JUDGMENT : PRANJAL DAS, J. 1. Heard Mr. Zoramchhana, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. C. Vanlalmalasawma, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The instant appeal has been filed by the appellant-defendant against the judgment and decree dated 23.03.2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 3, Aizawl in Eviction Suit No. 6 / 2017. The eviction suit i.e., Eviction Suit No.6 of 2017 was filed by the plaintiffs- respondents against the appellant-defendant. The plaintiffs submitted in the plaint inter alia that the land and building covered under the LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 were mortgaged by the defendant to Smt. RS Lalsangzuali by way of mortgage by deposit of title deed for availing a loan of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakh only) on 29.9.2007. That, as per their agreement, the defendant would return the principal amount and interest within six months from the date on which the defendant deposited the said LSC to Smti. RS Lalsangzuali . That, the said LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 was handed over to Smti. RS Lalsangzuali and the defendant took a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-. That, the defendant also agreed that if she failed to repay Rs. 2,00,000/- with an interest within the stipulated time, the defendant would lose the said property. 3. That, as the defendant could not repay the loan with interest, the defendant signed all the necessary papers for transfer of the said LSC in the name of Smti. RS Lalsangzuali. That, in pursuance to the application submitted by the defendant side, the Revenue authorities had transferred the said LSC in the name of Smti. RS Lalsangzuali. That, thereafter, the said plot of land was sold to the plaintiff No. 1 by Smti. RS Lalsangzuali for Rs. 4,70,000/- (Rupees four lakhs seventy thousand only) and the plaintiff No. 2 paid the said sum of Rs. 4,70,000/- to the plaintiff No. 1.That, without mutating the said LSC in the name of the plaintiff No. 1, the said LSC was directly mutated in the name of the plaintiff No. 2 from the name of Smti. RS Lalsangzuali on 3.6.2011 - That, when the said LSC was transferred in the name of the plaintiff No. 2, there was no suit pending Involving the suit land covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980. 4. That, the defendant filed Declaratory Suit No. 8 of 2010 against Smti. RS Lalsangzuali on 3.6.2011 - That, when the said LSC was transferred in the name of the plaintiff No. 2, there was no suit pending Involving the suit land covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980. 4. That, the defendant filed Declaratory Suit No. 8 of 2010 against Smti. RS Lalsangzuali and five others for declaration of title, ownership over the land covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 and for declaring the agreement dated 29.9.2007 as null and void. That, however, it was dismissed as per Order IX Rule 3 of CPC, 1908 vide Order Dated 11.4.2011. That, thereafter, the defendant filed Declaratory Suit No. 5 of 2013 against Smti. RS Lalsangzuali and five others. That, the suit was withdrawn by the defendant with the permission to file afresh on 26.4.2013. That, the defendant once again filed Declaratory Suit No. 25 of 2013 against the plaintiffs and 7 other persons wherein the plaintiffs in the present case along with Smti. RS Lalsangzuali responded with a joint written statement. The said suit was also dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl District, Aizawl on 8.9.2016. 5. That, as stated previously, the land covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 was registered in the name of the plaintiff No. 2 on 3.6.2011. That, as per the land records, the plaintiff No. 2 was the legal and rightful owner of the land and building covered under the LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980. That, the defendant and her family members were staying within the land and building covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 without any authority and without paying any rent. That, the plaintiff No. 2 was entitled to take vacant possession of the said land and building covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 based on title. That, having the said land covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 mutated in the name of the plaintiff No. 2, he requested the defendant to give vacant possession of the land covered under the said LSC. But, the defendant and her family did not vacate the said land and building. That, the plaintiffs issued notice to the defendant through their counsel requesting the defendant to quit and give vacant possession of the land and building covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 on or st before 31 day of December, 2016. But, the defendant and her family did not vacate the said land and building. That, the plaintiffs issued notice to the defendant through their counsel requesting the defendant to quit and give vacant possession of the land and building covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 on or st before 31 day of December, 2016. That, since the defendant and her family members had not vacated the suit land, the instant suit came to be instituted, with reliefs prayed for. 6. The plaintiffs had filed the suit for possession on the basis of the title, with regard to property under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980. For the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit was valued at Rs. 10,00,000/- and the requisite Court fee was paid. 7. In the suit, the plaintiffs, prayed: (a) For a decree for khas possession (actual possession) of the premises by ejecting the defendant and all her family members from the land and building covered under LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980. (b) For a decree for arrears of rent from July 2011 to June 2012, both inclusive at the rate of Rs. 2,000/-per month. (c) For a decree for the rent at the rate of Rs. 2,000/-per month to be accrued during the pendency of the suit and till the defendants vacate from the said premises. (d) For interest over the said sum at the rate of 14.5% per annum till payment is made in full. (e) For a decree for damages at the rate of Rs. 10 per month with effect from 1st January 2017 and for further damages until possession is delivered to the plaintiff at such rate as the Court deems just and proper. (f) For all costs of suit. (g) For any other relief to which the plaintiffs are entitled according to law, justice, equity and good conscience. 8. The original defendant had died and was represented in the suit by her son Shri. C. Zoramliana who filed the written statement wherein stated inter alia that the suit was not maintainable in its present form and style and was liable to be dismissed. That, in the year 2006, the guilty party Smti. R. Lalhlimpuii borrowed Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakh only) from Smti. RS. Lalsangzuali. That, Smti. R. Lalhlimpuil deceived the defendant by saying that she would give Rs. 70,000/- from the money she borrowed. Smti. That, in the year 2006, the guilty party Smti. R. Lalhlimpuii borrowed Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakh only) from Smti. RS. Lalsangzuali. That, Smti. R. Lalhlimpuil deceived the defendant by saying that she would give Rs. 70,000/- from the money she borrowed. Smti. R. Lalhlimpuii took the LSC No. AZL-3 of 1980 owned by Smti. H. Lalhmingthangi and mortgaged it to Smti. RS. Lalsangzuali. That, the defendant Smti. H. Lalhmingthangi passed away on 03.04.2019 and the burden lied in the hands of his son Shri. C. Zoramliana who was innocent. That, Shri. C. Zoramliana had no much knowledge about the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The defendant prayed to the Court to dismiss the suit. 9. Though the trial Court had received a written statement from the defendant on 26.11.2019, but despite repeated summons the defendant had not turned up and by virtue of Order IX, Rule 6 of CPC, 1908, the learned Trial th Court by Order Dated 27 May, 2022 proceeded with the case ex-parte against the defendant. 10. The learned Trial Court had framed the following issues on 27.05.2022. (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief claimed? If so, to what extent? 11. During the trial, plaintiff side adduced evidence of two witnesses. PW-1 is Shri P.C. Lianngura and PW-2 is Shri Lalchuana. PW-1 stated that the land and building covered under the said LSC No.3 of 1980 was mortgaged by H. Lalhmingthangi (L) to Smt. RS Lalsangzuali by way of mortgage by deposit of title deed for availing a loan of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) on 29.9.2007. 12. That, as per the agreed terms H. Lalhmingthangi (L) agreed to return the principal amount and interest within six months from the date on which she deposited the LSC to Ms. RS Lalsangzuali. That, the said LSC no.3 of 1980 was handed over to Smt. RS Lalsangzuali on 29.9.2007 and H. Lalhmingthangi (L) took the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-. 13. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) also agreed that if she fails to repay the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- with interest within the stipulated time, she was willing to lose the said property. That, as H. Lalhmingthangi (L) could not repay the loan with interest she had signed all the necessary papers for transfer of the said LSC in the name of Smt. RS Lalsangzuali. That, as H. Lalhmingthangi (L) could not repay the loan with interest she had signed all the necessary papers for transfer of the said LSC in the name of Smt. RS Lalsangzuali. That, in pursuance to the application submitted by H. Lalhmingthangi (L), the Revenue authorities transferred the said LSC in the name of Smt. RS Lalsangzuali. That, thereafter, the said plot of land was sold to plaintiff No.1/PW-1 by Smt. RS. Lalsangzuali for a sum of Rs.4,70,000/- (Rupees four lakhs seventy thousand) and the plaintiff no.2 paid the said sum of Rs.4,70,000/- and the said LSC was directly mutated in the name of the plaintiff no.2 from the name of Smt. RS. Lalsangzuali on 3.6.2011. That, when the said LSC was transferred in the name of the plaintiff no.2, there was no suit pending involving the immovable property covered under LSC no.3 of 1980. 14. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed a suit against Smt. R.S. Lalsangzuali and five others for declaration of title, ownership over the land covered under LSC no.3 of 1980 and for declaring the agreement dated 29.9.2007 as null and void. That, the suit was registered as Declaratory Suit No. 8 of 2010; however, the DS No.8 of 2010 was dismissed as per order IX Rule 3 CPC vide order dated 11.4.2011. 15. That, thereafter H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed another suit against Smt. RS Lalsangzuali and five others. The said suit was registered as Declaratory Suit No.5 of 2013 and the said suit was withdrawn by H. Lalhmingthangi (L) with the permission to file afresh. 16. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed another such suit against which was registered as Declaratory Suit No.25 of 2013 and the said suit was also dismissed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl District, Aizawl on 8.9.2016. 17. That, as per the land records, the plaintiff no.2 is the legal and rightful owner of the land and building covered under the LSC No.Azl-3 of 1980. That, as per the land laws applicable to the State of Mizoram, the said immovable property covered under LSC No.Azl-3 of 1980 is the property of the defendant no.2. 18. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) and her family members are staying within the land and building covered under LSC no.Azl-3 of 1980 without any authority without paying any rent. That, as per the land laws applicable to the State of Mizoram, the said immovable property covered under LSC No.Azl-3 of 1980 is the property of the defendant no.2. 18. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) and her family members are staying within the land and building covered under LSC no.Azl-3 of 1980 without any authority without paying any rent. That, the plaintiff no.2 was entitled to take vacant possession of the said land and building covered under LSC no.Azl-3 of 1980 based on title. 19. That, after the said land covered under LSC no.3 of 1980 was mutated in the name of the plaintiff no.2, he requested H. Lalhmingthangi (L) to give vacant possession of the land covered under the said LSC. But that, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) and her family did not vacate from the said land and building covered under LSC no.3 of 1980. That, notice was to the defendant through counsel requesting the defendant to quit and give vacant possession of the land st and building covered under LSC No.3 of 1980 on or before 31 day of December 2016. That, as H. Lalhmingthangi (L) and her family members did not vacate from the suit land covered under the LSC No.3 of 1980, the suit was filed. 20. That, as per the notice issued to the defendant, the defendant and her family were requested to give vacant possession of the land and building to the st plaintiffs on or before 31 day of December 2016. That, since the time the LSC No.3 of 1980 was mutated in the name of the plaintiff no.2 the stay within the said land covered under LSC no. 3 of 1980 was unauthorized, illegal and the defendant and her family members are trespassers. 21. PW-2 stated that the land and building covered under the said LSC No.3 of 1980 was mortgaged by H. Lalhmingthangi (L) to Smt. RS Lalsangzuali by way of mortgage by deposit of title deed for availing a loan of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) on 29.9.2007. 27. That, as per the agreed terms H. Lalhmingthangi (L) agreed to return the principal amount and interest within six months from the date on which she deposited the LSC to Ms. RS Lalsangzuali. That, the said LSC no.3 of 1980 was handed over to Smt.RS Lalsangzuali on 29.9.2007 and H. Lalhmingthangi (L) took the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-. 28. 27. That, as per the agreed terms H. Lalhmingthangi (L) agreed to return the principal amount and interest within six months from the date on which she deposited the LSC to Ms. RS Lalsangzuali. That, the said LSC no.3 of 1980 was handed over to Smt.RS Lalsangzuali on 29.9.2007 and H. Lalhmingthangi (L) took the sum of Rs.2,00,000/-. 28. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) also agreed that if she fails to repay the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- with interest within the stipulated time, she was willing to lose the said property. That, As H. Lalhmingthangi (L) could not repay the loan with interest she had signed all the necessary papers for transfer of the said LSC in the name of Smt.RS Lalsangzuali. That, in pursuance to the application submitted by H. Lalhmingthangi (L), the Revenue authorities transferred the said LSC in the name of Smt. RS Lalsangzuali. That, thereafter, the said plot of land was sold to Plaintiff no.1 by Smt.RS.Lalsangzuali for a sum of Rs.4,70,000/- (Rupees four lakhs seventy thousand) and Plaintiff No. 2 paid the said sum of Rs.4,70,000/- to the plaintiff no.1 and without mutating the said LSC in the name of the plaintiff no.1, the said LSC was directly mutated in the name of Plaintiff No. 2 from the name of Smt. RS. Lalsangzuali on 03.06.2011. That, when the said LSC was transferred in the name of Plaintiff No. 2, there was no suit pending involving the immovable property covered under LSC no.3 of 1980. 29. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed a suit against Smt. R.S Lalsangzuali and five others for declaration of title, ownership over the land covered under LSC no.3 of 1980 and for declaring the agreement dated 29.9.2007 as null and void. That, the suit was registered as Declaratory Suit No. 8 of 2010 – but was dismissed as per order IX Rule 3 CPC vide order dated 11.4.2011. 30. That, thereafter, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed another suit against Smt. RS Lalsangzuali and five others. The said suit was registered as Declaratory Suit No.5 of 2013 and the said suit was withdrawn by H. Lalhmingthangi (L) with the permission to file a fresh. 31. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed another suit, registered as Declaratory Suit No.25 of 2013. That, the said suit was also dismissed by the Honorable Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl District, Aizawl on 8.9.2016. 32. 31. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed another suit, registered as Declaratory Suit No.25 of 2013. That, the said suit was also dismissed by the Honorable Senior Civil Judge, Aizawl District, Aizawl on 8.9.2016. 32. That, the land covered under LSC no.Azl-3 of 1980 was registered in his name on 3.6.2011. As per the land records, he is the legal and rightful owner of the land and building covered under the LSC no.Azl-3 of 1980. That, as per the land laws applicable to the state of Mizoram, the said immovable property covered under LSC no.Azl-3 of 1980 is his property. 33. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) and her family members are staying within the land and building covered under LSC no.Azl-3 of 1980 without any authority without paying any rent. That, he was entitled to take vacant possession of the said land and building covered under LSC no.Azl-3 of 1980 based on title. 34. That, after the said land covered under LSC no.3 of 1980 was mutated in his name - he requested the defendant to give vacant possession of the land covered under the said LSC. But the defendant and her family did not vacate from the said land and building covered under LSC no.3 of 1980. That, H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed the Declaratory suit no.5 of 2013 but she withdrew the suit and the court dismissed the Declaratory suit no.5 of 2013 on 26.4.2013. That, after that H. Lalhmingthangi (L) filed the Declaratory suit no.25 of 2013 and the said suit was dismissed on 8.9.2016. That, thereafter, notice was issued to H. Lalhmingthangi (L) through counsel requesting her to quit and give vacant possession of the land and building covered under LSC No.3 of 1980 on or before 31st day of December 2016. That, as the defendant and her family members have not vacated from the suit land covered under the LSC No.3 of 1980 – the suit was filed. 35. That, he was entitled to rent arrears of rent as well as take possession of the property covered under LSC no. Azl-3 of 1980. 36. Mr. That, as the defendant and her family members have not vacated from the suit land covered under the LSC No.3 of 1980 – the suit was filed. 35. That, he was entitled to rent arrears of rent as well as take possession of the property covered under LSC no. Azl-3 of 1980. 36. Mr. Zoramchhana, the learned counsel for the appellant contends and submits that the document pertaining to the purported mortgage of the suit land was required to be registered under the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act 1908 and since it was not done so, therefore, it cannot be held to have validly conveyed the property. The learned counsel further submits that if that be so, then the subsequent sale of the property in favour of the respondents was null and void and could not have validly conveyed any property rights in their favour. In support of his contention, the learned counsel refers to the decision of this court in the case of Sanglura Sailo vs C. Lalrampari reported in (2013) 4 GLR 53. 37. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents, who were plaintiffs in the suit, contends and submits that no counterclaim was filed by the appellant defendant and they had also not challenged the documents of mutation. The learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the appellants are barred in law from taking a new plea in the Appellate Court. 38. In support of the same, the learned counsel for the respondents refers to the judgment of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Krishnapasuba Rao Kundapur Vs Dattatrava Krishnaji Karani reported in A.I.R 1966 SC 1024 and also a decision of this court in Vanlazuatavs H.K.L. Thanga 1993 (Supp.) GLR 10 39. The learned counsel for the respondents also cited the decision of this court in the case of Jagneswar Nath vs Jatra Mohan Sarkar reported in A.I.R 1980 GAU 23 40. With regard to the submission of the respondent side, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the issue of non-registered mortgage, non- conveying property is a question of law and it can be raised in any forum and that the decision cited by the respondent side would not come in the way of the appellant raising the said issue. DISCUSSION 41. DISCUSSION 41. I have carefully perused the appeal memo, the impugned judgment and order, the depositions available before the learned Trial Court and the exhibited documents. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel on both the sides and considered the decisions cited at the Bar. Points for determination 42. The following points for determination are formulated:- (i) Whether the mortgage by deposit of title deeds execution in favour of Lalsangzuali and involving forfeiture of the property in case of failure to return the loan – required registration? (ii) Whether absence of any such registration would fail to validly convey the property? (iii) Whether the learned Trial Court correctly held that the property was validly conveyed? 43. As per the materials and evidence, and also the undisputed position, the defendant’s, predecessor, mortgaged the property pertaining to LSC No. 3 of 1980 in favour of Lalsangzuali for taking a loan and it had the stipulation that, and it was agreed between the parties that if the defendant failed to pay the loan amount within the stipulated time, she will lose the property and accordingly, as the defendant could not repay the loan, she signed all the necessary papers to transfer the property pertaining to the same LSC in the name of Lalsangzuali. Subsequently, upon the property coming into her hands, R.S. Lalsangzuali sold the property to plaintiff No. 1 for Rs 4.7 lakhs. However, the money was paid by the plaintiff No. 2, and the property was directly mutated in the name of the plaintiff No. 2. 44. The appellant is contended that as the mortgage deed by deposit of title deeds was not registered, therefore, there was no valid transfer of property and accordingly, the subsequent transaction is also invalid and hence, the judgment and decree, which proceeded on the premise that the plaintiffs were the owner of the property was wrong in law and facts. To adjudicate this issue, a reference may be made to Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act and the said provision gainfully reproduced herein below:- “[59. Mortgage when to be by assurance where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards, a mortgage 10[other than a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds] can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses. Mortgage when to be by assurance where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees or upwards, a mortgage 10[other than a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds] can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witnesses. Where the principal money secured is less than one hundred rupees, a mortgage may be effected either by 11[a registered instrument] signed and attested as aforesaid, or (except in the case of a simple mortgage) by delivery of the property.” 45. Thus, it is clear that as per the statutory provision, mortgages whose value is more than Rs.100/- would require registration under the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act, but mortgages by deposit of title deeds would be an exception to the same. In other words, registration is not required with regard to mortgages by deposit of title deeds. However, what would be the situation regarding registration, if the said mortgage by deposit of title deeds creates rights and liabilities and extinguishment of property, as has been done in the instant case. 46. For this purpose, a reference may be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs Narvir Singh and Another reported in (2014) 1 SCC 105 . The relevant para 14.2 and 14.5 may be reproduced herein below:- “14.2 But the question is whether mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is required to be done by an instrument at all. In our opinion, it may be effected in specified town by the debtor delivering to his creditor documents of title to immoveable property with the intent to create a security thereon. No instrument is required to be drawn for this purpose. However, the parties may choose to have a memorandum prepared only showing deposit of the title-deeds. In such a case also registration is not required. But in a case in which the memorandum recorded in writing creates right, liability or extinguishes those, same requires registration. No instrument is required to be drawn for this purpose. However, the parties may choose to have a memorandum prepared only showing deposit of the title-deeds. In such a case also registration is not required. But in a case in which the memorandum recorded in writing creates right, liability or extinguishes those, same requires registration. 14.5 By way of abundant caution and at the cost of repetition we may, however, observe that when the borrower and the creditor choose to reduce the contract in writing and if such a document is the sole evidence of terms between them, the document shall form integral part of the transaction and same shall require registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act.” 47. Another decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court may be referred to as rendered in the case of A. B. Govardhan Vs P. Ragothaman reported in (2024) 10 SCC 613, Para 26 and 28 of the said judgment may be reproduced herein below:- “26. Requisites of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds (MDTD) are: (i) a debt; (ii) a deposit of title deeds; and (iii) an intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt. The existence of the first and third ingredients of the said requisites is not in dispute. The territorial restrictions contained in the said provision also does not stand as a bar in creating such a mortgage. The principal question, which, therefore, requires consideration is as to whether for satisfying the requirements of Section 58(/) TPA, it was necessary to deposit documents showing complete title or good title and whether all the documents of title to the property were required to be deposited. A fortiori the question which would arise for consideration is as to whether in all such cases, the property should have been acquired by reason of a registered document. Syndicate Bank v. Apnc Lid., (2007) 8 SCC 361 , relied on Under the Transfer of Property Act a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is one of the forms of mortgages where under there is a transfer of interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan. Therefore, such a mortgage of property takes effect against a mortgage deed subsequently executed and registered in respect of the same property. 28. Therefore, such a mortgage of property takes effect against a mortgage deed subsequently executed and registered in respect of the same property. 28. A mortgage by deposit of title deeds in terms of Section 58(f) TPA surely acknowledges the receipt and transfer of interest and, therefore, one may contend that its registration is compulsory. However, Section 59 TPA mandates that every mortgage other than a mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be effected only by a registered instrument. In the face of it, when the debtor deposits with the creditor title deeds of the property for the purpose of security, it becomes a mortgage in terms of Section 58() TPA and no registered instrument is required under TPA as in other classes of mortgage. The question is whether a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is required to be done by an instrument at all. It may be effected in a specified town by the debt or delivering to his creditor documents of title to immovable property with the intent to create a security thereon. No instrument is required to be drawn for this purpose. However, the parties may choose to have a memorandum prepared only showing deposit of the title deeds. In such a case also registration is not required. But in a case in which the memorandum recorded in writing creates rights, liabilities or extinguishes those, the same requires registration.” 48. In terms of the aforementioned law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that when the memorandum pertaining to creation of mortgages by deposit of title deeds creates rights, liabilities or extinguishes rights and liabilities, the same requires registration. It has also been held in A. B. Govardhan ( Supra ) that in case, the memorandum pertaining to mortgages by deposit of title deeds creates rights, liabilities or extinguishes those, the same would require registration. 49. The decision in Vanlalzuata (supra) relied upon by the respondent side would not, in my considered view, come to the aid of the respondents. 49. The decision in Vanlalzuata (supra) relied upon by the respondent side would not, in my considered view, come to the aid of the respondents. Rather, in paragraph-11 of the judgment, it has been stated that - a man, who has vested interest and in whom the legal title lies does not and cannot lose that title by mere laches or mere standing by or even saying that he has abandoned his right, unless there is something more, namely inducing any party by his words or conduct to believe the truth of that statement and to act upon it to his detriment. In my opinion, the decision in Jagneswar Nath (supra) also does not help the respondents. 50. On the touchstone of the case law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, when we come back to the facts of this case - it is found that - in the instant case, the mortgage had a stipulation that if the loan amount is unable to be returned by the mortgager within the specified time, then she would lose the rights to the property. In other words, the mortgage in the instant case - though a mortgage by deposit of title deeds – would be in the nature of extinguishment of the property rights of the mortgager in the event of her not being able to repay the loan. 51. The admitted position is that when the mortgagee, was unable to return the loan within that period, she was to lose the property and it is revealed that necessary papers were made for transfer of the property in the name of the mortgaging. However, there is no evidence to indicate that the mortgage memorandum between R.S. Lalsangzuali and the defendant was registered and since, it had a stipulation for extinguishment of the property rights of the defendant mortgager, it required registration. However, as there is no evidence regarding the registration of the mortgage memorandum, it could not have validly conveyed the property of the defendant to R.S. Lalsangzuali. 52. As already mentioned above, the property was subsequently sold by R.S. Lalsangzuali to petitioner plaintiff No.1, though the money was paid by plaintiff No.2 and the mutation of the property directly done in the name of the plaintiff No.2.There is also no evidence to indicate that the said sale deed was registered as required under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. 53. In the case of Sanglura Sailo Vs. C. Lalrampari (2012) SCC OnLine Gau 652 relied upon by the appellant, it has been stated in paragraph 17 thereof that a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered for valid conveyance of property. The relevant paragraph-26 and 27 may be reproduced herein below:- “26. In the case of Amar Singh (supra), Apex Court reiterated the settled law that mutation entries are only for the purpose of enabling the State to collect land revenue from the person in possession but it does not confer any title to the land. The title would be derived from an instrument executed by the owner in favour of an alience as per the Stamp Act and registered under the Registration Act. 27. In Bondar Singh (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held what under the law a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered before it can convey title to the vendee.” 54. In the aforesaid decision of this Court, reference has been made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of UP Vs Amar Singh , (1997) 1 SCC 734 on the subject and the relevant paragraph of the said decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court may be reproduced herein below:- 5. “……………………. It is settled law that mutation entries are only for the purpose of enabling the State to collect the land revenue from the person in possession but it does not confer any title to the land. The title would be derived from an instrument executed by the owner in favour of an alienee as per the Stamp Act and registered under the Registration Act. …………………………” Similarly, the relevant para of Bondar Singh v. Nihal Singh, (2003) 4 SCC 161 may be reproduced herein below: - 5. “……………………….. Under the law a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered before it can convey title to the vendee. However, legal position is clear law that a document like the sale deed in the present case, even though not admissible in evidence, can be looked into for collateral purposes. …………………………” 55. It is well settled that for a sale of property to convey the property in terms of the said sale, registration is essential. However, legal position is clear law that a document like the sale deed in the present case, even though not admissible in evidence, can be looked into for collateral purposes. …………………………” 55. It is well settled that for a sale of property to convey the property in terms of the said sale, registration is essential. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever that the subsequent sale of the land by R.S. Lalsangzuali to plaintiff No.1 was registered and hence, the sale of the property from R.S. Lalsangzuali to the plaintiff No.1 also did not validly convey any property and was void. 56. Thus, in terms of the law discussed above, the facts of the instant case reveal that both the property transactions - mortgage initially and sale subsequently - were void for lack of registration and did not convey any property. In fact, the original transaction of the mortgage itself was void due to its extinguishment of property rights of the defendant and lack of registration and therefore, the original transaction itself did not validly convey any property. Therefore, even without the aspect of the registration, the subsequent transaction of sale did not validly convey any property. 57. With regard to these contentions raised by the appellant side, the respondent plaintiffs have contended that these cannot be taken up in the appellate stage as these contentions were never taken up before. In support of its contentions, the respondent side has referred to the decision of Krishnapasuba Rao Kundapur (supra) . It is true that generally the plea which was not taken before the trial court cannot be taken before the Appellate Court. However, I find force in the contention of the appellant side that the issue being one of law - the said restriction would not bar taking of such a plea. That apart, when the original transactions itself did not constitute any valid transfer of property in terms of the laws applicable, it would be a travesty of justice to overlook that situation merely on the ground that the said plea has been taken before the Appellate Court. 58. Consequently, in the facts and circumstances and in the backdrop of the above discussion, there is no other option but to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 58. Consequently, in the facts and circumstances and in the backdrop of the above discussion, there is no other option but to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree dated 23.03.2023 passed by the learned Civil Judge No.3 (Senior Division) in Eviction Suit No.06/2017 - is hereby set aside and quashed. 59. The appellant defendant may produce a copy of this judgment and order before the revenue authorities and the revenue authorities may take steps to make the necessary corrections in the revenue records. 60. Draw up the appellate decree accordingly. 61. The original trial Court records may be returned along with a copy of this judgment and order. The instant Regular First Appeal stands allowed and disposed of on the aforesaid terms.