JUDGMENT : YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER, J. The instant revision petition under Section 438 R/W Section 442 of the BNSS has been preferred by the petitioner who is the biological brother of the accused praying for quashing and setting aside the judgment dated 05.06.2025 passed in GR.75/2021 corresponding to Kohima Women P.S Case No.09/2021 by which the accused person was convicted under Section 354 A(1)(i) IPC and Section 8 of the POCSO Act by the Special Judge, POCSO Kohima. The petitioner is also challenging the sentence order dated 02.07.2025 passed by the Special Judge, POCSO, Kohima, Nagaland. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Alezo Kire as well as Mr. V. Zhimomi, learned P.P and Mr. Sentiyanger, Legal Aid counsel for the respondent No.2. 3. The case of the petitioner is that on 01.07.2021 an FIR was lodged at the Women P.S Kohima by the respondent No.2/mother of the victim to the effect that her daughter was molested and raped at AG colony by the accused person when she went for nature’s call at around 1.30 to 2.00 PM at AG colony Kohima. The Officer-in-Charge of the Women PS registered the case as Women P.S Case.NO.009/2021 u/s 354(A) (1)(i)/376 (2)(i) IPC R/w Sec 4/8 POCSO Act. Subsequently, a charge sheet dated 29.07.2021 was submitted against the accused under Section 354 A (1)(i)/376(3) R/w Section 4 /8 POCSO Act as it was alleged that the victim was also a minor. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses including the victim and upon completion of the trial the learned trial court found that no case was made out against the accused under Section 376 (2) and Section 4 POCSO Act, but the learned Special Judge vide impugned judgment and order dated 05.06.2025 convicted the accused under A(1)(i) and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment and also under Section 8 of the POCSO Act to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-(One thousand) and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 2 months, wherein the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Alezo Kire submits that the present revision petition is being preferred on the ground that Section 42 of the POCSO Act provides that a person cannot be made to suffer punishment both under the IPC as well as the POCSO Act. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Alezo Kire submits that the present revision petition is being preferred on the ground that Section 42 of the POCSO Act provides that a person cannot be made to suffer punishment both under the IPC as well as the POCSO Act. Contrary to the statutory provisions, the learned Special Judge had awarded punishment under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and also under Section 354A(1)(i) of the . 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the accused could not be made to suffer two punishments for a single act as the same is impermissible in law. Another ground taken by the petitioner is that the prosecution inspite of exhibiting the birth certificate of the victim never proved the contents of the birth certificate in accordance with law. The original birth certificate of the victim was produced and marked as Exhibit P-12 before the Special Court but no witness having authority or any public servant from the office which issued the birth certificate was examined to prove the birth certificate. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is a settled law that documents are not proved merely because they are exhibited. The prosecution has a duty to exhibit and prove the contents of such documents to establish the truthfulness of its contents. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during the course of the trial, the prosecution never proved the age of the victim as being below 18 years of age. As such, the victim could not have been treated as “child” as defined in Section 2 (d) of the POCSO Act. Consequently, no conviction and punishment under POCSO Act could have been awarded to the accused. It is further submitted that the birth certificate of the victim clearly indicates that it was issued on 07.05.2013 whereas the date of birth of the victim is shown as 16.08.2006. The inordinate delay in issuing the certificate has never been explained by the prosecution before the learned trial Court. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the reasoning given by the learned Special Judge accepting the DOB of the victim as 16.08.2006 is not a valid reasoning. The inordinate delay in issuing the certificate has never been explained by the prosecution before the learned trial Court. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the reasoning given by the learned Special Judge accepting the DOB of the victim as 16.08.2006 is not a valid reasoning. The learned Special Judge had simply stated that the victim deposed that she was born on 16.08.2006 and therefore it was proved that the victim was below 18 years at the time of the incident. The learned counsel states that only basing on the fact that the victim stated that she was born on 16.08.2006, it cannot be concluded that the victim was below 18 years of age as a child does not have intellectual capacity to remember his/her date of birth as well as the year in which she was born. More so when the deposition of the victim has not been supported by examining a witness competent to prove the birth certificate in accordance with law. 8. Another ground taken by the petitioner is that the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the Gauhati High Court has held that any entry made in any public or other official book or register or record is required to be proved by the public servant who had made the entry or by any other persons in performance of his duty, specially enjoined by law as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Learned Counsel places reliance on the case of Manirul Islam vs State of Assam & Anr; 2021(3)GLT 128 , where it was held that the birth certificate issued by the Health Department of the State Government is also a public record. In the aforementioned case, the prosecution had exhibited the birth certificate, however, the Court held that the same does not automatically absolve the prosecution from the requirement in law to establish the truthfulness of its contents. It was therefore, held that the prosecution has failed to show that the victim was below 18 years on the date of the occurrence. The learned counsel for the petitioner therefore states that judicial discipline required the learned trial Court to be bound by the decision of a higher Court placed before it. It was therefore, held that the prosecution has failed to show that the victim was below 18 years on the date of the occurrence. The learned counsel for the petitioner therefore states that judicial discipline required the learned trial Court to be bound by the decision of a higher Court placed before it. In spite of placing such decision before the trial Court, the learned trial Court failed to appreciate the decision rendered by the higher Court which was relied upon during the hearing. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the following authorities in support of his submissions:- 1. Rajak Mohammad vs State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2018) 9 SCC 248 . 2. East India Commercial Co.Lts Calcutta and Another vs Collector of Customs, Calcutta reported in 1962 SCC online SC 142. 3. Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd vs Prem Heavy Engineering Works(P) Ltd and Another reported in (1997) SCC 450 4. Pandhari vs Kachru Pawar in Criminal Appeal No.48 of 2021 of Bombay High Court 5. Bishal Lamgadey vs State of Sikkim reported in 2016 SCC online Sikk 32 10. Relying on the above authorities and the submissions made, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the conviction of the accused under the POCSO Act is perverse and cannot be sustained and prays that the impugned judgment dated 05.06.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge POCSO in GR 75/2021 as well as the sentence order dated 02.07.2025 may be quashed and set aside and the accused may be acquitted from the liabilities of the G.R Case 75/2021. 11. The learned P.P. Mr. V. Zhimomi appearing for the State respondents has submitted that as far as the punishment under the IPC as well as the POCSO Act is concerned, Section 42 of the POCSO Act being a statutory provision, the matter is left to the discretion of this Court. However, in respect of the birth certificate, the learned P.P. submits that the same has been issued by the competent authority i.e. the Department of Economics and Statistics of the government of Nagaland and such official record does not need to be proved by adducing further evidence. The learned P.P by referring to the deposition of the victim as PW-2 also submits that the witness is reliable and can be regarded a sterling witness. The testimony of the victim PW-2 is clear and without any discrepancies. The learned P.P by referring to the deposition of the victim as PW-2 also submits that the witness is reliable and can be regarded a sterling witness. The testimony of the victim PW-2 is clear and without any discrepancies. She has clearly deposed that she was born on 06.08.2006 and the same has not been rebutted in cross examination and therefore, the deposition of the victim can also be relied upon to prove the minority of the victim. 12. The learned P.P. further submits that a case under Section 8 of the POCSO Act has been proved beyond reasonable doubt through the deposition of the prosecution witnesses. He has therefore, prayed that the conviction under Section 8 of the POCSO Act may be upheld by this Court. 13. Mr. Sentiyanger, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2/informant has fairly submitted that Section 42 of the POCSO Act provides that a convict shall be liable for punishment only under the POCSO Act or under the IPC whichever is greater in degree. Therefore, as Section 8 of the POCSO Act provided for punishment of imprisonment for not less than 3 years which may extent to 5 years, whereas Section 354A (1)(i) provides for punishment which may extent to imprisonment for one year or with fine, the learned trial Court could have convicted the accused only under Section 8 of the POCSO. 14. The learned counsel Mr. Sentiyanger also submits that the birth certificate in the present case was not proved in accordance with law. However, the learned counsel by referring to the case of Vinod Katara vs State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2023) 15 SCC 210 prays that this Court may remand back the case to the learned Special Court to re-examine the authenticity and genuineness of the birth certificate, more so when the victim was born in the year 2006 but the birth certificate issued in the year 2013. He prays that the learned Special Court may be directed to examine a competent witness who would be able to testify regarding the genuineness of the birth certificate. The learned counsel further submits that alternatively, this Court can also direct the trial Court to refer the victim for ossification test or any other recognized method of age determination and thereafter pass any order on the basis of the report from the trial Court. 15. The learned counsel further submits that alternatively, this Court can also direct the trial Court to refer the victim for ossification test or any other recognized method of age determination and thereafter pass any order on the basis of the report from the trial Court. 15. I have examined the pleadings and the Trial Court Records and also perused the judgments relied upon by the petitioner and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 16. The present Revision petition raises two important issues relating to a criminal prosecution under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (the Act). The first issue raised is regarding the provision of Section 42 of the Act. The second is regarding the quality of proof required to determine the age of a victim. 17. As per Section 2 (d) of the POCSO Act, a ‘child’ means a person below the age of 18 years. Therefore, to attract the provisions of the POCSO Act, the age of the victim on the date of occurrence must be below 18 years. If the prosecution cannot prove the minority of the victim, in accordance with law, the case would not fall within the purview of the POCSO Act. Moreover, the age of the victim cannot be determined solely basing on the deposition of the victim. It requires strict corroborative documentary or medical evidence. The Court has to prioritize school records, birth certificate or ossification test as the unverified testimony of the victim is insufficient to prove minority and ensure the integrity of the trial. The allegation of sexual assault coupled with the proof of minority of the victim drags an accused to the rigors of the POCSO Act, 2012 which mandates a reverse burden of proof. Therefore, it is absolutely vital to prove the minority of the victim. 18. While the deposition of the victim is valuable, it must be supported by quality evidence regarding the age of the victim. The learned trial Court has to conduct a holistic assessment of all the evidence, placing high value on the documentary proof over verbal testimony to prevent wrongful conviction or acquittal specially where proof of age of the victim is concerned. 19. The learned trial Court has to conduct a holistic assessment of all the evidence, placing high value on the documentary proof over verbal testimony to prevent wrongful conviction or acquittal specially where proof of age of the victim is concerned. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jarnail Singh Vrs State of Haryana , (2013) 7 SCC 263 , while examining Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and protection of children) Rules 2007 held that: “23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12 (3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12 (3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12 (3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12 (3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12 (3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12 (3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12 (3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion”. 20. In the instant case there is no matriculation certificate as the victim had dropped out of school after studying up to class 5. The second option of production of date of birth entered in a School Register of the school first attended by the child has also not been produced by the prosecution. The third option is the birth certificate. This Court has perused the birth certificate which was produced during the trial. It is seen that there are two birth certificates in the records. Out of the two, one birth certificate is not legible and the other has been marked as Exhibit P-12. The birth certificate at Exhibit P-12 shows the date of birth of the victim as 16.08.2006 whereas the date of issue of the certificate is entered as 07.05.2013. The prosecution has not produced any witness to prove the birth certificate. The prosecution has also never explained the inordinate delay in the issuance of the birth certificate adequately before the trial Court. In such circumstances it was all the more necessary to examine a competent witness to prove the genuineness of the contents of the birth certificate. The learned trial Court has not given any finding as to how a birth certificate issued after 7 years can be relied upon without being proved in accordance with law. Such discrepancy leaves room for ample doubt regarding the authenticity of the birth certificate. When the birth certificate exhibited by the prosecution is doubtful as in the present case, the learned trial Court should have insisted on the prosecution to prove the same by examining a competent person from the Department of Economics and Statistics having authority to issue such certificate. Admissibility of a document is one thing, while proof of its contents is an altogether different aspect. Admissibility of a document is one thing, while proof of its contents is an altogether different aspect. In view of the anomaly appearing in the birth certificate it would be unsafe to rely upon it and conclude that the date of birth of the victim was 16.08.2006. Date of birth is a question of fact which must be cogently proved by leading evidence. The prosecution could have produced the Register of the Registrar of Births and Deaths to substantiate the entries made in the birth certificate. If the Register is therefore, produced and proved it would prove the authenticity of what is recorded in the birth certificate. This would prove that the contents of the birth certificate are the extract of the contents of the register maintained under the 1969 Act. The birth of a child would be known to the parents and therefore the evidence of the parents has been accepted as best evidence if it is supported by unimpeachable documents. Unfortunately in the present case the parents of the victim also did not depose about the date of birth of the victim. 21. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manirul Islam (supra), the birth certificate is a public record and Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act mandates that such public record is required to be proved by a public servant who had made entry in discharging of his official duty or by any other person in performance of his duty specially enjoined by law. In the present case, no such officer of the Economics and Statistics Department was summoned by the prosecution as a witness to prove the birth certificate. As stated earlier, the victim was allegedly born on 16.08.2006 but the birth certificate was issued on 07.05.2013, after a period of 7 years. As per Section 13 (3) of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969, any birth or death which has not been registered within one year of its occurrence can be registered only on an order made by the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area where birth or death has taken place, after verifying the correctness of the birth or death and on payment of prescribed fee. 22. The power of this Court in Revision is a supervisory power to correct patent illegalities, jurisdictional errors or perverse findings rather than a re-appreciation of evidence. 22. The power of this Court in Revision is a supervisory power to correct patent illegalities, jurisdictional errors or perverse findings rather than a re-appreciation of evidence. It is restricted to examining the legality, propriety or correctness of findings. This Court is of the view that the learned Special Court could not have held that the victim was a ‘child’ as the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was below 18 years of age. In the absence of evidence to prove that the victim was below 18 years of age, the provisions of the POCSO Act could not have been invoked and therefore, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 8 of the POCSO and such conviction is perverse. 23. The other issue to be considered by this court is the legality of the sentence imposed on the convict, in the light of Section 42 of the POCSO Act: “ Section 42 . Alternate punishment.— Where an act or omission constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and also under sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 370, 370A, 375, 376, [376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB], [376E, section 509 of the Indian Penal Code or section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000)], then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, the offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to punishment only under this Act or under the Indian Penal Code as provides for punishment which is greater in degree”. 24. A bare perusal of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, would make it clear that when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act then, the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied. A person may not be punished twice for the same set of actions of conduct or omission that collectively form an offence covered by two separate articles of law. Despite the fact that the law allows for a trial on an alternative charge for both offences, the punishment can only be given for one of them, the one that is more serious. Despite the fact that the law allows for a trial on an alternative charge for both offences, the punishment can only be given for one of them, the one that is more serious. The Supreme Court, in the case of Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh vrs The State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2025 INSC 335 , addressed crucial questions surrounding the sentencing of an individual convicted of committing a sexual assault. Central to the issues before the Court was whether the appellant could be convicted under both the and the POCSO Act. The Court found no error in convicting the appellant under Sections 376 (2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the as well as under Sections 3 /4 of the POCSO Act but held that in light of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, if the offense is punishable under both statutes, the punishment offering a greater degree remains applicable. 25. The learned trial Court in view of the provision of Section 42 of the POCSO Act could not have sentenced the accused under Section 8 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 354 A(1)(i) of the IPC . Be that as it may this Court has already held that the conviction under Section 8 of the POCSO Act is not tenable in law as the minority of the victim was not proved. Therefore, the discussion of applicability of Section 42 of POCSO Act is merely an academic exercise in respect of the instant case as the sentence had to be confined to A(1)(i) of the . 26. In the result, the present petition is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act is quashed and set aside. However, the conviction under Section 354 A(1)(i) of the IPC and the consequent sentence is upheld. It is hereby directed that the accused person Azhovi R.K shall be released upon serving out the sentence under A (1) (i) of the . 27. The petition stands disposed of. 28. Registry shall send back the Trial Court Records.