1 2026:CGHC:20062 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 318 of 2016 1. Ramdhan Died Through His Legal Heirs 1.a Firantin Bai, Wd/o Late Ramdhan Suryavnshi, Aged About 75 Years, R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , Chhattisgarh 1.b Ratan Lal, S/o Late Ramdhan Suryavnshi, Aged About 50 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh 1.c Rajkumar S/o Late Ramdhan Suryavnshi, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh 1.d Meva Bai, D/o Late Ramdhan Suryavnshi, Aged About 43 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh 1. e Shail Bai D/o Late Ramdhan Suryavnshi, Aged About 34 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh 1.f Jay Kumar S/o Late Ramdhan Suryavnshi, Aged About 34 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh 1.g Shail Kumar S/o Late Ramdhan Suryavnshi, Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh. JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.05.01 10:43:21 +0530 2 ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Yashwat Kumar S/o Accheram Gada, Aged About 29 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , Chhattisgarh 2. Basant Kumar S/o Accheram Gada, Aged About 27 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 3. Aruna, D/o Accheram Gada, Aged About 18 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 4. Karuna, D/o Accheram Gada, Aged About 16 Years Through Her Natural Guardian Mother Braj Bai, Wd/o Late Accheram Gada, R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 5. Braj Bai Wd/o Accheram Gada, Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 6. Ratri Bai, D/o Dwarika Prasad Gada, Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 7. Bina Ram D/o Durga Prasad Gada, Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 8. Sita Bai Wd/o Durga Prasad Gada, Aged About 52 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 9. Sonu Ram D/o Durga Prasad Gada, Aged About 17 Years Through Natural Guardian Sita Bai Wd/o Gurga Prasad Gada, R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 10. Rajni Bai D/o Durga Prasad Gada, Aged About 23 Years R/o 3 Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 11. Laxmin Bai D/o Durga Prasad Gada, Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 12. Phool Bai, Wd/o Dwarika Prasad Gada, Aged About 72 Years R/o Village Sukli, Tahsil Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh , District : Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh 13. Dhiraj Puri Goswami, S/o Vasudev Puri, Aged About 29 Years R/o Gurunanak Chowk Torwa, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh , District : Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 14. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Janjgir, District Janjgir Champa, Chhattisgarh..........Defendants , District : Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. F.S. Khare, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. aman Tamboli, P.L. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 30.04.2026 1. The plaintiffs/appellants have preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 05.03.2016 passed by the Learned 1st Additional District Judge, Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 18-A/2015 (Ramdhan Vs. Yashwant Kumar & Ors.) 4 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 08.11.2011 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 50-A/2009 (Ramdhan Vs. Yashwant Kumar & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/ appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction in respect of agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 1312, admeasuring 0.92 acre, situated at Village Sukli, P.H. No. 39/44 (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”) pleading inter alia that the suit property was originally owned by Dwarika S/o Fadal along with other co-sharers, namely Birjha Bai (widow of Fadal), Durga S/o Fatte and Santra Bai (widow of Fatte), who were members of a joint family, wherein Dwarika acted as Karta. It is pleaded that on 19.11.1977, Dwarika, acting as Karta of the joint family, entered into an agreement to sell the suit property in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/-, received the said amount and executed a receipt-cum- agreement, also delivering possession of the suit property to the plaintiff in part performance thereof. Despite repeated requests, Dwarika did not execute the sale deed during his lifetime and died in the year 2007. Thereafter, his legal representatives, along with other co-sharers, who were 5 bound by the said agreement, instead of executing the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, executed a registered sale deed dated 02.02.2008 in favour of defendant No. 13, who was allegedly aware of the prior agreement. It is further pleaded that the plaintiff has remained in continuous and peaceful possession of the suit property and has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract; however, the execution of the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 13 amounts to refusal on the part of the defendants to perform the agreement, giving rise to the cause of action for filing the suit. 3. (i)Defendants No. 1 to 12 have not filed any written statement in response to the plaint. (ii) Defendant No. 13 contested the matter by filing a written statement, wherein he denied all the averments made in the plaint and pleaded that he had purchased the suit property from the defendants for valid consideration. It was further asserted that a sale deed had been duly executed in his favour and that possession of the suit property was also delivered to him. 4. After framing the issues, the learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, held that the plaintiff failed to prove the execution of the agreement to sell dated 19.11.1977, as the document was not duly proved 6 in accordance with law. It was further held that the suit property being joint family property, there was no evidence to establish that Dwarika was the Karta or had authority to bind other co-owners. The Court also found that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, as no steps were taken for a long period. Further, the plaintiff failed to prove his possession over the suit property. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 08.11.2011 the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal by the plaintiff. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the findings recorded by both the Courts are perverse and contrary to the evidence available on record. It is contended that the agreement to sell (Ex. P/1) has been duly proved by the appellant, but the Courts have erroneously held otherwise and further committed an error in treating the document as inadmissible on the ground of insufficient stamping. It is also 7 submitted that the Courts failed to properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence and wrongly held that late Dwarika was not the Karta of the family or that the agreement was not for family necessity. It is further contended that the appellant has been in continuous and peaceful possession of the suit property since 1977, yet the Courts erred in denying the relief of permanent injunction. On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned judgments and decrees be set aside. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 8. The submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellants do not merit acceptance. Both the Courts have rightly held that Ex.P/1, being insufficiently stamped, is inadmissible in evidence and cannot be relied upon for proving the alleged agreement. Further, no satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the appellant for the inordinate delay in instituting the suit after the alleged agreement of the year 1977, which clearly disentitles him to the discretionary relief sought. The findings recorded by both the Courts are thus based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not call for any interference. 8 9. Further, the First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, concurred with the findings of the trial Court and held that the suit property was admittedly a joint family property recorded in the names of Dwarika and other co-sharers. Though Dwarika was stated to be the Karta of the joint family, the Court found that there was no evidence to establish that the alleged agreement to sell dated 19.11.1977 was executed for legal necessity or for the benefit of the joint family, and the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving the same. The Court further held that the alleged agreement (Ex. P/1) was not proved in accordance with law, as the document was not properly stamped and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. It was also noticed that none of the attesting witnesses or the scriber were examined and the evidence led by the plaintiff suffered from material contradictions. It was further observed that the agreement being of the year 1977 and the suit having been filed in the year 2009, there was an inordinate delay of more than 30 years, for which no satisfactory explanation was furnished. Accordingly, it was held that the plaintiff failed to establish his readiness and willingness and that the claim was barred by limitation. On the aspect of possession, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove lawful possession over the suit property. In view of the aforesaid findings, the First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and 9 dismissed the appeal, holding that the findings recorded by the trial Court were neither contrary to law nor to the facts on record. 10. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 11. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 12. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of 10 fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 14. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 15. Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has held thus at paras 31 to 35 :- “31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate 11 Court has no legs to stand and fails. 32. Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs., wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 33. In Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others, a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 12 34. Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion. 35. Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors., it was emphasized that the fact remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it stands vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for interference has been made out in the present case.” 16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case 13 is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 17. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, as it does not involve any question of law, much less any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 18. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti