Page No. 1/18 GAHC010245342024 2026:GAU-AS:9588 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.Pet./1416/2024 RANJIT DAS S/O SRI BARINDRA KR. DAS R/O WARD NO. 3, HOLDING NO. 171, MADHYAPARA BANSBARI P.O. RAJBARI, P.S. JORHAT (SADAR) DIST. JORHAT, ASSAM, IN-785001, PRESENT ADDRESS- GOKUL DHAM APARTMENT, FLAT NO. B- 502, (NEAR GROCER DEPARTMENTAL STORE) PANDUPORT ROAD, ADABARI, GUWAHATI, PIN-781012, ASSAM VERSUS THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR, GOVT. OF INDIA, 6TH FLOOR, LODHI ROAD, NEW DELHI, PIN-110003. 2:THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ANTI CORRUPTION BRANCH ASSAM THROUGH THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE AND HEAD OF BRANCH CBI, ACB, BETKUCHI (OPP. BALAJI TEMPLE) GUWAHATI PIN-781035 3:THE UNDER SECRETARY MINISTRY OF RAILWAY GOVT. OF INDIA RAILWAY BOARD NEW DELHI-1. 4:SAPONTI HAZARIKA INSPECTOR (ACB GUWAHATI) Page No. 2/18 CBI, ACB BETKUCHI (OPP. BALAJI TEMPLE) GUWAHATI PIN-781035 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA For the Petitioner : Mr. B. Chetri, Advocate For the Respondents : Ms. M. Kumari, SC, CBI : Mr. K. K. Parasar, CGC Date of Hearing : 25.05.2026 Date of Judgment : 14.07.2026 JUDGMENT & ORDER 1. Heard Mr. B. Chetri, the learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. M. Kumari, the learned standing counsel, CBI, as well as Mr. K. Kalita, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. K. K. Parasar, the learned Central Government Counsel, appearing for respondent No. 3. 2. This application under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 has been filed by the petitioner, namely, Sri Ranjit Das, praying for quashing of the proceeding of Special Case No. 04/2023, pending before the Court of learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam (Addl. Court No. 2, Guwahati. While praying for quashing of the aforesaid criminal proceeding, the petitioner has impugned the FIR No. RC0172021A0012 dated 30.11.2021, the sanction order bearing Memo No. 2023/V3/NFR/Engg./09-CBI dated 20.10.2023, issued by the Under Secretary, Page No. 3/18 Ministry of Railways, Railway Board, New Delhi, Charge-sheet No. 7/2023 dated 30.11.2023 and order dated 31.07.2024 whereby charges were framed by the trial court against the present petitioner showing his disproportionate assets to the tune of 47.53% of his known source of income. 3. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant criminal petition, in brief, are that, on 30.11.2021, an FIR was lodged before the Officer-in-Charge of Anti-Corruption Bureau Police Station at Guwahati, inter alia, alleging that an information has been received from reliable sources that the petitioner, namely, Ranjit Das, retired, Deputy Chief Engineer, Construction, N.F. Railway, Maligaon has acquired huge property which is disproportionate to his known source of income. It has been alleged in the FIR that during the check period i.e., from 01.01.2013 to 31.12.2019, the present petitioner has been found to possess disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs.47,92,977/-which comes to around 47.53% of his income generated from known sources. 4. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, RC No. 0172021A 0012(RC12)(A) 2021-GWH) was registered under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the investigation was entrusted to one Saponti Hajarika, Inspector of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau, Guwahati. Ultimately on completion of investigation charge-sheet was laid against the present petitioner bearing charge-sheet No. 7/2023 on 08.11.2023 under above mentioned provisions of law. The present petitioner appeared before the trial court and he was allowed to be released on bail of Rs.50,000/- with one surety of like amount. 5. After considering the materials on record and after hearing the learned counsel for the prosecution side as well as for the present petitioner, the Page No. 4/18 trial court by its order dated 31.07.2024 framed the charges against the present petitioner under Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (e) and Section 13 (1) (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. When the said charges were read over and explained to the present petitioner, he pleaded not guilty to the same and claimed to be tried. 6. Mr. B. Chetri, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has retired from his service on 28.02.2021 on attaining the age of superannuationafter rendering about 35 years of unblemished service. At the time of his retirement, he was posted as Deputy Chief Engineer. He submits that the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Guwahati Branch had lodged the FIR without disclosing the source of information against the petitioner alleging amassing assets disproportionate to known source of his income to the tune of 47.53% after about nine months of his retirement without taking any prior sanction under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that even while according sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on 20.10.2023, the sanctioning authority showed total non-application of mind while granting sanction for prosecution. He further submits that no opportunity of being heard was given to the petitioner while according sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the Central Bureau of Investigation, while calculating the income and expenditure of the petitioner, also made gross mistake and calculated the same in a wrong manner, which does not tally with the income tax return/audit report of the earnings and expenditure of the petitioner. He submits Page No. 5/18 that the Central Bureau of Investigation has miserably failed to assess the actual income of the petitioner and his spouse from known and genuine sources of income and has shown less income due to gross miscalculation. He submits that the CBI has also committed wrong by arbitrarily calculating the kitchen expenditure of the petitioner to the tune of 33.33% of the total income of the petitioner. Whereas, in fact such expenditure is only to the tune of 5-6% of his income. He submits that had the CBI done right calculation, the assets of the petitioner would have come down to minus 2.04% of his known source of income. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the FIR lodged against the petitioner is also defective in as much as it does not disclose the name of the informant. He further submits that the FIR was lodged without a proper preliminary inquiry preceding the same. He also submits that the charge-sheet laid against the petitioner by the CBI was also defective in as much as though the FIR alleges disproportionate asset of the petitioner to the tune of 47.53%, however in the charge-sheet same has been shown as 89.96%. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that even the trial court while framing charges against the petitioner did not apply its judicial mind in as much as charges were also framed under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 without considering that after 2018 said penal provision no longer exists in statute books. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner under aforesaid circumstances would be unjust and unfair to him and, therefore, same is liable to be quashed. In support of his submission, the Page No. 6/18 learned counsel for the petitioner has cited following rulings:- (1) “Anil Kumar and Ors. Vs. M.K. Aiyappa” reported in “(2013) 10 SCC 705”; (2) “K.K. Raghupathy Vs. State of Karnataka” (Criminal Petition No. 413 of 2024, decided on 25.04.2024); (3) “Bhajan Lal Vs. State of Haryana” reported in“1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335” (4)“Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others” reported in “(2014) 2 SCC 1”; (5) “Alok Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation” reported in “2024 Supreme(Gau) 974”; (6) “Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat” reported in “(1997) 7 SCC 622”; (7) “State of Karnataka vs. Ameerjan” reported in “(2007) 11 SCC 273”; (8) “Nanjappa Vs. State of Karnataka”, reported in “(2015) 14 SCC 186”; (9) “Sandeep Silas Vs. CBI and others” reported in “2019 Supreme (Del) 882”; (10) “Meenakshi Khare &Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh” reported in “2026 Supreme (Online) MP 1703”; (11) “Nirankar Nath Pandey Vs. State of UP” reported in “2025 Supreme (Online) (SC) 111437” (12) “Mangilal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh” reported in “(2004) 2 SCC 447”. (13) “SBI Vs. Rajesh Agarwala and others” reported in “2023 0 Supreme (SC) 277”; (14) “Sushant Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal” reported in “2024 Page No. 7/18 Supreme (Cal) 769”; (15) “Tara Prasad Das Vs. State of Assam” reported in “2018 0 Supreme (Gau) 619”; (16) “State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mohanlal Soni” reported in “2000 5 Supreme 139”. 11. On the other hand, Ms. M. Kumari, the learned Standing Counsel, CBI has submitted that the trial court has rightly considered the materials before it and framed charges against the petitioner. She submits that since the charges have been framed and trial has commenced, it should be allowed to reach its logical conclusion and this is not a fit case to thwart the criminal proceeding by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Sections 482/528 of BNSS. She submits that when factual foundation of an offence has been laid down, court should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceeding, even on the premises that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. She submits that non-disclosure of the name of the informant in the form of the FIR is not fatal to the prosecution case as the information was received from a secret source and disclosure of such source would jeopardize the safety and security of such informant. 12. She further submits that the charges were framed amongst other provisions under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as the check period taken for in this case was also prior to the amendment of 2018 in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 13. The learned Standing Counsel, CBI has further submitted that the Page No. 8/18 prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is required for any inquiry or investigation into an offence which is alleged to have been committed by a public servant where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties. Whereas, in the instant case the allegation is of amassing of property beyond known source of income and as such the said offence is not relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by him in discharge of his official functions or duties. As such, in such cases, previous approval under Section 17 A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not necessary. 14. She submits that as regards sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Act is concerned, such previous sanction for criminal prosecution of the present petitioner was obtained by the prosecuting agency prior to taking of cognizance of the offence by the trial court and as such, there is no infirmity or irregularity in the criminal proceeding pending against the present petitioner justifying any interference by this Court. 15. She submits that the contentions raised by the petitioner before this Court can very well be raised by him before the trial court and trial court shall have the benefit of marshalling the evidence before it and, therefore, this is not a fit case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the criminal proceeding pending against the present petitioner. In support of her submission, the learned Standing Counsel, CBI has cited following rulings: - (1) “Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others” reported in “(2014) 2 SCC 1”; (2) “CBI Vs. T. H. Vijayalakshmi and Anr.” reported in (Criminal Appeal No. 1045 of 2021, decided on 08.10.2021) Page No. 9/18 (3) “State represented by Inspector of Police, Chennai Vs. N. S. Gnaneswaran” (Criminal Appeal No. 456/2008, decided on 09.01.2013) (4) “State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vegilance and Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department Vs. Easwaran” (Criminal Appeal No. 1405/2019, decided on 26.03.2025); (5) “CBI Vs. Aryan Singh” (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1025-1026 of 2023, decided on 10.04.2023); (6) “Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and Anr.” (Criminal No. 1407/2012, decided on 13.09.2012); (7) “State of Punjab Vs. Labh Singh” (Criminal Appeal No. 2168/2010, decided on 17.12.2014) 16. On the other hand, Mr. K. K. Parasar, the learned CGC has submitted that this is not a fit case to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of BNSS to thwart the criminal proceeding at initial stage. He submits that since the alleged offence is not relatable to any decision taken by the petitioner in discharge of his official function, hence, prior approval of the competent authority under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not necessary. 17. He submits that prior prosecution sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been granted by the competent authority on 20.10.2023 and while according such sanction, the authority has considered all the relevant materials before it and applied its mind before granting sanction and as such the same cannot be regarded as bad in law. He submits that the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner should be allowed to reach its logical conclusion and no justification is there to quash the same by this Court. Page No. 10/18 18. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides and have gone through the materials available on record. I have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel for both the sides in support of their respective submissions. 19. The Supreme Court of India has observed in the case of “M/S Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra” reported in “(2021) 19 SCC 401” that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). It has also observed in the said case that while examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. It further observed that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage and quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule. 20. Similarly, in the context of a prayer for quashing of charges/entire proceeding, the Apex Court has observed in the case of “Supriya Jain Vs. State of Haryana”reported in “(2023) 7 SCC 711” as follows: - “17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to quashing of a charge/proceedings either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Page No. 11/18 Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27. … 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide Page No. 12/18 specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for Page No. 13/18 reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. * * * 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” Page No. 14/18 21. Thus, the law with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings is no longer res integra. Once the charges have been framed and the trial has commenced, the High Court should be cautious in exercising its power under Section 528 of the BNSS for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings. 22. Once the charges have been framed and the trial has commenced, the proceeding should be allowed to reach its logical conclusion and taking recourse to Section 528 of BNSS for quashing a criminal proceeding should be treated as an exception rather than that of a rule. 23. In the instant case, it is apparent from the records that the charges against the petitioner have already been framed and trial has commenced. The accusation against the petitioner is that of amassing wealth which is disproportionate to his known source of income. 24. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no previous sanction was obtained under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 before conducting the inquiry into the offence which has been alleged against the present petitioner, it appears that the provisions of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 prohibit conducting of an inquiry or an investigation into any offence under the Act alleged to have been committed by a public servant where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his public function on duties. However, in the instant case, the accusation against the present petitioner is of amassing wealth disproportionate to his known source of income and as such the offence alleged is not relatable to any specific recommendation made or decision taken by the petitioner in discharge of his official function or duties. Hence, the question of taking prior approval of Page No. 15/18 competent authority before initiating investigation, under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, does not arise in this case and as such no such previous sanction is necessary in the instant case under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 25. As regards previous sanction for prosecution of the petitioner under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is concerned, on perusal of records it appears that such sanction was granted on 20.10.2023 by the Ministry of Railways, Government of India. 26. On perusal of the sanction order dated 20.10.2023, it appears that the sanctioning authority i.e., the President of India had carefully considered the materials relevant to the case before the said authorityin respect of allegations made against the petitioner and thereafter accorded the sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 27. The plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the sanctioning authority did not apply its judicial mind while according sanction for prosecution can be considered by the trial court after going through the relevant records and same cannot be considered by this Court in exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. Otherwise, it would be akin to holding a mini- trial in the instant proceeding which is deprecated by the Apex Court once the trial has commenced. 28. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is reluctant to exercise its powers under Section 528 of the BNSS for quashing the entire proceeding on the ground of alleged defect in grant of sanction under Section 17A or Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in the aforesaid case. Page No. 16/18 29. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the investigating agency as well as the trial court also fails to take into consideration that the wife of the petitioner, namely, Smti Sushmita Das, is an income tax assessee and submits separate income tax returns. However, it appears on the perusal of the charge-sheet that the investigating agency has investigated the source of income of the wife of the present petitioner and has come to a finding that from the known source of income of the wife of the petitioner, she could not have acquired properties in her own name as shown in the statement of assets and as such the investigating agency as well as the trial court came to the finding that such assets, though in the name of Smti Sushmita Das may be regarded as assets of the petitioner. 30. Now, whether the investigating agency or the trial court was right in coming to the aforesaid conclusion can be ascertained after examination of all relevant materials/evidence during the course of the trial. In exercise of its powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, this Court is not required to hold a full-fledged inquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agency to find out whether the case would result into acquittal or conviction. Same has to be left to the trial court and the trial should be allowed to reach its logical conclusion. 31. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that though the FIR has shown the percentage of disproportionate assets of the petitioner at 47.53%, whereas in charge-sheet it has been shown as 89.96% and the charges were framed showing the disproportionate asset to be 47.53%, same cannot be a reason for interfering with the trial and quashing the entire proceeding as held by the Apex Court in the case of “Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Page No. 17/18 Chander and Anr.” (supra) that even where the charge-sheet under section 173(2) of the Code suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be very well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 32. In the instant case, the factual foundation of the offence with which the petitioner has been charged has been laid down in the charge-sheet. This Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein and same has to be left to be decided by the trial court in the trial. The petitioner shall be able to raise all his defences before the trial court and the trial court shall have the benefit of going through and marshalling the evidence on record and of considering the case of both sides before coming to a conclusion of guilt or otherwise of the petitioner in the trial. This Court cannot embark into the same journey as it cannot sit on a mini-trial in exercise of its extraordinary inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023. 33. The plea that the FIR is defective due to non-disclosure of the informant and the charges is also defective as charges are framed under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which no longer remains in the statute book may very well be taken before the trial court during the trial and same may be considered by the trial court after consideration of the materials on record. 34. Since, this Court is of considered opinion that this is not an exceptional case where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice and it is of the opinion that the trial which has already been commenced against the petitioner should be allowed to reach its logical conclusion and as same would serve the interest of justice, this Court is reluctant to interfere in the trial by quashing the entire proceeding in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section Page No. 18/18 528 of BNSS. 35. In view of the discussions made and reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court is of considered opinion that continuation of trial pending before the Court of learned Special Judge, CBI, Assam (Addl. Court No. 2, Chandmari), Guwahati against the present petitioner in Special Case No. 04/2023 will not amount to abuse of the process of the Court and no exceptional case has been made out by the petitioner for invoking extraordinary inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 for quashing the entire criminal proceeding. As such this Court is of the view that this criminal petition is devoid of any merit. 36. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is hereby dismissed. JUDGE Comparing Assistant Abhishek Prem Digitally signed by Abhishek Prem Date: 2026.07.14 18:05:57 +05'30'