1 2026:CGHC:20402-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1695 of 2025 1 - Praveen Chandrakar S/o Dharamraj Chandrakar Aged About 39 Years R/o Village And Post Bodtara (Khurd) Police, Station Pandatarai District - Kabirdham (C.G.) – 491559 2 - Dharamraj Chandrakar S/o Late Firanta Chandrakar Aged About 64 Years R/o Village And Post Bodtara (Khurd) Police, Station Pandatarai District - Kabirdham (C.G.) – 491559 3 - Meena Chandrakar W/o Dharamraj Candrakar Aged About 58 Years R/o Village And Post Bodtara (Khurd) Police, Station Pandatarai District - Kabirdham (C.G.) - 491559 ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Home Department, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Nawa Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Superintendent Of Police Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Station House Officer , Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.) 4 - Megha Rani Chandrakar W/o Praveen Chandrakar Aged About 39 Years R/o Flat No. 203, Block - 1a, Police Colony Amlidih, Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sumit Singh Rathore, Advocate For State For Respondent No. 4 : : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, Advocate SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.05.04 10:40:26 +0530 2 Division Bench: Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 01 .05.2026 1. Heard Mr. Sumit Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. S. S. Baghel learned Govt. Advocate, for the State/Respondent No. 1 to 3 and Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, learned counsel for Respondent No. 4/ complainant. 2. The present petition under Section 528 of BNSS has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer :- “It is, therefore, prayed that, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned chargesheet No.117/2024 filed on 06-12-2024 along with the order dated 25-02-2025 (along with the proceeding) passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur District Raipur (C.G) in Criminal Case No.2040/2025 (State of CG Vs Praveen Chandrakar and Others) arising out of the Crime/FIR No.70/2024 registered before the Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G) on 12-06-2024, in the interest of justice.” 3. The present case arises out of a matrimonial dispute between petitioner No.1 (husband) and respondent No.4 (wife), a head constable in the Chhattisgarh Police, who were married on 11.12.2020 and resided together for about one year. Thereafter, disputes arose, and the respondent began living separately from December 2021. On 28.02.2024, after a delay of about 2.5 years, respondent No.4 lodged a complaint at Mahila Thana, Raipur, alleging dowry demand, physical and mental harassment, leading to registration of FIR dated 12.06.2024 under Section 498A IPC initially against petitioner No.1, 3 and later, upon filing of charge sheet dated 06.01.2025, petitioner Nos.2 and 3 (in-laws) were also implicated along with addition of Sections 377 and 34 IPC. The petitioners contend that the allegations are vague, delayed, and motivated, arising out of financial and matrimonial disputes relating to property and monetary contributions, and assert misuse of legal provisions by respondent No.4, who allegedly pressured for divorce and threatened false implication, while also highlighting procedural lapses such as non-compliance of Section 41-A CrPC and absence of specific instances of alleged harassment in the complaint and charge sheet. 4. Learned counsel for the State, in his reply, would submit that the FIR in Crime No. 70/2024 was registered on the basis of a written complaint disclosing cognizable offences under Sections 498-A, 377 and 34 IPC, and upon due investigation, the involvement of the petitioners was found, culminating in filing of charge-sheet dated 06.12.2024. The learned Judicial Magistrate has rightly taken cognizance, and prima facie material exists on record including statements of the complainant and other witnesses corroborating allegations of cruelty, harassment, and unlawful conduct. It is settled law that inherent jurisdiction for quashing is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases where no offence is made out on the face of record; however, in the present case, disputed questions of fact and appreciation of evidence are involved, which can only be adjudicated during trial. The petitioners have an efficacious alternative remedy to raise all their defenses at the stage of framing of charge and during trial, and cannot seek pre-trial adjudication by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction. There is no procedural illegality, arbitrariness, or abuse of process demonstrated 4 warranting interference by this Court. Hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed in limine. 5. Learned counsel for the Respondent No. 4/ complainant, in his reply, would submit that the FIR and subsequent charge-sheet clearly disclose specific and serious allegations of cruelty, dowry demand, physical and mental harassment, and unnatural offences committed by the petitioners, which are duly supported by statements of the complainant and other witnesses recorded during investigation. The respondent No.4, despite making sincere efforts to preserve the matrimonial relationship, was subjected to continuous ill-treatment, coercion for money and property, and physical abuse, compelling her to lodge a complaint. The existence of a similar pattern of conduct in the petitioner’s previous marriage further substantiates the allegations. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering a petition for quashment, the defence of the accused cannot be examined and if a prima facie case is made out, the proceedings ought not to be interfered with. The learned trial Court has rightly taken cognizance based on sufficient material on record, and no case of abuse of process or legal infirmity is made out warranting interference under Section 528 of BNSS. Hence, the present petition deserves to be dismissed with costs. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated in the rejoinder, that the present criminal proceedings are the result of a false, fabricated, and motivated complaint, and the reply filed by the State as well as Respondent No.4 fails to address the specific grounds raised by the petitioners or produce any cogent material in support of the allegations. The petitioners contend that the mandatory procedural safeguards and 5 guidelines governing investigation in matrimonial disputes, including those issued by Police Headquarters, Chhattisgarh, have not been followed, and the charge-sheet is devoid of essential particulars such as specific dates, time, place, or credible evidence of alleged harassment or dowry demand. It is further submitted that the allegations are vague, contradictory, and materially inconsistent, particularly with respect to financial transactions, and are rooted in personal and monetary disputes rather than any criminal conduct. The petitioners have approached this Court with clean hands, having disclosed all relevant facts including prior matrimonial history, which has no bearing on the present case but has been unnecessarily dragged by Respondent No.4 to prejudice the proceedings. It is also contended that the complainant has misused legal provisions and her official position, and that the material on record, even if taken at face value, does not disclose the commission of offences alleged. Reliance is placed on settled legal principles and recent judicial pronouncements to submit that mere filing of a charge-sheet does not bar this Hon’ble Court from exercising its inherent jurisdiction where no prima facie case is made out and continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law. Hence, the petitioners pray that the charge- sheet and consequential proceedings be quashed in the interest of justice. 7. In support of his submission, he would rely upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Geeta Mehrotra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another 1 , Preeti Gupta and another v. State of Jharkhand and another 2 , Swapnil v. State of Madhya 1 (2012) 10 SCC 741 2 (2010) 7 SCC 667 6 Pradesh 3 , Rashmi Chopra v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another4 (Para-24), Rajesh Sharma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another 5 , Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam and others v. State of Bihar and others 6 and Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh 7 . 8. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the scope of interference in charge-sheet filed by the police against accused in extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS. 10. In the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others8, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the accused can approach the High Court either under Section 482 of the CrPC or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others9 laid down the principles of law relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the first information report and it has been held that such power can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In 3 (2014) 13 SCC 567 4 2019 SCC OnLine SC 620 5 (2018) 10 SCC 472 6 (2022) 6 SCC 599 7 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 8 (1998) 5 SCC 749 9 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 7 paragraph 102 of the report, their Lordships laid down the broad principles where such power under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised, which are as under: - "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order 8 of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which criminal proceeding is a instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 12. The principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) has been followed recently by the Supreme Court in the matters of Google India Private Limited v. Visaka Industries 10 , Ahmad Ali Quraishi and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another 11 and Dr Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar. v. State of Maharashtra and others 12 ". The 10 (2020) 4 SCC 162 11 (2020) 13 SCC 435 12 (2019) 18 SCC 191 9 Supreme Court in Google India Private Limited (supra), explained the scope of dictum of Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and "that too in the rarest of rare cases" as indicated in paragraph 103 therein of the report. 13. Having noticed the scope of interference by this Court in the petition relating to quashment of FIR/charge-sheet, reverting to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that in the impugned charge-sheet, four petitioners have been charged for offences under Sections 498-A/34 of the IPC. 14. Chapter XXA of the IPC deals with offence of cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Section 498A of the IPC defines the offence of cruelty as under:- "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty - Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 10 15. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show that in order to establish offence under Section 498A of the IPC, the prosecution must establish, (i) That, woman must be married: (ii) She has been subjected to cruelty or harassment and (iii) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by relative of her husband. 16. The word 'cruelty' within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC has been explained in Explanation appended to Section 498A of the IPC. It consists of two clauses namely clause (a) and clause (b). To attract Section 498A of the IPC, it must be established that cruelty or harassment to the wife to coerce her or cause bodily injury to herself or to commit suicide or the harassment was to compel her to fulfill illegal demand for dowry. It is not every type of harassment or cruelty that would attract Section 498A of the IPC. Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC contemplates harassment of woman to coerce or any relation of her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. The complainant if wants to come within the ambit of Explanation (b) to Section 498A of the IPC, she can succeed if it is proved that there was an unlawful demand by the husband or any of his relatives with respect to money or of some valuable security. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Priya Vrat Singh and others v. Shyam Ji Sahai 13 considered the issue of delay in lodging the complaint as well as role that has been ascribed to the accused therein and quashed the complaint holding the delay of two years in 13 (2008) 8 SCC 232 11 lodging FIR to be fatal and further held that no role has been ascribed to the petitioner/accused therein. It was observed as under:- "8. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time in December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been explained as to why for more than two years no action was taken. 9. Further, it appears that in the complaint petition. apart from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently married wife, husband's mother's sister, husband's brother in law and Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has been specifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and that too of a dowry demand in February 1993 when the complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It is to be noted that in spite of service of notice, none has appeared on behalf of Respondent No.1." 18. Similarly, in the matter of Sunder Babu and others v. State of Tamil Nadu 14 delay in filing complaint against accused therein was taken note of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court holding the case to be covered by Category Seven of para-102 highlighted in Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the prosecution for offence under Section 498A of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was quashed. 19. Similarly, in the matter of Geeta Mehrotra (supra), the Supreme Court held that casual reference to the family member of the husband in FIR as co-accused particularly when there is no specific allegation and complaint did not disclose their active involvement. It was held that cognizance of matter against them for offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 and 304- B of the IPC would not be justified as cognizance would result in abuse of judicial process. 14 (2009) 14 SCC 244 12 20. In the matter of K. Subba Rao and others v. State of Telangana represented by its Secretary, Department of Home and others 15 their Lordships of the Supreme Court delineated the duty of the criminal Courts while proceeding against relatives of victim's husband and held that the Court should be careful in proceeding against distant relatives in crime pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths and further held that relatives of husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations, unless specific instances of their involvement in offences are made out. 21. Recently, in the matter of Rashmi Chopra (supra) it has been held by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relying upon the principle of law laid down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) that criminal proceedings can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed and further held that judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment and the High Court should not hesitate in exercising the jurisdiction to quash the proceedings if the proceedings deserve to be quashed in line of parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and further held that in absence of specific allegation regarding anyone of the accused except common and general allegations against everyone, no offence under Section 498A IPC is made out and quashed the charges for offence under Section 498A of the IPC being covered by category seven as enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) by holding as under:- "24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A 15 (2018) 14 SCC 452 13 perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra. 25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. "they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of one crore" and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother's sister and husband of mother's sister have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants....." 22. Having noticed the legal position qua quashing the FIR and charge- sheet, the question would be whether taking the contents of the FIR and charge-sheet as it is, offence under Section 498-A/34 of the IPC is made out against the petitioners? 23. It is the case of the prosecution that the marriage of the complainant/respondent No.4 with petitioner No.1 was solemnized on 11/12/2020 as per Hindu rites and rituals, and thereafter she was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and his family members in connection with demand of dowry and other disputes. On 28/02/2024, the respondent No.4 lodged a written complaint before Mahila Thana, Raipur alleging physical, mental and economic 14 harassment, pursuant to which counselling proceedings were conducted but failed. Thereafter, on the basis of the said complaint, FIR bearing Crime No. 70/2024 was registered on 12/06/2024 at Police Station Mahila Thana, Raipur for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 377 and 34 of IPC against the petitioners. During investigation, statements of the complainant and other witnesses were recorded and allegations were found prima facie substantiated, and upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet No. 117/2024 dated 06/12/2024 was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, who took cognizance and registered Criminal Case No. 2040/2025 against the petitioners. 24. In the complaint so made, the complainant has only made omnibus and general allegations against the petitioners No. 2 and 3without being full particulars about date and place that all the petitioners No. 2 and 3 treated her with cruelty for not bringing sufficient dowry at the time of marriage. There is no specific allegation regarding petitioners No. 2 and 3 except common and general allegations against the petitioners No. 2 and 3 that they have demanded cash amount and household articles. However, there is specific allegation against the petitioner No. 1/ husband in the complaint made by complainant that petitioner No. 1 i.e. her husband was used to harass her and committed marpeet her for demand of dowry. An amount of Rs. 1,51,000/- has been transferred by her brother in the bank account of petitioner No. 1. There is specific allegation in the written complaint that her husband used to torture her when she conceived pregnancy and he used to purchase the property in his own name by sanctioning personal loan in her name. She also 15 got sanctioned a personal loan from SBI Bank, Mana, Raipur and UCO Bank and gave the cash amount to the petitioner No. 1. She also gave cash amount to her husband to purchase a plot in twin city but has purchased the plot in his own name. From perusal of the entire complaint made by her, there is specific allegation against the petitioner No. 1/ husband. 25. Considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, material available on record, perusing the FIR in which no specific allegations have been made and only bald and omnibus allegations have been made against the petitioners No. 2 and 3, we are of the considered opinion that prima-facie no offence under Section 498A/34 of the IPC is made out for prosecuting petitioner Nos. 2 to 3 for the above-stated offences and the prosecution against them for the aforesaid offence is covered by Category 1, 3 & 7 of para-102 of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) and as such, liable to be quashed. 26. As a fallout and consequence of the above-stated legal analysis and also in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Criminal Case No. 2040/2025 pending before the court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Raipur arising out of Crime No. 70 of 2024 registered at Police Station, Mahila Thana, Raipur, Dist- Raipur for the offence under Section 498- A/34 is hereby quashed to the extent of Petitioner No. 2 (Dharamraj Chandrakar), Petitioner No. 3 (Meena Chandrakar). The prosecution against her husband i.e. petitioner No. 1- Praveen Chandrakar, S/o Dharamraj Chandrakar shall continue. 16 27. It is made clear that all the observations made in this order are for the purpose of deciding the petition filed by the petitioners hereinabove and this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits of the matter and concerned trial Court will decide criminal case pending against Praveen Chandrakar strictly in accordance with law without being influenced by any of these observations made hereinabove. 28. The petition under Section 528 of BNSS is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika