P a g e | 1 Date of reserved for orders : 18.08.2026 Date of pronouncement : 03.09.2026 Date of uploading : 10.09.2026 APHC010552372023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) THURSDAY, THE 03rd DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI WRIT PETITION NO: 28631 OF 2023 Between: 1. KHATEEB MUNWAR, age 39 years, Occ. Junior Assistant (terminated), S/o Iqbal Mean, C/o Kothapeta, Beside Post Office, Rapur Village and Mandal, SPSR Nellore District, A.P. - 524408. ...Petitioner AND 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh, , Rep by its Principal Secretary, Minority Welfare Department, A.P. Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Amaravathi, Guntur District, A.P.-522237. 2. A P State Waqf Board, 4th Floor, Imdadghar Waqf Complex, Opp. K.R. Market, Vijayawada, NTR District, A.P.-520001. 3. The Chairperson, A.P. State Waqf Board, 4th Floor, Imdadghar Waqf Complex, Opp. K.R. Market, Vijayawada, NTR District, A.P.-520001. 4. Andhra Pradesh State Waqf Board, Rep by its Chief Executive Officer, Imdadghar Waqf Complex, Opp. K.R. Market, Vijayawada, NTR District, A.P- 520001. ...Respondents P a g e | 2 Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to issue order or direction more particularly in the nature of writ of Mandamus to declare the proceedings F.No.E1/17/2022-A.P., dated 09.12.2022 issued by the 4th respondent terminating the service of the petitioner without conducting proper enquiry, without following service rules as per the provision of Waqf Act is illegal, arbitrary, biased, discriminative un- constitutional against the principals of natural justice and voilating of article 14, 19, 21 Constitution of India and further with consequent direction to set aside the proceedings F.No.E1/17/2022-A.P., dated. 09.12.2022 issued by the 4th respondent and consequently directs the respondents to consider the representation dated. 21.02.2023, 25.04.2023, 25.07.2023, 28.08.2023, 13.10.2023 given by the petitioner to continue the services of the petitioner by regularization of his services on par with others and to settle all benefits entitled by the petitioner including salary from the date of termination 09.12.2022 and to pass IA NO: 1 OF 2023 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to direct the urgent orders by restore the services of petitioner as Junior Assistant in Wakf Board, Vijayawada till pending the disposal of writ petition and pass Counsel for the Petitioner: K V RAGHU VEER Counsel for the Respondents: MOHAMMED GAYASUDDIN Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR SERVICES II Counsel for the Respondents: SHAIK KHAJA BASHA The Court made the following order: P a g e | 3 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI WRIT PETITION NO: 28631 of 2023 O R D E R: 1. This Writ Petition is filed for the following relief: “……to issue order or direction more particularly in the nature of writ of Mandamus to declare the proceedings F.No.E1/17/2022-A.P., dated 09.12.2022 issued by the 4th respondent terminating the service of the petitioner without conducting proper enquiry, without following service rules as per the provision of Waqf Act is illegal, arbitrary, biased, discriminative un-constitutional against the principals of natural justice and voilating of articles 14, 19, 21 of Constitution of India and further with consequent direction to set aside the proceedings F.No.E1/17/2022-A.P., dated 09.12.2022 issued by the 4th respondent and consequently directs the respondents to consider the representations dated. 21.02.2023, 25.04.2023, 25.07.2023, 28.08.2023, 13.10.2023 given by the petitioner to continue the services of the petitioner by regularization of his services on par with others and to settle all benefits entitled by the petitioner including salary from the date of termination 09.12.2022…” 2. The facts of the case, as narrated by the petitioner in the writ petition, are briefly set out hereunder: Petitioner was appointed as a Junior Assistant in the A.P. State Waqf Board, Head Office, against a clear vacancy in April, 2014, initially on daily wages of Rs.300/- per day. Subsequently, by proceedings dated 03.02.2015, he was engaged on consolidated pay of Rs.15,000/- per month. He states that, he qualified in the departmental examination conducted on 27.11.2016. While the services of some similarly situated employees were regularized, petitioner continued on consolidated pay despite submitting P a g e | 4 representations seeking regularization. Petitioner was subsequently deputed to Chittoor District as Additional Inspector/Auditor, Waqfs, and later transferred back to the Head Office. He thereafter filed W.P.No.36986 of 2022 seeking consideration of his claim for regularization. By order dated 15.11.2022, this Court directed respondents to consider his representations after affording him an opportunity of hearing. Thereafter, respondents issued a memo calling for his explanation on certain allegations. Petitioner submitted a detailed explanation along with supporting documents, denying the allegations. However, without conducting an enquiry, affording him an opportunity of personal hearing, or duly considering his explanation and the material placed in support thereof, the 4th respondent terminated his services by proceedings dated 09.12.2022 in F.No.E1/17/2022-AP. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned termination order is arbitrary, violates the principles of natural justice. Complaints relied upon by the respondents were not supported by any material evidence; complainants were not examined; and petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to effectively respond to the allegations or the material relied upon against him. Petitioner also questions the competence of the authority in issuing the order of termination and contends that the impugned action was intended to defeat his claim for regularization and to prevent him from pursuing the earlier order passed by this Court. Despite the petitioner submitting several representations seeking reinstatement, the respondents have not considered his case. Hence, the present writ petition has been filed P a g e | 5 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the termination order dated 09.12.2022 and seeking consequential reliefs. 4. Respondent No.4 filed a counter-affidavit contending that petitioner was appointed as a Junior Assistant on purely a temporary and consolidated-pay basis, with a condition that his services could be terminated without prior notice or assigning reasons, and that his services were never regularized. Several complaints alleging corruption, demand of bribes, misconduct and disobedience were received against the petitioner. After a preliminary enquiry, a memo dated 19.10.2022 was issued calling for his explanation, which he submitted on 25.10.2022 denying the allegations. Upon considering the complaints, petitioner's explanation and the legal opinion obtained, the competent authority discharged him from temporary service by proceedings dated 09.12.2022. It is further contended that, being a temporary employee, petitioner was not entitled for a regular departmental enquiry and that the impugned order constitutes discharge simpliciter. Accordingly, respondents seek dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Heard Sri K.V. Raghuveer, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sheik Abdullah, learned counsel representing Sri Shaik Khaja Basha, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No.4. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, in response to the explanation called for, the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation, which was referred to as the 8th reference in the impugned proceedings. In the said P a g e | 6 explanation, the petitioner specifically refuted each of the allegations leveled against him and referred to the relevant documents in support of his case. However, the respondents neither consider the said explanation nor recorded findings on the contentions raised therein. They merely referred to the explanation and proceeded to pass the impugned orders. It is further submitted that, though petitioner is a temporary employee, the allegations of misconduct, misbehaviour or financial irregularities may have an adverse effect on his future employment prospects. Therefore, before taking adverse action, the respondents were required to consider petitioner's explanation and, if necessary, conduct an appropriate enquiry. Instead, respondents merely observed that the explanation was a denial of the allegations and did not consider the defence raised by the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner had drawn the attention of this Court to the explanation dated 25.10.2022 submitted by the petitioner, along with the material placed in support thereof. The documents filed by the respondents along with the counter indicate that, petitioner had enclosed 23 documents, comprising 53 pages, along with his explanation, specifically refuting the allegations levelled against him. 8. The grievance of the petitioner is that his case was not properly considered and the explanation submitted by him was not considered in its proper perspective. Without referring to the contents of the explanation or considering the defence raised by the petitioner, respondents merely relied upon the alleged complaints, terminated his services on the ground that he P a g e | 7 was appointed on a temporary or consolidated-pay basis and that, under the terms of his appointment, he could be removed from the temporary post at any time without assigning any reason. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, though, petitioner is a temporary employee, the allegations of misconduct, misbehaviour and financial misappropriation levelled against him amount to imputations which are stigmatic in nature. Such allegations, particularly, when made the basis for termination, are likely to adversely affect the petitioner’s future employment prospects. Therefore, the termination cannot be treated as a mere discharge from temporary service, and the nature and substance of the allegations and the basis on which the termination was effected are required to be considered. Learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Swati Priyadarshini v. State of M.P.1, wherein it held that: 34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5] : (SCC OnLine SC para 28) “28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India [Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India, (1953) 1 SCC 420] . Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. [Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., (1954) 1 SCC 572] In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the 1 (2024) 19 SCC 128 P a g e | 8 motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India [Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, 1956 SCC OnLine Bom 38 : AIR 1956 Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of P a g e | 9 penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.2, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 7. The principal question is whether the impugned action is violative of principles of natural justice. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative order has gradually become thin. Now it is totally eclipsed and obliterated. The aim of the rule of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules operate in the area not covered by law validly made or expressly excluded as held in Col. J.N. Sinha v. Union of India [(1970) 2 SCC 458 : (1971) 1 SCR 791] . It is settled law that certified standing orders have statutory force which do not expressly exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. Conversely the Act made exceptions for the application of principles of natural justice by necessary implication from specific provisions in the Act like Sections 25- F; 25-FF; 25-FFF etc. The need for temporary hands to cope with sudden and temporary spurt of work demands appointment temporarily to a service of such temporary workmen to meet such exigencies and as soon as the work or service is completed, the need to dispense with the services may arise. In that situation, on compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F resort could be had to retrench the employees in conformity therewith. Particular statute or statutory rules or orders having statutory flavour may also exclude the application of the principles of natural justice expressly or by necessary implication. In other respects the principles of 2 (1993) 3 SCC 259 P a g e | 10 natural justice would apply unless the employer should justify its exclusion on given special and exceptional exigencies. 8. The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily affecting the rights of the concerned person. 11. The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that procedure prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of Article 14 and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or orders affecting the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the requirement of Article 14. So it must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. There can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as the quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable only to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both. 12. Therefore, fair play in action requires that the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable. The manner of exercise of the power and its impact on the rights of the person affected would be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood without which the glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal existence. When it is interpreted that the colour and content of procedure established by law must be in conformity with the minimum fairness and processual justice, it would relieve legislative callousness despising opportunity of being heard and fair opportunities of defence. Article 14 has a pervasive processual potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory dictates. Equality is the antithesis of arbitrariness. It is, thereby, conclusively held by this Court that the principles of natural justice are part of Article 14 and the procedure prescribed by law must be just, fair and reasonable. 15. In this case admittedly no opportunity was given to the appellant and no inquiry was held. The appellant's plea put forth at the earliest was that despite his reporting to duty on December 3, 1980 and on all subsequent days and readiness to join duty he was prevented from reporting to duty, P a g e | 11 nor was he permitted to sign the attendance register. The Tribunal did not record any conclusive finding in this behalf. It concluded that the management had power under Clause 13 of the Certified Standing Orders to terminate with the service of the appellant. Therefore, we hold that the principles of natural justice must be read into the Standing Order No. 13(2)(iv). Otherwise it would become arbitrary, unjust and unfair violating Article 14. When so read the impugned action is violative of the principles of natural justice. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that, once allegations are levelled against the petitioner, the principles of natural justice require that the matter be considered fairly and reasonably so as to prevent miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the petitioner submitted a detailed explanation; however, the respondents neither considered its contents nor dealt with the grounds raised therein. The impugned order was passed without even referring to the explanation and stated that the petitioner had merely denied the allegations contained in the complaints’. 12. As seen from the impugned order, though the respondents have referred to the allegations levelled against the petitioner in various complaints, they have neither considered the detailed explanation submitted by the petitioner nor the documents enclosed therewith. The impugned order, therefore, suffers from non-consideration of petitioner’s explanation and the material placed in support thereof. Further, the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of personal hearing before the adverse action was taken. The same constitutes a violation of the principles of natural justice and, on this ground, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. At the same time, this Court cannot overlook the serious allegations made against the petitioner by P a g e | 12 various persons, as reflected in the complaints. The competent authorities are, therefore, entitled to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law. However, such consideration shall be undertaken fairly and transparently, after taking into account the petitioner’s explanation and the documents submitted therewith and after affording him a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing. Thereafter, the authorities shall pass a reasoned order on the allegations in accordance with law. 13. In LIC v. A. Masilamani3, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows: 14. In the present case, the High Court after reappreciating the entire evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that in the course of enquiry proceedings, certain witnesses had not been examined in the presence of the delinquent respondent, and that hence, no proper opportunity was given to him to cross-examine such witnesses. Moreover, the documents relied upon by the enquiry officer, were not properly proved by any witness and ultimately, it was held that the findings of the enquiry officer stood vitiated for non-compliance with mandatory requirements of the Regulations applicable herein, as well as for violating the principles of natural justice. The Court further held that the appellate authority had not applied its mind to the case, and had failed to consider the case as required under Regulation 46(2) of the 1960 Regulations. Thus, in light of the aforementioned observations, the Court set aside the punishment imposed upon the respondent, and also refused to give the appellant any opportunity to continue the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, consequently therefore, denying any opportunity to prove the documents relied upon, as also denying the respondent adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses concerned, etc. only on the ground that a long time had now passed. 16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the court sets aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704 : AIR 1994 SC 1074] , Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. S.M. School for Girls [(2002) 10 SCC 293 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1033] , U.P. 3 (2013) 6 SCC 530 P a g e | 13 State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey [(2005) 8 SCC 264 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 78] and Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu [(2008) 12 SCC 30 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 126] .) 17. The second question involved herein is also no longer res integra. Whether or not the disciplinary authority should be given an opportunity to complete the enquiry afresh from the point that it stood vitiated depends upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine the magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It is in view of this, that courts/tribunals are not competent to quash the charge-sheet and related disciplinary proceedings, before the same are concluded on the aforementioned grounds. 14. A perusal of the aforesaid decision makes it clear that, where disciplinary proceedings are vitiated by violation of the principles of natural justice or other procedural requirements, the matter ordinarily ought to be remitted to the disciplinary authority to proceed from the stage at which the defect occurred. The necessity for such remand depends upon the nature and gravity of the alleged misconduct. Ordinarily, disciplinary proceedings ought not to be quashed at the threshold merely on account of such procedural violation. 15. In view of the foregoing, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order suffers from violation of the principles of natural justice and is, therefore, liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted to the competent authority for fresh consideration from the stage at which the violation occurred. The competent authority shall afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of hearing, consider the detailed explanation already submitted by him along with the documents enclosed thereto and, if an enquiry is warranted, conduct the same in accordance with P a g e | 14 law and the principles of natural justice. Thereafter, the competent authority shall pass a reasoned and speaking order on merits, uninfluenced by any observations made in this order. 16. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. The respondents shall complete the aforesaid exercise within a period of two (02) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Reinstatement of the petitioner shall be subject to the outcome of the above said enquiry and the consequential final orders to be passed by the competent authority. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. __________________________ JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI Date: 03.09.2026 SAK Whether the order is: Speaking ☑ Reasoned ☑ Reportable Non-reportable P a g e | 15 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE BALAJI MEDAMALLI WRIT PETITION NO: 28631 OF 2023 Date: 03.09.2026 SAK