17-wp-10104-2017.doc Shabnoor IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.10104 OF 2017 Padman Damodar Bhoir & Ors. … Petitioners V/s. The State of Maharashtra Through Principal Secretary & Ors. … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2897 OF 2017 Padman Damodar Bhoir & Ors. … Applicants V/s. The State of Maharashtra Through Principal Secretary & Ors. … Respondents Mr. A. Kulkarni a/w Vishakha Shelar, for the Petitioners. Ms. Swati Sagvekar, for Respondent No.4. Mr. Sunil G. Karandikar, for Respondent Nos.5 and 8. Ms. Mamta Srivastav, AGP, for State – Respondent Nos.1 and 2. CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J. DATED : SEPTEMBER 21, 2026 P.C.: 1. The challenge in the present petition arises from the proceedings initiated under Section 84C of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (“BT & AL Act”). 2. The petitioners claim their title and interest on the basis of a sale deed executed in the year 1976. It is the specific case of the 1 SHABNOOR AYUB PATHAN Digitally signed by SHABNOOR AYUB PATHAN Date: 2026.09.21 17:18:46 +0530 17-wp-10104-2017.doc petitioners that the said sale deed was executed without obtaining the prior permission of the Competent Authority as required under Section 43 of the BT & AL Act. According to the petitioners, the Authorities below failed to properly appreciate that the permission on which the respondents seek to rely was granted only subsequent to the execution of the sale deed in their favour. The principal submission, therefore, is that the validity of the transaction had to be examined with reference to the position prevailing on the date of its execution and that a subsequent permission could not validate a transaction which was otherwise contrary to the statutory requirement. 3. The petitioners have contended that the subsequent grant of permission could not have the effect of curing the initial illegality in the transaction. On this basis, it is submitted that the sale transaction continued to remain open to challenge under the provisions of the BT & AL Act and that the authorities were entitled to exercise the power under Section 84C notwithstanding the considerable period which had elapsed from the date of the transaction. The submission, in substance, is that where the original transaction is alleged to be in breach of a statutory restriction contained in Section 43, the mere passage of time cannot confer validity upon such transaction and cannot take away the statutory power under Section 84C. 4. I have considered the aforesaid submissions in the light of the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. It is apparent from the impugned orders that the Authorities below have considered the scope and 2 17-wp-10104-2017.doc ambit of Section 84C and have also examined the applicability of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71. Upon such consideration, the Authorities have held that although Section 84C does not prescribe any specific period of limitation for exercise of the power, such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonable lapse of time. The Authorities have taken into consideration the fact that the predecessors-in-title of the petitioners were themselves parties to and executants of the sale transaction. Consequently, the petitioners, claiming through such predecessors, cannot contend that the relevant transaction was incapable of being questioned for the entire period during which the statutory authority remained inactive. 5. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is not merely whether the original transaction suffered from any defect on account of absence of prior permission under Section 43. The more immediate question is whether, assuming that such defect existed, the power under Section 84C could have been exercised after an unexplained lapse of approximately 35 years. In considering this question, the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin (supra) assumes significance. The Supreme Court considered the earlier decision in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah, Special Writ Application No. 2770 of 1979, wherein the Court had held that the power under Section 84C was required to be exercised within a reasonable period. On consideration of the statutory scheme and the facts before it, the Supreme Court held that the suo motu power under Section 84C 3 17-wp-10104-2017.doc had not been exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable period. 6. The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that the absence of a prescribed period of limitation in the statutory provision does not confer an unrestricted power upon the authority to reopen a completed transaction at any point of time. Exercise of statutory power must bear a reasonable relationship with the object for which the power has been conferred. A transaction which has remained undisturbed for a substantial period of time cannot ordinarily be reopened merely because the statute does not prescribe a specific period within which the power is required to be exercised. The requirement of exercise within a reasonable period is relevant where the transaction has been acted upon and the parties have altered their position on the basis thereof. 7. In the present case, the sale deed was executed in the year 1976, whereas the proceedings under Section 84C came to be initiated only after a lapse of approximately 35 years. There is no satisfactory explanation on record for such extraordinary delay. More importantly, there is no material placed before this Court to show any circumstance which prevented the competent authority from examining the transaction at an earlier point of time. The fact that the predecessors of the petitioners themselves were parties to the sale transaction is also relevant. The persons through whom the petitioners claim were aware of the transaction and of the circumstances in which the sale deed was executed. The petitioners, therefore, cannot claim a position independent of the 4 17-wp-10104-2017.doc knowledge and conduct of their predecessors for the purpose of sustaining a challenge initiated after such an extraordinary lapse of time. 8. I am also unable to accept the submission that the alleged illegality in the original transaction would justify exercise of the power under Section 84C irrespective of the length of time that has elapsed. The existence of a statutory power and the manner and time within which such power is to be exercised are distinct considerations. Even where the authority is competent to examine whether a transaction is in breach of Section 43, such power cannot be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. 9. The contention regarding the subsequent permission also does not assist the petitioners in overcoming the fundamental difficulty arising from the enormous delay. Whether such subsequent permission had the effect of curing the alleged defect in the original transaction is a matter which may have significance while examining the transaction on its merits. However, before such question can be considered, the exercise of power under Section 84C itself must be shown to have been undertaken within a reasonable period. In the present case, that threshold requirement has not been satisfied. The lapse of 35 years is, in the facts of the present case, wholly disproportionate and remains unexplained. 10. No distinguishing circumstance has been brought on record which would take the present case outside the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin (supra). 5 17-wp-10104-2017.doc The factual circumstance which weighs against the petitioners is that their predecessors were themselves parties to the sale deed and were aware of the transaction from its inception. The authorities were, therefore, justified in examining the delay not merely from the date on which the petitioners acquired their interest, but from the date on which the transaction itself was entered into. The petitioners cannot obtain an advantage merely because they claim through the original parties to the transaction. 11. In these circumstances, I find that the Authorities below have correctly applied the principle governing exercise of power under Section 84C. The conclusion that the proceedings initiated after approximately 35 years could not be sustained is consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The impugned orders do not suffer from any error of jurisdiction or any perversity warranting interference in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 12. For the reasons recorded above, I find no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment and order passed by the Authorities below. The challenge raised by the petitioners, therefore, fails. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 13. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (AMIT BORKAR, J.) 6