2026:HHC:17431 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 349 of 2014 Reserved on: 24.04.2026 Date of Decision: 18.05.2026 Raj Kumar ...Appellant Versus Door Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the Appellant : Mr Naveen K. Bhardwaj, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr L.N. Mehta, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 02.07.2014 passed by the learned Special Judicial Magistrate, Kullu (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:17431 in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the complainant and the accused were well-known to each other. The complainant was running a business of a fruit and Vegetable commission agent at shop No.5 in the name of Inner Seraj Fruit Company at Village Damothi, Tehsil Banjar, District Kullu. He used to supply fruit packing material to fruit growers, etc. The accused had purchased Apple cartons worth ₹45,000/- from the complainant in the fruit season of 2010. He issued a cheque of ₹45,000/- in favour of the complainant to repay the amount. The complainant presented the cheque to the bank on 12.11.2010, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. The complainant issued a notice to the accused on 19.11.2010, asking him to pay the amount within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. This notice was returned with an endorsement “unclaimed”, which is deemed service. The accused failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of the notice. Hence, 3 2026:HHC:17431 the complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court against the accused for taking action as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The complainant examined Maya Dass (CW1), himself (CW1) and Harinder Chauhan (CW2). 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C), admitted that he knew the complainant, who was engaged in the business of fruit and vegetable commission. He denied the rest of the complainant’s case. He stated that a false complaint was made against him, and the witnesses had deposed falsely against him. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the relationship between the parties was not disputed. The complainant contradicted his version in his statement on oath and claimed that 90 boxes of apples were sold to the accused at the rate of ₹ 500 per box. He had not produced any record of the sale. Therefore, the 4 2026:HHC:17431 complainant’s version that the accused was liable to repay ₹45,000 to him was not proved. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the material on record. The complainant had specifically stated that he had sold the cartons to the accused on 16.08.2010, and the cheque was issued on the same day. There was no reason to disbelieve this version, and the learned Trial Court erred in rejecting the version of the complainant by holding that there was a variation in the complainant’s version. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Naveen K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr L.S. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. Mr Naveen K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the accused had not disputed the issuance of the cheque and the presumption under Section 118 (a) 5 2026:HHC:17431 read with Section 139 of the NI Act would be attracted that the cheque was issued by the accused in the complainant’s favour for consideration to discharge his debt/liability. There was no necessity to produce any material to prove the consideration. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr L.S. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that there was a variation in the consideration pleaded in the complaint and stated on oath, which was sufficient to doubt the complainant’s case. In these circumstances, some document was required to be brought on record to prove that the cheque was issued for the discharge of a debt/liability, and it was not permissible to rely upon the presumption alone to infer this fact. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6 2026:HHC:17431 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must 7 2026:HHC:17431 address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. The complainant asserted in his complaint and the proof affidavit that he used to supply fruit packing material to fruit growers, etc., and the accused had purchased the apple cartons worth ₹45,000/- from the complainant in the fruit season of 2010. The fact that the complainant used to supply fruit packing material to the fruit growers suggests that he had supplied cartons that were fruit packing material. However, the complainant stated in his cross-examination that he had sold 90 cartons weighing 25 kg on 16.08.2010 @ ₹500/- per carton. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that there was a variation in the statement of the complainant regarding the consideration. The statement on oath suggests that the apple boxes were sold because the complainant denied in his cross-examination that no apples were sold. Thus, the version in the complaint that the fruit packing material, 8 2026:HHC:17431 namely, the sale of cartons, was changed in the Court to the sale of apple boxes. Therefore, in these circumstances, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the complainant’s version regarding the consideration. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dattatraya v. Sharanappa, (2024) 8 SCC 573: (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 776: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1899 that when the complainant was unable to put forth the details of the loan and made contradictory statements, the presumption attached to the cheque will not help him. It was observed: 30. Admittedly, the appellant was able to establish that the signature on the cheque in question was of the respondent and in regard to the decision of this Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40, a presumption is to ideally arise. However, in the above-referred context of the factual matrix, the inability of the appellant to put forth the details of the loan advanced, and his contradictory statements, the ratio therein would not impact the present case to the effect of giving rise to the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881. The respondent has been able to shift the weight of the scales of justice in his favour through the preponderance of probabilities. 31. The trial court had rightly observed that the appellant was not able to plead even a valid existence of a legally recoverable debt, as the very issuance of a cheque is dubious based on the fallacies and contradictions in the evidence adduced by the parties. Furthermore, the fact that the respondent had inscribed his signature on the agreement drawn on white paper and not on stamp paper, as presented by the appellant, creates another set of doubts in the case. Since the accused has been able to cast a shadow of doubt on 9 2026:HHC:17431 the case presented by the appellant, he has therefore successfully rebutted the presumption stipulated by Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881. 16. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while holding that the variation in the statement on oath and the complaint would make the existence of the debt/liability doubtful, and it was not sufficient to rely upon the presumption alone. The complainant has not filed any document to support the plea taken by him that he had sold the cartons/apple boxes to the accused, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting his case. 17. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court cannot interfere with the judgment of acquittal merely because another view is possible. 18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any. 20. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail 10 2026:HHC:17431 bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 21. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th May, 2026 (Nikita)