Page No.# 1/22 GAHC020001072025 2026:GAU-NL:399 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : CRL.REVN/5/2025 THE STATE OF NAGALAND REPRESENTED BY THE DY. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (ADM.) NAGALAND, KOHIMA VERSUS MR. JONGPONGSOWA @AWA TECHNICAL BRANCH, PHQ NAGALAND KOHIMA, S/O LT. K IMNASASHI V/O KHENSA, PO/PS MOKOKCHUNG PS 1 Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr. Veto V. Zhimomi, P.P, NAGALAND, Advocate for the Respondent : SENTIYANGER, IMLIMENLA IMCHEN,KEVISERIENUO,YUKHAKOKLA,MAONGKALA,WAPANGLEMLA,NOCKLEI M KONYAK,KONLI BUCHEM,ALEMWAPANG AO BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS Date on which judgment is reserved : 16.06.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 16.07.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? : No Page No.# 2/22 Whether the full judgment has been Pronounced? : Yes JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) Date : 16-07-2026 Heard Mr. Veto V. Zhimomi, learned P.P. Nagaland for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Sentiyanger, learned counsel along with Mr. Alemwapang Ao, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. Invoking the provisions of Sections 438/442 of BNSS, read with Section 528 of BNSS, the State of Nagaland has preferred the instant Criminal Revision, aggrieved by order dated 03.10.2024, passed by the learned CJM, Kohima in GR No. 179/2012, arising out of State Crime P.S. Case No.05/2012, whereby, adjudicating I.A. No. 90/2024, preferred by the respondent accused herein, the learned trial Court was pleased to discharge the respondent accused. 3. The facts in brief may be stated as follows:- On 31.07.2012, a written suo-moto complaint was lodged by Mr. Kewetso Mero, (IPS), DIG (HQ) at the police headquarters of Nagaland Police at Kohima, regarding false pension claims in respect of 26 personnel belonging to 4 (four) units, namely 3rd Nagaland Armed Police Battalion, 6th Nagaland Armed Police, 7th Nagaland Armed Police and DEF Tuensang. It was alleged that their service books were fraudulently entered and pension papers were processed from the police headquarters and forwarded to the AG office, Nagaland. It was stated that the office of the Accountant General, Nagaland, vide letter dated 25.04.2012 had requested the police headquarters to verify the genuineness of some pension cases which were believed to be false claims. It is alleged that accordingly, the cases were Page No.# 3/22 referred back to the units from whom the pension cases had purportedly originated. The units, after verification, confirmed that out of the 27 cases verified, 4(four) were found to be genuine but the remaining 23 were found to be false pension claim cases. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, State Crime P.S. Case No. 5 of 2012 was registered on 31-07-2012 under Section 409/420/468/469/471/120(B) IPC. The corresponding G.R. number was GR No. 179/2012. 5. Subsequently, vide order dated 01.08.2014, the police headquarters at Kohima constituted a 6(six) member SIT for thorough investigation which was partially modified and reconstituted by order dated 15.06.2021. 6. The SIT was led by Tokavi Achumi, the then Additional DCP Chumoukedima as the team leader. It is stated that thorough investigation was conducted and upon completion of investigation and upon finding sufficient materials, two accused persons were sent up for trial, namely, the respondent Jongpongsowa @ Awa and one Imti Kumla Ao. The charge- sheet was filed vide C.S. no. 03/2024 dated 26.04.2024 and the penal provisions under which the charge-sheet was filed were Sections 409/420/471/120(B) IPC. 7. When the case reached the stage of consideration of charge before the learned Trial Court which was the court of the learned CJM, Kohima, the respondent accused Mr. Awa filed an application for discharge, which was registered as I.A. No. 90 of 2024. 8. Upon hearing the prosecution and the defence on the said application, the learned Trial Court vide order dated 03.10.2024 was Page No.# 4/22 pleased to discharge the respondent accused from the charges and the penal provisions under which he had been charge sheeted. 9. Aggrieved by such discharge of the respondent accused, the State/prosecution has preferred the instant criminal revision as already mentioned. It is informed at the Bar by the learned P.P. that the other co- accused, who was sent up for trial namely Imti Kumla Ao was also discharged by a separate order. However, the prosecution has not so far challenged her discharge. 10. The case of the prosecution in this revision is that the impugned order discharging the accused is defective in law and facts and that the learned Trial Court erred in discharging the accused, despite the existence of sufficient materials justifying commencement of trial. 11. It is contended that during investigation, the documents in question pertaining to the pension papers of the personnel in concern were all found false and had never been forwarded from the respective units as was mentioned in the documents. It is contended that some of the retired police personnel themselves gave statements before the Investigation Officer that they never submitted any applications for pension nor any pension books were in their custody. 12. It is stated that the entries made in the service books, signatures and seal of the units were also found to have been forged. It is contended that the discharge of the accused by the learned Trial Court was a premature action which deprived the prosecution to properly present its case before the court and that there was sufficient justification for allowing the prosecution to do so. Page No.# 5/22 13. It is stated by the prosecution that investigation revealed that service books were fraudulently entered and pension papers were processed from the police headquarters and forwarded to the office of the Accountant General and upon scrutiny, these papers were found to be suspicious and therefore, further verification was sought for from the respective units, which confirmed that the pension papers were never made and forwarded from the units. 14. It is stated that the investigation revealed that the pension papers relating to voluntary, medical or full pension were never applied for or processed from the unit to the police headquarters. It is also stated that no data records of the 26 personnel whose pension papers were in question were found either in the data records of the Pension Branch of the police headquarters or in the receipt register or in the data records of the accounts branch of the police headquarters. It is contended in this context that all the pension papers were bogus papers processed in the name of non-existent persons. 15. It is stated that during investigation it was found that the false pension papers originated from the pension branch of the police headquarters, where the respondent was posted as UDA at the relevant time and it was his responsibility to process and forward the papers. 16. It is further contended by the prosecution that the statement of witness no. 18 under section 164 Cr.P.C incriminates the respondent with regard to the offences attributed to him. It is further stated that the statement of witness no. 19 also justifies prosecution of the respondent. It is stated that the respondent was himself the one to take the files to the office of the Accountant General after scrutiny and clearance from DIG Page No.# 6/22 (Headquarters) and therefore, it would not lie in his mouth to say that he did not have the means to ascertain whether the signatures and documents were authentic or not. It is contended that investigation showed that the respondent did not seek any information from the concerned units nor approached the DIG headquarters about the false pension claims. 17. It is stated that the reaching of pension cases before the pension branch without the knowledge of the DIG (Headquarters) itself raises doubts on credibility of the process and of the respondent. 18. Mr. Zhimomi, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the state supports the contention of the revision petition and submits that the respondent is the main accused in the case and he was the Nodal Officer regarding the processing of the pension papers at the relevant time. 19. It is submitted that the findings of investigation were arrived at after thorough investigation by a SIT headed by a Police Officer of the rank of Additional DCP. It is submitted that the ingredients of forgery, cheating, misappropriation have all been found prima facie from the investigation materials and therefore, there was no justification in not commencing trial against the respondent. The learned PP submits that the statements of witness nos. 18 and 19 cannot be overlooked and that in the context of the same, the discharge was not justified. 20. It is submitted that at this stage the materials collected by investigation have to be taken as true and going by the said principle, there was no justification in not framing charges against the respondent accused and commencing trial against him. Page No.# 7/22 21. Summing up his submissions, the learned P.P. seeks interference with the impugned order dated 03.10.2024 passed by the learned Trial Court. 22. In support of his contentions and submissions, the learned P.P. cites the following decisions:- (i) Tulsibhai Jivabhai Changani Vs. State of Gujarat (2001) 1 SCC 719, (ii) Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another (2021) 8 SCC 753, (iii) State of Gujarat Vs. Dlipsinh Kishorsinh Rao (2023) 17 SCC 688. 23. On the other hand, Mr. Sentiyanger, the learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the case was registered with delay and on top of that the charge-sheet was filed after a long gap of more than 10 years. It is submitted that the respondent in the course of his duties had to process so many pension papers and that it was not possible on his part to verify each of them forensically if on the face of it they did not look suspicious. It is submitted that even if the documents were found to be forged, the respondent cannot be attributed with the act of using those documents, knowing them to be forged so as to attract liability under Section 471 IPC. It is submitted that there was no entrustment of property in the sense that is required to make out an offence under Section 409 IPC. 24. It is submitted that the respondent had no intention whatsoever to use any forged documents. It is submitted that the prosecution sanction was also secured after a long gap of 11 years on 23.11.2023. It is submitted that the essential ingredients of the offences for which the respondent is sought to be tried are not there. It is submitted that in the Page No.# 8/22 meantime, the respondent has also retired from service. 25. Supporting the impugned order, the learned counsel submits that the trial court while discharging the respondent gave cogent reasoning for the same. It is submitted that the specimen signature of the respondent was taken after more than 10 years and there was no speaking order to take specimen handwriting and that in any case, the handwriting evidence is opinion evidence. It is submitted that during the investigation the respondent was summoned only once. 26. The learned counsel submits that undue delay in completion of investigation had prejudiced the respondent and was violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in terms of the settled laws in this regard. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the trial Court was justified in discharging the respondent in view of not having grave suspicion against him, further submitting that this is permissible in terms of the position of law in this regard. 27. Summing up his submissions, the learned counsel seeks dismissal of the criminal revision, thereby confirming the impugned order. In support of these contentions and submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent cites the following decisions:- (i) P. Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala and Another (2010) 2 SCC 398, (ii) Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba Vs. State of West Bengal 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2604, (iii) Robert Lalchungnunga Chogthu @ R L Chogthu Vs. State of Bihar 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128, (iv) Dr. Vimla Vs. The Delhi Administration AIR 1963 Supreme Court Page No.# 9/22 1572, (v) K.T. Sukumaran and 3 Ors. Vs. State of Kerala in CRL. MC. No. 7845/2023, (vi) Dr. Sarbesh Bhattacharjee Vs. State NCT of Delhi 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3365 28. I have perused the revision petition, the impugned order, the FIR, the charge-sheet, relevant documents and other relevant materials. The original case record was called for and I have perused the relevant portions from the original case record. 29. I have considered the submissions of the prosecution and the learned counsel for the respondent. I have perused and considered the decisions cited at the Bar. 30. The law regarding discharge in a criminal case is settled through a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this context, reference may be made to the following decisions:- 31. In the case of Dlipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (supra) relied upon by the prosecution, the Honourable Supreme Court held that the defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused is seeking discharge. The relevant Para-12 may be reproduced herein below:- “12. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227 Cr.P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.” Page No.# 10/22 32. In the case of Tulsibhai Jivabhai Changani, (supra) relied upon by the prosecution, the Honourable Supreme Court in the brief order, upheld the finding that the accused used the mark-sheets of the examination knowing it to be false. 33. In Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba (supra), relied upon by the respondent/accused, the Honourable Apex Court discussed several decisions on the subject of discharge in a criminal case such as Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad vs. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715; P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2SCC 398; M.E. Shivalingamurthy vs. Central Bureau of Investigation Bengaluru, (2020)2 SCC 768 - wherein principles regarding the charge/discharge were laid down. The Court held in para-17 that at the stage of discharge, strong suspicion suffices, but such strong suspicion should be founded on some materials, which can be translated into evidence. The Court also noticed the principle laid down in P. Vijayan (supra) that if there is suspicion rather than great suspicion, the Court would have the discretion to discharge the accused. 34. In the case of Dr. Vimla (supra), relied upon by the respondent/accused, the Honourable Apex Court inter-alia discussed the meaning of the expression “defraud”. The relevant para-14 may be reproduced herein below:- “14. The word “defraud” includes an element of deceit. Deceit is not an ingredient of the definition of the word “dishonestly” while it is an important ingredient of the definition of the word “fraudulently”. The former involves a pecuniary or economic gain or loss while the latter by construction excludes that element. Further, the juxtaposition of the two expressions “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” used in the various sections of the Code indicates their close affinity and therefore the definition of one may give colour to the other. To illustrate, in the definition of “dishonestly”, Page No.# 11/22 wrongful gain or wrongful loss is the necessary ingredient. Both need not exist, one would be enough. So too, if the expression “fraudulently” were to be held to involve the element of injury to the person or persons deceived, it would be reasonable to assume that the injury should be something other than pecuniary or economic loss. Though almost always an advantage to one causes loss to another and vice versa, it need not necessarily be so. Should we hold that the concept of “fraud” would include not only deceit but also some injury to the person deceived, it would be appropriate to hold by analogy drawn from the definition of “dishonestly” that to satisfy the definition of “fraudulently” it would be enough if there was a non-economic advantage to the deceiver or a non-economic loss to the deceived. Both need not co-exist.” 35. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768, the Hon’ble Apex Court discussed in detail the subject of charge and discharge. The relevant paragraph-52 thereof may be reproduced herein below:- “52. The provisions which deal with the question of framing of charge or discharge, relatable to : (i) a sessions trial or, (ii) a trial of warrant case, or (iii) a summons case, are contained in three pairs of sections under the Cr.P.C. These are Sections 227 and 228 respectively, insofar as, the sessions trial is concerned; Sections 239 and 240 respectively, relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and Sections 245(1) and 245(2) respectively, in respect of summons case. The relevant provisions read as follows: 227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. 228. Framing of charge.—(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which— Page No.# 12/22 (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. 239. When accused shall be discharged.—If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. 240. Framing of charge.—(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. *** 245. When accused shall be discharged.—(1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, Page No.# 13/22 would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless.” 36. The Court further held in paragraph-55 that under the different provisions pertaining to discharge engrafted in the Cr.P.C, the settled legal position is that charges are to be framed upon finding a prime facie case. The relevant paragraph 55 may be reproduced herein below:- “55. Despite the slight variation in the provisions with regard to discharge under the three pairs of sections referred to above, the settled legal position is that the stage of framing of charge under either of these three situations, is a preliminary one and the test of “prima facie” case has to be applied — if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.” 37. Further discussing the subject matter in R. Soundirarasu (supra), the Honourable Apex Court noticed the stipulation in Section 239 Cr.P.C that if the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. The term groundless has been interpreted to mean lack of a prime facie case on the basis of the materials. The relevant paragraph 60, 61, 62 and 67 also may be reproduced herein below:- “60. In the context of trial of a warrant case, instituted on a police report, the provisions for discharge are to be governed as per the terms of Section 239 which provide that a direction for discharge can be made only for reasons to be recorded by the court where it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. It would, therefore, follow that as per the provisions under Section 239 what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not that a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the Page No.# 14/22 offences alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of that offence, and it is only in a case where the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he is to discharge the accused after recording his reasons for doing so. 61. Section 239 envisages a careful and objective consideration of the question whether the charge against the accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that he has committed an offence. What Section 239 prescribes is not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is a valuable provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not permissible under the law. But if the Judge, upon considering the record, including the examination, if any, and the hearing, is of the opinion that there is “ground for presuming” that the accused has committed the offence triable under the chapter, he is required by Section 240 to frame in writing a charge against the accused. The order for the framing of the charge is also not an empty or routine formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a decision that the accused is not entitled to discharge under Section 239, that there is, on the other hand, ground for presuming that he has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX and that he should be called upon to plead guilty to it and be convicted and sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. (See: V.C. Shukla v. State [V.C. Shukla v. State, 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695] ). 62. Section 239 Cr.P.C lays down that if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. The word “groundless”, in our opinion, means that there must be no ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The word “groundless” used in Section 239CrPC means that the materials placed before the court do not make out or are not sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused. 67. Thus the word “groundless”, as interpreted by this Court, means that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.” (emphasis added) 38. Another very important principle laid down in R. Soundirarasu (supra) is that a crucial test to decide the question of charge or discharge would Page No.# 15/22 be as to whether the materials, even if unrebutted do not make out any case whatsoever. The relevant paragraph-72 may be reproduced herein below:- “72. The real test for determining whether the charge should be considered groundless under Section 239CrPC is that whether the materials are such that even if unrebutted make out no case whatsoever, the accused should be discharged under Section 239 Cr.P.C. The trial court will have to consider, whether the materials relied upon by the prosecution against the applicant herein for the purpose of framing of the charge, if unrebutted, make out any case at all.” (emphasis added) 39. In the case of Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Private Limited (supra), relied upon by the prosecution, pertains to cancellation of bail by an appellate or superior Court due to grant of bail by ignoring relevant materials. In that case, there were serious allegations against the accused of fraudulent misappropriation of amounts. In the instant case, the matter pertains to discharge though here also, there are allegations about committing fraudulent acts and using as genuine false documents. 40. Thus, some of the principles governing the subject of discharge in a criminal case may be summarized as follows:- 40.1 The trial court is not permitted to conduct appreciation of evidence and any process amounting to mini trial. However, it would be permissible for the trial Court to shift the evidence and materials to see as to whether prima facie case is made out or not against the accused so as to commence trial against him. 40.2. In this context, one important principle laid down is that if the material on record left unrebutted does not make out the offenses against the accused, then it would be justified and fair in the interest of justice to discharge the person. 40.3 It has also been held that when there is grave suspicion against the Page No.# 16/22 accused on the basis of the materials on record, it would be fully justified on the part of the trial Court to frame charges. However, if there is only suspicion against the accused, rather than grave suspicion, then the trial court would have the discretion to discharge the accused also. 41. On the aforesaid principle, the difference between suspicion and grave suspicion is a matter of degree with regard to the suspicion. In the considered view of this Court, the law could not be this that whenever the suspicion is less than grave suspicion, it would be mandatory on the part of the trial Court to discharge the person. The exercise of the discretion in my considered view depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and if in the facts and circumstances the Court is of the opinion that despite the materials giving rise to a suspicion which is lesser in degree than grave suspicion, the situation justifies giving an opportunity to the prosecution to prove its case, it would be justified on the part of the trial Court to frame charges. 42. On the touchstone of these case laws and principles, now, I go back to the facts and circumstances of this case to determine as to whether the impugned order dated 03.10.2024 passed by the learned Trial Court recharging the respondent accused is justified and tenable in law. 43. The Investigating Officer has narrated in detail the findings of investigation in the charge-sheet. He has also given a flowchart in paragraph 16.14 regarding the sequence of procedure for processing of pension at the police headquarters. The said flowchart indicates that the matter is processed from the respective unit and sent to the office of the DIG in the police headquarters who then marks it to the pension branch and the pension branch marks it to the accounts branch regarding leave, Page No.# 17/22 encashment and GPF. The accounts branch in turn sends the file to the pension branch for scrutinization and after completion of scrutiny, the file is sent back to the DIG in the police headquarters and from the office of the DIG in the police headquarters, the file is sent to the office of the Accountant General, Nagaland. 44. From the office of the Accountant General Nagaland, the file is processed to the police headquarters again for confirmation and thereafter, the file is sent back to the office of the Accountant General for settlement of the pension. 45. Admittedly, the respondent accused was working as a UDA in the Pension Branch and he was handling the pension files pertaining to Battalion and the other co-accused was handling the pension files pertaining to DEF. 46. As already stated, the anomalies in the pension files were first flagged by the office of the Accountant General who found certain suspicious aspects of those files and sought verification from the police headquarters and the police headquarters in turn verified the matter from the concerned units and found that there were anomalies in as many as 26 cases - in as much as the files did not co-relate with actual official records in those units. The investigation found that in several cases, the files for processing of pension were never sent from the concerned units as indicated in the files and therefore, on the basis of such investigation and the connected materials, the I.O came to the conclusion that many of these files were subject of forgery. 47. The investigation also found that in some cases, the persons whose Page No.# 18/22 files were sent for processing of pension had never applied for such pension and this is revealed by the statements of those persons recorded as witnesses during the investigation. In some cases, it was also found by the investigation as stated by the I.O in that charge that the concerned persons had expired in the meantime but the file was sent for processing of pension, which obviously indicates manipulation and fraudulent acts. 48. The statement of Meyasangla, who was initially arrayed as an accused was recorded by police as well as before the learned Judicial Magistrate during the investigation. She was not sent up for trial in the charge-sheet and transposed as a prosecution witness. The said person was working as a Computer Assistant in the Pension Branch and in her statement, she stated that she merely typed out the particulars in the files upon instruction of the respondent accused and the other co-accused and that despite some reluctance on her part, she did the typing as it was instructed by her superiors. It has also been revealed from the investigation that contrary to what is indicated in the flowchart about sequence of processing of files - some of the files reached the Pension Branch without going through the office of the DIG in the police headquarters and in this context, it was also revealed by the investigation as stated by the I.O that after the completion of processing of the files, the respondent accused used to personally carry the files to the office of the Accountant General, Nagaland. The finding of the investigation about some files reaching the pension branch without going through the office of the DIG in the police headquarters is a significant incriminating circumstance. 49. The statement of the respondent accused was also recorded during Page No.# 19/22 investigation and the said statement reveals self-incrimination. However, being a statement before police, the same is not being taken into account even for the purpose of adjudication with regard to the question of charge or discharge. 50. The I.O has stated in the charge-sheet that with regard to the first Nagaland Armed Police Battalion, Chumoukedima, the statement of the concerned person was recorded which corroborated with the findings and that one constable was appointed from the unit on 28.04.1980 but discharged on 01.06.1986. It is stated that despite attempts he could not be traced. 51. Similarly, in 5th Nagaland Armed Police Battalion, the investigation revealed that the personnel whose pension files were shown to have been processed had voluntarily left service and one of them was martyred on duty on 16.10.1996. It is stated in the charge-sheet in para 16.10 that the statement of the informant was also recorded and he supported the allegations. It is further stated that 23 service books along with three more service books were returned from the office of the Accountant General stating that the service books were suspiciously fictitious and upon carrying out the inquiry it was found that these pension cases were never forwarded from the concerned units and that pension cases were found to have directly reached the Pension Branch without the knowledge of the concerned DIG, the police headquarters. It was also stated in the investigation that the purported signatures of the then IGP headquarters who was earlier commandant of 3rd NAP battalion Tuensang were forged and did not belong to him. Page No.# 20/22 52. One important aspect which is revealed by the investigation is that at the relevant time the respondent accused was not only working in the pension branch and looking after scrutiny of pension files specially with regard to the battalion - but he was also the Nodal Officer and as already mentioned earlier he used to carry the files to the office of the AG, from the office of the DIG in the police headquarters. 53. It is stated in the investigation that the respondent accused was the main accused of the case. The sample handwriting of the accused persons were also taken and forensically examined along with the signatures and handwriting found in the question documents and the forensic report prime facie stated that the handwriting in the sample tallied with the handwriting in the question documents. 54. In the instant case, significant materials were revealed by the investigation about fraudulent activities with regard to as many as 26 detected pension files, which were a subject of forgery and the same were processed and sent to the A.G. in Nagaland and the matter came to be detected only when the office of the AG flagged some suspicions and communicated the matter to the Police Headquarters in Nagaland. The charge-sheet does not hold the sent up accused liable for forgery but they have been held liable for processing the forged pension files knowing them to be false and fraudulent. 55. Keeping in mind the test indicated in R. Soundirarasu (supra) and upon perusing the findings of investigation - it cannot be said that the materials collected by the investigation are groundless vis-à-vis the respondent accused. It cannot also be said in terms of the principle laid down in R. Soundirarasu (supra) that the materials, even if unrebutted, do Page No.# 21/22 not make out any case whatsoever against the respondent accused. 56. Considering the materials revealed by the investigation, it would be unfair and incorrect in law, to not even give an opportunity to the prosecution to lead evidence on these materials. There are certain aspects of the materials in my considered view which can be determined only after adducing evidence. 57. The Court deprecates the long delay in completing the investigation, especially in a matter of this nature and when the investigation was carried out by an SIT headed by an experienced police officer. Though speedy investigation is also a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but considering the nature of the materials eventually revealed by the investigation, though delayed –there would be no case for discharging the accused as has been done by the learned Trial Court. In this context, it can be said that considering the materials revealed by investigation, it would not be justified to prevent commencement of trial on the ground of delay vis-à-vis Article 21 of the Constitution of the India. 58. Thus, upon perusing the entire materials revealed by the investigation and the detailed narration in the charge-sheet, this Court is of the considered opinion and finding that if these materials and evidence are taken as unrebutted then it cannot be said that they do not make out any offences against the respondent accused specially the offences of using as genuine documents known to be forced. Even from the point of view of the degree of suspicion test, this Court is of the considered view that the materials revealed by the investigation create significant suspicion against the respondent accused. Page No.# 22/22 59. Therefore, in the given situation, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court was not justified in discharging the accused and thereby preventing the prosecution from putting forth its evidence and giving an opportunity to the prosecution to prove its case. 60. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 03.10.2024 passed by the learned CJM, Kohima in GR No.179/2012, discharging the respondent accused is hereby set aside and quashed. 61. The prosecution and the defence shall appear before the learned trial Court on 04.08.2026 for further proceedings. 62. Return the original TCR. 63. The instant criminal revision stands allowed and disposed of on the aforesaid terms. JUDGE Comparing Assistant