. Therefore Defendant No.1 was well within his rights to deal with the suit property as it was his property. Even on this account, he submits that the trial Court was justified in dismissing the same. He relies upon the following judgments in support of his submissions 1. Darshan Singh Vs. Gurdev Singh reported in AIR 1995 SCC 75. 2. Utha Moidu Haji Vs. Kuningarath Kunhabdulla and Others reported in (2007) 14 SCC 792. 3. Chinnaian Vs. Kattayya reported in AIR 1978 MADRAS 51. 4. Winifred Colaco and others Vs. Nanjappa Gowda and others reported in AIR 1953 MYSORE 84. 5. Rachappa Totappa and another Vs. Madivalawa Rachappa reported in AIR (32) 1945 BOMBAY 63 - 26 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 6. Kolandavel Gounder and another Vs. Chinnappan and others reported in AIR 1965 MADRAS 541 7. Janardhan Saraf Vs. Nilkantha Saraf and others reported in AIR 1952 ORISSA 31. 8. Kalidindi Seetarama Raju Vs. Vegesana Subbaraju reported in AIR 1922 MADRAS 12. 9. Ponnamma Pillai Indira Pillai and another Vs. Padmanabhan Channar Kesavan Channar Kesavabhavanam and Others reported in AIR 1969 KERALA 163 10. Viswambhar and others Vs. Laxminarayan (dead) through LRs. and another reported in (2001) 6 SCC 163. 11. Bailochan Karan Vs. Basant Kumar Naik and others reported in AIR 1999 SCC 876. 12. Prem Singh Vs. Birbal (2006) reported in 5 SCC 353. 13. V.Muthiah Pillai Vs. Vedambal reported in AIR 1986 MADRAS 106. 14. Subburaya Gounder Vs. Balakrishnan and another reported in AIR 2006 MADRAS 301. - 27 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 15. Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak and others Vs. Somanath Muljibhai Nayak and others reported in AIR 2004 SCC 1893 16. Chandrakanthaben J. Modi Vs. Vadilal Bapalal Modi and others reported in AIR 1989 SCC 1269 17. Ibramsa Rowther and others Vs. S.K. Meerasa Rowther and others reported in AIR 1972 MADRAS 467 18. Jagat Ram Vs. Varinder Prakash reported in AIR 2006 SCC 1786 19. Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai Vs. Parmar Karsanbhai reported in 2000 0 Supreme (GUJ) 582. 13. Heard and perused the records. 14. The points that arise for consideration is; 1. Whether the trial court is justified in answering the issue No.1, 2, 3, 5 and additional issues Nos.1 and 2 in the affirmative? 2. Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation in view of provisions contained in Sections 6 and 8 read with Article 65 of the Limitation Act? 3. Whether the defendant No.2 has proved that he having perfected his title by adverse possession ? - 28 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of declaration and possession as sought for? REGARDING POINT NO.1: 15. Ex.P1 is the deed of sale dated 07.02.1981, perusal of which would indicate that, defendant No.1 is shown to be purchaser for and on behalf of minor plaintiff as his guardian. Ex.P1 is a registered document. 16. Ex.P2 is the deed of sale dated 23.02.1994 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2, in which defendant No.1 has represented himself to be vendor and absolute owner of the suit schedule property and there is no mention of he alienating the suit schedule property for and on behalf of the minor plaintiff. The sale transaction under Ex.P2 is neither for nor on behalf of the plaintiff. Clearly, what transpired under Ex.P2-deed of sale dated 23.02.1994 is completely unconnected and unrelated to the plaintiff. 17. Defendant No.2 in his written statement at paragraph No.2 has categorically pleaded that defendant No.1 is the absolute owner of the property and not the plaintiff as claimed. - 29 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 18. The trial Court while answering issue Nos.1 and 2 in the affirmative and issue No.3 in the negative, has accepted the case of the plaintiff to be the absolute owner of the suit schedule property that the defendant No.1 not having any right, title or interest to alienate the suit property. It has also held that the sale transaction by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 was neither for any legal necessity nor for the family benefit. It has also negated the claim of the defendant No.2 of the said deed of sale executed by defendant No.1 in his favour was valid and binding on the plaintiff. 19. Reasons and conclusions arrived at by the trial court in this regard are just and proper. Settled position of law is that a minor can be a transferee as such purchase of suit schedule property by defendant No.1 in the name of minor plaintiff as per deed of sale at Ex.P1 indeed created absolute right, title and interest in favour of the plaintiff therein. Oral assertions of defendant No.1 being the absolute owner of the suit schedule property cannot be countenanced, particularly in view of Section 92 of the Evidence Act, which bars any oral assertions or oral evidence contrary to the contents of a document. - 30 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 Besides, defendant No.1 has neither filed written statement nor has entered the witness box claiming rights in himself. 20. Since the deed of sale at Ex.P2 has been executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 to which the plaintiff is neither a party nor the same was for his benefit, as rightly held by the trial court same is not binding on the plaintiff. Thus the sale deed at Ex.P2 is void-ab-initio and is nullity as regards the plaintiff. REGARDING POINT NOs.2 and 3: 21. The trial court however while answering issue No.4, has held that the suit to be barred by limitation and while answering additional issue No.4 has held that defendant No.2 has perfected the title by adverse possession. Therefore, point No.2 and 3 are as to whether the suit is barred by limitation and whether the defendant No.2 has perfected his title by adverse possession are relatable to issue No.4 and additional issue No.4 framed in the suit. The trial Court has taken said issues for its common consideration under the heads, namely; ''about possession'', ''about adverse possession'' and ''about - 31 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 limitation'', trial court has answered the said issues in the affirmative for following reasons; a. Trial Court by adverting to the deposition of defendants and the plaintiff and also the documentary evidence in the nature of recitals in Ex.P2, the tax-paid receipts produced at Exs.D3 to D5, letter dated 06.10.1995 issued by the Assistant Executive Engineer and document at Ex.D10 and the water bills, accepted the case of the defendant No.2 of he being in his possession of the suit schedule property. b. D.W.2 is a tenant who has deposed that he handed over the possession of his portion of suit schedule property to defendant No.2. Thus the trial Court has found that defendant No.1 was in possession of the suit property from the date of deed of sale dated 07.02.1981 as per Ex.P1 and thereafter defendant No.2 from 23.02.1994. As such the suit schedule property has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of defendant No.1 from 07.02.1981 and subsequently, - 32 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 defendant No.2 from 23.02.1994 to the knowledge of the plaintiff as well as his mother. c. Adverting to the issue of adverse possession of the suit schedule property the trial Court has referred to the plaint in O.S.No.6379/1993, a suit which was filed by the mother of the plaintiff produced at Ex.D6. Referring to the averments made therein with regard to defendant No.1 acting and posing himself as the owner of the suit schedule property and he acting against the interests of the plaintiff, illegally trying to alienate the suit property, has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff himself has admitted that defendant No.1 was acting against the interest and he was denying the plaintiff's ownership over the suit schedule property by asserting that he himself was the owner of the suit schedule property. The trial Court has thus opined that since defendant No.1 possessed the suit schedule property and he denied the title of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property, asserting title in himself, the - 33 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 same would constitute adverse possession against the plaintiff. d. The trial Court has referred to the doctrine of 'tacking' to hold that defendant No.1 being in possession of property from the date of the Ex.P1 which continued till he sold the property in favour of defendant No.2 in terms of Ex.P2, 23.02.1994, Defendant No.2 stepped into the shoe of defendant No.1, as such, the period of possession of the prior adverse possessor continued to be so through and under defendant No.2. Thus, it is concluded that by virtue of Ex.P2, the possession of defendant No.2 has become adverse to the interest of the plaintiff. e. The trial Court has further observed that plaintiff was the owner of the suit schedule property as on the date of Ex.P2 and defendant No.1 being a defacto guardian had no right or authority to sell the suit schedule property. That the defendant No.2 would not get any right or ownership of the suit schedule property and - 34 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 thus the alienation so made being void, the alienee is a trespasser and his possession is adverse to the interest of the real owner of the property. As such, defendant No.2 has perfected his title over the suit schedule property by adverse possession. f. On the ground of limitation, the trial Court has found that though initially suit was for relief of declaration, by virtue of amendment it had become the suit for possession based on title and as such Article 65 of the Limitation Act, would govern aspect of limitation. That the suit for possession based on title ought to have been filed within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendants became adverse to the plaintiff. That in the instant case since the possession of defendant No.2 including the possession of defendant No.1 started to become adverse to the plaintiff ever since the date of execution of Deed of sale dated 07.02.1981 at Ex.P1, the limitation to file the suit for possession started to run even prior to 22.10.1993 when the suit in O.S.No.6379/1993 was - 35 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 filed, thus the limitation for filing the suit by the plaintiff started to run when he was minor, as such, Section 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act would come into picture. g. Thus, the trial Court has found the plaintiff was born on 29.01.1979 and attained majority on 29.01.1997. As such, Section 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act would come into play. The trial Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Darshan Singh and others (supra) to hold that limitation for recovery of possession of immovable property by minor in respect of a void sale transaction is 12 years from the date of the said sale or 3 years from the date when the minor attained the age of majority, whichever is longer. 22. Thus based on the aforesaid reasoning, the trial court has held that since the plaintiff did not file the suit in time, his right over suit schedule property has extinguished by virtue of Section 27 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, proceeded to - 36 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 answer the said issues in the affirmative and consequently dismissing the suit. 23. It is necessary at this juncture to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Darshan Singh and others (supra), wherein the Apex Court referring to Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Limitation Act, at paragraph No.4 has held as under: 4. In other words, Section 8 is a proviso to Section 6 or 7. A combined effect of Sections 6 and 8 read with third column of the appropriate article would be that a person under disability may sue after cessation of disability within the same period as would otherwise be allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule but special limitation as an exception has been provided in Section 8 laying down that extended period after cessation of the disability would not be beyond three years from the date of cessation of the disability or death of the disabled person. Take for instance, if a minor acquires a cause of action to sue for possession of immovable property but due to being minor, Section 6 aids him to lay the suit within the same period of 12 years after attaining majority. Suppose he dies, his legal representatives would be entitled to lay the suit within three years from the date of his attaining majority though he may die after the expiry of three years since his right to file the suit is extended only up to three years from the date of his attaining majority. In other words, cessation of disability or death whichever occurs earlier. The date of death of disabled person does not provide further extended cause of action, a period beyond - 37 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 three years after the disability ceases and death. Take another instance, where a cause of action for possession has arisen when the minor was at the age of 16 years. On his attaining majority, he gets three years' period but Article 65 Column 3, gives him the right to file a suit within 12 years from the date the defendant acquires prescriptive title. His cessation of disability and expiry of three years under Section 8 does not take away his right to file the suit within 12 years under Article 65. In other words the benefit of Section 6 is available to him. Take a third case, where the cause of action had arisen to a minor when he was at the age of 4 years. During his minority, the 12 years' prescriptive period expired by efflux of time at his attaining 16 years but on his becoming major, his disability ceases. Therefore, he gets a further period of three years from the date of cessation of disability to file a suit for recovery of the possession from the defendant who claims adverse possession to the plaintiff. Thus considered Section 8 is a special exception to Section 6 or 7 and the period of limitation though barred under Section 3, remained available to persons under disability specified in Section 6 or 7 and the right to lay the suit or application after disability ceased under Section 6 or 7 is regulated by the limitation prescribed by Section 8. 24. Learned counsel for the respondents/defendants referring to the said Darshan Singh and others (supra), judgment vehemently submits that, in the instant case since the plaintiff attained majority on 29.01.1997, he ought to have filed the suit by 23.02.2006, i.e., 12 years from the date of execute deed of sale dated 23.02.1994 as per Ex.P2. That the - 38 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 amendment sought for in the year 2008 stood barred by limitation. He submits that since disability ceased, the period of 3 years or 12 years as the case may be, contemplated under Section 8 has to be strictly construed and the same does not get elongated from the date of he attainting majority. On the same principles, learned counsel for the respondents relies upon other judgments referred to above. 25. Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff, in response to the said submissions relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shanti Devi (Supra), referring to paragraph No.39, wherein it has held as under : ''39. The First Appellate Court had rightly observed that the plaintiff had claimed the relief of joint possession. It had also arrived at the finding that the transaction in question was void. To put it simply, in the eyes of the law, the plaintiff could not be said to have executed the sale deed. Therefore, the plaintiff could indeed have maintained an action to obtain possession of the property on the basis of her title and filed the same within the period of 12 years from the date of knowledge that the possession of the defendant was adverse to that of the plaintiff. Even if the date of execution of the sale deed, i.e., 14.06.1973 is considered, the suit having been filed on 28.02.1984, i.e., almost 11 years later, could be said to be well within limitation as stipulated under Article 65.'' (emphasis supplied) - 39 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 he submits that the period of 12 years for filing suit for possession as contemplated under Article 65 of the Limitation Act has to be calculated from the date of knowledge that the possession of the defendants was adverse to the plaintiff and not prior to that. He further submits that the plaintiff was under disability till he attained majority. Therefore no knowledge could be attributed to him. He submits that the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Darshan Singh and others (supra), is not applicable as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shanti Devi (Supra), the date of knowledge in the facts circumstances of the case is applicable. He also refers to another judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Neelam Gupta (Supra) referring to paragraph No.37, he submits that the defendant No.2 was required to plead and prove the ingredients of adverse possession, most importantly, ''animus possidendi'' and in the instant case except averment made in paragraph Nos.9 and 9(a) of the written statement that too as an alternate plea, nothing has been brought on record, which the trial Court has not appreciated. - 40 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 26. The facts narrated above indicate that neither defendant No.1 nor defendant No.2 at any point in time till defendant No.2 filed the amendment written statement, considered plaintiff to be the absolute owner of the suit property, let alone, denying his title over same. It is the case of the defendant No.2, that defendant No.1 is the absolute owner of property and it is his self-property and the plaintiff had no semblance of right over property. 27. One of the core distinguishing factors is that defendant Nos.1 and 2 have neither considered plaintiff to be the purchaser under the deed of sale dated 07.02.1981 at Ex.P1 nor the vendor under the deed of sale dated 23.02.1994 at Ex.P2. 28. In the case of Darshan Singh and others (supra), admittedly the sale was for and in respect of the minor's property. Thus there was no dispute of property belonging to the minor. As such, under the said circumstances the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that, the day when the sale was made, it became adverse and the limitation would commence therefrom. - 41 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 29. In the instant case since admittedly plaintiff is not a party to the sale deed dated 23.02.1994 at Ex.P2 and it is not even for and on his behalf, essential element of plaintiff having knowledge of such sale becomes imminent in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shanti Devi (Supra), as held at paragraph No.39, which is extracted hereinabove. This is because the defendant No.2 as already noted in the first place has not acknowledged that the plaintiff to be the absolute owner of the suit property. Therefore the question of he claiming adverse possession would not arise. Secondly, even if there was any such pleading it was only by virtue of amendment as seen at paragraph No.9(a), where there is no details with regard to the date on and from which his possession became adverse to the right, title and interest of the plaintiff. Elementary requirement of claim for adverse possession is that the party in adverse possession has to acknowledge the title of true owner and thereafter declare that his possession being adverse to the interest of such true owner, which is lacking in the instant case. - 42 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 30. Though the trial Court as noted above while answering issue No.4 and additional issue No.4, has elaborately adverted to concepts of ‘possession’, ‘adverse possession’ and ‘limitation’, has lost out on these crucial distinguishable aspects of the matter. Therefore, the reliance placed on by the trial Court as well as the learned counsel for the defendants on judgment of the Apex court in the case of Darshan Singh and others (supra), would not be of any avail. 31. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Neelam Gupta (Supra), at paragraph Nos.37, 40 referring to its judgment in the case of Saroop Singh Vs. Banto has held as under: 37. We have already taken note of the fact that the High Court had duly taken note of Ext.P4 application submitted by the defendants, and also the evidence of DW-1, while being cross examined which were not given due weight by the Courts below. We have also found that the High Court has rightly reached the conclusion that the appellants herein had only permissive possession over the scheduled land and it was not adverse possession. In the contextual situation the following decisions including the one in Saroop Singh v. Banto, relied on by the High Court, assume much relevance. Paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of Saroop Singh's decision read thus:— “28. The statutory provisions of the Limitation Act have undergone a change when compared to the terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1908, in terms - 43 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 whereof it was imperative upon the plaintiff not only to prove his title but also to prove his possession within twelve years, preceding the date of institution of the suit. However, a change in legal position has been effected in view of Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the instant case, the plaintiff- respondents have proved their title and, thus, it was for the first defendant to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession. As noticed hereinbefore, the first defendant-appellant did not raise any plea of adverse possession. In that view of the matter the suit was not barred. 29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. (See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak [(2004) 3 SCC 376].) 30. “Animus possidendi” is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has a requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. As in the instant case, the appellant categorically states that his possession is not adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus. (See Mohd. Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita [(2004) 1 SCC 271] 40. In the light of Saroop Singh's case there can be no doubt that once the plaintiff proves his title over suit property it is for the defendant resisting the same claiming adverse possession that he perfected title through adverse possession and in that regard, in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the starting point of limitation would not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but would commence only from the date the defendant's becomes adverse.'' (Emphasis added) - 44 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 32. Thus under the facts situation of the matter, even as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date that the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff, but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. This principle of law applies to the fact situation of the instant case. 33. Section 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act reads as under; 6. Legal disability.—(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified there for in the third column of the Schedule. (2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified. (3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified. (4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub- section (3) is, at the date of the death of the person - 45 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 whom he represents, affected by any such disability, the rules contained sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply. (5) Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to that person had he not died. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘minor’ includes a child in the womb. 7. ….. 8. Special exceptions.— Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of preemption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application. 34. Also relevant to refer to Article 65 of the Limitation Act, which read as under: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 64 …. ….. … 65 For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. Explanation.—For the purposes of this article— (a) where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee, the possession of the Twelve years. When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. - 46 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devisee, as the case may be, falls into possession; (b) where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies; (c) where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgmentdebtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who was out of possession. 35. Defendant No.2 for the first time made the claim for adverse possession by incorporation of paragraph 9 and 9(a) in the written statement in the year 2011. 36. Thus the plaintiff being a minor who was under disability till he attained age of majority on 29.01.1997 and - 47 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 only thereafter could the knowledge be attributed to him, as the sale was not made in the name of the plaintiff. 37. Suit initially is filed on 16.07.1997, which is within three years of he attaining age of majority. Application for amendment of Plaint seeking relief of possession was filed on 29.01.2008 which is within 12 years of he attaining the age of majority. 38. Therefore the finding of trial Court that defendant No.1 was in possession of the suit property from the date of deed of sale dated 07.02.1981 as per Ex.P1 and thereafter defendant No.2 from the deed of sale dated 23.02.1994 as per Ex.P2 and as such the suit property has been in continuous possession and enjoyment of defendant No.1 from 07.02.1981 and subsequently, defendant No.2 from 23.02.1994 to the knowledge of the plaintiff as well as his mother is incorrect and unsustainable. Moreso, when it is the definite and consistent stand of defendant No.2 that defendant No.1 purchased the property for himself, he was the absolute owner and he sold the same in terms of deed of sale dated 23.02.1994 in his - 48 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 favour without considering or recognizing the plaintiff to be having any right, title and interest over the suit schedule property. 39. In the light of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shanti Devi (Supra) and Neelam Gupta (Supra), reliance placed on by the learned counsel for the respondent-defendant on the judgments are of no avail to the facts and situation of the instant case. Point Nos. 2 and 3 are answered accordingly. REGARDING POINT No.4: 40. For the aforesaid reasons and analysis, this court is of the considered view that the trial court is not justified in dismissing the suit. The plaintiff is thus entitled to be declared as absolute owner of the suit schedule property being entitled for the relief of possession of the same. Consequently the following; ORDER (i) RFA No.940/2012 is allowed. - 49 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:12953 RFA No. 940 of 2012 C/W RFA.CROB No. 26 of 2012 (ii) Judgment and decree dated 20.04.2012 passed in O.S.No.5356/1997 on the file of VIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru is set aside. (iii) The said suit in O.S.No.5356/1997 is decreed as prayed for. (iv) RFA Crob.No.26/2012 is dismissed. (v) Draw decree accordingly. Sd/- (M.G.S. KAMAL) JUDGE RL List No.: 1 Sl No.: 22