JUDGMENT : KARDAK ETE, J. Heard Ms. R. Wunchibeni Tsanglao, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. N. Mozhui, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 4 & 6; Mr. M. Longkumer, learned Government Advocate for the respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 5 and Mr. N. M. Konyak, learned counsel for the respondent No. 7. 2. By filing this Writ Petition, the Petitioner has challenged the Notification dated 05.03.2018 issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Nagaland, particularly Clause 3(a) thereof, whereby it is provided that in cases prior to 26.07.2005 and subsequent to the setting up of Administrative and Block Headquarters on freely donated land, where a specific written agreement exists providing for employment to the landowner, the claim of such landowner for employment shall be settled in terms of the said agreement. The Petitioner has also challenged the Minutes of the Meeting of the District Screening/Selection Committee, Wokha dated 17.05.2023, whereby the shortlisted Grade-IV candidates under the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Wokha, including the private Respondent No. 7 herein, were forwarded, as well as the consequential Appointment Order dated 05.12.2023. The Petitioner further prays for a direction to appoint him to the Grade-IV post of Chowkidar at Sub-Centre Aitepyong under the CMO, Wokha, in terms of the Agreement dated 22.05.1994, which stipulates preference for appointment on the basis of land ownership. 3. Briefly put, the case of the Petitioner is that he is the grandson of Shri Mhontsen Humtsoe, a landowner of the plot of land on which the Sub-Centre at Aitepyong, Lakhuti Village, Wokha, has been established. The Petitioner, being the grandson of the landowner, is seeking appointment to Grade-IV post in the Government Service. An agreement was executed on 22.05.1994 by the grandfather of the Petitioner with the Government of Nagaland, whereby land measuring 130 x 200 Ft., along with a residential quarter, was sold for a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs) with the condition that as and when any Grade-IV post becomes vacant in the said Sub-Centre/Dispensary, first preference would be given to the landowner. 4. The petitioner projected that the respondent authorities, without giving the due preference to the landowner, appointed the father of Respondent No. 7 of Lakhuti Village as Chowkidar at the Aitepyong Sub-Centre under the CMO, Wokha. 4. The petitioner projected that the respondent authorities, without giving the due preference to the landowner, appointed the father of Respondent No. 7 of Lakhuti Village as Chowkidar at the Aitepyong Sub-Centre under the CMO, Wokha. Later, in 1999, when another vacancy arose, then also one Shri A. Yentsao of the same village was appointed as Medical Attendant. 5. It is the contention of the petitioner that, since an agreement was executed stipulating for preference to the landowner for appointment to a Grade-IV post whenever a vacancy arises, the landowner ought to have been given preference for appointment to Grade-IV post. However, the respondent authorities have ignored the claim of the petitioner, time and again thereby violating the agreement dated 22.05.1994. In the meantime, other landowners from the same village were appointed to vacant Grade-IV posts. As on date, no member of the petitioner’s family has been appointed on the basis of land ownership, despite the clear terms of the agreement with the Government. The Village Council and the Head Gaon Burah of Lakhuti Village have certified that the petitioner’s grandfather is the sole landowner of the plot on which the present Sub-Centre at Aitepyong, Lakhuti Village, has been established. 6. The private respondent No. 7, by filing an application, applied for the post of Chowkidar on compassionate grounds due to the death of her father. Accordingly, the respondent authorities forwarded the applications for appointment to Grade-IV posts of 6 (six) Health Units under CMO, Wokha. In the list, the name of the petitioner appears at Serial No. 1. By Minutes of Meeting, dated 17.05.2023, the District Screening Committee examined and shortlisted the candidates and accordingly, 5 (five) candidates were recommended for appointment to the Grade-IV posts under CMO, Wokha, in which the name of the respondent No. 7 was placed at Serial No. 1. 7. It is contended that the respondent authorities, instead of considering the case of the petitioner for Grade-IV post on land ownership basis, forwarded the application of the private respondent No. 7 for appointment on compassionate ground. The Joint Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, vide communication dated 22.11.2023, conveyed the Government approval for appointment to the Grade-IV post. By an impugned appointment order dated 05.12.2023, the private respondent No. 7 along with 4 (four) other candidates were appointed to various Grade-IV posts. The Joint Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, vide communication dated 22.11.2023, conveyed the Government approval for appointment to the Grade-IV post. By an impugned appointment order dated 05.12.2023, the private respondent No. 7 along with 4 (four) other candidates were appointed to various Grade-IV posts. However, the petitioner was denied appointment on the basis of land ownership, in clear violation of the agreement dated 22.05.1994, as no preference was extended to him as land owner. It is contended that the post in which the respondent No. 7 was appointed, being the third vacancy post-agreement, ought to have been offered to the petitioner on land ownership basis. 8. It is contended that the appointment of the respondent No. 7 is in violation of the policy on compassionate appointments, which provides that appointments on compassionate grounds should not exceed 50% of the vacancies. The post to which the respondent No. 7 has appointed, being a post meant for land owner basis, makes the appointment not only contrary to the State policy on compassionate appointments but also violates the agreement entered into by the grandfather of the petitioner way back in the year 1994. 9. The petitioner filed WP(C) No. 78 of 2024 seeking consideration of his appointment on land ownership basis. However, during the hearing, it was observed that it would be necessary to challenge the policy under which appointments on land ownership basis are made, since the land of the grandfather of the petitioner was not freely donated. Accordingly, this petition has been filed challenging not only the appointment of private respondent No. 7 but also the notification dated 05.03.2018, which sets out the policy for appointment to Grade-IV posts under the Government of Nagaland on land ownership basis particularly, Clause 3(a). 10. Ms. R. Wunchibeni Tsanglao, learned counsel for the petitioner, while referring to Clause-3(a) of the notification dated 05.03.2018, as regards the land owners who have freely donated their land under a written agreement, submits that the notification fails to consider land owners whose land was acquired by the State on payment of certain consideration, with a written agreement stipulating that preference would be given for appointment to Grade- IV posts as the same is not in conformity with the principles of reason and relevance. 11. Ms. 11. Ms. Wunchibeni, learned counsel, submits that the respondent authorities have been applying a different yardstick for different land owners in the matter of appointment to Grade-IV posts on the basis of land ownership. For instance, in the Districts of Mokokchung and Wokha under the Department of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Office, land acquired for consideration in the year 1982 resulted in the land owners being granted contractual works along with appointments to Grade-IV posts. Therefore, it is evident that the State respondents have been appointing land owners who have provided land for government establishments and received consideration not only to Grade-IV posts but also awarding them contractual works, wherein written agreements were executed. 12. Ms. Wunchibeni, learned counsel submits that the agreement dated 22.05.1994, entered into in good faith by the State respondents with the petitioner’s grandfather, has been violated repeatedly by not giving preference for appointment to Grade-IV post to the land owner. The respondent authorities failure to consider the case of land owner whose land was acquired by the State for consideration, with a written agreement stipulating for giving preference for appointment to Grade-IV posts, is arbitrary, discriminatory and unreasonable and therefore violates Article 14 of the Constitution. 13. Ms. Wunchibeni, learned counsel submits that the State respondents, by deviating from their own policy and applying it in an inconsistent and arbitrary manner, have discriminated against the petitioner, as many land owners whose lands were acquired for consideration have been provided appointments to Grade-IV posts in terms of the agreement. This clearly shows that the policy itself has failed the test of fairness and reasonableness. She further submits that the appointment of the private respondent on compassionate ground, without following due procedure of law, has denied the petitioner his right to be appointed to a Grade-IV post in terms of the agreement. Therefore, the impugned appointment order dated 05.12.2023 may be set aside and quashed and a direction may be issued to consider and appoint the petitioner to the said post on land owner basis. The respondents may also be directed to modify Clause-3(a) of the notification dated 05.03.2018 with regard to the phrase “freely donated land”. 14. Ms. Wunchibeni, learned counsel, in support of her submissions, has placed reliance on the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court: (i). C. Cheriathan vs. P. Narayanan Embranthiri , reported in (2009) 2 SCC 673 (ii). The respondents may also be directed to modify Clause-3(a) of the notification dated 05.03.2018 with regard to the phrase “freely donated land”. 14. Ms. Wunchibeni, learned counsel, in support of her submissions, has placed reliance on the following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court: (i). C. Cheriathan vs. P. Narayanan Embranthiri , reported in (2009) 2 SCC 673 (ii). Bhagwat Sharan (Dead through legal representative) vs. Purushottam and Ors., reported in (2020) 6 SCC 387 (iii). Parisons Agrotech Private Limited and Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. , reported in (2015) 9 SCC 657 (iv). Sivanandan C.T & Ors. Vs. High Court of Kerala and Ors., reported in (2024) 3 SCC 799 15. Mr. N. Mozhui, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 4 & 6, submits that the petitioner, at his own convenience, has read Clause 3(a) of the notification to his benefit by challenging the policy for modification or alteration of the element of “freely donated land” in the said clause. He contends that the notification was framed not only for the petitioner but for the entire class of land owners who had donated their land free of cost to the Government for development purposes. The policy is in pursuance of the observation made by this Hon’ble Court for framing a policy for accommodation of land owners. The petitioner has assailed Clause 3(a) of the notification on the ground that there was a purported agreement between the petitioner’s late grandfather and the Government without any basis. The notification indicates that in other cases prior to 26.07.2005 and subsequent to the setting up of Administrative and Block Headquarters on freely donated land, where a specific written agreement exists providing for employment to the land owner, the claim of the land owners for employment should be settled in terms of such agreement. 16. Mr. N. Mozhui, learned counsel, submits that the claim for appointment on land ownership basis, based on the purported agreement dated 22.05.1994 does not arise, as there was no mutual agreement between the petitioner’s late grandfather and the Government for providing appointment. The purported agreement is, in fact, a self-declaration by the late grandfather of the petitioner, which was merely counter-signed by one Administrative Officer. Therefore, the petitioner does not have any locus standi to challenge the notification dated 05.03.2018. As such, the writ petition is not maintainable. 17. Mr. The purported agreement is, in fact, a self-declaration by the late grandfather of the petitioner, which was merely counter-signed by one Administrative Officer. Therefore, the petitioner does not have any locus standi to challenge the notification dated 05.03.2018. As such, the writ petition is not maintainable. 17. Mr. N. Mozhui, learned counsel, submits that in terms of the purported agreement dated 22.05.1994, it is clearly stated that a plot of land measuring 130 x 200 Ft., along with the residential quarter, was sold for a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs). In view of Clause 1(a) and 3(a) of the notification, the land has been outrightly purchased. Therefore, there is no question of appointment on land ownership basis, as such appointment can only be provided to land owners who have donated land freely. The respondent authorities are not parties to the said purported agreement, except for the counter-signature simply by the Administrative Officer. Therefore, it cannot be termed as an agreement and is at best a declaration by the grandfather of the petitioner. Since the land, along with the residential quarter, was sold to the Government by the late grandfather of the petitioner for a consideration of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs), no right accrues to the petitioner for appointment on land ownership basis and there is no question of modifying the said notification. 18. Mr. N. Mozhui, learned counsel, submits that regarding the appointment of respondent No. 7, her application was already under consideration prior to the issuance of the letter dated 06.05.2023 and therefore her name did not appear in the waiting list for compassionate appointment. In accordance with the Government Policy for appointment of indigenous inhabitants in a particular district, respondent No. 7 was considered for appointment on compassionate ground in the District of Wokha, as she is a resident of the Wokha District. He further submits that any appointment on land ownership basis must be made strictly in terms of the notification dated 05.03.2018 for the relevant class of land owners within the State of Nagaland. The petitioner, seeking personal benefit, has prayed for quashing of Clause 3 (a) of the notification or modification of the phrase “freely donated land” under Clause 3(a), without any valid grounds. The petitioner, seeking personal benefit, has prayed for quashing of Clause 3 (a) of the notification or modification of the phrase “freely donated land” under Clause 3(a), without any valid grounds. Therefore, apart from being not maintainable on the ground of locus standi, no case is made out by the petitioner on merit and as such, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 19. Mr. N. M. Konyak, learned counsel for respondent No. 7, while subscribing to the submissions of Mr. Mozhui, submits that it is no longer res integra that unless a policy decision adopted by the State is perverse, patently illegal, or irrational, the scope of judicial review is very limited and the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. Respondent No. 7 having been appointed on compassionate ground in accordance with the standing government policy, there is no illegality in such appointment. The petitioner, claiming appointment on land ownership basis, has no locus standi to challenge the appointment of respondent No. 7, as the appointment was made under the Office Memorandum dated 17.09.2015 on compassionate grounds. In the absence of any perversity, illegality, or irrationality on the part of the State, the policy decision cannot be questioned, much less the appointment of respondent No. 7, who was not appointed on land ownership basis. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 20. Due consideration has been extended to the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and I have also perused the materials available on record. 21. Essentially, the petitioner challenges the provision of Clause 3(a) of the notification dated 05.03.2018, issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, which is a State policy regarding appointments to Grade-IV posts under the Government of Nagaland on the basis of land ownership. The challenge is on the ground that the notification only provides for land freely donated with a written agreement and fails to take into account land acquired on payment of consideration with a written stipulation for granting preference for appointment to the land owner. The petitioner seeks appointment on land ownership basis in terms of the purported agreement dated 22.05.1994 executed by his grandfather, Shri Mhontsen Humtsoe and also challenges the appointment of respondent No. 7 on the ground that the post constitutes a vacancy meant for land ownership-based appointment, being the third post after the said agreement. 22. The petitioner seeks appointment on land ownership basis in terms of the purported agreement dated 22.05.1994 executed by his grandfather, Shri Mhontsen Humtsoe and also challenges the appointment of respondent No. 7 on the ground that the post constitutes a vacancy meant for land ownership-based appointment, being the third post after the said agreement. 22. The grandfather of the petitioner sold a plot of land at Aitepyong measuring 130 x 200 Ft. along with his residential quarter, to the Medical Department for a consideration of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs). The purported Agreement dated 22.05.1994 provides that the land and residential quarter were sold to the Government for the purpose of establishing a Dispensary, with a condition that if and when any Grade-IV post falls vacant in the Dispensary, first preference should be given to the land owner. 23. Careful reading of the purported Agreement clearly shows that the grandfather of the petitioner sold the land to the Government for the purpose of establishing a Dispensary for a consideration of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs), with a condition that as and when a Grade-IV post becomes vacant in the Dispensary, first preference should be given to the land owner. This reflects that, although it is styled as an Agreement, it is in fact a declaration by the grandfather of the petitioner, albeit with a condition that preference would be given to the land owner for appointment to the Grade-IV post as and when it falls vacant in the Dispensary. 24. An agreement is defined under Section 2 (e) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 to mean every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other. (b) provides that when a proposal is accepted, it becomes a promise, and an agreement is formed when one party makes a proposal and the other party accepts it and there is consideration. Thus, an agreement under the law is a promise or commitment given by one party to another. It includes an offer made by one person and accepted by another person. It consists of two or more parties and outlines their rights and obligations. There must be consideration for the agreement to be legally enforceable. It must also meet certain conditions, including the intention to create legal relations, the competence of the parties and the lawfulness of the subject matter. 25. It consists of two or more parties and outlines their rights and obligations. There must be consideration for the agreement to be legally enforceable. It must also meet certain conditions, including the intention to create legal relations, the competence of the parties and the lawfulness of the subject matter. 25. The aforesaid agreement was executed in the presence of three witnesses and countersigned by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Aitepyong. However, for a valid agreement, the State authorities must be a party and expressly agree to its terms. A document signed by only one party, even if witnessed and countersigned, can at best be treated as a declaration or evidence of the sale of the land. Since the claim of the petitioner is based on the purported agreement dated 22.05.1994, the petitioner must establish that a valid agreement exists between the parties. As noted above, the agreement claimed to have been entered into with the State respondents cannot be treated as a valid agreement; it is not an agreement at all, but at best a declaration and evidence of the sale of the land by the grandfather of the petitioner. Unless there is a valid agreement, it cannot be enforced under the law. Moreover, the grandfather of the petitioner sold the land for a consideration of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs), which amounts to an outright purchase by the Government. The mere one-sided stipulation by the grandfather for giving preference in appointment to a Grade-IV post, although countersigned by the Administrative Officer, does not confer any enforceable right on the petitioner. 26. The State of Nagaland has framed a policy with regard to appointment to Grade-IV posts under the Government on the basis of Land Ownership, which applies to land freely donated by Land Owners for the establishment of Administrative and Block Headquarters, where written or oral agreements exist providing employment to the Land Owner. On consideration of the intent and purpose of the policy, it is seen that the policy reflects a beneficial measure by the Welfare State in favour of Land Owners who have freely donated land for Government Establishments, including Administrative and Block Headquarters. Land Owners whose lands have been acquired for consideration or compensation would be entitled to claim parity with those who have freely donated land for public purposes, as those Land Owners are a class apart in the State. 27. Land Owners whose lands have been acquired for consideration or compensation would be entitled to claim parity with those who have freely donated land for public purposes, as those Land Owners are a class apart in the State. 27. To appreciate the matter, I deem it appropriate to refer to and consider the notification dated 05.03.2018, issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Nagaland, which is reproduced hereinbelow: GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND LAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Dated Kohima, the 5 March, 2018 NO.LR/6-181/LIT/2015: In pursuance of approval of the Cabinet vide O.M No. CAB-2/2013 Dt. 13.12.17, the Governor of Nagaland is pleased to notify the following policy with regard to appointments Grade-IV posts under the Government of Nagaland on landownership basis. 1(a) It has been laid down vide Notification No. LR/4-3/KOH/2003 dated 26.07.2005 that no land shall be acquired free of cost and all land shall be acquired on payment of full compensation as determined by law. No further condition for employment in service or contractual works should be entertained. Therefore, in case any Department has entered into any agreement with the landowners in deviation of the laid down policy on or after 26.07.2005, such agreement shall be treated as null and void. The Department concerned shall take necessary action accordingly to nullify such agreement. 1(b) In case the Department concerned is of the view the agreement should not be declared null and void, it shall refer it with relevant details giving justification to the Department of Land Revenue for examination and advice in consultation with P&AR and Justice & Law Departments and thereafter submit the matter for consideration and decision of the Cabinet. 2. Old cases where Administrative headquarters and Block headquarters were set up in various parts of the State on lands donated freely by individuals, villages or people of that area should not be reopened for compensation or for employment in consonance with the policy brought out vide Memorandum No. LR/2-135/76 dated 20.06.1977. 3(a) In other cases prior to 26.07.2005 and subsequent to setting up of Administrative and Block headquarters on freely donated land, where a specific written agreement exists providing for employment to the landowner, the claim of landowner for employment should be settled in terms of such agreement. 3(a) In other cases prior to 26.07.2005 and subsequent to setting up of Administrative and Block headquarters on freely donated land, where a specific written agreement exists providing for employment to the landowner, the claim of landowner for employment should be settled in terms of such agreement. 3(b) If there is any claim for providing employment as a result of oral agreement, the Department concerned shall refer the matter to the Deputy Commissioner of the District concerned who shall examine such claim carefully including whether any employment or any other facility including contract or supply order has been given in the past. Written statements from the witnesses, that is, Government officials of the concerned department and the District Administration and village functionaries present at the time of such oral agreement should be taken by the Deputy Commissioner. The recommendation of the Deputy Commissioner should be referred with relevant documents to the Department of Land Revenue for advice in such cases by the Department concerned. 3(c) It is also clarified that it is not the policy of the Government to provide employment to the landowner in perpetuity. The employment of landowner, if permitted by a verifiable and valid agreement, is limited to the person first appointed as landowner in Government service and does not entitle his descendents for further employment on his retirement from service. After the appointed landowner retires or vacates the post, the vacancy will be filled up through open advertisement in consonance with the existing policy giving equal opportunity to all applicants. Sd/- (Pankaj Kumar) IAS Chief Secretary” 28. Perusal of the above notification, inter alia, shows that by the earlier notification dated 26.07.2005, it was provided that no land shall be acquired free of cost, but only on payment of full compensation as per law and no further condition for employment in service or contractual work shall be entertained. Accordingly, any such agreement shall be treated as null and void. The old cases, where Administrative and Block Headquarters were set up on land donated freely, shall not be reopened for compensation or for employment, in consonance with the memorandum dated 20.06.1977. Accordingly, any such agreement shall be treated as null and void. The old cases, where Administrative and Block Headquarters were set up on land donated freely, shall not be reopened for compensation or for employment, in consonance with the memorandum dated 20.06.1977. In other cases, prior to 26.07.2005 and subsequent to the setting up of Administrative and Block Headquarters on freely donated land, where a specific written agreement exists providing for employment to the land owner, the claim of the land owner for employment shall be settled in terms of such agreement. The notification also reflects that no employment shall be granted to the land owner in perpetuity. 29. On careful consideration, it appears that the State has framed the policy rationally, with a view to compensate those who have donated their precious land free of cost for larger public interest for Government establishment and the setting up of Administrative and Block Headquarters in the State. The policy benefits deserving land owners who have sacrificed their land for the greater interest of the public. 30. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, the grandfather of the petitioner, having agreed to sell the land along with the residential quarter for a consideration of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs) and having accepted the same, although with a stipulation for preference for appointment to a Grade-IV post, cannot insist on modifying the clauses of the policy, particularly Clause 3(a), to include land sold on agreement, as the policy is intended for those landowners who have freely donated land for the greater interest of the State without any reward in return. Landowners who have freely donated their lands are a class apart, and the State, as the authority, is empowered to provide beneficial measures by way of a policy decision in consonance with law. There cannot be any policy of the State solely for the benefit of one individual; rather, State policy would be for the larger or greater populace of the State. 31. As regards the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in some districts landowners who sold their land to the Government were not only appointed to Grade-IV posts but also awarded contract works, I am afraid that the petitioner cannot claim any parity on the perceived misconception of the principle of equality. 31. As regards the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in some districts landowners who sold their land to the Government were not only appointed to Grade-IV posts but also awarded contract works, I am afraid that the petitioner cannot claim any parity on the perceived misconception of the principle of equality. Even if certain landowners have been granted appointments on the basis of land ownership and were also granted contracts after payment for the land, such instances would not be in accordance with the policy or the law, but appear to be isolated cases of irregularity or illegality committed by the State respondents. Thus, such a claim is also not acceptable, as Article 14 postulates positive equality and there is no concept of negative equality. 32. Now this Court would refer and consider the case laws relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. (a). The case of C. Cheriathan (supra) pertains to the interpretation of a deed, specifically whether it constitutes an absolute conveyance with a condition of repurchase or a mortgage with conditional sale. The respondent executed a deed of assignment in respect of his half share of the property for a consideration, with an option to repurchase. One V, by a deed of assignment, transferred her right, title, and interest in half of the property to the appellant, by which, according to him, he became the full owner. The appellant was subsequently granted a purchase certificate under the Kerala Land Reforms Act in 1978 for the entire property. The respondent did not take any steps to set aside the certificate for a considerable period and only in 1984 filed for redemption of mortgage and partition of his half share, alleging that the deed dated 27.10.1969 represented merely a loan transaction. The Trial Court held that the transaction constituted a sale. The First Appellate Court, however, held it to be a mortgage by conditional sale, as the respondent did not exercise his option to repurchase the property within the limitation period, thereby making the sale absolute. The High Court concluded that the document was a deed of mortgage and held that the suit for partition and redemption was maintainable. In that contextual facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “…12. A document, as is well known, must be read in its entirety. The High Court concluded that the document was a deed of mortgage and held that the suit for partition and redemption was maintainable. In that contextual facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “…12. A document, as is well known, must be read in its entirety. When character of a document is in question, although the heading thereof would not be conclusive, it plays a significant role. Intention of the parties must be gathered from the document itself but therefore circumstances attending thereto would also be relevant; particularly when the relationship between the parties is in question. For the said purpose, it is essential that all parts of the deed should be read in their entirety. 13. The deed in question is said to be a deed of sale. The source of title has been disclosed. What was sought to be conveyed thereby was the leasehold interest. Assignment was in respect of the vendor’s one half share in the property. Possession of the properties had been handed over. A stipulation was made therein that the vendor shall repurchase the same at his expenses within a period of three years from the date of execution thereof. He acknowledged receipt of sale consideration of Rs.2,000/- in cash. The vendor relinquished all his right over the scheduled property. However, the nature of assignment was sought to be clarified as the words “till the period is over” and “efflux of time and thereafter as an absolute sale” are used. It is significant that thereby the vendee in terms of the said instrument became entitled to attorn to the landlord by paying stipulated rent evidently as a tenant and not as a mortgagee. The vendor accepted that he would have no right to deal with the property in any manner. The reason why the original deed of sale had not been handed over was also explained. Declaration has been made that no encumbrances had been created in respect of the vendor’s share in the property.” (b). The case of Bhagwat Sharan (supra) has been relied upon to project that the parties cannot approbate and reprobate. The reason why the original deed of sale had not been handed over was also explained. Declaration has been made that no encumbrances had been created in respect of the vendor’s share in the property.” (b). The case of Bhagwat Sharan (supra) has been relied upon to project that the parties cannot approbate and reprobate. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that a party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold,” “play fast and loose,” or both “approbate and reprobate.” Where a party knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, conveyance, or an order, such party is estopped from denying the validity or binding effect of that contract, conveyance, or order. (c). In the case of Parisons Agrotech Private Limited (supra), the Central Government, by notifications dated 16.10.2007 and 24.12.2007, prohibited the import of palm oil through the Kochi Port in Kerala and through all ports in the State of Kerala, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 5 read with Section 3 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992. As a consequence, the appellants were restrained from importing crude palm oil through the ports of Kochi and Beypore and were compelled to import the raw materials through ports outside the State of Kerala. The said notifications were challenged on the ground that the provisions of read with of the Act did not confer such power upon the Central Government and were therefore ultra vires. The principal issue that arose for consideration was whether the Central Government possessed the requisite authority under read with of the Act to issue such notifications. In that context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “14. No doubt, the writ court has adequate power of judicial review in respect of such decisions. However, once it is found that there is sufficient material for taking a particular policy decision, bringing it within the four corners of Article 14 of the Constitution, power of judicial review would not extend to determine the correctness of such a policy decision or to indulge into the exercise of finding out whether there could be more appropriate or better alternatives. Once we find that parameters of Article 14 are satisfied; there was due application of mind in arriving at the decision which is backed by cogent material; the decision is not arbitrary or irrational and; it is taken in public interest, the Court has to respect such a decision of the Executive as the policy making is the domain of the Executive and the decision in question has passed the test of the judicial review. 15. In Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation, (2001) 8 SCC 491 , this Court delineated the aforesaid principle of judicial review in the following manner: “12. there is no doubt that this Court has held in more than one case that where the decision of the authority is in regard to the policy matter, this Court will not ordinarily interfere since these policy matters are taken based on expert knowledge of the persons concerned and courts are normally not equipped to question the correctness of a policy decision. But then this does not mean that the courts have to abdicate their right to scrutinise whether the policy in question is formulated keeping in mind all the relevant facts and the said policy can be held to be beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonableness, bearing in mind the material on record. Any decision be it a simple administrative decision or policy decision, if taken without considering the relevant facts, can only be termed as an arbitrary decision. If it is so, then be it a policy decision or otherwise, it will be violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.” (d). The case of Sivanandan C.T (supra) has been relied upon in support of the submissions of the petitioner with regard to the doctrine of legitimate expectation. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “…43. In Shyama Nandan Mishra, the Court also highlighted that regularity, predictability, certainty, and fairness are important facets of governance: "37. Taking a cue from above, where the substantive legitimate expectation is not ultra vires the power of the authority and the court is in a position to protect it, the State cannot be allowed to change course and belie the legitimate expectation of the respondents. Taking a cue from above, where the substantive legitimate expectation is not ultra vires the power of the authority and the court is in a position to protect it, the State cannot be allowed to change course and belie the legitimate expectation of the respondents. As is well known, regularity, predictability, certainty and fairness are necessary concomitants of Government's action and the Bihar Government in our opinion, failed to keep to their commitment by the impugned decision, which we find was rightly interdicted by the High Court." 33. On perusal of the above case laws, this Court finds that none of the cases advance the cause of the petitioner, as the observations and principles of law laid down therein arise from the specific contextual facts of those cases. In C. Cheriathan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the intention of the parties must be understood from the document as a whole, including attendant circumstances and that headings or labels alone are not conclusive. Even if a document is called a sale, the actual rights depend on its terms and execution. On this basis, the purported agreement relied upon by the petitioner cannot be treated as a valid agreement but only as a declaration evidencing the sale by his grandfather. The decision in Bhagwat Sharan (supra) held that a party accepting the benefits of a contract cannot later deny its validity; however, this principle is inapplicable here, as the petitioner never acquired any legally enforceable right under the purported agreement. The decision in Parisons Agrotech Private Limited (supra) establishes that Courts exercising judicial review over executive policy are limited to ensuring that the policy is rational, non-arbitrary, based on relevant material and within the framework of Article 14 and cannot question the correctness of the policy or explore alternative measures once these conditions are met. This principle does not aid the petitioner, as by the policy in question, there is reasonable and rational classification of land freely donated for public purposes and land sold for consideration and the claim of the petitioner falls outside its scope. Likewise, in Sivanandan C.T. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that legitimate expectation arises only from a clear, lawful and enforceable promise by the State. Mere hope, assumption, or a one-sided promise is not enough. While fairness, predictability and certainty are essential in governance, they cannot substitute a legally binding promise. Likewise, in Sivanandan C.T. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that legitimate expectation arises only from a clear, lawful and enforceable promise by the State. Mere hope, assumption, or a one-sided promise is not enough. While fairness, predictability and certainty are essential in governance, they cannot substitute a legally binding promise. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is a well-settled principle of law, but it cannot be pressed into service in every and sundry case. In the present case, the purported agreement dated 22.05.1994 by the petitioner’s grandfather did not create any enforceable right and expectation against the State. Thus, while this Court is in agreement with the observations and principles of law laid down in the aforesaid cases, finds the same to be not relevant to the facts and circumstances of the present matter. 34. Reverting back to the present case, as noted above, the purported agreement on which the petitioner has primarily based his claim for appointment to a Grade-IV post on land ownership basis cannot be construed as a valid agreement. Rather, it is merely a declaration made by the grandfather of the petitioner evidencing the sale of land to the Government for the establishment of a Medical Sub-Centre at Aitepyong for a consideration of Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs), albeit with a stipulation that preference may be given to the landowner for appointment to a Grade-IV post. Such a one-sided condition, however, cannot be enforced in law, as the document does not constitute a valid agreement between the parties. The policy of the State with regard to appointments to Grade-IV posts under the Government on a land ownership basis to landowners who have freely donated land for public purposes for the setting up of government establishments, including Administrative and Block Headquarters in the State, is a rational one and the petitioner cannot insist on being provided the same benefit by modifying or altering the element of land freely donated to include landowners who have sold their land for consideration. Thus, I find no ground to interfere with the notification dated 05.03.2018, a policy framed for the benefit of a class of persons in the State, which cannot be said to be arbitrary, discriminatory, unlawful, or unreasonable. 35. Thus, I find no ground to interfere with the notification dated 05.03.2018, a policy framed for the benefit of a class of persons in the State, which cannot be said to be arbitrary, discriminatory, unlawful, or unreasonable. 35. Regard being had to the appointment of respondent No. 7, it is apparent from the petitioner’s own statement that the appointment was made on compassionate grounds pursuant to a separate and distinct policy of the State, under which the petitioner has no claim. Accordingly, no interference is warranted. 36. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out any case either for interference with the Notification dated 05.03.2018 issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Nagaland or for consideration of appointment on a landowner basis, as well as in respect of the appointment of respondent No. 7 vide Appointment Order dated 05.12.2023. 37. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, no order as to cost(s).