[2026:RJ-JP:25806-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1181/2019 URN: CMA / 1801U / 2019 Vasudeo Sharma S/o Shri Poonam Chand Sharma, Aged About 58 Years, R/o Nath Kunj, Jodla Power House, Harmara, Jaipur. ----Appellant Versus 1. M/s Bharti Hexacom Ltd., Through Head Finance, K-21, Malviya Nagar, C-Scheme, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 2. Office of Shri Nanagram Sharma, R.H.J.S. (Retired) Sole Arbitrator, B-2, Shubham Tower, Shastri Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Nikhil Simlote For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ajit Maloo with Mr. Achyut Aggarwal (legal officer) HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order(Oral) 09/07/2026 Per: Arun Monga, J 1. Assailed herein is an order dated 17.01.2019 passed by the learned Commercial Court, whereby the cross-objections filed by both the parties against the award dated 06.12.2013 passed by the learned Arbitrator were dismissed. The appellant seeks quashing of the said order as well as modification of the arbitral award. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are that the Appellant filed a Statement of Claim, along with supporting documents, asserting that the parties had entered into a Licence Deed dated 19.10.2005 for a term of fifteen years. Under the Deed, the Appellant licensed approximately 530 square feet of rooftop space to the Respondent for the installation of a mobile tower, in consideration of a monthly licence fee of ₹5,900/-. 2.1 According to the Appellant, the Respondent failed to obtain and utilize a regular electricity connection for operating the mobile tower [2026:RJ-JP:25806-DB] (2 of 5) [CMA-1181/2019] and instead relied upon a diesel generator set, which gave rise to complaints from neighbouring residents as well as regulatory difficulties. The Appellant further alleged that the Respondent defaulted in payment of the agreed licence fee, whereupon a legal notice dated 18.08.2006 was issued demanding arrears for the period March 2006 to July 2006. 2.2. The Respondent, in turn, issued a notice dated 19.05.2007 terminating the Licence Deed and forwarded a cheque towards an alleged full and final settlement, which the Appellant repudiated by reply dated 29.05.2007. 2.3. The Appellant thereafter sought, inter alia, recovery of ₹13,03,305/- together with costs of arbitration. 2.4 The learned Sole Arbitrator framed twelve issues, and both parties led oral and documentary evidence. By award dated 06.12.2013, the Arbitrator partly allowed the claim, awarding the Appellant a sum of ₹5,31,000/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim, together with ₹1,02,450/- towards costs of arbitration. Aggrieved by the award, both parties filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the Act of 1996"). 2.5 By order dated 17.01.2019, the learned Commercial Court rejected the Appellant's objections, holding that the relief sought amounted, in substance, to modification or rectification of the arbitral award, a relief beyond the permissible scope of interference under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. 3. It is against the arbitral award and the said order of the Commercial Court that the Appellant has preferred the present appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that both the learned Arbitrator and the learned Commercial Court failed to consider the relevant submissions, documents, and the terms of the agreement [2026:RJ-JP:25806-DB] (3 of 5) [CMA-1181/2019] between the parties, and that the findings recorded suffer from a lack of proper appreciation of the evidence on record. 4.1 It is further submitted that the Respondent failed to comply with the approved plans for installation of the mobile tower, resulting in notices from the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA) raising safety concerns. It is contended that the courts below also failed to consider the Respondent's failure to obtain a regular electricity connection and its use of a defective DG set, which caused disturbance to the neighbours. 4.2 Learned counsel also contends that the learned Commercial Court erred in holding that the relief sought by the Appellant fell beyond the scope of Section 34 of the Act of 1996. 5. In the aforesaid backdrop, we have heard the rival contentions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. 6. At the outset, it is apposite to examine the reasoning that weighed with the learned Commercial Court while dismissing the cross- objections of both sides. The relevant portion of the order (in English translation) reads as under: "9. The grounds on which the award has been challenged by the objector are entirely based on facts. In the entire objection application, no such ground has been pleaded which falls within the ambit of any of the grounds mentioned under Section 34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In the objection applications submitted by both the parties, neither party has sought the relief of setting aside the impugned award. Through the objection application filed by the applicant Vasudev Sharma, only a prayer for modification of the award has been made. For deciding an objection application filed under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the Court does not possess the powers of interference which are available with an appellate court. If the party challenging the award suc- ceeds in establishing any of the grounds mentioned under Section 34(2) of the Act, 1996, the Court may set aside the award. Apart from setting aside the award, the Court has no power to grant any other relief. The Court can- not either enhance the award or reduce any claim which has been granted. The non-applicant Bharti Hexacom Ltd. has also not sought the relief of set- ting aside the impugned award. The objections filed by the applicant and the non-applicant, and the grounds raised therein, are all questions of fact [2026:RJ-JP:25806-DB] (4 of 5) [CMA-1181/2019] and evidence. The Court cannot examine the legality of the opinion ex- pressed by the Arbitrator on questions of fact and evidence. So far as the issue regarding the award being without reasons is concerned, the Arbitrator has considered the documentary and oral evidence produced by both the parties on each issue and has passed a reasoned award. No ground regarding the award being without reasons is found to exist. Along with the written submissions, documents marked as Annexure 1 to 7 have been submitted on behalf of Vasudev Sharma; however, for deciding the objection application, the Court can only rely upon the arbitral record. No documents produced by either party beyond the arbitral record can be taken into consideration. No such ground has been pleaded in the objection application, nor was any such ground argued during the course of arguments, and no such ground has emerged from the perusal of the record which falls within the scope of Section 34(2) of the Act, 1996. Although, in the objection application filed on behalf of applicant Vasudev, it has been alleged that the Arbitrator did not remain impartial during the arbitral proceedings, however, upon perusal of the entire arbitral proceed- ings and the impugned award, no such circumstance or fact has come to the notice of the Court, nor has the applicant produced any evidence which raises doubt regarding the impartiality of the arbitral proceedings. The parties have failed to establish any ground for setting aside the award passed by the Arbitrator. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the objection applications filed by the objectors are liable to be rejected." 7. A perusal of the impugned order inter alia reveals that the learned Commercial Court held, and, in our considered view, rightly so, i.e., that the objections filed by both parties did not disclose any ground falling within the contours of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 so as to warrant interference. Having so found, the learned Commercial Court dismissed the cross-objections, and we are in respectful agreement with that conclusion. 8. It is evident that the objections filed against the award rest primarily upon disputed questions of fact and alleged misappreciation of evidence. It is trite law that such grounds lie beyond the scope of Section 34, which confers only a supervisory jurisdiction upon the Court; the Court under Section 34 does not sit as a court of appeal in the strict sense. [2026:RJ-JP:25806-DB] (5 of 5) [CMA-1181/2019] 9. Furthermore, upon perusal of the impugned award, we find that the learned Commercial Court rightly observed that the award is well- reasoned and was rendered after due consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties. No sustainable allegation of bias, or of failure to consider material placed before the learned Arbitral Tribunal, has been made out. 10. As regards the additional documents (Annexures 1 to 7) sought to be placed on record before the learned Commercial Court, the Court acted well within its discretion in declining to consider them, since those documents did not form part of the record before the learned Arbitral Tribunal. It is settled that proceedings under Section 34 must be decided on the basis of the arbitral record alone. 11. On all counts, therefore, we find no ground for interference. 12. Before parting, we consider it apposite to add a caveat i.e. the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 is even narrower than the jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 34. This Court must, therefore, be all the more circumspect in exercising its appellate jurisdiction. 13. Re-appreciation of evidence under the guise of exercising power under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 is ordinarily impermissible, save in a fit case where interference is warranted on account of patent absurdity or perversity in the award leading to any legal misconduct. The present case discloses no such infirmity. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, and finding no ground for interference, the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs. 15. All pending application(s) also stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J (ARUN MONGA),J SOURAV/31