1 2026:CGHC:20207 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 381 of 2014 Jagdish Prasad S/o Ramadhar Yadav Aged About 68 Years R/o Sivani, Tah. Janjgir, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1. Ajit Suryawanshi S/o Ramsai @ Ghoghawa Suryawanshi Aged About 39 Years R/o Near Mahila Vridhashram, Janjgir, Tah. Janjgir, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., Chhattisgarh 2. State Of Chhattisgarh Thru- Collector, Janjgir, Tah. Janjgir, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 3. Geeta Bai W/o Kashi Ram Suryawanshi Aged About 40 Years R/o Khisora, Tah. Akaltara, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 4. Bharat Lal S/o Ramprasad Suryawanshi Aged About 58 Years R/o Near Devidai Mandir, Bheema Talab, Janjgir, Tah. Janjgir, Distt. Janjgir-Champa C.G., District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Mr. Paras Mani Shrivas, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. G.A. For Respondent No. 4 : Mr. Somnath Verma, Advocate JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.05.01 17:24:51 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 30.04.2026 1. The plaintiff/appellant has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 08.07.2014 passed by the Learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 38-A/2014 (Jagdish Prasad Vs. Ajit Suryawanshi & Ors.) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 31.10.2011 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 141A/2007 (Jagdish Prasad Vs. Ajit Suryawanshi & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/ appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of land bearing Khasra No. 3434/4, admeasuring 0.03 acre, situated at Village Janjgir, P.H. No. 41, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”) pleading inter alia that the suit property originally belonged to Ramprasad S/o Bodhiram Suryavanshi, which was purchased by Thakur Surendra Pal Singh by registered sale deed dated 12.01.1970, who thereafter sold the same to the plaintiff by registered sale 3 deed dated 03.03.1980 for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/-, pursuant to which the plaintiff claims to have acquired title and continuous possession over the suit property. It is further pleaded that when the plaintiff commenced construction over the suit property in the year 2007, the defendants interfered with his possession and denied his title, despite having no subsisting right therein, as defendant No. 3 had already alienated his land. 3. Defendants No. 3 and 4, while contesting the suit, denied the averments made in the plaint and contended that no land bearing Khasra No. 3434/4 exists on the spot and that the land claimed by the plaintiff actually forms part of Khasra No. 3434/1, which is owned by Defendant No. 3. It was further pleaded that Defendant No. 4 is the authorized representative of Defendant No. 3 and that, pursuant to an order of the Tehsildar, Janjgir, demarcation of the land was carried out on 09.03.2007, wherein the plaintiff was informed that the alleged suit land does not exist on the spot. It was also contended that the land in question is the ancestral property of Defendant No. 3, over which he has constructed a house, and that no agreement has been executed in favour of Swatantra Kumar. The defendants further alleged that the plaintiff is attempting to rely on forged documents to lay claim over their land and that the suit has not been properly valued. 4 On these grounds, dismissal of the suit with costs was prayed for. 4. After framing the issues, the learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, held that the plaintiff failed to prove his title and possession over the suit land, as there were material discrepancies regarding the identity of the land (Khasra No. 3434/4 vis-à-vis 3434/1) and no evidence to establish its conversion or existence. Consequently, the plaintiff was held not entitled to declaration and permanent injunction, and the suit was dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 31.10.2011 the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal by the plaintiff. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the judgments of both the Courts are perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. It is contended that the appellant has duly proved his title and possession over the suit land through a registered sale deed and supporting evidence, but the same has been wrongly disbelieved. The dismissal of the suit on the ground 5 of non-existence of the land is erroneous, and thus the impugned judgments are liable to be set aside. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 8. The submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Both the courts have rightly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and have recorded concurrent findings, which do not suffer from perversity or illegality. It is evident that the appellant has failed to establish his title and possession over the suit land. The alleged sale deed relied upon by the appellant is itself doubtful, as it does not contain proper description or identification of the suit land, thereby rendering it unreliable. In absence of clear particulars of the property, no valid right or title can be said to have been conveyed. The finding of both the Courts that the existence and identity of the suit land has not been proved is based on proper appreciation of evidence and does not call for interference. Accordingly, the contention of the appellant deserves to be rejected. 9. Both the learned Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently held, upon proper appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence, that the plaintiff has 6 failed to establish his title and possession over the suit land bearing Khasra No. 3434/4. It has been consistently found that the plaintiff could not prove, by any cogent or reliable evidence, that the land originally purchased as Khasra No. 3434/1 was subsequently converted or renumbered as Khasra No. 3434/4, and even the vendor was unable to explain such change. The revenue records produced were not duly proved in accordance with law, and no supporting evidence, such as examination of the concerned Patwari, was adduced. Further, the identity and even the existence of the suit land on the spot remained doubtful, as the evidence indicated that the land in question corresponded to Khasra No. 3434/1 belonging to the defendants. In such circumstances, it was held that no valid title accrued to the plaintiff under the alleged sale deed, and he failed to prove lawful possession. Consequently, the plaintiff was held not entitled to the reliefs of declaration and permanent injunction. Though the suit was found to be properly valued and court fee duly paid, both the Courts concluded that the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proof, and accordingly, the suit and the appeal were dismissed. 10. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal 7 involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 11. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ plaintiff failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 12. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 14. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the 8 appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 15. Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has held thus at paras 31 to 35 :- “31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails. 32. Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under 9 Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs., wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 33. In Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others, a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 34. Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion. 10 35. Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors., it was emphasized that the fact remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it stands vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for interference has been made out in the present case.” 16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 17. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, as it does not involve any question of law, much less 11 any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 18. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti