[2026:RJ-JP:25094-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Central/excise Appeal No. 193/2018 URN: EXCIA / 308U / 2018 M/s Shree Siddhi Vinayak Induction Pvt. Ltd., G-183, Riico Industrial Area, Bagru, Jaipur Through Its Director And Authorized Signatory Shri Ashok Dharendra. ----Appellant Versus Commissioner Of Central Excise And Service Tax /cgst, Jaipur, Ncrb, Statue Circle, C-Scheme, Jaipur. ----Respondent For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ravi Gupta For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ajay Shukla with Mr. Shivam Sharma HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP TANEJA Order (Oral) 06/07/2026 Per: Arun Monga, J 1. The appeal herein is directed against the order dated 09.05.2016 passed by the learned CESTAT, to the extent it did not adjudicate the appellant's plea regarding invocation of the extended period of limitation, and the subsequent order dated 02.05.2018 rejecting the application for rectification of mistake by learned CESTAT. 2. Brief Factual Background first. The appellant, M/s Shree Siddhi Vinayak Induction Pvt. Ltd., manufactures M.S. Billets falling under Chapter Heading No. 72061090 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. By a Show Cause Notice dated 20.08.2010, the Department demanded CENVAT credit of Rs. 7,73,243/- with interest and penalty, invoking the extended period of limitation for April 2008 to [2026:RJ-JP:25094-DB] (2of 4) [EXCIA-193/2018] January 2009. The dispute concerned the admissibility of CENVAT credit on iron and steel items and cement used in the supporting structure of an overhead crane. 2.1 The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand with interest and imposed an equivalent penalty, granting the option of paying 25% of the penalty upon compliance within the prescribed period. The appellant deposited the confirmed dues under protest and appealed to the Commissioner (Appeals), Central Excise, Jaipur, who dismissed the appeal by order dated 06.09.2013. 2.2 Before the CESTAT, New Delhi, the appellant contended that divergent judicial views existed on the admissibility of such credit, and consequently neither the extended period of limitation nor the penal provisions could be invoked in the absence of suppression, fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement. By order dated 09.05.2016, the CESTAT partly allowed the appeal, holding that mala fides could not be attributed to the appellant, and set aside the penalty. The appellant's grievance is that the Tribunal recorded no finding on its challenge to the invocation of the extended period of limitation. 2.3 The appellant thereafter moved an application for rectification of mistake, asserting that the omission to decide the limitation issue was an error apparent on the record. The CESTAT dismissed that application by Order No. MO/50239/2018-SM[BR] dated 02.05.2018. 2.4 Hence, the present appeal. 3. Heard and perused the file in the above backdrop. Sole question that falls for consideration is whether the Tribunal committed any error, apparent or otherwise, in not returning a finding on the invocation of the extended period of limitation. The answer depends upon what was actually pressed before the Tribunal, for a Tribunal cannot be faulted for not deciding an issue that was expressly given up. [2026:RJ-JP:25094-DB] (3of 4) [EXCIA-193/2018] 4. At this stage, paragraphs 3 and 6 of the Tribunal's order dated 09.05.2016 are decisive and are reproduced: "3. The Ld. Advocate appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant is not contesting the demand of cenvat credit along with interest confirmed by the authorities below. He submits that the prayer of the appellant is for setting aside the penalty imposed by the authorities below. To support such stand, the Ld. AR submits that there were divergent views by different judicial forums regarding entitlement of cenvat credit on the disputed goods, and thus the appellant entertained a bonafide belief that cenvat credit is available on such goods, and accordingly, availed such credit in the books of account. Since there is no element of suppression fraud, collusion mis-statement etc, with intention to avail fraudulent cenvat credit, penalty cannot be imposed under Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. x-x-x-x-x 6. I find that the issue regarding entitlement of cenvat credit on disputed goods were highly debatable and the Larger Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Vandana Global Ltd. Vs. CCE 2010 (253) E.L.T. 440 (Tri. LB) has held that Central Excise duty paid on such goods are not available for cenvat credit. I also find that the period involved in this case is from 15.04.2008 to 19.01.2009, which is prior to the date of amendment of Rule 2(k) ibid and also pronouncement of the decision by this Tribunal, in the case of Vandana Global (supra). Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, malafides cannot be attributed for imposition of penalty on the appellant." 5. Three consequences follow from the above. 5.1 First, counsel for the appellant made a candid and unequivocal concession before the Tribunal that the demand of CENVAT credit with interest was not being contested. The relief sought was confined solely to the setting aside of the penalty. 5.2 Second, once the demand itself stood conceded, the challenge to the extended period of limitation necessarily fell away. Limitation is not an abstract question; it goes to the sustainability of the demand. A party that concedes the demand on merits cannot simultaneously keep alive a plea whose only purpose is to defeat that very demand. The concession thus subsumed the limitation plea. 5.3 Third, the Tribunal granted the only relief that remained live before it i.e. it quashed the penalty on the finding that the issue was [2026:RJ-JP:25094-DB] (4of 4) [EXCIA-193/2018] highly debatable during the relevant period, which preceded both the amendment of Rule 2(k) and the Larger Bench decision in Vandana Global Ltd. v. CCE, 2010 (253) E.L.T. 440 (Tri. LB), and that no mala fides could be attributed to the appellant. 6. In these peculiar premises, the Tribunal was fully justified in not dealing with limitation or the merits of the demand. There was, consequently, no "mistake apparent on the record" capable of rectification, and the dismissal of the rectification application suffers from no infirmity. We are therefore unable to accept the contention that the issue of limitation was left undecided; it was, in substance, never in issue before the Tribunal. 7. We find no irregularity, in law or otherwise, warranting interference in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and the appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 8. Before parting, we may also note a further and; an independent infirmity. During the pendency of these proceedings, the appellant- company has been directed to be wound up in accordance with law. Upon winding up, needless to say, it would cease to exist as a juristic entity. During liquidation also, its cause cannot be carried forward on the strength of a Power of Attorney executed at the relevant time by its erstwhile Directors, since the authority of an attorney does not survive anymore. The appellant's locus (an erstwhile director/promoter) to seek relief at this stage is, therefore, itself suspect. 9. Be that as it may, with these observations, the appeal stands dismissed as aforesaid. 10. All pending applications also stand disposed of. (SANDEEP TANEJA),J (ARUN MONGA),J 42/TN-SKS