2026:HHC:17430 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4262 of 2013 Reserved on: 01.04.2026 Date of Decision: 18.05.2026. State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Kishan Pal ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant : Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Vijay Chaudhary, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.08.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge- III, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.11.2007 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P (learned Trial Court) was set aside. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:17430 to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Swaroop Krishan Bhardwaj (PW9), was driving a car bearing registration No. HP- 37A-2814 on 27.12.2005. He was going towards the Court of Sub Divisional Magistrate at about 11:15 AM. An Indica car, bearing registration No. HP-32A-0367 came from Mahakaal at high speed and hit the informant’s car. The informant’s car turned turtle, and the informant sustained injuries. Accused Kishan Pal was driving the Indica car, and the accident occurred due to his negligence and the high speed of the Indica car. An intimation was given to the police. ASI Amar Singh (PW10) and Constable Ajay Kumar went to the hospital for verification. ASI Amar Singh (PW10) filed an application (Ext.PW10/A) for conducting the medical examination of the informant. Dr Bindu Sood (PW1) examined the injured and found that he had sustained simple injuries which could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle 3 2026:HHC:17430 accident. She issued the MLC (Ext.PW1/A). ASI Amar Singh recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW9/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW8/A) was registered. The site plan (Ext.PW10/B) was prepared. The photographs of the spot (Ext.PW10/C1 to Ext.PW10/C3) were taken. ASI Amar Singh seized the vehicles bearing registration No. HP-37A-2814 and HP-32A-0367 vide memo (Ext.PW2/A). Accused Krishan Pal produced the documents of his vehicle, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW5/A). ASI Amar Singh (PW10) filed an application (Ext.PW10/D) for conducting the mechanical examination of the vehicles. Reports of mechanical examination (Ext.PW10/E and Ext.PW10/F) were obtained, in which it was mentioned that the vehicle had no defect that could have led to the accident. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per the version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4 2026:HHC:17430 4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its case. Dr Bindu Sood (PW1) conducted the medical examination of the injured. Sanjay Bhardwaj (PW2), HC Ajay Kumar (PW5) and HC Janak Chand (PW6) witnessed the recoveries. Kamlesh Chand (PW3) and Rajeev Bhardwaj (PW4) are the eyewitnesses. Kamla Devi (PW7) is the owner of the vehicle who proved that she had employed the accused as a driver. Sureshtha Thakur (PW8) signed the FIR and prepared the chargesheet. S.K. Bhardwaj (PW9) is the informant/injured. Amar Singh (PW10) investigated the matter. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that the police had seized the vehicle and he had produced the documents of the vehicle. He stated that a mechanical examination of his vehicle was conducted, but denied that a mechanical examination of the informant’s vehicle was also conducted. He admitted that photographs of the vehicles were taken. He claimed that the informant had wrongly turned the vehicle, which led to the accident. He was not driving the vehicle negligently. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. 5 2026:HHC:17430 6. The learned Trial Court held that the informant was turning his vehicle towards SDM Court Road. The road was quite wide with clear visibility. The accused did not try to slow down or stop the vehicle upon finding that the informant was turning his vehicle towards SDM Court Road. The accused was clearly negligent in driving the vehicle, which led to the accident. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows: Sections Sentences 279 of the Indian Penal Code The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and, in default of payment of fine, undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days. 337 of Indian Penal Code The accused were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and, in default of payment of fine, undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently. 6 2026:HHC:17430 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the informant’s vehicle was hit on its left side, clearly showing that the informant’s vehicle was towards its right side, or he had suddenly turned the vehicle. This supported the defence taken by the accused that the accident occurred because of the sudden turning of the vehicle by the informant. Learned Trial Court had not properly appreciated the evidence on record. Hence, the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The prosecution witnesses proved that the accused had already turned his vehicle, and the accused should have taken care to avoid the collision. He had failed to take care, which led to the accident. Learned Appellate Court had erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be 7 2026:HHC:17430 allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Vijay Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 10. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant specifically stated that he had turned the vehicle, and the accused was bound to take care in such a situation. He had failed to take care or to slow his vehicle, which led to the accident. Learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence on record, and learned Appellate Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 11. Mr Vijay Chaudhary, the learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the accident occurred because of the sudden turning of the vehicle by the informant. This was a 8 2026:HHC:17430 reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence led before the Court, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the Court acquitting the accused, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438: “24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on 9 2026:HHC:17430 record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 14. This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed: 21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471. 15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. The informant S.K. Bhardwaj (PW9) stated that he was going towards the SDM Court in his vehicle bearing registration No. HP-37A-2814 on 27.12.2005 at about 11-11:30 AM. A car being driven by the accused hit the informant’s car at high speed. He stated in his cross-examination that the road 10 2026:HHC:17430 was 22 feet wide at the place of the accident. He stated that he had turned the vehicle. 17. The site plan (Ext.PW10/B) shows that an accident had occurred near the left-hand side of the road for a vehicle coming from Mahakal. Thus, the accused was driving the vehicle towards his left side, and the informant was turning his vehicle to enter the road leading to the SDM Office. Rule 3 of the Rule of Road Regulation provides that the driver of a Motor Vehicle shall, while turning to the right, drive as near as may be to the centre of the road along which he is travelling and arrive as nearly as may be at the left-hand side of the road which he is entering. Therefore, it is apparent that the driver of the vehicle has to drive their vehicle to the centre of the road while turning right. It is admitted by the informant in the cross-examination that the road was visible. Therefore, he should not have entered the road leading to the office of SDM when he could see another vehicle approaching from the opposite side. Therefore, the proximate cause of the accident was the breach of Rule 3 by the informant. 11 2026:HHC:17430 18. Kamlesh Chand (PW3) stated in his cross- examination that he had reached the spot after the accident. Manish Bhardwaj (PW4) also admitted in his cross-examination that the accident had not occurred in his presence, and he reached the spot after hearing the noise. The cross-examination of these witnesses shows that the accident had not occurred in their presence, and their testimonies will not establish the negligence of the accused. 19. The prosecution is relying upon the use of the term high speed by the witnesses to infer the negligence, which is not sufficient. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey 12 2026:HHC:17430 was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 20. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 21. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. 13 2026:HHC:17430 The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 22. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: - “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 23. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable based on high speed alone without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care. 24. The informant’s statement that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused will also not help the prosecution. Negligence is an inference from the fact. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ 14 2026:HHC:17430 in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed at 595: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 25. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 26. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the statements that the accident had occurred because of the negligence of the accused. 27. There is no other witness to the accident. Hence, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the negligence of the accused was not proved. 28. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will 15 2026:HHC:17430 not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court, even if another view is possible. 29. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of 30. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 31. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, shall be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th May, 2026 (Nikita)