1 2026:CGHC:20535 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 238 of 2016 1. Bhiman Das S/o Mangalchand Satnami, Aged About 29 Years R/o Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2. Geshan Bai D/o Mangalchand Satnami, Aged About 40 Years R/o Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh, District : Balodabazar- Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 3. Kalash Bai D/o Mangalchand Satnami, Aged About 35 Years R/o Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Mangalchand Andors. S/o Sonkal Satnami, Aged About 65 Years R/o Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2. Bhupendra S/o Mangalchand Satnami, Aged About 20 Years R/o Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 3. Radha Bai W/o Mangalchand Satnami, Aged About 52 Years R/o Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh Sukariya Bai Dead, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 4. Motim Bai D/o Mangalchand Satnami, Aged About 30 Years R/o JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.05.01 17:15:17 +0530 2 Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 5. Arti D/o Mangalchand Satnami, Aged About 25 Years R/o Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 6. Bhagmati D/o Mangalchand Satnami, Aged About 20 Years R/o Chherkadih, P.H. No.27, R.I.C. And Tahsil Palari, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh, District : Balodabazar-Bhathapara, Chhattisgarh 7. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Raipur, District Raipur ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. P.K. Patel, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 01.05.2026 1. The plaintiffs/appellants have preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 16.03.2016 passed by the Learned District Judge, Baloda Bazar, Baloda-Bazar-Bhatapara C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 58- A/2014 (Bhiman Das & Anr. Vs. Mangalchand & Ors.) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 23.07.2014 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 68-A/2011 (Bhiman Das & Anr. 3 Vs. Mangalchand & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/ appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiffs instituted the suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction and possession to the extent of 3/4th share over the land bearing Khasra Nos. 316 and 320/1, admeasuring 1.396 and 0.061 hectares respectively, total area 1.457 hectares, situated at Village Chheskadih, P.H. No. 27, R.I. Circle Palari, Tehsil Palari, District Balodabazar (C.G.) pleading inter alia that suit property was inherited by defendant No. 1 from his father Sonkali, and thus constitutes ancestral property. It is alleged that defendant No. 1 ousted his legally wedded wife Sukariya Bai from the matrimonial home after subjecting her to cruelty and also drove away the plaintiff Bhimandas, and thereafter contracted a second marriage with one Radhabai, with whom he has one son and three daughters. It is further alleged that despite Sukariya Bai being the legally wedded wife, defendant No. 1 has neglected her and the plaintiffs, and is instead maintaining his second wife and children. The plaintiffs came to know that defendant No. 1 is attempting to transfer the suit property in favour of his alleged illegitimate children without effecting any partition in favour of the plaintiffs. It is contended that the plaintiffs, being 4 legitimate children, have a rightful share in the suit property and defendant No. 1 has no authority to alienate the entire property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs further stated that they had approached the Tehsildar, Palari for partition of the suit property, but their application was rejected on the ground that their names were not recorded in the revenue records. Despite issuance of notice through counsel, defendant No. 1 has refused to effect partition and is proceeding to transfer the property in favour of his son Bhupen. 3. (i) Defendant No. 1, while admitting the undisputed facts, has denied all other averments made in the plaint and specifically refuted the allegation of having subjected Sukariya Bai to cruelty or having ousted her from the matrimonial home. It is his case that he had purchased land measuring 1.40 acres from Uttamchand and 0.86 dismil from Fekan Bai in the name of Sukariya Bai and provided the same to her, out of which the plaintiffs and their mother have already alienated 0.08 dismil in favour of Sonkunwar, and the remaining land has been transferred by Sukariya Bai in favour of her son. It is further contended that the land bearing Khasra No. 320/1 admeasuring 0.061 hectare is his self-acquired property. According to him, having already provided approximately 1.75 acres of land to the plaintiffs and their 5 mother, the remaining property exclusively belongs to him along with his second wife and children, and as such, the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest over the suit property and the suit is liable to be dismissed. (ii) Defendants No. 2, 3 and 5 did not file any written statement, and therefore, they were proceeded ex parte. (iii) The remaining defendants No. 4 and 6 to 8 have likewise denied the averments made in the plaint and have contended that prior to institution of the suit, defendant No. 1 had already alienated a portion of land bearing Khasra No. 316 admeasuring 0.870 hectare in favour of Bhupendra by a registered sale deed dated 13.05.2011. It is further pleaded that the remaining land bearing Khasra No. 320/1 was purchased by defendant No. 1 from Sonu Kurmi, which had fallen to his share in partition. According to these defendants, as the plaintiffs have already been allotted their due share, they have no subsisting right, title or interest over the suit property, and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. After framing the issues, the learned trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence,held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the suit property bearing Khasra Nos. 316 and 320/1 is ancestral in nature. The evidence led by the plaintiffs was found to be inconsistent and unsupported by cogent documentary proof, whereas the 6 revenue records indicate the ownership and possession of defendant No. 1. It has further been held that the plaintiffs are not entitled to 3/4th share, separate possession, or permanent injunction, as they could not establish any right, title or interest over the suit property. The registered sale deed dated 13.05.2011 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 has been held to be valid and binding. The Courts have also found that there is no defect of non-joinder of necessary parties and that the suit has been properly valued with requisite court fee. Accordingly, it has been concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove their case even on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, and the suit has rightly been dismissed. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 23.07.2014 the plaintiffs preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal by the plaintiff. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts are illegal, perverse and contrary to the material available on record, as 7 the evidence has not been properly appreciated. It is contended that the suit property is ancestral in nature and the plaintiffs, being the sons of the first wife of defendant No. 1, are entitled to their legitimate share therein. It is further submitted that the sale deed, to the extent it affects the plaintiffs’ share, is not binding upon them, and despite sufficient oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, the Courts have erroneously dismissed the suit. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 8. The First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, concurred with the findings of the trial Court and held that the appellants failed to establish that the suit property bearing Khasra Nos. 316 and 320/1 was ancestral in nature or ever stood in the name of their predecessor, Sonkali. The oral evidence led by the appellants was held to be vague and unreliable, and no cogent documentary evidence was produced to substantiate their claim. The application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for leading additional evidence was also found to be meritless, as the documents sought to be produced did not relate to the suit property and were inconsistent with the record. It has 8 further been observed that despite having knowledge of the sale deed dated 13.05.2011, the appellants did not seek its cancellation. Accordingly, it has been held that the appellants failed to prove their case on their own strength, and no error or infirmity is found in the impugned judgment and decree, which have been rightly affirmed. 9. As far as the submission of learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff with regard to production of certain documents is concerned, such permission cannot be granted as a matter of course, nor can additional evidence be introduced at the whim or convenience of a litigating party. In fact, the general principle is that the appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court and cannot take any evidence in an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC. It is noteworthy to mention here that once trial had concluded and the decree was under challenged in an appeal, the appellants cannot be permitted to fill the gaps in their case by seeking to adduce further material to fortify the claim that was fundamentally flawed. (See : Gobind Singh and Ors. v Union of India and Ors. (Civil Appeal Nos.5168-5169 of 2011 decided on 9-3- 2026). 10. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely 9 limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 11. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 12. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 14. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any 10 concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 15. Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has held thus at paras 31 to 35 :- “31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails. 32. Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself 11 would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs., wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 33. In Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others, a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 34. Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a 12 different conclusion. 35. Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors., it was emphasized that the fact remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it stands vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for interference has been made out in the present case.” 16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 17. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above 13 settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, as it does not involve any question of law, much less any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 18. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti