[2026:RJ-JP:26327] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12693/2024 URN: CW / 25377U / 2024 Arvind Jayaswal S/o Ram Prasad Jayaswal, Aged About 50 Years, R/o A.2, Vijay Nagar- Ii, Kartarpura, District- Jaipur, Rajasthan. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary, Department Of Medical And Health, Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. The Mission Director, National Health Mission, Directorate Of Medical And Health Services, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur. 3. The Director (Ph), Directorate Of Medical And Health Services, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur. 4. The Chief Medical And Health Officer, Sikar. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Punit Singhvi Mr. Ishan Verma Mr. Naman Dadhich For Respondent(s) : Mr. Archit Bohra, AGC Mr. Yashwant Singh HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA Order 13/07/2026 1. The present writ petition has been filed aggrieved of order dated 03.05.2017 whereby the services of the petitioner stood terminated. 2. Evidently, the present writ petition was filed in the year 2024 that is, after a period of seven years of the impugned action. 3. The only ground raised in the petition is that as the similarly situated persons have been granted the relief as prayed for and [2026:RJ-JP:26327] (2 of 4) [CW-12693/2024] have been reinstated, the present petitioner is also entitled for the same relief. 4. It is evident on record that similarly situated persons who had been granted the relief, approached the Court way back in the year 2017 soon after their orders of termination been passed. Even their writ petitions (led by Writ Petition No. 8135/2017) stood decided on 20.07.2018. Further, the appeals as preferred against the said judgment also stood decided way back in the year 2022 and the special leave to appeal filed before Hon’ble the Apex Court also stood dismissed on 26.02.2022. 5. The present petitioner chose to prefer the petition in the year 2024 with an intent to get a relief, relying upon the orders passed in the above writ petitions. 6. As it is the settled position of law, a person desirous of getting a relief, is required to approach the Courts within a reasonable time. The fence-sitters are not entitled to any relief. Just because similarly situated people have been granted a relief, the other persons would ipso facto not be entitled to the said relief if they chose not to approach the Courts within a reasonable period. 7. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava; (2015) 1 SCC 347, while observing that fence-sitters cannot be given benefit on the basis of parity, held as under: “23. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the Appellants as well as the Respondents, can be summed up as under: (1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would [2026:RJ-JP:26327] (3 of 4) [CW-12693/2024] amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. (2) However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. (3) However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.” [2026:RJ-JP:26327] (4 of 4) [CW-12693/2024] 8. In view of the above settled position of law, the present writ petition filed in the year 2024 assailing order of year 2017, deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of delay and laches and the same is hereby dismissed. 9. Stay application and pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (REKHA BORANA),J 3/SHIVAM