1 2026:CGHC:20382 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 173 of 2015 Vashistha S/o Late Dhawajaram Patel Aged About 66 Years R/o Village- Bodapali, Police Station And Tahsil Saraipali, Disttrict Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Tikaram And Anr. S/o Late Ishwar Prasad Patel Aged About 55 Years R/o Village- Bodapali, Police Station And Tahsil Saraipali, District And Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector, Mahasamund, District Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, District : Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant :Shri K.N. Singh, Advocate appears on behalf of Shri B.P. Sharma, Advocate For Respondent/State :Shri Atanu Ghosh, Dy. Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.05.04 10:30:50 +0530 2 01/05/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant/ plaintiff under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 19.02.2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Saraipali, District Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 02- A/14 (Tikaram v. Vashistha & Another), reversing the judgment and decree dated 02.11.2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class-I, Saraipali in Civil Suit No. 88-A/2009 (Vashistha v. Tikaram and Another), whereby the civil appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. The plaintiff has instituted the present civil suit against the defendants seeking declaration of title over land bearing Khasra No. 113, admeasuring 1.60 hectares, situated at Village Bodapali, P.H. No. 3, Tahsil Saraipali, District Mahasamund. In the alternative, the plaintiff has sought partition and separate possession of 2 acres 20 decimals out of the suit land (locally known as “Devmuda” field), along with a decree of permanent injunction. 3 3. It is an admitted fact that Defendant No. 1 is the nephew of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and the father of Defendant No. 1 namely; Late Ishwar were real brothers, and their father was late Dhwajaram. The suit land stands recorded in the revenue records in the name of Defendant No. 1. 4. (a) The case of the plaintiff, in brief, is that both parties belong to the Agharia community and are governed by Mitakshara Hindu Law. The suit land forms part of ancestral joint family property originally held by late Dhwajaram. The family remained joint until 1996, when an oral partition took place between the plaintiff and his brother late Ishwar. (b) It is contended that during the lifetime of Ishwar, for the purpose of obtaining agricultural loan facilities, the suit land (old Khasra No. 46/5) was temporarily recorded in the name of Defendant No. 1 under a family arrangement, though it continued to be joint family property. As per the alleged oral partition of 1996, out of the suit land, 2 acres 20 decimals (western portion with borewell) fell to the share of the plaintiff, and the remaining 1 acre 80 decimals (eastern portion with well and pump) fell to the share of Ishwar. The plaintiff further submits that he had filed an application for 4 partition of joint holdings before the Tahsildar, Saraipali, which was registered as Case No. 2-अ/27 (2004-05). By order dated 06.12.2005, the Tahsildar directed partition of other joint lands but excluded the suit land on the ground that it stood recorded exclusively in the name of Defendant No. 1. Aggrieved by such exclusion affecting his rights, the plaintiff has filed the suit seeking declaration as co-sharer and, alternatively, partition and permanent injunction. 5. (A) The Defendant No. 1 has denied the plaintiff’s claim and contended that the partition had already taken place prior to 1996. It is stated that the suit land has been recorded in his name since 1980 and he has been in exclusive possession since then, having also availed and repaid agricultural loans. It is further contended that the land was given to him under a valid family arrangement, and the plaintiff has no right, title, or interest therein. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff had earlier initiated partition proceedings, which were settled by a compromise dated 26.06.2006, wherein the suit land was expressly left in the exclusive share of Defendant No. 1. (B) The defendant also raises the plea of limitation, estoppel, and relinquishment, stating that the plaintiff cannot now 5 challenge a long-standing arrangement after more than two decades. It is further alleged that the plaintiff had earlier fabricated documents, and a criminal case under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 34 IPC is pending against him. 6. Defendant No. 2, being a formal party, has neither appeared nor filed any written statement and has been proceeded ex parte 7. After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff, holding that the the suit property is joint ancestral property and the alleged transfer in favour of the defendant is invalid for want of registration. Accordingly, both parties were declared entitled to equal shares, and the suit was partly decreed in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 02.11.10, the defendant preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, reversed the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court and allowed the appeal in favour of the defendant vide 6 impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal by the plaintiff. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the first appellate Court has committed serious errors of law and jurisdiction by denying equal share in the suit property despite recording a finding of partition of other properties, and by erroneously presuming exclusive title in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of an unregistered and unproved family settlement. It is further contended that the burden of proof has been wrongly shifted, and reliance on revenue entries or alleged compromise/consent documents neither duly proved nor admissible in law cannot divest the appellant of his lawful share. It is further submitted that the appellate Court has reversed the well-reasoned findings of the trial Court in disregard of settled principles governing appreciation of evidence and reversal of findings, thereby misapplying the law and rendering the impugned judgment unsustainable. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 7 10. In the present case, the learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, recorded a finding that the suit property bearing Khasra No. 113, admeasuring 1.60 hectares, is joint ancestral (shamil sharik) property of the plaintiff and the father of defendant No.1, which fact stood admitted by the defendant in his written statement. It was further held by the trial Court that although the parties pleaded a prior family arrangement/partition, the same was not proved in accordance with law insofar as the suit property is concerned. The document (Ex.P-1) relied upon by the plaintiff was found vague, incomplete and not specifically describing the suit property, while the defendant also failed to produce any valid registered instrument evidencing lawful transfer of the suit property in his favour. The Court observed that mere mutation entries and revenue records do not confer title, and in absence of a registered document as required under law, no valid title could pass to the defendant. 11. However, the learned First Appellate Court, on reappreciation of the entire evidence, has reversed the said finding by holding that the Trial Court misappreciated evidence and wrongly applied Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. It 8 found that the suit property stood in the name of defendant No.1 based on a family arrangement, which did not require registration, and the plaintiff failed to prove his claim of partition. Relying on the compromise document (Ex.D-1), it concluded that the defendant’s title stood established, and therefore set aside the Trial Court’s judgment and allowed the appeal. 12. A careful evaluation of the impugned judgment, this Court finds that the First Appellate Court has undertaken a proper and independent re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, as is permissible in a first appeal. The Appellate Court has rightly observed that the plaintiff himself admitted the ancestral nature of the property and also failed to produce any reliable and cogent document to establish that the suit property fell to his exclusive share in the alleged partition of the year 1996. The document (Ex.P-1) relied upon by the plaintiff was found vague, lacking material particulars such as khasra number and area, and therefore not worthy of reliance. 13. The Appellate Court has further held that the suit property stood recorded in the name of defendant No.1 since the year 9 1980 on the basis of a family arrangement. It rightly concluded that in the case of ancestral property, such family arrangements do not mandatorily require registration, and the Trial Court erred in applying Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act to discard the defendant’s claim. 14. Significantly, it is evident that the Trial Court failed to consider the material document Ex.D-1, which is a compromise/ consent deed dated 26.06.2006. The said document, duly supported by the testimony of defendant’s witnesses, clearly reflects that the plaintiff had consented to the continuance of the name of defendant No.1 over the suit property in the revenue records, thereby acknowledging his right. The Appellate Court has rightly taken this document into consideration and assigned due weight to it, whereas the omission on the part of the Trial Court to consider Ex.D-1 has resulted in an erroneous and incomplete appreciation of evidence. 15. The Appellate Court has also correctly held that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the suit property was recorded in the name of defendant No.1 merely for obtaining agricultural loan, which he failed to discharge. In absence of 10 such proof, and in light of the long-standing revenue entries coupled with the admitted consent of the plaintiff, the claim of the plaintiff was rightly disbelieved. 16. A careful analysis manifests that the First Appellate Court has correctly evaluated the evidence, giving due weightage to the admissions and the material facts, and has arrived at a conclusion consistent with law. The Appellate Court’s decision is based on proper appreciation of evidence and settled legal presumptions regarding the nature of transactions. The findings recorded by the learned First Appellate Court are just, proper, and based on a careful examination of evidence. The judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court do not suffer from any error, illegality, or perversity, and accordingly, there is no ground to interfere with the same under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 17. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly confined to examination of substantial questions of law. Even in a case where the First Appellate Court has reversed the findings recorded by the Trial Court, interference is permissible only when the findings of the First 11 Appellate Court are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, suffering from material irregularity, or involving a substantial error of law affecting the rights of the parties. Unless such infirmities are demonstrated, the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court are binding in Second Appeal. 18. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Findings of fact recorded by the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 19. In the present case, the learned First Appellate Court, after due appreciation of the pleadings and evidence available on record, recorded findings that the plaintiffs established their case. The Appellate Court has correctly evaluated the evidence and arrived at a conclusion consistent with law. 20. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to the findings of fact recorded by the First 12 Appellate Court. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless it is shown that the findings are perverse or based on misreading of evidence. 21. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court appears to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and it does not call for any interference. 22. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, resulting in upholding the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/shoaib