2026:JHHC:12010 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (C) No. 4158 of 2007 ------ Mangra Oraon, son of Late Dhurwa Oraon, resident of Village Patratu, Mahuatoli, P.O. and P.S. Chanho, District Ranchi .... .... …. Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand 2. The Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi 3. The Additional Collector, Ranchi 4. The Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation, Ranchi 5. Jatuwa Oraon, son of Late Jitu Oraon 6. Chandra Pal Oraon, son of Late Dharmu Oraon 7(a) Sajid Ali 7(b) Parwez Akhtar 7(c) Tanweer Akhtar All sons of Late Mohammed Ishaque, resident of Village Patratu, Mahuatoli, P.O. and P.S. Chanho, District Ranchi 8(a) Aburehan 8(b) Rizwan Ahmad 8(c) Md. Faizan 8(d) Md. Affan All sons of Late Anjum Ahsan, resident of Village Patratu, Mahuatoli, P.O. and P.S. Chanho, District Ranchi .... .... .... Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI For the Petitioner : Mr. Ayush Aditya, Advocate Mr. Akash Deep, Advocate Mr. Priyanka Dayal, Advocate For the Respondents-State : Mr. Prashant Kumar Rai, Advocate For the Respondent Nos.6, 7 & 8:Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Sr. Advocate ------ 09/23.04.2026 Heard Mr. Ayush Aditya, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. P.P.N. Roy, learned senior counsel for the respondent no.6 and legal heirs of respondent nos.7 and 8. 2. This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the revisional order dated 05.01.2007 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi in S.A.R. Revision No.140/1999 as also the appellate order dated 03.02.1999 passed by the learned Additional Collector, Ranchi in S.A.R. Appeal No.580/1996-97, whereby and whereunder the order of restoration dated 02.12.1996 passed by the Special Officer, Scheduled Area Regulation Ranchi in S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 / T.R. No.164/1994-95 was set aside and claim of restoration of lands under Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act has been disallowed. 2026:JHHC:12010 2 3. Mr. Ayush Aditya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submits that the lands comprised within different plots of R.S. Khata No.40 was recorded in the name of Mostt. Gandauri Orain @ Goindi Orain, widow of Late Bandhan Oraon, Khata No.40 comprising of 21 plots, having total area 8.59 acres. He further submits that the petitioner herein filed two separate restoration applications under Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. The same were registered as S.A.R. Case No.2/93-94 and S.A.R. Case No.3/93-94 respectively. He next submits that the two S.A.R. Cases in the chart provided at para 5 of the writ petition, the plots were the subject matter. The said chart is reproduced herein:- Case No. Plot Nos. Area in Acres Opposite Parties S.A.R. Case No.2/93-94 T.R. No.164/94-95 557 0.93 1. Dharmu Oraon, S/o Telko Oraon 2. Mangu Oraon, S/o Rudna Oraon 3. Shiv Oraon, S/o Hari Oraon 2232 0.85 18692477 1.34 2475 1.60 2478 0.17 24792480 0.13 2481 0.06 0.02 0.03 S.A.R. Case No.3/93-94 T.R. No.163/94-95 (9 Plots) Total 5.13 acres Mohammad Hanif S/o Gulam Ansari 2191 0.38 2307 0.66 2420 0.62 (3 Plots) Total 1.66 Acres 4. He next submits that claim for restoration was made by the petitioner on the ground that the recorded Raiyat died in the year 1978 leaving behind a son namely Dhurwa Oraon. Dhurwa Oraon died leaving behind two sons namely Gandura Oraon (petitioner) and Sukra Oraon. Accordingly, the petitioner claimed that he is legal heir of the recorded raiyat and there has been a violation of the provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and the respondents are liable under law to restore back the lands to the petitioner under the provisions of 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. The claim for restoration in S.A.R. Case No.2/93-94 was made against Dharmu Oraon, Mangru Oraon and Shiv Oraon. He submits that Dharmu Oraon, who 2026:JHHC:12010 3 was the opposite party no.1, filed a show cause contending inter alia that he has not violated any provision of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and the petitioner was not the heir of the recorded Raiyat. He has also contended that Gandauri Orain surrendered the lands and the ex-landlord has granted settlement of all the lands of Khata No.40 in favour of Md. Hanif and his minor nephews. It was further contended that the opposite party no.1 had purchased 93 decimals of lands of Plot No.557 by terms of registered sale deed dated 29.07.1978 from the settlee. In view of that, opposite party no.1- Dharmu Oraon claimed to be in possession as a purchaser by terms of registered sale deed dated 29.07.1978. Learned Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation, Ranchi allowed S.A.R. Case No.2/93-94 by order dated 02.12.1996. Dharmu Oraon alone preferred S.A.R. Appeal No.588/96-97 in which Dharmu Oraon claimed only 93 decimals of Plot No.557 of Khata No.40. He submits that the learned Appellate Court has been pleased to set aside the said S.A.R. case by order dated 03.02.1999, against that, the petitioner herein preferred revision before the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division which was registered as S.A.R. Revision No.140/1999 and the said revision was also dismissed by the judgement dated 15.01.2007. 5. With regard to merit of the case, Mr. Ayush Aditya has argued only one point that the opposite parties were three in number in S.A.R. Case No.2/93-94 and only Dharmu Oraon has preferred appeal and in view of that the appeal was required to be confined only for the area which Dharmu Oraon was claiming i.e. 0.93 acres in Plot No.557. Only on this ground, he submits that the impugned orders may kindly be set aside and to buttress his argument, he relied the case of Ittyavira Mathai Vs. Varkey Varkey & Another reported in 1963 SCC OnLine SC 200. Relying on the said judgment, he submits that the appeal was not preferred by other persons and learned courts have erred in passing the order and in view of that the order may kindly be set aside to that extent. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, Mr. Prashant Kumar Rai opposed the prayer and submits that two separate land restoration cases being S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 / T.R. No.164/1994-95 and S.A.R. Case No.3/1993-94 / T.R. No.163/1994-95 were filed in respect of land of Plot Nos.557 and 2232 in the light of the aforesaid chart was filed and S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 was allowed by the order dated 02.12.1996 2026:JHHC:12010 4 and the application for restoration of land in question in S.A.R. Case No.3/1993-94 was dismissed on contest by order dated 05.01.1996. He further submits that aggrieved with the order passed in S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94, one Dharmu Oraon son of Telko Oraon preferred appeal before Additional Collector, Ranchi which was registered as S.A.R. Appeal No.580-R-15/1996-97 / A.C. T.R. No.38-R-15 of 1997-98. The learned appellate authority heard the appeal in which legal heirs and successors of Md. Hanif namely Md. Ishaque and Md. Izrail made an intervener application on the ground that Md. Hanif was the original Raiyat and he was not made party in S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94, and another S.A.R. Case No.3/1993-94 filed by the petitioner was already dismissed and against that, till date the petitioner has not preferred any appeal and considering these aspects of the matter, the learned appellate authority allowed the intervener petition of the legal heirs and successors of Late Md. Hanif. He submits that in S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94, the petitioner herein has cleverly added the other plots of S.A.R. Case No.3/1993-94 in the same Khata. He submits that the learned appellate authority considering the period of limitation that the said S.A.R. was filed after 53 years, has been pleased to allow the appeal and against that the revision was preferred and the revisional authority has found that the petitioner claimed only three plots of R.S. Khata No.40 in S.A.R. Case No.03/1993-94, but added the other plots of this Khata under possession of Md. Hanif in S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 without making him a party. He has also held that the order in S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 was obtained behind the back of Md. Hanif whose sons are opposite party nos.2 and 3 in the revision. He submits that in this background, the revisional court also dismissed the revision of the petitioner. He submits that once fraud has been made upon the court, it can be brought in the knowledge of the court. The courts cannot be mute spectator, the learned courts have rightly exercised the power. There is no illegality in the impugned judgments by the appellate authority as well as by the revisional court. 7. Mr. P.P.N. Roy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.6 and legal heirs of respondent nos.7 and 8 also adopted the argument of Mr. Prashant Kumar Rai, learned counsel on behalf of State and has further added by drawing attention of the court to the revisional order of the Commissioner and submits that in para 12 of the said judgment, the learned Commissioner has elaborately given the reasons of dismissing the 2026:JHHC:12010 5 revision petition. He submits that once fraud is made upon the court, the learned courts have rightly passed the said order. He submits that in view of these facts, the writ petition may kindly be dismissed. 8. It is an admitted positon that the petitioner herein has filed two S.A.R. cases being S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 and S.A.R. Case No.3/1993-94 and subject matter of the plots of these two S.A.R. cases have already been noted hereinabove in the form of chart as in the argument of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Md. Hanif was the original settlee in S.A.R. Case No.3/1993-94 which was dismissed by the order dated 05.01.1996. Against that order, the petitioner herein has not preferred any appeal. S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 was allowed by the learned Special Officer by the order dated 02.12.1996 and the said order was tested before the learned appellate court in S.A.R. Case No.588/1996-97. In the said appeal, the legal heirs and successors of Md. Hanif have filed intervener petition alleging Md. Hanif or his legal heirs and successors have not been made party in S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 and the order has been obtained behind their back. Considering that aspect of the matter, the learned appellate authority has been pleased to allow the intervener petition. The appellate authority has further considered that the settlement was made in favour of Md. Hanif in the year 1940 by the registered deed of settlement and the S.A.R. case was filed in the year 1993-94 i.e. after 53 years of settlement. The fraudulent aspect has also been dealt by the appellate authority and thereafter, he has been pleased to allow the appeal and setting aside the order of the S.A.R. court i.e. order dated 02.12.1996. Against that the petitioner herein has preferred the revision before the Revisional Commissioner, South Chotanagpur being S.A.R. Revision No.140/1999. The learned Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division found that the petitioner claimed only 03 plots of R.S. Khata No.40 in S.A.R. Case No.3/1993-94 which was dismissed, but added the other plots of this Khata under possession of Md. Hanif in S.A.R. Case No.2/1993-94 without making him a party and further the said order was obtained behind the back of Md. Hanif, whose sons have been made party in the appeal. Gandauri Oraon, the recorded tenant of R.S. Khata No.40 died issueless and land of this Khata devolved to the land-lord under the provisions of Section 23 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. After such devolution, the land-lord was fully competent under law to settle the land with a new Raiyat and pursuant to 2026:JHHC:12010 6 that in the year 1940, the said land was settled by the registered settlement in favour of Md. Hanif and accordingly, Md. Hanif and his nephew, were coming in possession over all lands of R.S. Khata No.40 as properly settled Raiyats. The learned Commissioner has found that: - I. The petitioner claimed only three plots of R.S. Khata No. 40 in SAR Case no. 3/93-94 but added the other plots of this khata under the possession of Md. Hanif, in SAR Case No. 2/93-94 without making him a party. II. Order in SAR Case No. 2/93-94 was obtained behind the back of Md. Hanif whose sons are O.P. no. 2 & 3 here. III. Mosmat (widow) Gandauri Orain, the recorded tenant of R.S. Khata no. 40 died issueless and the lands of this Khata devolved to the land- lord under the provisions of section 23 of CNT Act. After such devolution the land-lord was fully competent under law to settle the lands with any new Raiyat. IV. Following the devolution of the lands of R.S. Khata no. 40, the lands in question were duly settled with the predecessors-in-interest of O.P.'s no. 2 & 3; such settlement, having been made through a registered deed, and being in accordance with section 44 of CNT Act was valid and legal. Accordingly Md. Hanif Miyan and his nephews (and later their successors-in-interest) had been coming in possession over all the lands of R.S. Khata no, 40 as properly settled Raiyats. V. Even in the genealogy prepared during the current survey operation, the recorded tenant of R.S. Khata no. 40 has been shown to have died issueless. VI. The petitioner has miserably failed in proving his claim of being the grand-son of Ganduri Orain. Since Gandauri Orain died issueless, the question of the petitioner being her descendent does not arise. VII. It is established from the R.S. records of right that the name of petitioner's grand-father was Goinda Oraon, but Gandauri Orain was wife of Bandhana Oraon. There is no evidence of Goinda Oraon (who was of Hanhat village) and Bandhana Oraon (who was of Pataratu village) being the same person, as asserted by the petitioner. There is no evidence to support this assertion of the petitioner. VIII. The petitioner has failed to come out with any cogent reason as to why he did not stake claim on all the plots under the possession of Md. Hanif in SAR Case No. 3/93-94. If the petitioner indeed was the descendent of the recorded tenant of R.S. Khata no. 40, he should have made a claim on all the plots of KHATA no. 40 under the possession of Md. Hanif in the same case. Filing two separate SAR cases and not making Md. Hanif a party in SAR Case No. 2/93-94 amounts to concealment and fraud on the part of the petitioner. IX. While only one plot (Plot No. 557) had been transferred to O.P. No. 1 through a registered deed by Md. Hanif and others, the petitioner's action of filing land restoration case only against O.P. no.1 while including other plots of Md. Hanif and others, without making them a party, amounts to an attempt to snatch an order from the court by keeping the court in dark about all the relevant facts fully known to the petitioner. X. Rent receipts have been issued regularly till date, to Md. Hanif Miyan in respect of the lands settled with him and under his possession. 2026:JHHC:12010 7 XI. The petitioner has failed to establish any violation of any of the provisions of CNT Act. The petitioner has also failed to prove any fraud in the settlement dated 9-2-1940 effected through the registered deed as mentioned earlier. XII. The learned lower court (Additional Collector, Ranchi) has rightly corrected the palpably erroneous order passed by the Special Officer in SAR Case No. 2/1993-94. The impugned order is in accordance with the principle enunciated in the ruling given in L.P.A. No. 47/1988 [1990(1) BLJ 124] of Ranchi Bench. 9. The law is well settled so far as the principle to issue of writ of certiorari is concerned as has been rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 477, wherein in para.7 it has been held as under: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168. 10. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., 2026:JHHC:12010 8 AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph no.21 as under: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” 11. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868, the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 12. In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443, in paragraph nos.66 and 67 it has been held as under: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a 2026:JHHC:12010 9 reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” 13. In the case of Thansingh vs. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 1419, Hon'ble Supreme Court hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. 14. Further, in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-17 as under: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi- judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference 2026:JHHC:12010 10 may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 15. In the case of General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695, it has been held that the writ of certiorari by the High Court can be implied if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the orders can be passed and set aside. 16. In the light of the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is crystal clear that the writ of certiorari can only be issued if the finding of the administrative authority in the capacity of quasi-judicial functionary is available in the order so as to adjudge the perversity for the purpose of exercising the power to writ of certiorari. Further, the ground to issue writ of certiorari is the lack of jurisdiction. 17. In the case of Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while considering the perversity, it has been held that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is said to be is rendered infirm in law. 18. Admittedly, after 53 years, the S.A.R. case has been instituted that too suppressing the fact and the limitation aspect is already set at rest in the light of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Jai Mangal Oraon vs. Mira Nayak (Smt) and Ors., reported in (2000) 5 SCC 141 and the fraudulent aspect has been considered in the case of Situ Sahu and Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors., reported in (2004) 4 JLJR 109 SC. 19. Further, it is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a writ court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the petitioner does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. That rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts 2026:JHHC:12010 11 are candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible. However, in the present writ petition, suppression of fact has not been made, suppression of facts have been made in S.A.R. court which has been corrected by the first appellate court and affirmed by the revisional authority. 20. The judgment relied by Mr. Ayush Aditya in the case of Ittyavira Mathai (supra) was on different issue and the facts as discussed hereinabove, were not involved in that case and even in the matter arising under the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and the power is conferred upon the Deputy Commissioner even suo moto initiates the proceeding for restoration if it comes in his knowledge that by the fraudulent mode, the land of the tribal has been transferred. 21. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, this Court finds that there is no illegality in the impugned orders and as such, the writ petition is hereby, dismissed. (Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Anit A.F.R. Uploaded 04.05.2026