2026:HHC:16743 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.203 of 2022 Date of Decision: 13.05.2026 __________________________________________________________________________ Amrik Singh ……...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Others …....Respondents Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. __________________________________________________________________________ For the Petitioner: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Tarun K. Brakta, Advocate. For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General, with Mr. Ravi Chauhan and Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for State. Mr. Vikram Thakur, Advocate, for respondent No.4. __________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No.0005 of 2019, dated 23.04.2019, registered at Police Station SV & AC, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, under Sections 7 & 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (hereinafter, ‘the Act’), on the ground that no case much less under aforesaid provisions of law is made out against the petitioner, especially when it is admitted case of the prosecution that bribe, if any, in the case at hand was received by co-accused ASI Rajinder Pathania. 2026:HHC:16743 2 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties are that on 20.04.2019, a complaint came to be filed by respondents No.4 to respondent No.3 i.e. Additional Superintendent of Police, SV & AC, Una, District Una, H.P., alleging therein ASI Rajinder Pathania, Incharge, Police Post, Daulatpur Chowk, District Una, H.P., is asking for bribe. Complainant, namely Rakesh Kumar, stated that he is running a flower nursery at two places at Ghanari and Daulatpur. In the year 2017, complainant came in contact with one Ms. Pinki Diwakar, with whom certain talks were exchanged inter se them for marriage. Since Ms. Pinki Diwakar and complainant Rakesh Kumar were divorcee, they thought of solemnising marriage inter se them. Complainant, who had come in contact with aforesaid Ms. Pinki Diwakar through Facebook, visited Bareilly on 22.06.2018 and solemnised marriage at Gurudwara, as per Hindu rites and brought Ms. Pinki Diwakar and her son to District Una, H.P., however, it subsequently transpired that Ms. Pinki Diwakar already stood married to some other person from whom she had not taken divorce. In the afore background, complainant Rakesh Kumar sent above named Ms. Pinki Diwakar along with her son to Bareilly. Complainant also instituted some proceedings in the Court at Una, Himachal Pradesh, for cancellation of marriage inter se him and Ms. Pinki Diwakar. Though in afore proceedings, parties compromised the matter inter se them, whereby their marriage was 2026:HHC:16743 3 annulled, but yet Ms. Pinki Diwakar along with her son started living forcefully in the house of complainant. Ms. Pinki Diwakar, who was denied maintenance, lodged complaint at Police Post, Daulatpur against complainant Rakesh Kumar, who was summoned at Police Post, Daulatpur and allegedly, ASI Rajinder Pathania started harassing him. Complainant alleged that on 31.03.2019, some money was taken by ASI Rajinder Pathania from him on the pretext of settling the matter. He alleged that on 18.04.2019, ASI Rajinder Pathania called him at Police Post and asked him to pay ₹5,00,000/- so that he is saved from Ms. Pinki Diwakar. Allegedly, aforesaid Police Officer told complainant that in case afore amount is paid Ms. Pinki Diwakar will leave the place. Complainant also alleged that he contacted Mr. Amrik Singh, petitioner herein, a Police Officer, who at one point of time had remained posted near his native place, who asked him to pay ₹10,000/- to ASI Rajinder Pathania for settling the matter. In the afore background, FIR sought to be quashed came to be lodged against ASI Rajinder Pathania as well as present petitioner, namely Amrik Singh, under Sections 7 and 12 of the Act. 3. Though after completion of investigation, Police has already presented Challan in the competent Court of law, but before same could be taken to its logical end, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR as well as consequential proceedings pending the competent Court of law. Since record of learned trial Court 2026:HHC:16743 4 stands summoned in the case at hand, trial before the learned Court below has not proceeded further. 4. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, duly assisted by Mr. Tarun K. Brakta, Advocate, is that petitioner herein has been falsely implicated, because at no point of time, he had ever advised complainant to pay ₹10,000/- to ASI Rajinder Pathania, who had allegedly demanded sum of ₹5,00,000/- from the complainant for settling the matter with Ms. Pinki Diwakar. While making this Court peruse provisions contained under Sections 7, 11 and 12 of the Act, Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, vehemently argued that no case under aforesaid provisions of law is made out against the petitioner and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served in case FIR sought to be quashed is permitted to sustain, rather in that eventuality, petitioner would be put to ordeal of protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to fail. Mr. Sharma submitted that though petitioner has been booked under Section 12 of the Act, but no cogent and convincing evidence has been adduced on record with regard to abetment, if any, by the petitioner. He submitted that neither there is evidence to suggest the ASI Rajinder Pathania ever demanded money from complainant through present petitioner, nor such money, if any, was ever paid to ASI Rajinder Pathania through present petitioner. He submitted that to invoke 2026:HHC:16743 5 Section 12 of the Act, it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove demand, if any, by co-accused ASI Rajinder Pathania and role, if any, played by petitioner in persuading complainant to pay such money to ASI Rajinder Pathania. Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that otherwise also, story put forth by the prosecution is totally absurd, because it is own case of the prosecution that prior to 18.04.2019 to 21.04.2019, when allegedly petitioner herein asked complainant to pay sum of ₹10,000/- to ASI Rajinder Pathania, complainant had been dealing directly with ASI Rajinder Pathania because allegedly on 31.03.2019, he had paid some amount to ASI Rajinder Pathania. He submitted that once complainant was in direct touch with ASI Rajinder Pathania, there was otherwise no occasion, if any, to involve the present petitioner, who admittedly at that time was not posted at Police Post, Daulatpur, rather at that time, he was posted at Police Station Kot Kehloor, District Bilaspur. While disputing the transcript placed on record by the respondent-State along with reply, Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, invited attention of this Court to report of FSL (Annexure R-1), perusal whereof reveals that though voice recording sent to FSL was carefully listened, but it was found that these contained a lot of disturbance and noise and as such, transcript quality was not up to the mark. 5. Pursuant to notices issued in the instant proceedings, respondent-State has filed reply, wherein facts, as have been noticed 2026:HHC:16743 6 hereinabove, have not been disputed, rather an attempt has been made to refute the claim of the petitioner on the ground that statement made by complainant itself is sufficient to conclude the guilt of the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act. Mr. Anish Banshtu, learned Deputy Advocate General, while making this Court peruse contents of FIR, which came to be lodged on the basis of statement given by the complainant under Section 151 Cr.P.C., submitted that once complainant specifically alleged that he was asked by the petitioner herein to pay ₹10,000/- to ASI Rajinder Pathania, who was subsequently caught red handed by the Police officials, it cannot be said that no prima facie case, if any, exist against the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record. 7. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. 8. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that High Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC is entitled 2026:HHC:16743 7 to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. 9. Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while elaborately discussing the scope and competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC laid down certain principles governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. After passing of aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC, again came to be considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of SLP (CrL.) No. 287 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings ought not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. 10. In Amish Devgan vs Union of India and Ors, (2021) 1 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “(vii) Conclusion and relief 116. At this stage and before recording our final conclusion, we would like to refer to decision of this Court in Pirthi Chand [State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand, (1996) 2 SCC 37 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 210] wherein it has been held : (SCC pp. 44-45, paras 12- 13) “12. It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court 2026:HHC:16743 8 before embarking to scrutinise the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that FIR is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After the investigation is conducted (sic concluded) and the charge- sheet is laid, the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance with the provisions which are considered mandatory and effect of its non- compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. The court has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statements of witnesses on the record in support thereof whether court could take cognizance of the offence on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it reaches a conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out, no further act could be done except to quash the charge-sheet. But only in exceptional cases i.e. in rarest of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak private vengeance issue of process under Criminal Procedure Code is availed of. A reading of a [Vide Corrigendum dated 20-3- 1996 issued from Residential Office of Hon'ble Mr Justice K. Ramaswamy.] complaint or FIR itself does not disclose at all any cognizable offence — the court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power.” 11. In the case of Kaptan Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2021) 9 SCC 35, the Supreme Court held as under : “9.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. It is required to be noted that when the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC quashed the criminal proceedings, by the time the investigating officer after recording the statement of the witnesses, statement of the complainant and collecting the evidence from the incident place and after taking statement of the independent witnesses and even statement of the accused persons, has filed 2026:HHC:16743 9 the charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC and even the learned Magistrate also took the cognizance. From the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court, it does not appear that the High Court took into consideration the material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even the statements recorded. If the petition under Section 482 CrPC was at the stage of FIR in that case the allegations in the FIR/complaint only are required to be considered and whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not is required to be considered. However, thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence is collected and the charge-sheet is filed after conclusion of the investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different footing and the Court is required to consider the material/evidence collected during the investigation. Even at this stage also, as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, the High Court is not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or enter into the merits of the case as if the High Court is exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. As held by this Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel [Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] in order to examine as to whether factual contents of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court cannot act like the investigating agency nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. It is further observed and held that that question is required to be examined keeping in view, the contents of FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. At such stage, the High Court cannot appreciate evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from contents of FIR and material relied on. It is further observed it is more so, when the material relied on is disputed. It is further observed that in such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 12. Therefore, the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the criminal proceedings by entering into the merits of the allegations as if the High Court was exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. 2026:HHC:16743 10 The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC.” 12. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Abhishek Singh vs Ajay Kumar and Ors., (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1313, reiterated that: “9. The scope of the Court's power to quash and set aside proceedings is well-settled to warrant any restatement. While the arguments advanced have the potential to raise many issues for consideration, we must first satisfy ourselves as to the propriety of the exercise of such power by the High Court. The task of the High Court, when called upon to adjudicate an application seeking to quash the proceedings, is to see whether, prima facie, an offence is made out or not. It is not to examine whether the charges may hold up in the Court. In doing so, the area of action is circumscribed. In Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, it was held: “8. It is no more res integra that exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an allegation made in the FIR or the charge-sheet constitutes the ingredients of the offence/offences alleged. Interference by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding.” 15. In that view of the matter, we hold that the High Court had improperly quashed the proceedings initiated by the appellant. It stands clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the matter, and the guilt or innocence of the respondents has to be established in the trial, in accordance with the law. The 2026:HHC:16743 11 proceedings out of the subject FIR, mentioned in paragraph 2 are revived and restored to the file of the concerned Court.” 13. Reliance is also placed upon judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, Rajiv Thapar and Others Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, Anand Kumar Mohatta and Anr. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home and Anr, AIR 2019 SC 210 and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, (2019) 9 SCC 608. 14. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case. 15. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that ASI Rajinder Pathania was caught red handed by the Police officials on the basis of complaint lodged by complainant Rakesh Kumar, but admittedly there is no material adduced on record to prove that petitioner herein helped complainant Rakesh Kumar to bribe ASI Rajinder Pathania. Similarly, there is no evidence suggestive of the fact that prior to alleged bribing of ASI Rajinder Pathania by complainant, any prior meeting had taken place inter se ASI Rajinder Pathania and present petitioner, who, admittedly at the time of alleged incident, were posted at two different stations. ASI Rajinder 2026:HHC:16743 12 Pathania was posted at Police Post Daulatpur, whereas present petitioner was posted at Police Station Kot Kehloor, District Bilaspur. Though complainant alleged that he approached present petitioner, who at one point of time was posted near his native place for getting the matter settled and thereafter, allegedly present petitioner asked him to pay ₹10,000/- to ASI Rajinder Pathania, but to prove such allegation, no cogent and convincing evidence has been led on record. 16. There is no material adduced on record that petitioner herein had any prior acquaintance with the complainant and co-accused ASI Rajinder Pathania. Though co-accused ASI Rajinder Pathania may be from the Police Department, but that may not be sufficient to conclude acquaintance, if any, inter se ASI Rajinder Pathania and present petitioner Amrik Singh. Similarly no evidence worth credence has been led on record to prove prior acquaintance of petitioner and complainant, who claimed that present petitioner remained posted at Ghanari for some time. 17. Leaving everything aside, no evidence has been led on record to suggest that present petitioner paid money to ASI Rajinder Pathania on behalf of complainant, rather complainant himself paid money to ASI Rajinder Pathania. There is another aspect of the matter that allegedly between 18.04.2019 to 21.04.2019, complainant had been talking to present petitioner Amrik Singh with regard to illegal demands being made by ASI Rajinder Pathania and thereafter allegedly present petitioner advised 2026:HHC:16743 13 complainant to pay ₹10,000/- to ASI Rajinder Pathania, but once it is admitted case of the prosecution that prior to afore date on 31.03.2019, complainant himself had paid some amount to ASI Rajinder Pathania directly, there was otherwise no occasion, if any, to involve the present petitioner, who at relevant time was not posted at Police Post Daulatpur, rather he was posted at Police Station Kot Kehloor, District Bilaspur. 18. Though with a view to substantiate factum of telephonic conversation with the petitioner and complainant Rakesh Kumar, respondents have placed on record transcript, but bare perusal of same nowhere suggest that petitioner asked complainant to bribe ASI Rajinder Pathania. Moreover, this Court, after having carefully perused FSL report dated 25.05.2020 (Annexure R-1), is persuaded to agree with Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, that correctness of transcript placed on record is doubtful for the reason that FSL has categorically opined that on account of disturbance and noise, transcript quality was not up to the mark. If it is so, it is not understood that on what basis and from where, transcript of alleged conversation inter se complainant and present petitioner came to be placed on record by the respondent-State. At this stage, it is apt to take note of Sections 7, 11 and 12 of the Act, which read as under: “7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. - Any public servant who,- 2026:HHC:16743 14 (a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or (b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or (c) performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1. - For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Illustration. - A public servant, 'S' asks a person, 'P' to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. 'S' is guilty of an offence under this section. Explanation 2. - For the purpose of this section,- (i)the expressions "obtains" or "accepts" or "attempts to obtain" shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or "accepts" or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means; (ii)it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party. 7A. Taking undue advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal influence. - Whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for himself or for any other person any undue advantage as a motive or reward 2026:HHC:16743 15 to induce a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of his personal influence to perform or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or to cause to forbear such public duty by such public servant or by another public servant, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 11. Public servant obtaining [undue advantage] [Substituted 'valuable thing' by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.], without consideration from person concerned in proceeding or business transacted by such public servant. - Whoever, being a public servant, accepts or obtains [***] [Omitted 'or agrees to accept' by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.], or attempts to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any [undue advantage] [Substituted 'valuable thing' by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.] without consideration, or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by such public servant, or having any connection with the [official functions or public duty] [Substituted 'official functions' by Act No. 16 of 2018, dated 26.7.2018.] of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. 12. [ Punishment for abetment of offences. - Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” 19. Section 7 of the Act reveals that any public servant who obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to 2026:HHC:16743 16 perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 11 of the Act provides that whoever, being a public servant, accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any undue advantage without consideration, or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years. Section 12 of the Act provides for punishment of abetment of offences under Sections 7 and 11 of the Act. Meaning thereby, to invoke Section 12 of the Act, it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove that bribe was demanded by public servant. However, in the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that petitioner herein asked for some money from the complainant for further giving it to ASI Rajinder Pathania on behalf of complainant. There is nothing on record to show that amount, if any, was ever taken by petitioner for complainant on the pretext that same is required to be given to ASI Rajinder Pathania, rather in the case at hand, sum of ₹10,000/-, paid as a bribe, was received by ASI Rajinder Pathania directly, without any aid and help of the petitioner. Conversation, if any, adduced on record is only inter se petitioner and complainant with regard to bribe, if any, demanded by ASI Rajinder Pathania, but admittedly, there is no evidence to suggest that present petitioner acted on behalf of ASI 2026:HHC:16743 17 Rajinder Pathania, who ultimately received amount of bribe directly from the complainant. 20. In view of aforesaid discussion as well as facts noticed hereinabove, this Court is persuaded to agree with Mr. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served in case FIR registered against petitioner under aforesaid provision of law is permitted to sustain. Since there is no evidence collected on record to prove the guilt of the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act, continuation of the proceedings, otherwise sought to be quashed, would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. Since it is apparent from the discussion made hereinabove that prosecution case is bound to fail, no fruitful purpose would be served by putting the petitioner to ordeal of protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to fail. 21. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds merit in the present petition and accordingly the same is allowed. FIR No.0005 of 2019, dated 23.04.2019, registered at Police Station SV & AC, Una, District Una, Himachal Pradesh, under Sections 7 & 12 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, along with consequential proceedings is quashed and set aside, qua the petitioner only. Petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him. 2026:HHC:16743 18 The present petition is disposed in the above terms, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. May 13, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma), Rajeev Raturi Judge