- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA WRIT PETITION No. 5833 OF 2026 (MV) BETWEEN: MR. M NAWAZ BASHA S/O LATE AKBAR SAHEB, AGED 53 YEARS R/A No. 15-16, CTM ROAD MADANAPALLE ANNAMMAYYA DISTRICT ANDHRA PRADESH, PIN 517 325. …PETITIONER (BY SRI C V KUMAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE KARNATAKA STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, BMTC-TTMC BUILDING, KH ROAD, SHANTI NAGAR, BANGALORE - 560 027. 2. THE SECRETARY, KARNATAKA STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, BMTC-TTMC BUILDING, KH ROAD, SHANTHI NAGAR, BANGALORE - 560 027. Digitally signed by MAHALAKSHMI B M Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 3. SMT. T.N SHAKUNTHALA REDDY, W/O LATE T.N JAI NARAYANA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS, PROP: JNR MOTO SERVICE, AVENUE ROAD MADANAPALLE, CHITTOR DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH- 517 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. RASHMI RAO, HCGP FOR R1 AND R2 SRI. A. S. PRASANNA KUMAR, ADVOCATE FOR C/R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER OF THE KARNATAKA STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE DATED:17.12.2025 MADE IN REVISION PETITION No.11/2023 (ANNEXURE-E). THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B' GROUP THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 ORAL ORDER Learned HCGP accepts notice for respondents Nos.1 and 2. 2. The petitioner aggrieved by the order of the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal” for short), condoning the delay of 817 days in filing the Revision Petition No.11 of 2023 has preferred this writ petition. 3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the caveator- respondent No.3. 4. Permit No.8/67 for the inter State Interstate route Kadapa – Bangalore was originally held by M/s Venkateshwara Transport, a Partnership Firm, of which the petitioner was the Managing Director. The permit permitted operation of one round trip with one vehicle and there existed vacancy for an additional round - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 trip under the intestate agreement between the States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. 5. The said firm applied for variation of permit conditions seeking permission for an additional round trip with an additional vehicle within the scope of interstate agreement. The Andhra Pradesh Transport Authority by order dated 24.04.2013 granted the variation. Pursuant thereto, the Karnataka State Transport Authority granted counter signature on 19.06.2013. 6. Aggrieved by the grant of counter signature, rival operators, including the predecessor of respondent No.3 filed RP No.414 of 2013 and connected matters before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by order dated 23.03.2016 and 24.03.2016 allowed the revision petitions and set aside the counter signature granted by the Karnataka State Transport Authority. 7. The permit holder challenged the said orders before this Court in WP No.18997-19001 of 2016 against - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 the orders dated 23.03.2016 and 24.03.2016. This Court by order dated 13.03.2019 set aside the orders of the Tribunal and held at paragraph No.5 as under; "5. For the foregoing reasons the Writ Petitions stand disposed of setting aside the impugned order at Annexures-E and F dated 23/3/2016 and 24/3/2016 respectively. The proceedings are restored to the file of the respondent no.1 Karnataka state transport authority, Bengaluru, to consider the petitioner's application for renewal of stage carriage permit in accordance with law." 8. Pursuant to the said direction, the Karnataka State Transport Authority by order dated 02.02.2021 restored the counter signature of the permit, holding that the permit was in operation as on 18.12.2014. 9. Respondent No.3 thereafter filed RP No.11 of 2023 challenging the order dated 02.02.2021, along with an application seeking condonation of delay of 817 days in filing the Revision Petition. The petitioner filed objections opposing the said application. The Tribunal by order dated 17.12.2025 allowed the application and - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 condoned the delay of 817 days, directing the revision petitions to be heard on merits. Aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition is filed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Tribunal has committed a serious error in condoning the delay of 817 days, which is far beyond the prescribed limitation period of thirty days under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It is submitted that respondent No.3 has not assigned any satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay and the Tribunal has condoned the delay on an erroneous assumption that the service commenced only in January 2023. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.3 seeks to justify the impugned order. It is submitted that the Tribunal has exercised its discretion after considering the material on record and the explanation offered for the delay. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 12. This Court has carefully considered the rival contentions and perused the material on record, the point that would arise for consideration is; “Whether the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay of 817 days in filing the Review Petition and consequently allowing IA No.I and whether the same warrants any interference by this Court?” 13. The concept of “sufficient cause” is a condition precedent for the condonation of delay in filing the appeal or a revision. In the present case, respondent No.3 has stated in the affidavit filed in support of the application that he came to know about the impugned order only in September 2022 when the service commenced operations and thereafter applied for the certified copy on 07.01.2023, which was made ready on 07.01.2023, and thereafter, filed the revision petition. The reasons are stated at paragraph Nos.2 and 3 of the affidavit which reads as under: “2. I submit that the impugned order is dated 4.11.2020 I was not a party to the proceedings and I - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 was not aware of the impugned order dated 4.11.2020 even though the order was passed on 4.11.2020 the 2nd Respondent made an application for variation of condition of permit by way of revision of timings before the Secretary, State Transport Authority, Vijayawada on a memo dated 30.12.2019 addressed to the Deputy Transport Commissioner, Chittoor the Joint Transport Commissioner and Secretary, State Transport Authority, Vijayawada revised the timings on 21.9.2022 and the said order in revising the timings given effect after granting the countersignature by the 2nd Respondent by an order 26.9.2022 and after obtaining the countersignature the 3rd Respondent started operating the service with the revised timings departing Madanapalli instead of 12.50 p.m. as 1.10 p.m. whereas the service of the Petitioner is 1.45 p.m. Departure Madanapalli and arrival Bangalore 5.10 p.m. so even though the countersignature has been granted for revision of timings in the month of September 2022 i.e. 26.09.2022 the 2nd Respondent started operating the service with the revised timings on the route in question effecting my service from Madanapalli towards Bangalore only in the first week of January 2023. 3. 3. I submit that when the 2nd Respondent started operating the service with the revised timings earlier to my service from Madanapalli towards Bangalore even though the endorsement of countersignature obtained 26.9.2022 started operating the service with the revised timings on the route in question only in the first week of January 2023. However, on the instructions given by me, my General Power of Attorney Holder Sri. S.R.K. Pavan Kumar came to the 1st Respondent's office and after due verification the relevant permit held by the 3rd Respondent I was informed that the present impugned order/endorsement dated 4/11/2020 in granting countersignature by the 2nd respondent. So - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 the impugned order/endorsement is contrary to the Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court dated 18.03.2019 passed in W.P.No.18997-19001/2016 and since order/endorsement is illegal on the instructions given by me, my GPA Holder applied for the certified copy of the order/endorsement dated 4.11.2020 applied on 7.1.2023 made ready and delivered on 7.1.2023. So the Revision Petition is filed within 30 days from the date of the receipt of the certified copy." 14. The Tribunal on consideration of the material on record, and the explanation offered has held that respondent No.3 was not a party before the Authority in the proceedings leading to the order dated 02.02.2021 and therefore, the explanation offered for delay constituted ‘sufficient cause’. 15. Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that the reasoning assigned by the Tribunal is inconsistent with the affidavit filed in support of the application, this Court is of the considered view that the Tribunal has exercised its discretion for condoning the delay after considering the explanation offered and surrounding circumstances. - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 16. The Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy1 (N. Balakrishnan) at paragraph Nos.9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 held that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, which reads as under: “9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause 1 (1998) 7 SCC 123 - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 17. In the present case, there was a delay of 817 days in filing the revision petition before the Tribunal and in light of the decision of the Apex Court as stated supra is that, acceptability of explanation of delay is the sole criteria, length of delay is not relevant. 18. It is well settled that where an aggrieved person establishes that he was prevented by ‘sufficient cause’ from filing the revision within the prescribed period, the delay can be condoned in the interest of justice. In the present case, the Tribunal having found sufficient cause and having condoned the delay, this Court does not - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:14014 WP No. 5833 of 2026 find any ground to interfere with the said discretionary order and the point framed for consideration is answered accordingly and this Court pass the following; ORDER The writ petition is hereby dismissed. Sd/- ____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA DS List No.: 1 Sl No.: 29 Ct.sm