JUDGMENT : ANJAN MONI KALITA, J. 1. Heard Mr. R. Ingo, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners. Also heard Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, representing the State of Arunachal Pradesh. 2. The instant petition, under Section 528 of the BNSS , 2023, has been filed by 5(five) Petitioners jointly, seeking quashing and setting aside of the G.R. Case No. 333/2019, arising out of Itanagar P.S. Case No. 124/2019, dated 21.05.2019, registered under Sections 279 /304(A) of IPC and the subsequent Charge-sheet No. 14/2020 dated 15.02.2020, under /304/201/34 , pending against the Petitioner no. 1 and the Petitioner no. 2, before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia. 3. The Petitioner no. 1 and the Petitioner no. 2 are the alleged accused-persons, while the Petitioner no. 3 is the wife of the deceased (victim) and the Petitioner nos. 4 & 5 are the Informants in Itanagar P.S. Case No. 124/2019, dated 21.05.2019, registered under Sections 279 /304(A) of IPC . 4. An FIR was lodged by one Shri Techi Dokum (Petitioner No. 4) before the Officer In-charge of Itanagar Police Station on 21.05.2019, alleging, inter alia, that in the early morning of 20.05.2019 in between 01:00 hours to 02:00 hours, Late Dado Dayo of Donyi Polo Road, Itanagar, was found dead on the NH-415, near Hotel Arun Subansiri, Tinali with multiple injuries in his body; that the body of Late Dado Dayo was taken to RKM Hospital, Itanagar by Itanagar Police, wherein the attending doctor declared him brought-dead; that on 21.05.2019, the informant came to know that the Bolero (white colour), bearing Registration No. AR-05-2649 belonging to the Project Director DRDA, Seppa, hit the scooty driven by aforesaid Late Dado Dayo from back resulting in death of Late Dado Dayo on the spot. 5. On receipt of the FIR, Itanagar P.S. Case No. 124/2019, dated 21.05.2019, under Sections 279 /304-A of IPC was registered and after completion of the investigation, Charge-sheet No. 14/2020, dated 15.02.2020, under /304/201/34 was submitted against the Petitioner no. 1 and Petitioner no. 2. Thereafter, the case was registered as G.R. Case No. 333/2019 in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia, wherein the criminal trial is presently pending at the stage of prosecution evidence. 6. It is seen that before filing of the FIR dated 21.05.2019, another FIR was lodged about the same incident by the Respondent no. 2. Thereafter, the case was registered as G.R. Case No. 333/2019 in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia, wherein the criminal trial is presently pending at the stage of prosecution evidence. 6. It is seen that before filing of the FIR dated 21.05.2019, another FIR was lodged about the same incident by the Respondent no. 5 on the same date. 7. The instant joint petition has been filed by the Petitioners stating that the family members of both sides, upon consideration of various facts including that the incident was purely accidental in nature and with the advice of well wishers and elderly members of the society, the parties have amicably settled the disputes regarding the death of the victim. It is stated that amicable settlement meetings were held on two occasions and the parties mutually agreed to resolve the dispute by execution of a settlement deed, whereby the Petitioner nos. 1 & 2 paid a lump sum compensation amount of Rs. 72,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy-Two Lakhs only) for the welfare of the deceased’s wife and three minor daughters. It is stated that the Petitioner no. 3 (the wife of the victim) had, after due consideration accepted the amount without having any grievances. Therefore, the parties, including the Informants in the instant case had jointly filed the instant petition before this Court to invoke the inherent power under Section 528 of the BNSS , 2023, to quash the criminal proceeding in the above mentioned G.R. Case, in the interest of justice. In this connection, 2(two) deeds of mutual settlement agreements dated 09.06.2023 and 12.08.2025 respectively entered between the family members of the victim and the Petitioner nos. 1 & 2 along with Petitioner nos. 4 & 5 are brought on record by way of Annexures in the instant petition. It is also seen that money receipt issued by the Petitioner no. 3, wherein it has been mentioned that Rs. 72 lakhs has been received by the Petitioner no. 3 from the Petitioner no. 1 as full and final compensation amount in terms of the aforesaid 2(two) agreements. 8. The learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the accident was an unfortunate incident, but the same occurred accidently without having any intention to cause harm to the deceased person by the Petitioner nos. 1 & 2. 3 from the Petitioner no. 1 as full and final compensation amount in terms of the aforesaid 2(two) agreements. 8. The learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the accident was an unfortunate incident, but the same occurred accidently without having any intention to cause harm to the deceased person by the Petitioner nos. 1 & 2. He further submits that since the parties involved in the instant case have mutually settled the issue by way of aforesaid 2(two) agreements and accordingly, a huge amount i.e., Rs. 72,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Two Lakhs) has already been paid to the Petitioner no. 3, who is the wife of the victim, for the welfare of the victim’s family, there is nothing left in the instant case. He submits that the continuation of G.R. case pending before the learned Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia, will be a futile exercise as the parties have already settled their issues without having any grievances against each other. He submits that the compensation amount, which has been paid to the wife of the victim is sufficient in the instant case and if the criminal proceeding is allowed to go on, the same will be nothing but wastage of judicial time, as well as the same might hamper the cordial relationship that the parties are having at the present moment. Therefore, he submits that this Court should quash the entire proceedings pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia, by invoking the inherent power under Section 528 of BNSS , 2023. 9. The learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that in similar circumstances, this Hon’ble Court has quashed criminal proceedings pending before the Trial Court. Therefore, taking into account of the same fact, the instant petition should also be allowed by this Court by quashing the criminal proceeding pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia. In this connection, he referred to the case of Ojing Darin and Ors. Vs. The State of Arunachal Pradesh (Crl. Pet. No. 9/2024 ), decided on 12.02.2025. 10. Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. P.P., on the other hand, submits that though the case involved rash and negligent driving by the Petitioner nos. In this connection, he referred to the case of Ojing Darin and Ors. Vs. The State of Arunachal Pradesh (Crl. Pet. No. 9/2024 ), decided on 12.02.2025. 10. Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. P.P., on the other hand, submits that though the case involved rash and negligent driving by the Petitioner nos. 1 & 2, whereby a person has lost his life, since this Court has allowed quashing of criminal proceeding, taking into account the fact of the mutual agreement and receipt of compensation amount, this Court should also consider the instant case as it deems fit. 11. Before going into the facts of the instant case, it may be relevant to refer to the case that has been relied on by the learned counsel for the Petitioners. It is seen that in the case of Ojing Darin (supra) , a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has allowed quashing of the G.R. case, which was pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pasighat, invoking the power under Section 528 of the BNSS , 2023, relied on the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. , (2019) 5 SCC 688 . 12. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Ojing Darin (supra) , it is seen that several other cases decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue of invoking power under Section 528 , BNSS , 2023, were not placed before the Co-ordinate Bench. Therefore, the case was decided without consideration of the other case laws that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided, which will be discussed on a later stage. 13. Coming to the legal question on hand, i.e., in an incident of causing death by negligence, which comes under Section 106 (1) of BNS , 2023, whether the same could be quashed on the basis of a mutual settlement between the parties, i.e., the accused and the family members of the victim. Another aspect which is clear is that the Petitioners have filed the instant petition because of the fact that (1) of the , 2023, is not compoundable. Therefore, without having an order of quashing from this Court, the matter cannot be settled and closed irrespective of their having signed a mutual settlement agreement or deed. 14. Another aspect which is clear is that the Petitioners have filed the instant petition because of the fact that (1) of the , 2023, is not compoundable. Therefore, without having an order of quashing from this Court, the matter cannot be settled and closed irrespective of their having signed a mutual settlement agreement or deed. 14. As far as law relating to invoking the power under Section 528 of the BNSS , 2023, in quashing the criminal proceeding relating to non-compoundable offences, the pioneer case which can be referred to is the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 . Paragraph nos. 48, 50, 51, 57 & 58 of the aforesaid case being relevant are extracted herein below: - “ 48. A five-Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab was called upon to determine, inter alia, the question whether the High Court has the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings or allow the compounding of the offences in the cases which have been specified as non-compoundable offences under the provisions of Section 320 of the Code. The five-Judge Bench referred to quite a few decisions of this Court including the decisions in Madhu Limaye, Bhajan Lal, L. Muniswamy, Simrikhia, B.S. Joshi and Ram Lal and framed the following guidelines: (Kulwinder Singh case, CTC pp. 783-84, para 21) "21. ... ‘(a) Cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if other offences are introduced for aggravation of the case. (b) Cases pertaining to property disputes between close relations, which are predominantly civil in nature and they have a genuine or belaboured dimension of criminal liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace and harmony to larger number of people. (c) Cases of dispute between old partners or business concerns with dealings over a long period which are predominantly civil and are given or acquire a criminal dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a redressal of their financial or commercial claim. (d) Minor offences as under Section 279 1PC may be permitted to be compounded on the basis of legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another offence which remains non-compoundable is Section 506(11) IPC , which is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. (d) Minor offences as under Section 279 1PC may be permitted to be compounded on the basis of legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another offence which remains non-compoundable is Section 506(11) IPC , which is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. It is the judicial experience that an offence under Section 506 in most cases is based on the oral declaration with different shades of intention. Another set of offences, which ought to be liberally compounded, are Sections 147 and 148 , more particularly where other offences are compoundable. It may be added here that the State of Madhya Pradesh vide M.P. Act 17 of 1999 (Section 3) has made Sections 506(11) , 147 and 148 compoundable offences by amending the schedule under Section 320 CrPC. (e) The offences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide where the victim dies in the course of transaction would fall in the category where compounding may not be permitted. Heinous offences like highway robbery, dacoity or a case involving clear-cut allegations of rape should also fall in the prohibited category. Offences committed by public servants purporting to act in that capacity as also offences against public servant while the victims are acting in the discharge of their duty must remain non-compoundable. Offences against the State enshrined in Chapter VII (relating to army, navy and air force) must remain non-compoundable. (f) That as a broad guideline the offences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide may be permitted to be compounded when the court is in the position to record a finding that the settlement between the parties is voluntary and fair. While parting with this part, it appears necessary to add that the settlement or compromise must satisfy the conscience of the court. The settlement must be just and fair besides being free from the undue pressure, the court must examine the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims with necessary caution." To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the court to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the section itself i.e. 'to prevent abuse of the process of any court' or 'to secure the ends of justice'." “ 50. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the section itself i.e. 'to prevent abuse of the process of any court' or 'to secure the ends of justice'." “ 50. A three-Judge Bench of the Bombay High Court in Abasaheb Yadav Honmane v. State of Maharashtra dealt with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code vis-à-vis the express bar for compounding of the non-compoundable offences in Section 320 (9) of the Code. The High Court referred to various decisions of this Court and also the decisions of the various High Courts and then stated as follows: (Mah LJ pp. 904-05, para 14) "14. The power of compounding on one hand and quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of inherent powers on the other, are incapable of being treated as synonymous or even interchangeable in law. The conditions precedent and satisfaction of criteria in each of these cases are distinct and different. May be, the only aspect where they have any commonality is the result of exercise of such power in favour of the accused, as acquittal is the end result in both these cases. Both these powers are to be exercised for valid grounds and with some element of objectivity. Particularly, the power of quashing the FIR or criminal proceedings by the court by taking recourse to inherent powers is expected to be used sparingly and that too without losing sight of impact of such order on the criminal justice delivery system. It may be obligatory upon the court to strike a balance between the nature of the offence and the need to pass an order in exercise of inherent powers, as the object of criminal law is protection of public by maintenance of law and order." “ 51. Section 320 of the Code articulates public policy with regard to the compounding of offences. It catalogues the offences punishable under IPC which may be compounded by the parties without permission of the court and the composition of certain offences with the permission of the court. The offences punishable under the special statutes are not covered by . When an offence is compoundable under , abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence or where the accused is liable under Section 34 or 149 can also be compounded in the same manner. The offences punishable under the special statutes are not covered by . When an offence is compoundable under , abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence or where the accused is liable under Section 34 or 149 can also be compounded in the same manner. A person who is under 18 years of age or is an idiot or a lunatic is not competent to contract compounding of offence but the same can be done on his behalf with the permission of the court. If a person is otherwise competent to compound an offence is dead, his legal representatives may also compound the offence with the permission of the court. Where the accused has been committed for trial or he has been convicted and the appeal is pending, composition can only be done with the leave of the court to which he has been committed or with the leave of the appeal court, as the case may be. The Revisional Court is also competent to allow any person to compound any offence who is competent to compound. The consequence of the composition of an offence is acquittal of the accused. Sub-section (9) of mandates that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an offence has to be in accord with and in no other manner.” “ 57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.” “ 58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.” 15. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.” 15. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the power under Section 528 of BNS S , 2023, and Section 359 of S , 2023, are quite different and therefore, both have to be invoked in a different and distinct manner. While of S , 2023, articulates public policy with regard to the compounding of offences, the power of quashing the criminal proceedings by the Court by taking recourse to inherent powers is expected to be used sparingly and that too without losing sight of impact of such order on the criminal justice delivery system under of S , 2023. Therefore, the power under S , 2023, is discretionary while the power under Section 320 of the S , 2023 is statutory, under which certain types of offences can be compounded by the parties, without consent of the Court. What is discernible is that the exercise of power under is to be done with pure caution and with propounding reasons in exceptional cases and not as a matter of routine. The aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, reveal that in respect of serious offences like murder, rape dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under or offences of moral turpitude under special statures, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavor having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. Therefore, a clear guideline can be found in the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, whereby the High Court, in its discretion, can invoke the inherent power under of S , 2023, to quash a criminal proceeding. High Court needs to examine the facts of the particular case in hand to examine whether because of mutual settlement between the parties, whether there is any possibility of conviction or the conviction seemed to be remote or a sheer wastage to time. It further needs to look into the gravity of the offence and overall effect on the society as a whole, excluding the effect on the victim alone. Consideration of social status of victim vis-à-vis the offender can be also a relevant factor. 16. A similar view was also expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab , (2014) 6 SCC 466 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis a petition for quashing of criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power, the High Court has to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. It was held that such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. It was held that such kinds of offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. It was held that, on the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationships or family disputes, should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that while exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 17. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that while exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 17. In a similar manner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors. Vs. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 2017 (9) SCC 641 , as well as in the case of Laxmi Narayan (supra) reitereated the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases of Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh (supra). 18. In a recent case of Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. (2022) 16 SCC 117 , while dealing with the case under Section 306 IPC for abetment to commit suicide, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave and serious offences only on the basis of an agreement with the complainant, would send a dangerous precedent, where complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons, with a view to extract money from the accused. It was further observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that financially strong offenders would go scot- free, even in cases of grave and serious offences, such as, rape, murder, bride burning etc., by buying of Informants/Complainants and settling with them. It was held that these would render otiose provisions such as Sections 306 , 498-A, 304-B etc., incorporated in the as a deterrent, with a specific social purpose. In this connection, Paragraph no. 39 and 50 of aforesaid case being relevant are quoted herein below:- “ 39. In criminal jurisprudence, the position of the complainant is only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a matter between the State and the accused. The State has a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in society. It is for the state to prosecute offenders. In case of grave and serious non-compoundable offences which impact society, the informant and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction and punishment of the offender. The State has a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in society. It is for the state to prosecute offenders. In case of grave and serious non-compoundable offences which impact society, the informant and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction and punishment of the offender. An informant has no right in law to withdraw the complaint of a non-compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts society. 50. As held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi Narayan, Section 307 of the IPC falls in the category of heinous and serious offences and are to be treated as crime against society and not against the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence under Section 306 of the would fall in the same category. An FIR under of the cannot even be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardian, care-givers or anyone else.” 19. Coming back to the facts of the instant case, in the instant case, the victim died because of rash and negligent driving by the Petitioner nos. 1 & 2 and subsequently, due to monetary consideration as compensation, the helpless wife and family members of the victim had agreed to compromise with the Petitioner nos. 1 & 2 and to settle the entire dispute in a private agreement. From the aforesaid case laws that have been discussed, one of the most important aspects which emerge is that in cases of compromise, a compromise is basically with the victim and the accused/offender. Therefore, the principle is basically to the effect that the victim does not have any grievance against the accused/offender. But, in a case of death, resulted from rash and negligent driving, the victim is no longer there to say anything about the grievance or non-grievance.Therefore, the compromise between the Informant or the family members of the victim and the accused/offender cannot be said to be a compromise on the basis of the foundational principle that has evolved, vide various judicial pronouncements. Another important factor which needs to be considered is the cascading effect of rash and negligent driving in the public at large. Another important factor which needs to be considered is the cascading effect of rash and negligent driving in the public at large. It is also observed that in many of the cases of rash and negligent driving, the cases have been compromised by settlement by paying money as compensation before an FIR is lodged. By this type of compromise what actually seems to have been done is that certain rich people are settling those cases by paying certain amounts to the poor victim’s family. By doing such acts, what actually is being done is that the rich people are buying their criminal elements from the poor victims and the criminal jurisprudence in India is not to be so, as the criminal justice system in India is based on the concept of State Vs. the accused and not between the private individuals. 20. In a case decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court i.e. Baldev Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another , passed in CRM-M-40769-2024 , decided on 02.06.2016 the same issue of compromise in a case under Section 106 (1) of BNSS , cropped in, wherein, the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court has negated the prayer of quashing of the case on the basis of a compromise/settlement between the family of the victim and the accused. It has also been discussed about the dangerous precedent that would be laid if certain offenders are allowed to go scot-free with the so-called compromise/settlement with the victim’s family, wherein the victim himself/herself is not present to consent. This will clearly go against the criminal jurisprudence of this Country. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussions, this Court is of the considered view that in the instant case in hand, the plenary power under Section 528 of the BNSS cannot be exercised to quash the criminal proceeding, i.e., G.R. Case No. 333/2019, arising out of Itanagar P.S. Case No. 124/2019 dated 21.05.2019, registered under Sections 279 /204(A) of the IPC , pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Yupia, on the basis of the aforesaid 2(two) mutual settlement agreements dated 09.06.2023 and 12.08.2025 respectively, entered amongst the Petitioners in the instant case. 22. 22. This Court also hastens to add that the case of Ojing Darin (supra) , cited by the learned counsel for the Petitioners cannot be said to be binding on this Court as several judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were not cited before the Co-ordinate Bench while the matter was heard. 23. In terms of the aforesaid conclusions, the instant criminal petition is disposed of as rejected.