2026:HHC:17167 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 680 of 2026 Reserved on: 05.05.2026 Date of Decision: 15.05.2026. Pradeep Kumar ….Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & another …. Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate with Mr K.S. Gill, Advocate. For the Respondents/State : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for regular bail in FIR No. 41 of 2025, dated 17.02.2025, registered at Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:17167 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police received secret information on 17.02.2025 that the petitioner was working as a Chowkidar in the Forest Corporation Sale depot at Taruwala. He indulged in the sale/purchase of narcotics from his room. He had kept contraband in an iron Almirah in his room, and a huge quantity of contraband could be recovered by searching the almirah. The information was reduced into writing and was sent to the Sub-Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. The police went to the spot and searched the Almirah. The police recovered a bag containing 1.614 kilograms of charas. The allegations made against the petitioner are false. The petitioner has nothing to do with the commission of the crime. The Forest Department had filed a reply before this Court, in which it was asserted that the petitioner was not the occupant of the premises from where the contraband was stated to have been recovered by the police; rather, the premises were lying in an abandoned condition. This affidavit falsifies the prosecution's version regarding the petitioner being in possession of the contraband. The petitioner was present in the premises owing to his duties. He had no knowledge or control over the contraband stored in the premises. 3 2026:HHC:17167 The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 2383 of 2025 and was dismissed by this Court on 23.01.2026. The statement of an independent witness was recorded on 5.03.2026, in which he stated that the premises were in dilapidated condition and were not allotted to any person. Hence, there is no material to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 17.02.2025. They received secret information at about 6:30 PM that petitioner Pradeep Kumar was selling charas, and in case of a search of his room, a huge quantity of charas could be recovered. The information was credible, and any delay in procuring the search warrant would have led to the destruction of the case property. Hence, the information was reduced into writing and was sent to the SDPO, Paonta Sahib. The police joined Suprabhat Thakur and went to the petitioner’s room, where he (the petitioner) was present. The police searched the room and 4 2026:HHC:17167 recovered a carry bag containing 1.614 kg of charas. The police arrested the petitioner and seized the charas. The charas was sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), and as per the result of analysis, it was confirmed to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. The chargesheet has been filed before the Court. Statements of two witnesses out of 18 cited by the prosecution have been recorded, and the matter is now listed for the recording of statements of prosecution witnesses on 15.06.2026. Hence, the status report. 4. I have heard Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State 5. Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The independent witness has not supported the prosecution's case, and this constitutes a change in the circumstances. Reply filed by the Forest Corporation before this Court clearly shows that the petitioner was not allotted the premises, and there is no material to connect the petitioner with the commission of a crime. Grounds of arrest 5 2026:HHC:17167 were not communicated to the petitioner, and his arrest is illegal. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed. 6. Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State, submitted that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by this Court. The subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances. The petitioner has not shown any change in the circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully. 8. It is undisputed that the petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 2383 of 2025, and was dismissed by this Court on 23.01.2026. It was laid down in the State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the 6 2026:HHC:17167 fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 7 2026:HHC:17167 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380, wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents. 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458, wherein it was observed: 30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications. 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: 8 2026:HHC:17167 7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 9 2026:HHC:17167 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered based on the change in the circumstances, and it is impermissible to review the order passed by the Court. 14. This Court had earlier held that there was sufficient material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime, and the petitioner was unable to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under section 37 of the NDPS Act; hence, he was not entitled to bail. These considerations have not been changed. 15. It was submitted that the independent witness has not supported the prosecution's case, and this is sufficient to grant bail to the petitioner. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Dineet v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8603, that it is impermissible for the bail Court to appreciate the evidence recorded during the trial and grant bail on the ground that the independent witness has not supported the prosecution’s case. It was observed: “17. Addressing Mr Mahajan's submissions, it is pertinent to note that nearly the entirety of the petitioner's case rests upon the assumption that this Court may enter into witness 10 2026:HHC:17167 testimonies and evidence to determine contradictions and the hostility of witnesses at the stage of bail. 18. However, it is trite that the same is not within the power of this Court at the stage of bail, as laid down in Satish Jaggi v. State of Chhattisgarh (2007) 11 SCC 195 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 660, paragraphs 11 and 12 of which merit reproduction: “11. On the aforesaid reasoning, the learned Chief Justice thought it fit to grant bail. Mr. A.K. Ganguli, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant complainant, Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned ASG appearing on behalf of CBI and Mr. Rajiv Dutta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh strenuously contended that having regard to the observations and findings of the learned Chief Justice as recorded above, it clearly shows that the learned Chief Justice while granting bail to the accused virtually decided the case on merit which amounts to acquitting the accused of the criminal charge levelled against him without trial. Per contra, Mr Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Counsel, contended that now the evidence is closed, so there is no question of the accused tampering with the prosecution witnesses or fleeing from justice. He further contended that now the arguments in the case have finally started, and the arguments of the prosecution are over, and only the defence is to give its reply. He, accordingly, contended that the bail granted by the learned Chief Justice need not be disturbed. 12. Normally, if the offence is non-bailable, bail can also be granted if the facts and circumstances so demand. We have already observed that in granting bail in a non- bailable offence, the primary consideration is the gravity and the nature of the offence. A reading of the order of the learned Chief Justice shows that the nature and the gravity of the offence and its impact on the democratic fabric of the society were not at all considered. We are more concerned with the observations and findings recorded by the learned Chief Justice on the credibility and the evidential value of the witnesses at the stage of granting bail. By making such observations and findings, 11 2026:HHC:17167 the learned Chief Justice has virtually acquitted the accused of all the criminal charges levelled against him even before the trial. The trial is in progress, and if such findings are allowed to stand, it would seriously prejudice the prosecution's case. At the stage of granting bail, the court can only go into the question of the prima facie case established for granting bail. It cannot go into the question of the credibility and reliability of the witnesses put up by the prosecution. The question of credibility and reliability of prosecution witnesses can only be tested during the trial.” 19. By virtue of the aforementioned paragraphs from the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Satish Jaggi, it is evinced that this Court, at the stage of Bail, cannot look into the allegations of PW2 being a witness who has turned hostile, nor apply its mind to alleged contradictions in his statement under Section 161 of the CrPC when compared with his testimony in Court, as the same would amount to appreciation of the evidentiary value of his statement and testimony, and this is an exercise that is only to be conducted during the course of trial. 20. The same has been relied upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702, with the following paragraphs of this decision reproduced for ready reference: “20.2.5. Further, such an approach of the High Court is contrary to the judicial precedents of this court, including Satish Jaggi v. State of Chhattisgarh (supra), Kanwar Singh Meena v. State of Rajasthan4, wherein it was held that courts, while considering bail, should not assess the credibility of witnesses, as this function squarely lies within the domain of the trial Court. Thus, the impugned order of the High Court violates this principle by commenting on the delay in the witness statements and imputing a lack of credibility at this stage” (emphasis supplied) ***** 12 2026:HHC:17167 “20.3.6. In the present case, the High Court also proceeded to analyse and discount the credibility of certain prosecution witnesses and forensic material. It observed contradictions in the eyewitness statements concerning the overt acts of the accused (para 26). It expressed doubts about the prosecution's explanation for the delay in recording the statements of CW. 76 and CW. 91 (para 27). It questioned the timing of the doctor's supplementary opinion and weighed its evidentiary worth (para 31). As already pointed out, the credibility or reliability of witnesses is a matter for the trial Court to determine after full-fledged cross-examination. It is a trite law that statements recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C. are not substantive, and their evidentiary value can only be determined after cross-examination during trial. Any opinion rendered at the bail stage risks prejudging the outcome of the trial and must be avoided. Thus, the court's assessment of these aspects amounts to a premature appreciation of the probative value of prosecution evidence.” (emphasis supplied) ***** “24. On a cumulative analysis, it is evident that the order of the High Court suffers from serious legal infirmities. The order fails to record any special or cogent reasons for granting bail in a case involving charges under Sections 302, 120B, and 34 IPC. Instead, it reflects a mechanical exercise of discretion, marked by significant omissions of legally relevant facts. Moreover, the High Court undertook an extensive examination of witness statements at the pre-trial stage, highlighting alleged contradictions and delays - issues that are inherently matters for the trial Court to assess through cross-examination. The trial Court alone is the appropriate forum to evaluate the credibility and reliability of witnesses. Granting bail in such a serious case, without adequate consideration of the nature and gravity of the offence, the accused's role, and the tangible risk of interference with the trial, amounts to a perverse and wholly unwarranted exercise of discretion. The well-founded allegations of witness intimidation, coupled with compelling forensic and circumstantial 13 2026:HHC:17167 evidence, further reinforce the necessity for cancellation of bail. Consequently, the liberty granted under the impugned order poses a real and imminent threat to the fair administration of justice and risks derailing the trial process. In light of these circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the present case calls for the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 439(2) Cr. P.C.” (emphasis supplied) 21. Drawing inspiration from the judgment in Darshan, the hostility of a witness cannot be interpreted as an automatic declaration of the prosecution's case as unconvincing, and thereby, in essence, result in the conduction of a mini-trial at the stage of bail and return findings upon the ex facie merit of the accused's innocence/guilt. 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences, the Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial and grant bail because of some discrepancy in the testimony. It was observed: - “14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath to entertain the bail application of the Accused. 15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim. 14 2026:HHC:17167 16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or the acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only if the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.” 17. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Suraj Singh v. State of H.P., 2022 SCC OnLine HP 268 that the Court exercising bail jurisdiction cannot appreciate the contradictions in the evidence. It was observed: 10. Petitioner has placed reliance on the statements of witnesses already recorded by the learned Special Judge, in support of his argument to the effect that, from perusal of these statements, reasonable grounds can be entertained for concluding prima facie innocence of the petitioner. The arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner deserve to be rejected for the reason that this Court, while dealing with the bail application, will not appreciate the evidence being recorded during the trial. Undisputedly, only some of the witnesses out of the entire list of witnesses relied upon by the prosecution have been examined. In these circumstances, it is not prudent to form any opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the petitioner on the basis of such partial evidence. 15 2026:HHC:17167 18 The findings recorded by the Court cannot be reviewed by this Court while exercising the jurisdiction to grant a subsequent bail petition. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1520: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070, that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676: 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. Successive bail applications are indeed permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 19. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to release the petitioner on bail because the independent witness has not supported the prosecution's case. 20. It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission is only stated to be 16 2026:HHC:17167 rejected. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed: “58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied) 21. This judgment was followed by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it was observed: “7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as previously there existed no consistent or binding requirements mandating written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth, this means that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make directions issued therein prospective.” 17 2026:HHC:17167 22. This Court held in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of HP CrMP (M) no. 2329 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025, that the requirement of providing the grounds of arrests is prospective. This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of HP SLP (Criminal) no. 797 of 2026. Therefore, the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him. 23. A reference was made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of India and anr, SLP Criminal 3326 of 2026, decided on 01.04.2026, however, in the said case, it has been nowhere stated that the provisions of supplying the grounds of arrest laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs State of Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) 17132 of 2024, would be retrospective, therefore, no advantage can be derived from the cited judgment. 24. No other point was urged. 25. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 18 2026:HHC:17167 26. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 15th May, 2026. (ravinder)