1 2026:CGHC:20067 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 114 of 2026 1 - Cholamandalam Ms General Insurance Company Limited Second Floor, Simran Tower Behind L.I.C. Building Pandri Raipur Tehsil And District- Raipur (C.G.) ... Applicant versus 1 - Reshma Priyanka Toppo D/o Bonifas Toppo Aged About 35 Years Pondibahar Near Ganesh Chowk P.S. Civil Lines, Rampur Korba, Tehsil And District- Korba C.G. Claimant 2 - Bhaskar Devnath S/o Dr. K.C. Devnath Aged About 33 Years R/o Cic 2 64, M.P. Nagar P.S. Civil Line Rampur Korba Tehsil And District- Korba (C.G.) Driver/owner ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from CIS System) For Applciant : Mr. Swapnil Thawaney, Advocate Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 30/04/2026 1. The present civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the applicant/Insurance Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 Company calling in question the legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned order dated 12.02.2026 passed by the learned Second Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Korba (C.G.) in Claim Case No. 80/2025, whereby the application filed by the applicant under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. has been dismissed and the application preferred by the claimant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been allowed. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the claimant instituted a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 seeking compensation of Rs. 44,00,000/- on account of injuries sustained in a motor accident dated 12.05.2024. As per the claim petition, the accident occurred when the claimant, along with her brother, was travelling on a motorcycle and was hit by a Honda City car being driven rashly and negligently, resulting in grievous injuries. It is not in dispute that the claim petition was filed after a delay of approximately 14 months from the date of accident. Along with the claim petition, the claimant filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. Upon notice, the present applicant, who was respondent No. 2 before the Claims Tribunal, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. contending that the claim petition was barred by limitation in view of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, liable to be rejected at the threshold. The learned Claims Tribunal, however, by the 3 impugned order dated 12.02.2026, dismissed the application filed by the applicant under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and allowed the application for condonation of delay, observing that the issue of delay is a matter of evidence and that the respondents would have the liberty to raise such objections in their written statement during the course of trial. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present revision has been preferred. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the impugned order is contrary to law and suffers from material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. It is contended that Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act clearly stipulates that no application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is filed within six months from the date of occurrence of the accident. In the present case, the claim petition having been filed after a delay of about 14 months, the same was ex facie barred by limitation. It is further submitted that the learned Claims Tribunal has erred in invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as there is no provision under the Motor Vehicles Act empowering the Tribunal to condone delay in filing claim petitions under Section 166. It is argued that the Tribunal, being a statutory authority, cannot travel beyond the provisions of the statute. Learned counsel also submits that the application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the C.P.C. ought to have been allowed, as the claim petition, on the face of it, was barred by law. The failure of the Tribunal to reject 4 the claim petition at the threshold has resulted in grave prejudice to the applicant. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the applicant and perused the material available on record. 5. The primary issue that arises for consideration in the present revision is whether the learned Claims Tribunal committed any jurisdictional error or material irregularity in rejecting the application filed by the applicant under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and in proceeding to entertain the claim petition despite the delay. At the outset, it is to be noted that the issue relating to limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act and the power of the Claims Tribunal to condone delay has already been engaging consideration before various Courts, including the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In fact, in a batch of matters, including ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited v. Ayiti Navaneetha and others (Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 8412–8413/2023 and connected matters), wherein, vide order dated 04.11.2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has issued interim directions to the effect that claim petitions should not be dismissed solely on the ground of limitation at this stage. 6. This Court also, in a batch of civil revisions involving identical questions, has adopted a consistent view that while the issue of limitation remains under consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, a balanced approach is required to be adopted so as to safeguard the interests of both parties. 5 7. In the present case, the learned Claims Tribunal has not finally adjudicated upon the issue of limitation but has merely declined to reject the claim petition at the threshold and has permitted the matter to proceed for adjudication on merits. The Tribunal has also observed that the issue of delay can be considered at an appropriate stage upon appreciation of evidence. 8. In light of the interim directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the consistent view taken by this Court in similar matters, it cannot be said that the learned Claims Tribunal has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has committed any material irregularity warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. At the same time, the contention of the applicant with regard to limitation and maintainability cannot be brushed aside and deserves to be kept open for consideration at an appropriate stage. 9. Accordingly, while declining to interfere with the impugned order, it is directed that the learned Claims Tribunal shall proceed with the adjudication of the claim petition in accordance with law. However, no final award shall be passed by the Tribunal until the issue relating to limitation under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act is conclusively decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further clarified that all contentions of the parties, including those relating to limitation, jurisdiction, and applicability of the Limitation Act, are kept open to be urged before the Tribunal at the 6 appropriate stage, and the Tribunal shall decide the same independently, uninfluenced by any observations made herein. 10. Needless to say, in the event of any authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue, it shall be open to the parties to bring the same to the notice of the Tribunal, which shall thereafter proceed in accordance with law. 11. In view of the aforesaid, the civil revision stands disposed of. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Shayna Judge