[2026:RJ-JP:25145] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16924/2025 URN: CW / 38486U / 2025 Bharat Bhushan Sharma S/o Shri Puran Chand Sharma, Aged About 50 Years, R/o 82/116, Neelgiri Marg, Aravali Path, Near Mansarovar City Park, Jaipur, Rajasthan Presently Posted As Assistant Development Officer, Zila Parishad, Jaipur, Rajasthan. ----Petitioner Versus 1. The State Of Rajasthan, Through The Chief Secretary, Government Of Rajasthan, Government Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. The Secretary And Commissioner, Panchayati Raj Department, Jaipur. 3. The Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jaipur. 4. The Additional Commissioner And Joint Secretary-I, Panchayati Raj Department, Jaipur. 5. The Additional Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jaipur. 6. Sher Singh Luhadia, The Additional Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Pradeep Mathur For Respondent(s) : Mr. Prateex Saxena & Mr. Sunil Purohit for Mr. Kapil Prakash Mathur, AAG HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA Order 06/07/2026 1. Order dated 16.10.2025 (Annexure-6) whereby the petitioner had been put under suspension, is under challenge in the present petition. [2026:RJ-JP:25145] (2 of 4) [CW-16924/2025] 2. Counsel for the petitioner submits that despite a period of more than one year having elapsed since the order of suspension, no charge-sheet has been served on the petitioner till date. 3. Counsel for the respondents placed on record proposed charge-sheet dated 30.10.2025 but then, he admits that the same has not been served on the petitioner till date. 4. In view of the above admitted fact, it is crystal clear that no disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner till date. 5. As is the settled position of law, a Government employee cannot be kept under suspension for an inordinate delay without any disciplinary proceedings been initiated. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India & Ors.; 2015 (7) SCC 291 while dealing with a situation wherein the petitioner was suffering a prolonged suspension without any further disciplinary proceedings, observed and held as under: “13. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of the Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Division Bench in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, 1986 (4) SCC 481, and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso of Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to moderate Suspension Orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary inquiries also. It seems to us [2026:RJ-JP:25145] (3 of 4) [CW-16924/2025] that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) Code of Criminal Procedure postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal. 14. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a Suspension Order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the Memorandum of Charges/Chargesheet is served a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the concerned person to any Department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognize that previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us.” 6. Counsel for the respondents is not in a position of refute the above position of law. 7. In view of the above settled position of law, the present writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. Order dated [2026:RJ-JP:25145] (4 of 4) [CW-16924/2025] 16.10.2025 whereby the petitioner had been kept under suspension, is hereby quashed and set aside. 8. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the present order. 9. Needless to observe that the present Order shall not preclude the respondents from undertaking the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, in accordance with law. 10. Stay petition and pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. (REKHA BORANA),J 6/KASHISH