1 2026:CGHC:20401-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2047 of 2024 Dipesh Jitendra Thacker S/o Late Jitendra Thacker Aged About 40 Years R/o 503 Shri Laxmi Apartment Shastri Nagar West Thana Bank Mod District Dhanbad, Jharkhand, Pin - 826001 ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Home Affairs, Ministry At Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The Superintendent Of Police Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 3 - Station House Officer P.S. Rajnandgaon Kotwali, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) 4 - Ajay Ganatra S/o Late Navneet Lal Ganatra R/o Ward No. 30, Behind Patidar Bhawan, S.V. Patel Timber Market, Rajnandgaon, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rahul Jha, Advocate For State For Respondent No. 4 : : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy. G.A. Mr. Aditya Bhardwaj, Advocate SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.05.04 18:21:25 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 01-05-2026 1. Heard Mr. Rahul Jha, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State as well as Mr. Aditya Bharadwaj, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 4. 2. The petitioners have filed the present petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 with the following prayer(s):- “It is therefore most respectfully prayed that the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the instant petition and be pleased to quash the charge-sheet no.266/2024 filed in Crime No.128/2022 by Police Station Kotwali Rajnandgaon filed as ANNEXURE PA be quashed against the present applicant in the interest of justice.” 3. The present case arises out of a commercial dispute between the complainant (respondent no. 4), acting on behalf of Jalaram IT Solutions, and Wardwiz India Solutions Pvt. Ltd., wherein the complainant was appointed as a super-stockist for the State of Chhattisgarh under an agreement dated 01.09.2017. Pursuant to a scheme floated by the company, the complainant placed an order in May 2019 and made part payments; however, disputes 3 arose regarding alleged excess billing, non-supply and inferior quality of goods, and non-refund of the advance amount, leading to registration of FIR on 22.02.2022 against the directors of the company, including the present applicant. It is the case of the applicant that he had resigned from the directorship on 04.07.2019, prior to the main disputed transactions, and had no role thereafter; further, the material on record reflects that the actual dispute was limited to Rs. 25.80 lakhs, which amount has already been repaid by the company and acknowledged by the complainant. The dispute, essentially arising out of alleged breach of contractual obligations and governed by an arbitration clause, is thus civil in nature, though it has been given a criminal colour, and is presently pending as Criminal Case No. 3017/2024 before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner had admittedly resigned from the directorship of the company on 04.07.2019, much prior to the alleged cause of action, including the raising of the disputed bill dated 23.10.2019 and the alleged supply of inferior goods, and therefore had no role, control, or involvement in the transactions in question. The FIR, written complaint, and charge-sheet do not attribute any specific allegation, overt act, or incriminating material against the petitioner, and even as per the prosecution record, the complainant had paid only Rs.17.5 lakhs during the petitioner’s tenure, with the remaining dispute arising subsequently. The 4 materials further reflect continuous communication between the parties for amicable settlement, negating any dishonest intention or ingredients of cheating or fraud. It is also an admitted position that the actual dispute amount of Rs.25.80 lakhs has already been repaid by the company and acknowledged by the complainant, thereby rendering the dispute infructuous. Moreover, the agreement itself contains an arbitration clause providing an efficacious civil remedy, and the complaint has been filed by an entity not even party to the agreement. In such circumstances, continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner, in absence of any role or mens rea, would amount to gross abuse of the process of law, causing undue harassment, and thus warrants interference under Section 528 of BNSS/482 CrPC for quashment of the proceedings. 5. Learned counsel for the State would submit that the material collected during investigation, including statements of witnesses and documentary evidence, clearly discloses the commission of cognizable offence under Sections 420/34 IPC against the petitioner, and therefore, the learned Trial Court has rightly taken cognizance in accordance with law. It is a settled position that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases, and where the allegations prima facie constitute an offence, interference at this stage is unwarranted. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 (the complainant) submits the material placed on record clearly establishes the 5 active involvement of the applicant, Deepesh J. Thaker, in the commission of the alleged offence. It is an admitted position that the fraudulent transactions occurred during the period when the applicant was serving as a Director of M/s Wardwiz India Solutions Pvt. Ltd., and his subsequent resignation on 09.05.2019 does not absolve him of liability for acts committed during his tenure. The documentary evidence, including the ledger entries (Annexure R-4/2) and the note dated 16.03.2021 (Annexure R- 4/3), prima facie demonstrate that funds payable to the complainant were deliberately diverted to entities associated with the applicant, thereby constituting dishonest intention and fraudulent conduct from the inception. Further, despite partial payments made by co-accused, a substantial amount remains outstanding, which, as per records, is attributable to the present applicant, who has failed to discharge his liability. The contention that the dispute is purely civil in nature is untenable in light of the clear ingredients of cheating under Section 420 IPC being satisfied, including inducement, deception, and wrongful loss. Therefore, considering the gravity of the offence, the role of the applicant, and the supporting documentary evidence, no interference is warranted, and the present petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 8. A perusal of the First Information Report reveals that the 6 complainant, Ajay Ganatra, acting on behalf of his wife’s proprietorship firm Jalaram Infotech, has alleged that the accused persons, being Directors and officials of Wardwiz India Solutions Pvt. Ltd., induced the complainant to enter into a business arrangement by appointing the firm as a super stockist for the State of Chhattisgarh and further lured them through promotional schemes to place bulk orders of antivirus products upon advance payment. It is alleged that pursuant to such inducement, a substantial advance amount of approximately Rs. 40,60,786/- was paid in May 2019; however, thereafter, the accused persons raised inflated and inconsistent bills, supplied inferior or different products than agreed, and ultimately failed to deliver the ordered goods or refund the advance amount. The FIR further discloses allegations that despite repeated demands and personal visits, the accused neither honored their commitments nor returned the money, and instead, sold products to other parties in violation of the agreement, thereby causing wrongful loss to the complainant. It is also alleged that a cheque issued towards partial payment was dishonored, and that similar acts of cheating may have been committed with other parties as well. On these allegations, the complainant asserts that the accused persons, in furtherance of common intention, dishonestly induced payment and misappropriated the funds, thereby committing an offence punishable under Sections 420/34 IPC. 9. Upon perusal of the First Information Report and the material 7 placed on record, this Court finds that even if the entire contents of the FIR are taken at their face value, the allegations primarily disclose a dispute arising out of a commercial and contractual transaction between the parties. The FIR itself reflects that the grievance of the complainant pertains to alleged excess billing, non-supply or inferior quality of goods, and non-refund of advance amount, all of which are matters ordinarily falling within the realm of civil liability. Significantly, the FIR does not contain any specific or direct allegation attributing a distinct role, overt act, or fraudulent inducement on the part of the present petitioner, nor does it disclose that the petitioner had dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, which is an essential ingredient to constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC. The sequence of events narrated in the FIR further indicates that the dispute arose subsequently during the course of business dealings, and there were continuous communications and demands for settlement, thereby negating the element of mens rea. In such circumstances, the allegations, at best, make out a case of breach of contract and do not satisfy the ingredients of cheating. 10.At this juncture it would be apposite to refer the settled legal principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 laid down the categories of cases where criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed including the cases where 8 allegations do not prima facie constitute any offence or inherently improbable and it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 102 and 103 that - "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1)Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in 9 support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4)Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5)Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which criminal proceeding is a instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the 10 rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 11. In the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta and Another Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home and Another, (2019) 11 SCC 706 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 and 16 of its judgment that:- “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge-sheet is filed, petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [(2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [(2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR, when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge-sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima 11 facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not." 15. Even otherwise it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 CrPC and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 CrPC. Section 482 CrPC reads as follows:- “482. Saving of inherent powers of the High Court.— Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” 16. There is nothing in the words of this section which restricts the exercise of the power of the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513. Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 338 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 237] . Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced and the allegations have materialised into a charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of power of any court.” 12. Recently, in the case off “Anukul Singh Vs. State of UP and 12 Another”, 2025 SCC Online SC 2060, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- 17. This Court has, in a long line of decisions, deprecated the tendency to convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.17, it was held that criminal law cannot be used as a tool to settle scores in commercial or contractual matters, and that such misuse amounts to abuse of process. The following paragraphs from the decision are apposite: “9. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the 13 necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 10. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, 14 by applying pressure though criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 18. Similarly, in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal18, it was emphasized that criminal prosecution must not be permitted as an instrument of harassment or private vendetta. In Ganga Dhar Kalita v. State of Assam19, this Court again reiterated that criminal complaints in respect of property disputes of civil nature, filed solely to harass the accused or to exert pressure in civil litigation, constitute an abuse of process. 19. Most recently, in Shailesh Kumar Singh @ Shailesh R. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh20, this Court disapproved the practice of using criminal proceedings as a substitute for civil remedies, observing that money recovery cannot be enforced through criminal prosecution where the dispute is essentially civil. The Court cautioned High Courts not to direct settlements in such matters but to apply the settled principles in Bhajan Lal. The following paragraphs are relevant in this context: “9. What we have been able to understand is that there is an oral agreement between the parties. The Respondent No. 4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement and it may be that the appellant - herein owes a particular amount to be paid to the Respondent No. 4. However, the question is whether prima facie any offence of cheating could be said to have been committed by the appellant. 10. How many times the High Courts are to be reminded that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie on record to indicate that the intention of the accused was to cheat the complainant right from the inception. The plain 15 reading of the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality. 11. The entire case is squarely covered by a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of “Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh”, (2024) 10 SCC 690. In the said decision, the entire law as to what constitutes cheating and criminal breach of trust respectively has been exhaustively explained. It appears that this very decision was relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner before the High Court. However, instead of looking into the matter on its own merits, the High Court thought fit to direct the petitioner to go for mediation and that too by making payment of Rs. 25,00,000/- to the 4th respondent as a condition precedent. We fail to understand why the High Court should undertake such exercise. The High Court may either allow the petition saying that no offence is disclosed or may reject the petition saying that no case for quashing is made out. Why should the High Court make an attempt to help the complainant to recover the amount due and payable by the accused. It is for the Civil Court or Commercial Court as the case may be to look into in a suit that may be filed for recovery of money or in any other proceedings, be it under the Arbitration Act, 1996 or under the provisions of the IB Code, 2016. 12. Why the High Court was not able to understand that the entire dispute between the parties is of a civil nature. 13. We also enquired with the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 4 whether his client has filed any civil suit or has initiated any other 16 proceedings for recovery of the money. It appears that no civil suit has been filed for recovery of money till this date. Money cannot be recovered, more particularly, in a civil dispute between the parties by filing a First Information Report and seeking the help of the Police. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. 14. We could have said many things but we refrain from observing anything further. If the Respondent No. 4 has to recover a particular amount, he may file a civil suit or seek any other appropriate remedy available to him in law. He cannot be permitted to take recourse of criminal proceedings. 15. We are quite disturbed by the manner in which the High Court has passed the impugned order. The High Court first directed the appellant to pay Rs. 25,00,000/- to the Respondent No. 4 and thereafter directed him to appear before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre for the purpose of settlement. That's not what is expected of a High Court to do in a Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution or a miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing of FIR or any other criminal proceedings. What is expected of the High Court is to look into the averments and the allegations levelled in the FIR along with the other material on record, if any. The High Court seems to have forgotten the well-settled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in the “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal”, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335” 20. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, it is manifest that the dispute - concerning repayment of loan money and the alleged coercion in execution of 17 documents - is purely civil in character. The essential ingredients of cheating or forgery are not prima facie made out. The institution of multiple FIRs in quick succession, particularly after the appellant had already initiated lawful proceedings, reinforces the inference of mala fides. 21. The High Court, in refusing to quash the proceedings, misdirected itself in law by failing to apply the ratio laid down in Bhajan Lal, and the subsequent authorities referred to above, which uniformly hold that the machinery of criminal law cannot be permitted to be misused for settling civil disputes or to wreak vengeance. 13. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the considered opinion that continuation of criminal proceedings against the present petitioner, in absence of specific allegations and in light of the predominantly civil nature of the dispute, would amount to misuse of the criminal justice machinery. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be and hereby allowed, 14. The proceeding of Criminal Case No. 3017/2024 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajnandgaon under Section 420, 34 of the IPC arising out of Charge Sheet No. 266/2024, FIR of Crime No.128/2022 registered at Police Station Kotwali, Rajnandgaon are hereby quashed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika