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2026 DAILYLAW 9510 (HP)

SANJAY KUMAR AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF HP

CR.R/175/2026 · 2026-05-18

Rakesh Kainthla

body2026

Judgment text

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2026:HHC:17432 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 175 of 2026 Reserved on: 31.03.2026 Date of Decision: 18.05.2026. Sanjay Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr Ritesh Bhardwaj, Advocate. For the Respondent/State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present revision against the judgment dated 24.02.2026 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 09.02.2023 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Trial Court) and order of sentence dated 10.04.2024 passed by learned 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:17432 Chief Judicial Magistrate, H.P. were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the petitioner (accused before the learned Trial Court) for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 39 (1) (a) of the H.P. Excise Act. It was asserted that ASI Sandeep Kumar (PW8), ASI Prem Singh (PW5), Constable Mann Singh (PW1) and HHG Sanjay Kumar stopped an Alto car bearing registration No. HP-28-9798 at Sidhpur on 31.10.2014 at about 7:15 PM. Sanjay Kumar was driving the car, and Nek Ram was sitting in it. The police officials asked the accused, Sanjay Kumar, to produce the documents, but he refused. The police searched the car based on a suspicion and recovered 36 bottles of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) bearing Mark ‘Green label’, 24 bottles of IMFL bearing mark ‘Royal Stag’, 24 pints of IMFL bearing mark ‘Officers Choice’, 12 bottles of beer, 48 bottles of Country Liquor bearing mark ‘Una no.1’ and 71 bottles of Country Liquor bearing mark ‘Dabang No.1’. The police demanded the documents for transporting the liquor, but the accused could not produce any 3 2026:HHC:17432 documents. The police obtained the samples and sealed the sample bottles and remaining bottles with seal impression ‘H’. Sample seal (Ext.PW1/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The liquor was seized vide memo (Ext.PW2/A). Rukka (Ext.PW8/A) was prepared and was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW8/B) was prepared. ASI Sandeep Kumar (PW8) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW8/C) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. The samples were sent to SFSL, Junga, and a report (Ext.PW8/E) was issued. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their versions, and upon completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 39 (1) (a) of the H.P. Excise Act, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Constable Maan Singh (PW1), ASI Prem Singh (PW5) 4 2026:HHC:17432 and ASI Sandeep Kumar (PW8) were the members of the police party. Constable Karam Singh (PW2) witnessed the recovery. Constable Vinod Kumar (PW3) was working as MHC with whom the case property was deposited. HHC Dina Nath (PW4) carried the case property to CTL, Kandaghat. Rakesh Kumar (PW6) did not support the prosecution's case. HC Vipin (PW7) proved the entry in the daily diary. SHO Jagdish Chand (PW9) signed the FIR and resealed the case property. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), admitted that Sanjay Kumar was driving the car and Nek Ram was travelling in it. They also admitted that liquor was recovered from the car. They claimed that the liquor belonged to the contractor. They did not produce any evidence in the defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the prosecution witnesses corroborated the statements of each other. Minor contradictions in their testimonies were not sufficient to discard them. The accused admitted to the seizure of liquor from their car. The independent witnesses could not be associated because the incident had taken place at a lonely and deserted place. The 5 2026:HHC:17432 integrity of the case property was duly established. Therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 39 (1) (a) of the H.P. Excise Act. However, the learned Trial Court found that the offence punishable under Section 39 (1) (a) of H.P. Excise Act in case of transportation of more than 45 litres of country liquor was punishable with imprisonment which shall not be less than three years and the fine which shall not be less than ₹ 1 lakh. The Learned Magistrate was not competent to impose a fine of more than ₹10,000/-. Hence, he submitted the case file to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 325 of the Cr.P.C. 7. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate sentenced each of the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four months, pay a fine of ₹5000/- each and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 39 (1) (a) of H.P. Excise Act. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned 6 2026:HHC:17432 Additional Sessions Judge, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses corroborated each other. The accused also admitted the recovery of the liquor from their vehicle in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was not possible to join any independent witness because of the chance recovery. The Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had already imposed less than the minimum imprisonment, and no further leniency was required in the matter. Hence, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed. 9. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused have filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The statements of the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The Maalkhana register did not contain any entry regarding the receipt of the registration certificate and driving license. The recovery was effected from a car, and the police failed to comply with the requirements of Section 100(4) of the Cr.P.C., which is fatal to the prosecution's case. Rakesh Kumar 7 2026:HHC:17432 (PW6), the owner of the car, did not support the prosecution's case, which was fatal to the prosecution's version. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 10. I have heard Mr Ritesh Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 11. Mr Ritesh Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioners/accused, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. There are material contradictions in the statements of official witnesses, which made the prosecution's case suspect. The police had not joined any independent witnesses, which is fatal to the prosecution's case. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 12. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the accused admitted in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the 8 2026:HHC:17432 Cr.P.C. that they were present in the vehicle from which the recovery of liquor was made. This admission corroborated the prosecution's version, and the learned Courts below had rightly relied upon it. The contradictions pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioners/accused are minor and bound to come with the time due to failure of memory. Both the Courts have concurrently found that the accused were found in possession of the liquor, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 13. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207- 9 2026:HHC:17432 “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695: “14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. 15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has 10 2026:HHC:17432 been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) “12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well- founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.” 16. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC 11 2026:HHC:17432 OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169: “12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) 5. … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …” 13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court 12 2026:HHC:17432 in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) “14. … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 17. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205: “16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure 13 2026:HHC:17432 Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. 17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.” 18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 19. Constable Maan Singh (PW1), ASI Prem Singh (PW5) and ASI Sandeep Kumar (PW8) supported the prosecution case in their examination-in-chief. Learned Counsel for the petitioners/accused submitted that their testimonies contain the following contradictions: – 1) As per the prosecution's case, Rukka was sent by Constable Maan Singh (PW1). However, Constable Maan Singh (PW1) stated that he did not know who had carried the rukka to the Police Station and who had brought the file to the spot. 2) ASI Prem Singh (PW5) stated that he had no knowledge about the registration number of the motorcycle or who had owned the motorcycle. ASI Sandeep Kumar stated that the motorcycle belonged to Prem Singh and that he was driving it. The government motorcycle was being driven by Maan Singh (PW1). 3) Maan Singh (PW1) stated that the accused person did not have the documents of the vehicle, whereas Sandeep 14 2026:HHC:17432 Kumar (PW8) stated that the registration certificate and driving license of the vehicle were seized by the Police vide memo (Ext.PW2/A), which were sent to the Police Station along with the case property. Further, no entry was made in the Malkhaana Register about the receipt of the registration certificate and driving license. 4)The prosecution asserted that the recovery was effected at a lonely and deserted place. ASI Prem Singh (PW5) stated that the road was busy. ASI Sandep Kumar (PW8) stated that the bags were brought from the shop Sidhpur Bazaar by HHC Sanjay Kumar. ASI Prem Singh (PW5) stated that bags were brought from the nearby shop. However, no independent person was called from the shop. 20. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, that the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case unless they shake the core of the testimonies. It was observed: - “32. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for the appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for the appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as follows: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly, keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the 15 2026:HHC:17432 witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eye-witness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an 16 2026:HHC:17432 element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events that take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill in details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be 17 2026:HHC:17432 sufficient to amount to a contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the latter statement, even if the latter statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217: 1983 Cri LJ 1096: (AIR 1983 SC 753) Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525: AIR 1999 SC 3717 and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP (AIR 1959 SC 1012)” 21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the 18 2026:HHC:17432 evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202], this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such a discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The 19 2026:HHC:17432 credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205: 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961]. 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case that the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055]]. 32. These are variations that would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 people can hardly be expected to state a minute- by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all their attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide them with medical aid and inform the police. The statements that are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an 20 2026:HHC:17432 attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777].” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685], this Court held: (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timings as to when they had seen the scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statements of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238], this Court held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) 21 2026:HHC:17432 “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 22. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817, wherein it was observed: “17. It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed to the hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence, armed with guns, and they caused the injury to the informant, PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457. This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as follows: 22 2026:HHC:17432 "42. Only such omissions that amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 23. The contradictions pointed out in the present case do not relate to the core of the prosecution case but to the matters surrounding the recovery, which are bound to come with time. Further, the learned Courts below rightly held that the accused had admitted the recovery of the liquor from their car and the fact that the accused Sanjay was driving the car and Nek Ram was travelling in it. Therefore, these contradictions will become insignificant. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon 23 2026:HHC:17432 the statement of the accused recorded under section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed at page 742: “51. That brings us to the question of whether such a statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is administered to the accused, the statements made by the accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers. Then comes sub-section (4), which reads: “313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed.” Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section. Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4) permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari (1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This Court, in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951 SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held that if the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observations at pages 684-685: 24 2026:HHC:17432 “Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before the accused is called upon for his defence shall put questions to the accused person for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. Examination under Section 342 is primarily to be directed to those matters on which evidence has been led for the prosecution to ascertain from the accused his version or explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or the trial. If the accused person in his examination under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the offence charged against him the court may, relying upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he does not confess and in explaining circumstance appearing in the evidence against him sets up his own version and seeks to explain his conduct pleading that he has committed no offence, the statement of the accused can only be taken into consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied) Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section (1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the presence of the accused is dispensed with, his examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with. Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub- section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim reproduction of the old sub- 25 2026:HHC:17432 section (3). Therefore, the aforestated observations apply with equal force.” 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot form the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244: 27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58, para 23) “23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence. According to this statement, the injury that the appellant received was caused by the appellant's attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was contradicted by the statement of the accused himself under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The injury found on his body when he 26 2026:HHC:17432 was examined by the doctor on 13-10-1961, negatives of both these versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so considerable as to attract the attention of Ram Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one as his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More than that, the knife which was discovered on his person was found to have been stained with blood according to the report of the Chemical Examiner. According to the post- mortem report, this knife could have been the cause of the injuries on the victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion that the appellant was the person responsible for the crime.” (emphasis supplied) 25. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213, that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: - “52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put material evidence to the accused under Section 313 CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is 27 2026:HHC:17432 to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the accused takes advantage of this opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313 CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.” 26. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was held at page 761: - 24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement, if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries by the firing by the accused and his associates, that admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held that since no oath is administered to the accused, the statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of course, shall not render himself liable to punishment merely on the basis of answers given while he was being examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4) says that the answers given by the accused in response to his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951 SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933 held that the 28 2026:HHC:17432 answers given by the accused under Section 313 examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR 678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to the commission of the offence with which he is charged, the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to convict him. 25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27) “27. The statement made in defence by the accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a part of such statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his conviction.” In this connection, reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions would indicate that the statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not making the statement on oath, but all the same the confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led by the prosecution. 26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved, and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC.” 29 2026:HHC:17432 27. Therefore, the admissions made by the accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. could have been used to lend corroboration to the prosecution's case, and once the prosecution's version was admitted by the accused, the minor contradictions related to the periphery of the case would become insignificant. 28. It was submitted that the recovery was effected from a car and provisions of Section 100 (4) of the Cr.P.C. would apply to the present case. The prosecution had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 100 (4) of the Cr.P.C., and the prosecution's case is doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The learned courts below had rightly pointed out that the police had no prior information, and it was a case of chance recovery. The police became suspicious of the conduct of the accused and searched the car, leading to the recovery of the liquor. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh Versus State of Punjab 1999 (1) SCC 130 that the police party is under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty, and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. It was observed: 30 2026:HHC:17432 “3. Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us through the evidence recorded by the prosecution, as also the judgment under appeal. Except for the comment that the prosecution is supported by two police officials and not by any independent witness, no other comment against the prosecution is otherwise offered. This comment is not of any value since the police party was on patrolling duty, and they were not required to take along independent witnesses to support recovery if and when made. It has come to the evidence of ASI Jangir Singh that after the recovery had been effected, some people had passed by. Even so, obtaining their counter-signatures on the documents already prepared would not have lent any further credence to the prosecution’s version.” 29. It was laid down by this court in Chet Ram Vs State, Criminal Appeal No. 151/2006, decided on 25.7.2018, that the non- association of independent witnesses in a case of chance recovery is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. It was observed: - “(A)appellant was intercepted, and a search of his bag was conducted on suspicion, when he turned back and tried to flee, on seeing the police. Police officials did not have any prior information, nor did they have any reason to believe that he was carrying any contraband. They overpowered him when he tried to run away and suspected that he might be carrying some contraband in his bag. Therefore, the bag was searched, and Charas was recovered. After the recovery of Charas, there was hardly any need to associate with any person from the nearby village because there was nothing to be witnessed. It is by now well settled that non-association of independent witnesses or non-support of the prosecution’s version by independent witnesses where they are associated, by itself, is not a ground to acquit an accused. It is also well-settled that the testimony of 31 2026:HHC:17432 official witnesses, including police officials, carries the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that Courts have to be more circumspect while appreciating the evidence of official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of official witnesses, in a case where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. Of course, it is only the material contradictions and not the trivial ones, which assume significance.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Raveen Kumar v. State of H.P., (2021) 12 SCC 557: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 230: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 869 that non-association of the independent witnesses will not be fatal to the prosecution case. However, the Court will have to scrutinise the statements of prosecution witnesses carefully. It was observed on page 566: “(C) Need for independent witnesses 19. It would be gainsaid that the lack of independent witnesses is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. [Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8 SCC 732: 1998 SCC (Cri) 134: AIR 1998 SC 201, para 9] However, such omissions cast an added duty on courts to adopt a greater degree of care while scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which, if found reliable, can form the basis of a successful conviction.” 32 2026:HHC:17432 31. This position was reiterated in Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 9 SCC 627: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 730, wherein it was observed at page 633: “12. It is settled law that the testimony of the official witnesses cannot be rejected on the grounds of non- corroboration by independent witnesses. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, examination of independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s case [see Pardeep Kumar [State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 808: (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 420]]. 13. In the recent decision in Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767], while considering somewhat similar submission of non-examination of independent witnesses, while dealing with the offence under the NDPS Act, in paras 15 and 16, this Court observed and held as under: (SCC p. 568) “15. The judgment in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1191], relied on by the counsel for the respondent State, also supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that merely because the prosecution did not examine any independent witness would not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the accused was falsely implicated. The evidence of official witnesses cannot be distrusted and disbelieved merely on account of their official status. 16. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil, (2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri) 248], it was held as under: (SCC p. 655) 33 2026:HHC:17432 ‘It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust. It is time now to start placing at least initial trust in the actions and the documents made by the police. At any rate, the court cannot start with the presumption that the police records are untrustworthy. As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the other way around. That official acts of the police have been regularly performed is a wise principle of presumption and recognised even by the legislature.’ 32. Similar is the judgment of this Court in Balwinder Singh & Anr. Vs State of H.P., 2020 Criminal L.J. 1684, wherein it was held: - “3. (iii) Learned defence counsel contended that in the instant case, no independent witness was associated by the Investigating Officer; therefore, the prosecution case cannot be said to have been proved by it in accordance with provisions of the Act. Learned defence counsel, in support of his contention, relied upon the titled Krishan Chand versus State of H.P.,2017 4 CriCC 531 3(iii)(d). It is by now well settled that a prosecution case cannot be disbelieved only because the independent witnesses were not associated.” 33. This position was reiterated in Kallu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 197: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1223, wherein it was held at page 204: - “17. The issue raised regarding conviction solely relying upon the testimony of police witnesses, without procuring any independent witness, recorded by the two courts, has also been dealt with by this Court in Surinder Kumar [Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 34 2026:HHC:17432 563 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 767] holding that merely because independent witnesses were not examined, the conclusion could not be drawn that the accused was falsely implicated. Therefore, the said issue is also well settled and in particular, looking at the facts of the present case, when the conduct of the accused was found suspicious, and a chance recovery from the vehicle used by him is made from a public place and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant cannot avail any benefit on this issue. In our view, the concurrent findings of the courts do not call for interference.” 34. A similar view was taken in Kehar Singh v. State of H.P., 2024 SCC OnLine HP 2825, wherein it was observed: 16. As regards non-association of the independent witnesses, it is now well settled that non-association of the independent witnesses or non-support of the prosecution version by independent witnesses itself is not a ground for acquittal of the Appellants/accused. It is also well-settled that the testimonies of the official witnesses, including police officials, carry the same evidentiary value as the testimony of any other person. The only difference is that the Court has to be most circumspect while appreciating the evidence of the official witnesses to rule out the possibility of false implication of the accused, especially when such a plea is specifically raised by the defence. Therefore, while scrutinising the evidence of the official witnesses, in cases where independent witnesses are not associated, contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimonies of such witnesses are required to be taken into account and given due weightage unless satisfactorily explained. However, the contradiction must be a material and not trivial one, which alone would assume significance. 17. Evidently, this is a case of chance recovery; therefore, the police party was under no obligation to join independent witnesses while going on patrolling duty, 35 2026:HHC:17432 and the association of any person after effecting the recovery would be meaningless. Xxxx 19. A similar reiteration of law can be found in the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Avtar @ Tarri v. State of H.P., (2022) Supreme HP 345, wherein it was observed as under: — “24. As regards the second leg of the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it cannot be said to be of much relevance in the given facts of the case. The fact situation was that the police party had laid the ‘nakka’ and immediately thereafter had spotted the appellant at some distance, who got perplexed and started walking back. The conduct of the appellant was sufficient to raise suspicion in the minds of police officials. At that stage, had the appellant not been apprehended immediately, the police could have lost the opportunity to recover the contraband. Looking from another angle, the relevance of independent witnesses could be there when such witnesses were immediately available or had already been associated at the place of ‘nakka’. These, however, are not mandatory conditions and will always depend on the fact situation of each and every case. The reason is that once the person is apprehended and is with the police, a subsequent association of independent witnesses may not be of much help. In such events, the manipulation, if any, cannot be ruled out.” Xxxx 22. A similar reiteration of law can be found in a very recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. A. No. 202 of 2020, titled Dillo Begum v. State of H.P., decided on 27.03.2024.” 35. In any case, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 299: 1994 36 2026:HHC:17432 SCC (Cri) 634: 1994 SCC OnLine SC 126 that non-compliance with a provision of Section 100 (4) of the Cr.P.C. is not fatal to the prosecution case, unless some prejudice has been caused to the accused. It was observed at page 309: “6. At this juncture, we may also dispose of one of the contentions that failure to comply with the provisions of CrPC in respect of search and seizure, even up to that stage, would also vitiate the trial. This aspect has been considered in a number of cases, and it has been held that the violation of the provisions, particularly that of Sections 100, 102, 103 or 165 CrPC, strictly per se does not vitiate the prosecution case. If there is such a violation, what the courts have to see is whether any prejudice was caused to the accused and in appreciating the evidence and other relevant factors, the courts should bear in mind that there was such a violation and, from that point of view, evaluate the evidence on record. Under Section 100 CrPC, the officer conducting a search under a warrant should call upon two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situated or of any other locality if no such inhabitant of the said locality is available or is willing to be a witness to the search, to attend and witness the search. Section 165 CrPC lays down that whenever an officer-in-charge of a police station or a police officer making an investigation has reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence which he is authorised to investigate may be found in any place within the limits of the police station of which he is in- charge, or to which he is attached, and that such thing cannot in his opinion be otherwise obtained without undue delay, such officer after recording in writing the grounds of his belief and specifying in such writing, may proceed to search or to cause search to be made. Section 37 2026:HHC:17432 165(4) lays down that the provisions of this Code as to search warrants and the general provisions as to searches contained in Section 100 shall, so far as may be, apply to a search made under Section 165 also. The scope of these two sections has been examined in a number of cases. In State of Punjab v. Wassan Singh [(1981) 2 SCC 1: 1981 SCC (Cri) 292], this Court has clearly held that irregularity in a search cannot vitiate the seizure of the articles. In Sunder Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1956 SC 411: 1956 Cri LJ 801], it is held that irregularity cannot vitiate the trial unless the accused has been prejudiced by the defect, and it is also held that if reliable local witnesses are not available, the search would not be vitiated. In State of Maharashtra v. P.K. Pathak [(1980) 2 SCC 259: 1980 SCC (Cri) 428: AIR 1980 SC 1224], it is held that the absence of any independent witness from the locality to witness the search does not affect the trial and the conviction of the accused under the Customs Act. In Radha Kishan v. State of U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 822: 1963 Supp (1) SCR 408 : (1963) 2 LLJ 667], it is held that irregularity in a search would, however, cast a duty upon the court to scrutinise the evidence regarding the search very carefully. In Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [AIR 1956 SC 44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925: 1956 Cri LJ 140] it is held that when the salutory provisions have not been complied with, it may, however, affect the weight of the evidence in support of the search or may furnish a reason for disbelieving the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the prosecution properly explains such circumstance which made it impossible for it to comply with these provisions. In the State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni [(1980) 4 SCC 669: 1981 SCC (Cri) 98: AIR 1980 SC 593], after referring to the above- mentioned decisions, this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 673, para 9) “Taking the first contention first, it may be observed that the police had powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure to search and seize this gold if they had reason to believe that a cognizable offence had been 38 2026:HHC:17432 committed in respect thereof. Assuming arguendo that the search was illegal, then also, it will not affect the validity of the seizure and further investigation by the Customs Authorities or the validity of the trial which followed on the complaint of the Assistant Collector of Customs.” 7. It therefore emerges that non-compliance of these provisions, i.e. Sections 100 and 165 CrPC, would amount to an irregularity and the effect of the same on the main case depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Of course, in such a situation, the court has to consider whether any prejudice has been caused to the accused and also examine the evidence in respect of the search in the light of the fact that these provisions have not been complied with and further consider whether the weight of evidence is in any manner affected because of the non-compliance. It is well settled that the testimony of a witness is not to be doubted or discarded merely on the ground that he happens to be an official, but as a rule of caution, and depending upon the circumstances of the case, the courts look for independent corroboration. This again depends on the question whether the official has deliberately failed to comply with these provisions, or failure was due to lack of time and opportunity to associate some independent witnesses with the search and strictly comply with these provisions. In Deepak Ghanshyam Naik v. State of Maharashtra [1989 Cri LJ 1181: 1989 Mah LJ 276 (Bom)] a case arising under the NDPS Act, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the effect of non-compliance of Section 100(4) namely that two or more independent respectable inhabitants of the locality were not called to be present during the search and that on the other hand two Panchas of different locality were called to be present. The Division Bench considered the explanation that Parnaka was at a distance of half a kilometre from the place of occurrence, and they called the Panch witnesses from that place and that they could not call somebody present 39 2026:HHC:17432 on the road where the incident took place and held that there was no material to hold that the Panch witnesses from Parnaka were in any way motivated to falsely implicate the accused. In Sunil Kumar v. State [1990 Cri LJ 414 (Del)] again a case arising under the NDPS Act, the Delhi High Court while considering the scope of Section 42 of the NDPS Act and Section 100(4) of CrPC observed that failure to associate independent persons in the search in a given situation would not affect the prosecution case in toto and the same cannot be thrown out or doubted on that ground alone. In this case, it has also been observed that provisions of Sections 41 or 42 would not be attracted at this stage when the police had secret information that some persons would be reaching in a public place while in transit, and the information was not about the specific presence of contraband but was only about the likelihood of such articles being brought. It thus emerges that when the police, while acting under the provisions of CrPC as empowered therein and while exercising surveillance or investigating into other offences, had to carry out the arrests or searches, they would be acting under the provisions of CrPC. At this stage, if there is any non-compliance of the provisions of Section 100 or Section 165 CrPC that by itself cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution case outright. The effect of such non-compliance will have a bearing on the appreciation of evidence of the official witness and other material depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case…. 36. A similar view was taken by this Court in State of H.P. v. Sukh Ram, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 95: 2003 Cri LJ 219, wherein it was observed at page 220: 13. Even otherwise, failure to comply with the provisions of Section 100(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, will not invariably be fatal to the prosecution. This is because the 40 2026:HHC:17432 circumstances of the case may be such as to make it totally unreasonable and impracticable, if not impossible, to procure the presence of such witnesses. The possibility of such a circumstance has been noted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Maharashtra v. P.K. Pathak, (1980) 2 SCC 259: AIR 1980 SC 1224: (1980 Cri LJ 923). Nevertheless, it would be for the prosecution to establish, on the facts and in the circumstances of each case, that meeting the requirements of Section 100(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, pertaining to the association of two or more independent and respectable persons with the conducting of a search was not possible or practicable. (See: Smt. Prem Lata v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1987) Cri LJ 1539 (Him Pra)). 14. In Sunder Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 411: (1956 Cri LJ 801), it was held that, assuming that the two witnesses associated during the course of the search were not respectable inhabitants of the locality, that circumstance would not invalidate the search. It would only affect the weight of the evidence in support of the search and recovery. Hence, at the highest, the irregularity in the search and recovery, insofar as the terms of S. 103, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (now Section 100(4), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) had not been fully complied with, would not affect the legality of the proceedings. It only affected the weight of evidence, which is a matter for the Courts of fact to see. 37. In the present case, the accused/petitioners have not claimed any prejudice to them; rather, they admitted their presence in the car and the recovery of liquor from the car. Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because of non-compliance with Section 100 (4) of the CrPC. 41 2026:HHC:17432 38. It was submitted that the case property did not have the seal when it was produced before the Court. This submission will not help the accused. The learned courts below had rightly pointed out that the recovery of the liquor was not in dispute. The integrity of the case property was established by the certificate issued by the chemical examiner, in which it was stated that the samples were properly sealed and the seals were tallied with the specimen seal sent separately. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P 2007 HLJ 707, where the report of analysis shows that the seals were intact, and the prosecution's claim that the case property remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed: “A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner, and the sample seal separately sent and tallied with the specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions were separately taken and sent to the expert also.” 39. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held: “It has also come on evidence that to date the parcels of the sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, the seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves and establishes that there was no tampering with the 42 2026:HHC:17432 previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and the sample received by the analyst for chemical examination contained the same opium, which was recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to the appellant.” 40. In State of Punjab vs. Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402, the High Court had concluded that there could have been tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that case property was produced in the Court, and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed: “The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained poppy husk and accordingly the same were seized after taking samples therefrom, which were properly sealed. The defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure and seal put in the samples were in any manner tampered with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner. There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having been found intact at the time of the examination by the Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in his report, a mere observation by the High 43 2026:HHC:17432 Court that the case property might have been tampered with, in our opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot take the place of proof. 17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 in which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the samples were intact till they were handed over to the Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal to the prosecution's case. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case in this regard. 18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.” 41. Similar is the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563, wherein it was held: - 10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, Joginder Singh, ASI to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed over the case property for producing the same before the Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after such production was not examined, as such link evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the case property before the Court, he returned the case property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13, the concerned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after 44 2026:HHC:17432 verifying the seals on the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no judicial malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by him did not arise at all. 11. Further, he has returned the case property, after production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter, the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way, affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied) 42. Thus, the integrity of the case property till the analysis was established by the report of analysis. Once it was proved by the report of the analysis that the samples contained proof alcohol in them, the absence of a seal on the case property produced before the Court would become insignificant. Further, the witnesses had duly identified the case property in the Court, and simply because the seal was found to be broken cannot lead to an inference that the case property was tampered with. 43. It was submitted that Rakesh Kumar (PW6) has not supported the prosecution's case. This fact will not affect the 45 2026:HHC:17432 prosecution's case. He only stated that he had not engaged any driver to drive the car, and he used to drive the car on his own. The accused have not disputed the fact that Sanjay was driving the car and Nek Ram was travelling in the car. Therefore, the statement made by the owner that he had not engaged any person to drive the car or that he used to drive the car himself will not make the prosecution suspect the case. 44. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the evidence and the judgment of conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, cannot be faulted. 45. The learned Trial Court had submitted the case file to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate because the offence was punishable with a minimum imprisonment of three years and a fine of not less than one lakh rupees. The Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for four months each and pay a fine of ₹5000/- each, which is less than the minimum prescribed sentence. The Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has already shown leniency to the accused, and no further leniency is possible in the matter. 46 2026:HHC:17432 Therefore, the sentence imposed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court, cannot be interfered with. 46. No other point was urged. 47. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and it is dismissed. 48. The present revision stands disposed of, and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. 49. The record of the learned Courts below be returned with a copy of the judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th May, 2026 (Nikita)