1 2026:CGHC:18535-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 325 of 2026 1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary Department Of School Education Mahanadi Bhawan Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar, District- Raipur (C.G.) 2 - The District Education Officer Baikunthpur District- Koriya Chhattisgarh District- Koriya (Baikunthpur ) Chhattisgarh, 3 - Block Education Officer Chirmiri District- Koriya Chhattisgarh District- Koriya (Baikunthpur) Chhattisgarh 4 - The Commissioner Municipal Corporation Chirmiri District- Koriya Chhattisgarh District- Koriya (Baikunthpur) Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus 1 - Rajendra Prasad Patel S/o Ram Rangile Pate Aged About 47 Years R/o Ward No. 27, Ekta Nagar, Godaripara, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh.District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 2 - Chandan Kumar Dutta S/o Late Nitya Gopal Dutta Aged About 54 Years R/o Ward No. 16, Hospital Dafai, Haldibadi, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Smt Sharda Prajapati D/o Shiv Bilas Ram Aged About 56 Years R/o Ward No. 35, New Mines Quarter, Subhash Colony, Domanhill, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 4 - Bipul Chandra Bhaumik S/o Late Birendra Chandra Bhaumik Aged About 55 Years R/o Ward No. 10, Mahua Dafai, Haldibadi, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Digitally signed by BABLU RAJENDRA BHANARKAR Date: 2026.04.25 17:15:40 +0530 2 5 - Bharatlal Jaiswal S/o Jokhan Ram Jaiswal Aged About 50 Years R/o Ward No. 29, Mainroad, Badabazaar, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 6 - Pannalal Singh S/o Dheer Sai Aged About 56 Years R/o Ward No. 08, Mitwa Nagar, Koriya Colliery, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 7 - Sisiliya Minj W/o Walter Minj Aged About 55 Years R/o Ward No. 32, Near Odiya School, Godaripara Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 8 - Smt Rajkumari Khatik W/o Chhote Lal Khatik Aged About 60 Years R/o Ward No. 30, Chip House, Infront Of Durga Pandal, Godaripara, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 9 - Smt Shail Kumari Pal W/o Shri Heeralal Pal Aged About 56 Years R/o Ward No. 33, B - Typed, Godaripara, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 10 – Smt. Rejina Tirkey W/o Jagdish Kujur Aged About 53 Years R/o Ward No. 24, Mines Quarter, Bartuga, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh 11 - Shambhunath Singh S/o Late Kishori Singh Aged About 53 Years R/o Ward No. 07, Bang Samiti, Koriya Colliery, Chirmiri, District Koriya Chhattisgarh., District Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellants : Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General For Respondents : Mr.Sanjeev Verma, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 23.04.2026 1. Heard Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General for the 3 appellants as well as Mr.Sanjeev Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This writ appeal is presented against the order dated 17.02.2026 (Rajendra Prasad Patel ane others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others) and other connected matters passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.777 of 2021, whereby, the writ petition filed by the respondents herein / writ petitioners therein was disposed of by the learned Single Judge. 3. The case of the writ petitioners before the learned Single Judge is that the writ petitioners were initially appointed during the years 1998–1999 as Shikshakarmis under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shikshakarmi (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997. Their appointments were made through the prescribed process and against sanctioned posts under the Panchayat framework, and from the very inception, the writ petitioners continuously discharged teaching and allied educational responsibilities in government-run institutions. 4. Upon rendering long and uninterrupted service, the services of the writ petitioners were subsequently regularised strictly in accordance with the applicable statutory rules, Government resolutions, and executive instructions in force from time to time. Consequent upon such regularisation, the writ petitioners were absorbed into the School Education Department of the State 4 Government, thereby bringing them within the fold of regular government service. 5. After absorption, the writ petitioners continued to serve in regular, pensionable establishments under the direct administrative, financial, and disciplinary control of the State Government, and their service conditions thereafter were governed by the relevant service rules applicable to government employees, including those relating to pay scales, service benefits, and retiral entitlements. Despite such absorption and continued service in pensionable posts, the period rendered by the writ petitioners as Shikshakarmis has not been accorded due recognition for the purposes of pensionary benefits. 6. The dispute giving rise to the batch of writ petitions originates from an administrative order dated 16.02.2021, passed by the Under Secretary, School Education Department, whereby certain representations pertaining to pensionary status were rejected. The said order was stated to have been issued in purported compliance of earlier directions of this Court. The writ petitioners contend that the said order reflects absence of a clear, uniform and settled executive position governing the applicability of the pension regime to employees whose service commenced prior to the introduction of the New Pension Scheme but whose regularisation and absorption occurred thereafter. 7. During the pendency of the writ petitions, the State Government 5 issued Gazette Notifications dated 11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023 reinstating the Old Pension Scheme and prescribing an option mechanism for employees governed by the New Pension Scheme. However, according to the writ petitioners, despite restoration of the Old Pension Scheme, the State has not clarified the determinative date of appointment for pensionary purposes, resulting in continued ambiguity as to whether the relevant date is the date of initial engagement, regularisation, confirmation or absorption. It is this continuing uncertainty and lack of a definitive policy determination that has necessitated the filing of the batch of writ petitions. 8. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has disposed of a batch of writ petitions by observing as under:- “45. In the considered view of this Court, the ends of justice would be best served not by issuing a mandamus either granting or denying pensionary benefits, but by requiring the respondent-State to undertake a comprehensive and reasoned reconsideration of the determinative date of appointment for pensionary purposes in respect of employees whose service commenced as Shikshakarmis and later culminated in absorption into regular government service. Such reconsideration must necessarily take into account the continuity of service, nature of duties performed, source of salary, administrative control, and the constitutional mandate of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 6 46. It is, therefore, clarified in unequivocal terms that this Court does not strike down or modify the existing policy, nor does it direct extension of any specific pensionary benefit. The formulation or amendment of policy remains within the exclusive prerogative of the State Government. However, any policy decision so taken must be clear, unambiguous, uniformly applicable and constitutionally compliant, so as to obviate further litigation and ensure predictability in service administration. 47. The State Government is accordingly expected to take a conscious, reasoned and categorical decision on the issue, including the question as to whether and to what extent the service rendered by the petitioners as Shikshakarmis prior to absorption in the School Education Department merits consideration for pensionary purposes, including the requirement of completion of ten years of qualifying service from 01.07.2018. Such decision shall be finalized and communicated via a speaking order within a strict period of 120 days from the date of receipt of this order. It is expected that authorities would consider the observations made herein above. 48. Needless to observe that any such decision shall be informed by relevant considerations, shall eschew arbitrariness, and shall conform to the constitutional guarantees of fairness, non- discrimination, and proportionality. 49. With the aforesaid observations/directions, all 7 these writ petitions are disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.” Being aggrieved by the same, the appellants/State have filed this writ appeal. 9. Learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellants/State submits that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is legally unsustainable. It is contended that an issue which had already attained finality was impermissibly sought to be reopened by issuance of a direction founded merely on sympathetic considerations, directing reconsideration of the respondents’ case. It is further submitted that the vital aspect of unexplained delay and laches, which goes to the root of the matter and which stood specifically pleaded and elucidated in the affidavit of the Secretary, Department of Finance, has neither been adverted to nor adjudicated upon by the learned Single Judge, thereby resulting in a grave error of law. 10. Elaborating the aforesaid submission, it is urged that the law is well settled that stale and time-barred claims ought not to be revived under the guise of directing “consideration” of representations. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, wherein it has been categorically held that belated representations pertaining to “dead” or “stale” issues ought not to be entertained and that compliance with a 8 court’s direction to consider such representation does not furnish a fresh cause of action. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraphs 15 and 16, has clearly laid down that limitation, delay and laches are to be examined with reference to the original cause of action and not from the date of decision rendered pursuant to a judicial direction. It is further submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has cautioned that courts and tribunals, before issuing directions for “consideration” of a claim, must first satisfy themselves whether the issue is a live one or stands concluded. In cases involving stale or dead claims, the matter ought to be given a quietus rather than being reopened. 11. Learned Deputy Advocate General submits that the direction contained in paragraph 47 of the impugned order is directly in the teeth of the law laid down in M.K. Sarkar (supra), which has recently been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalita, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 916. It is further contended that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Mahendra Prasad Agrawal v. Arvind Kumar Singh [SLP (C) No.17141/2025 decided on 10.02.2026], has deprecated the practice of so-called “consideration jurisprudence”. In paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said judgment, it has been observed that routinely directing consideration of claims, without adjudicating their merits, is counterproductive and legally unsound. It has been emphasized that where a claim deserves to be allowed, appropriate relief ought to be granted forthwith, and where it does 9 not, the same ought to be rejected. Applying the aforesaid principles, it is submitted that despite recording that the respondents’ claims had already been conclusively rejected by the order dated 16.02.2021, and further explained in detail in the affidavit of the Secretary, Department of Finance, the learned Single Judge nevertheless proceeded to direct reconsideration of a closed issue, thereby committing a manifest error of law. 12. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submits that the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Har Narayan Yadav v. Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission and another (WA No.215 of 2017), decided on 07.01.2019 continues to hold the field and remains binding. It was neither the case of the respondents before the learned Single Judge that the said judgment has been set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, nor that it has been overruled by a larger Bench. In such circumstances, it is contended that the principles of judicial discipline, as expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673, were clearly attracted. It has been authoritatively held therein that a Bench of lesser strength cannot take a view contrary to that of a Bench of greater strength, and in case of disagreement, the only permissible course is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Single Judge could not have taken a view contrary to the binding Division Bench judgment of this Court in Har Narayan 10 Yadav (supra) and the directions issued in paragraph 47 of the impugned order are thus ex facie erroneous and contrary to settled principles of law. 13. Learned Deputy Advocate General also submits that, in light of the law laid down in Har Narayan Yadav (supra), members of Panchayat and local bodies were not treated as Government servants. Accordingly, the absorption notification dated 30.06.2018 clearly stipulated that no arrears for the prior period would be admissible and that all service benefits would accrue only with effect from 01.07.2018. The respondents, having accepted the terms and conditions of such absorption, are bound thereby. It is further submitted that the doctrine of precedent and judicial discipline has been consistently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, in Sandeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2014) 16 SCC 623, relying upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754, as well as in Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234, wherein it has been emphasized that consistency and certainty in law require adherence to precedents rendered by Benches of equal or larger strength. It is thus contended that, in view of the binding precedents and settled legal position, the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 47 are patently illegal and unsustainable, and the impugned order dated 17.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. 11 14. Learned Deputy Advocate General also submitted that the respondents, having consciously accepted the terms and conditions of their absorption and having exercised options under the notifications relating to the Old Pension Scheme dated 11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023, are estopped from challenging the same. Such conduct is hit by the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, as recognized in law, including in State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, (2014) 15 SCC 144, which was specifically relied upon before the learned Single Judge, but has not been considered. It is also submitted that though the learned Single Judge has referred to several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court pertaining to policy matters, including Census Commissioner and others v. R. Krishnamurthy, (2015) 2 SCC 796, BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India and others, (2002) 2 SCC 333, D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, Government of Andhra Pradesh and others v. N. Subbarayudu and others, (2008) 14 SCC 702 and Union of India v. P.N. Menon and others, (1994) 4 SCC 68, the ultimate direction issued is inconsistent with the principles laid down therein. 15. It is contended that the observations regarding alleged “conspicuous silence” in the notifications dated 11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023 are factually incorrect, inasmuch as the affidavit of the Secretary, Department of Finance, had comprehensively clarified the position, specifically in paragraphs 19 to 22 thereof, and 12 further supported by finance instructions dated 24.06.2024. Learned Deputy Advocate General submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider the said affidavit in its proper perspective and has proceeded on assumptions, thereby vitiating the impugned order. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned order has been rendered on sympathetic considerations, overlooking binding precedents, statutory provisions, and material on record, and proceeds on an erroneous assumption that the controversy still subsists, whereas the same had already been conclusively settled. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to allow the present appeal and set aside the order dated 17.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge, in the interest of justice. 16. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/writ petitioners, while supporting the impugned order, submits that the learned Single Judge has exercised jurisdiction with due circumspection and in accordance with settled principles of law, and that no interference is warranted by this Court. He further submits that a plain reading of paragraphs 45 to 47 of the impugned order would demonstrate that the learned Single Judge has consciously refrained from issuing any positive mandamus either granting or denying pensionary benefits to the respondents. Instead, the learned Single Judge has adopted a balanced and legally sound approach by directing the State Government to undertake a comprehensive, reasoned, and policy-based 13 reconsideration of the issue relating to the determinative date of appointment for pensionary purposes. He also submits that such a course of action is fully justified in the facts of the present case, where the respondents initially served as Shikshakarmis and were subsequently absorbed into regular government service. It is urged that the issue involves examination of complex and interrelated factors, including continuity of service, nature of duties discharged, source of remuneration, degree of administrative control exercised by the State, and the overarching mandate of equality enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. These are essentially matters falling within the domain of executive policy, and therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly left the final determination to the State. It is further submitted that the clarification contained in paragraph 46 of the impugned order unequivocally preserves the prerogative of the State Government in matters of policy formulation. The learned Single Judge has neither struck down the existing policy nor directed extension of any particular pensionary benefit. On the contrary, it has been expressly observed that the policy domain remains exclusively within the competence of the State, subject only to the requirement that such policy be clear, non-arbitrary, and constitutionally compliant. Learned counsel contends that the direction issued in paragraph 47 of the impugned order is in the nature of requiring the State to take a “reasoned decision” on an issue which directly affects a large class of employees and has 14 led to repeated rounds of litigation. It is submitted that the requirement of passing a “speaking order” within a stipulated timeframe merely ensures transparency, accountability, and adherence to principles of natural justice, and does not, in any manner, prejudice the rights of the appellants/State. It is thus contended that the impugned order strikes a careful balance between judicial restraint and the need to ensure fairness in State action. As such, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissing affirming the order of learned Single Judge. 17. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 18. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants/State is that the learned Single Judge has erred in law in directing reconsideration of an issue which, according to the appellants, had already attained finality and stood concluded. It has further been urged that the impugned order suffers from non- consideration of delay and laches, and is contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.K. Sarkar (supra) and other judgments. 19. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the aforesaid submissions. 20. A careful reading of paragraphs 45 to 47 of the impugned order would reveal that the learned Single Judge has consciously 15 refrained from issuing any positive mandamus either granting or denying pensionary benefits to the respondents. The direction issued is neither in the nature of conferring any substantive benefit nor does it unsettle any existing policy. On the contrary, the learned Single Judge has adopted a restrained and balanced approach by requiring the State Government to take a conscious, reasoned, and policy-based decision on the issue. 21. It is significant to note that the controversy in the present case arises in a peculiar factual backdrop, where the respondents initially served as Shikshakarmis and were subsequently absorbed into regular government service. The question as to whether, and to what extent, the pre-absorption service ought to be reckoned for pensionary purposes involves consideration of multiple factors, including continuity of service, nature of duties, administrative control, and the constitutional mandate of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. These are matters which squarely fall within the domain of executive policy. 22. The learned Single Judge, in our considered view, has rightly refrained from adjudicating upon such policy matters and has instead directed the competent authority to undertake an informed decision-making process. The clarification contained in paragraph 46 of the impugned order explicitly preserves the prerogative of the State in matters of policy formulation, thereby ensuring that there is no judicial overreach. 16 23. The contention of the appellants/State that the impugned direction amounts to revival of a stale or concluded issue is also misplaced. The direction issued is not for consideration of an individual or belated representation so as to attract the ratio of M.K. Sarkar (supra). Rather, it is a direction to the State to address a broader, systemic issue affecting a class of employees, which has continuing civil consequences and has led to recurring litigation. Such a direction, in our opinion, cannot be equated with the “consideration jurisprudence” deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In fact, the requirement of passing a reasoned and speaking order within a stipulated timeframe advances the cause of transparency and accountability in governance, and ensures that the issue is examined at the appropriate level on relevant considerations. No prejudice, much less irreparable prejudice, is caused to the appellants by such a direction. 24. As regards the submission pertaining to judicial discipline and binding precedent, we find that the learned Single Judge has not taken any view in derogation of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Har Narayan Yadav (supra). The learned Single Judge has neither overruled nor disregarded the said judgment, but has merely directed reconsideration of the issue in light of existing legal and factual parameters. Therefore, the argument founded on alleged breach of judicial discipline is misconceived. 17 25. Similarly, the plea based on delay and laches, as well as the reliance placed upon the affidavit of the Secretary, Department of Finance, are matters which can appropriately be considered by the State Government while undertaking the exercise directed by the learned Single Judge. The impugned order does not foreclose any such contention and leaves it open to the State to take an appropriate decision in accordance with law. 26. We also find merit in the submission advanced on behalf of the respondents that the impugned order strikes a balance between judicial restraint and the need to ensure fairness in State action. The learned Single Judge has neither encroached upon the policy domain nor abdicated judicial responsibility, but has facilitated a lawful and structured decision-making process. 27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. 28. For the foregoing reasons, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed . No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Bablu