26 jdt. 08.04.2026 jb. WPA 7085 of 2026 (Nazrul Islam & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.) Robiul Islam Mr. Raju Mondal Masooq Rahaman Jayed Hossain …. For the Petitioners Mr. Amal Kr. Sen Mr. Sabyasachi Mondal …. For the State Heard learned counsels for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners submitted a no confidence motion against the Pradhan, 8 no. Raipur Gram Panchayat, being the 6th respondent herein before the prescribed authority on 27th February, 2026 for her removal. Requisition notice was received by the authority on 5th March, 2026 despite which no step was taken by the authority in terms of Section 12 (2) of the West Bengal Panchayat Act. Upon lapse of the statutory period of time, the petitioners have approached this Court seeking redressal. An order passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in MAT 524 of 2026 on 24th March, 2026 has been brought to the notice of this Court wherein in a similar situation, the Hon’ble Division Bench has observed that time limits fixed by the statute are mandatory and Section 12(10) of the Act provides that the entire matter up to communication of the result of 2 the meeting upon preparation of the report must be completed within 30 days from receipt of the motion. The Hon’[ble Court set aside the direction to straight away convene the meeting in view of the fact that compliance of sub-sections (2) and (3) were not recorded in the order impugned before the learned Court. With utmost deference to the said order, this Court is inclined to place reliance on the authority in C. Bright vs. District Collector and Others reported in (2021) 2 SCC 392 placed by the learned counsel for the State . In the said report the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the rule of interpretation of statutes and has observed that the use of word ‘shall’ in the statute does not necessarily mean that in every case it is mandatory that unless the ‘words’ of the statute are literally followed, the proceedings or the outcome of the proceedings would be invalid. When the statute uses the word ‘shall’, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. The principle of liberal construction of the statute alone in all circumstances may not serve the purpose of the statute. Referring to a judgment in Remington Rand of India Limited vs. Workmen reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court, 224 dealing with Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Hon’ble Court has stated that though Section 17 is mandatory, the time 3 limit to publish the award within 30 days is directory inter alia, for the reason that non publication of the award within the period of 30 days does not entail any penalty. The ratio decidendi of the said judgment is squarely applicable in the fact situation of the present case. The requisition notice was received by the prescribed authority on 5th March, 2026. The authority was supposed to complete the entire procedure in terms of sub-section (10) within 4th April, 2026. Non compliance of the said mandate does not entail any penalty upon the prescribed authority. In view of the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court directs the prescribed authority, being the 4th respondent herein, to take necessary steps in terms of Section 12 of the Act by treating the requisition notice to have been submitted on the date of communication of this order. The entire exercise should be completed strictly in terms of Section 12 of the Act considering the date of submission of motion to be the date of communication of this order. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Since no affidavit has been invited, allegations contained in the writ petition shall be deemed not to have been admitted. 4 Urgent certified website copy of the order, if applied for, be given to the parties on compliance of requisite formalities (Suvra Ghosh, J.)