1 2026:CGHC:19659 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRR No. 296 of 2021 Sanjay Kumar Bhagat S/o Mohar Sai Aged About 45 Years R/o Village- Narmadapur, Mainpat, District- Surguja, Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh ... Applicant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, District- Surguja (Place Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Applicant(s) : Mr. Sharad Mishra, Advocate. For Respondent(s) : Dr. Sourabh Pande, Deputy Advocate General. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Order on Board 28 /04/2026 1. This criminal revision has been preferred by the applicant / complainant challenging the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in paragraphs 27 to 35 of the judgment dated 19.02.2021 AKHILESH KUMAR DEWANGAN Digitally signed by AKHILESH KUMAR DEWANGAN 2 passed by the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Ambikapur, District – Surguja in Special Criminal Case No.01/2014. 2. Brief facts necessary for disposal of this revision are that the applicant is the complainant in Crime No. 47/2011 registered at Police Station Economic Offence Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau, Raipur (C.G.) against accused Akhtar Ahmad Siddiqui for offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(ii) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The case arises from allegations that the applicant’s mother, Smt. S. Tirky, who was working as a Supervisor at Anganbadi Centre, Mainpat (District Surguja), had retired from service about two years prior to the complaint. Her dues, including G.P.F. and leave encashment, were pending with the department. The accused, who was posted as a Clerk at the Project Office, Ambikapur, was responsible for processing her payment. It is alleged that he prepared a cheque of approximately Rs.3,00,000/- but demanded an illegal gratification of Rs.10,000/- from the complainant for releasing the cheque. Upon receiving the complaint, the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bilaspur, organized a trap. On 08.08.2011, after completing necessary pre-trap formalities, the trap team reached Ambikapur. During the arranged meeting at the office of the District Programme Officer, the complainant allegedly handed over the bribe amount to the accused, upon which the trap team apprehended the accused red-handed and completed necessary seizure and procedural formalities. 3 3. After investigation and obtaining sanction for prosecution, a charge-sheet was filed before the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Ambikapur, registered as Special Criminal Case No. 01/2014. During trial, multiple prosecution witnesses, including the complainant, were examined, and the accused was also examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and as a defence witness. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused of all charges. However, in paragraphs 27 to 35 of the judgment dated 19.02.2021, the trial Court held that the complainant had given false evidence and directed initiation of proceedings against him under Sections 182 and 193 IPC. The Court further directed filing of a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambikapur, authorized a court official to file the complaint, and appointed an Amicus Curiae to conduct the prosecution. Aggrieved by these adverse observations and directions, the applicant has filed the present criminal revision. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the learned trial Court has erred both in law and on facts while deciding Point of Determination No. 4 and in making adverse observations against the applicant made in paragraphs 27 to 35 of the impugned judgment, thereby wrongly directing prosecution under Sections 182 and 193 IPC. The finding recorded in paragraph 34 that the complainant appears to have given false evidence is unsupported by cogent reasoning. The trial Court selectively relied on a portion of the complainant’s deposition (particularly para 28 referring to 4 part of his statement) without appreciating the evidence in its entirety. It is well settled that testimony must be read as a whole, and minor inconsistencies, especially arising after a considerable lapse of time between the incident and deposition, are natural and cannot be equated with deliberate falsehood so as to attract prosecution for perjury. He further submits that the trial Court failed to consider the mandatory legal requirements under Sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C. before directing prosecution. No preliminary inquiry was conducted, nor was any finding recorded that such prosecution was expedient in the interest of justice, which is a sine qua non for initiating perjury proceedings. Insofar as Section 182 IPC is concerned, the Court overlooked that, under Section 195(1)(a)(i) Cr.P.C., only the concerned public servant to whom the alleged false information was given is competent to file a complaint, and not the Court itself. Additionally, statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are meant only for the purpose of contradiction or corroboration under Section 162 Cr.P.C., and mere deviation from such statements cannot form the sole basis for prosecuting a witness for giving false evidence under Section 193 IPC. He also submits that the impugned direction further suffers from procedural and jurisdictional errors, as the Trial Court neither established intentional or deliberate falsehood on a material point nor recorded satisfaction that there existed a prima facie case warranting prosecution. It is settled that proceedings for perjury should be initiated sparingly and only in 5 exceptional cases where there is a reasonable likelihood of conviction. Mere contradictions or inconsistencies in statements, unless wholly irreconcilable and consciously made to mislead the Court, do not justify such action. In the present case, the essential ingredients for initiating prosecution are conspicuously absent, and the Trial Court has acted mechanically in directing lodging of complaint, even delegating authority to sign and prosecute the complaint, which is impermissible in law. Hence, the impugned directions are unsustainable and liable to be set-aside. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1943 (paragraphs 9 & 10). 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State opposes the revision and supports the impugned judgment. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and other documents appended with criminal revision. 7. At the outset, it is to be noted that the present revision is confined only to the findings recorded in paragraphs 27 to 35 of the impugned judgment dated 19.02.2021 by the Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Ambikapur, District Surguja in Criminal Case No.01/2014 and the consequential directions for prosecution of the complainant/applicant. The acquittal of the accused is not under challenge in this revision. 6 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of James Kunjwal (supra) has explained the scope of Sections 191 and 193 IPC, which read as under: “9. Hence, in the attending facts, the short question that falls for consideration of this Court is whether the contents of the affidavit filed before the High Court, as taken note of in the impugned order, constitutes an offence under Section 193 IPC, as defined in Section 191 IPC? 10. Section 191 IPC which defines the offence, reads as under:- "191. Giving false evidence. Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence. Explanation 1.- A statement is within the meaning of this section, whether it is made verbally or otherwise. Explanation 2.- A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the meaning of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by stating that he believes a thing which he does not believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does not know." Section 193 IPC, under which the appellant is sought to be prosecuted is extracted below for reference. "193. Punishment For False Evidence. Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a 7 judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1. proceeding. A trial before a Court- martial is a judicial Explanation 2. An investigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice." 9. Insofar as the offence under Section 182 IPC is concerned, Section 195(1)(a)(i) Cr.P.C. creates a clear bar that no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except upon a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned to whom the alleged false information was given. Thus, the competence to initiate prosecution is vested exclusively in the concerned public servant, and not in the Court. The learned trial Court, therefore, exceeded its jurisdiction in directing initiation of proceedings under Section 182 IPC. 10. With regard to the offence under Section 193 IPC, it is well settled that before initiating prosecution for perjury, the Court must 8 comply with the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 340 Cr.P.C., but without complying the mandatory provisions the trial Court issued notice to the complainant, which is per se illegal. The Court is required to conduct a preliminary inquiry, record a finding that an offence appears to have been committed, and form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice to initiate such prosecution. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in James Kunjwal (supra) has reiterated that mere inconsistencies or contradictions in statements do not ipso facto constitute giving of false evidence unless it is established that the statement was deliberately false and made with intent to mislead the Court. 12. In the present case, a perusal of paragraphs 27 to 35 of the impugned judgment reveals that the learned trial Court has drawn adverse inference against the complainant primarily on the basis of certain inconsistencies in his deposition. However, there is no finding that such statements were intentionally false or that they were made with the requisite mens rea to attract Section 193 IPC. Further, the learned trial Court has not conducted any preliminary inquiry as mandated under Section 340 Cr.P.C., nor has it recorded any satisfaction that prosecution of the complainant was expedient in the interest of justice. The direction appears to have been issued in a mechanical manner. It is also settled that proceedings for perjury are to be initiated sparingly and only in cases where there is a prima facie case of deliberate falsehood 9 and a reasonable likelihood of conviction. The present case does not satisfy these requirements. Additionally, the direction of the trial Court authorizing a Court official to file complaint and appointing an Amicus Curiae to conduct prosecution is also contrary to the scheme of law governing such proceedings. 13. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered opinion that the findings recorded and directions issued by the learned trial Court in paragraphs 27 to 35 of the judgment dated 19.02.2021 are unsustainable in law. 14. Accordingly, the criminal revision is allowed. The findings and observations recorded by the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Ambikapur in paragraphs 27 to 35 of the judgment dated 19.02.2021, to the extent they hold the complainant guilty of giving false evidence and direct initiation of proceedings under Sections 182 and 193 IPC, are hereby expunged. 15. It is clarified that the remaining part of the impugned judgment, including the acquittal of the accused, shall remain undisturbed. 16. A copy of this order be send to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Akhil