Page No.# 1/10 GAHC040002762020 2026:GAU-AP:640 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/95/2020 TAP TAKIA R/O RESTERING VILLAGE, PO/PS PALIN, KRA DAADI DIST. AP. VERSUS THE STATE OF AP AND 4 ORS. REPRESENTED THROUGH THE SECRETARY (EDUCATION-CUM-STATE PROJECT DIRECTOR, GOVT. OF AP, ITANAGAR. 2:THE SECRETARY Age: 0 Occupation : EDUCATION CUM STATE PROJECT DIRECTOR 3:THE STATE PROJECT DIRECTOR Age: 0 Occupation : INTEGRATED SCHEME FOR SCHOOL EDUCATION (ISSE) SAMAGRA SHIKSHA SOCIETY AP ITANAGAR. 4:THE DEPUTY STATE PROJECT DIRECTOR Age: 0 Occupation : INTEGRATED SCHEME FOR SCHOOL EDUCATION (ISSE) SAMAGRA SHIKSHA SOCIETY AP ITANAGAR 5:THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SCHOOL EDUCATION Age: 0 Page No.# 2/10 Occupation : KRA DAADI DIST. AP Advocate for the Petitioner : Dicky Panging, Sr. Adv, T Tayeng,Vijay Jamoh,D Tamuk,B Padung,M Doji,M Gibi, C. Tajo. Advocate for the Respondent : Tagum Jamoh, Taba Tagum,SC (Education) Date on which Judgment was reserved : N/A Date of pronouncement of Judgment : 29.06.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the Judgment ? : N/A Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced ? : Yes :::BEFORE::: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KARDAK ETE JUDGMENT & ORDER (Oral) 29.06.2026 Heard Mr. D. Panging, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. C. Tajo, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. T. Tagum, learned Standing Counsel, Education Department, for respondents. 2. Challenging the termination order dated 14.02.2020, issued by the Deputy State Project Director, Samagra Shiksha/Integrated Scheme for School Page No.# 3/10 Education (ISSE), Itanagar, by which the services of the petitioner is terminated in exercise of power under sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, on the basis of a report of the Superintendent of Police, Kra-Daadi District, to the effect that a case had been registered against the petitioner under Palin P.S. Case No. 01 of 2020 under Sections 447/427/506 of the IPC read with Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, followed by the arrest and remand of the petitioner for 14 days, the present writ petition has been filed. 3. The case, in brief, is that the petitioner was appointed and engaged as Primary Teacher (PRT) on contractual basis under the Centrally Sponsored Scheme of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) by an order dated 03.09.2008 issued by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Project Director, SSA District Mission, Kurung Kumey District, Koloriang. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme of SSA and other Central programmes have been integrated under a single programme known as the Integrated Scheme for School Education (ISSE). The ISSE programme is regulated through a Government Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and as such, the employees of SSA, RMSA and other integrated schemes, including the petitioner were engaged under the ISSE programme. The petitioner was posted at Nama Upper Primary School, Tarak Lengdi Circle, Kra-Daadi District, Arunachal Pradesh. 4. On 26.01.2020, during the Republic Day programme, it is contended by the petitioner that an argument ensued with the driver of the vehicle of the Circle Officer, Tarak Lengdi, regarding the parking of the vehicle, which subsequently led to an altercation between the petitioner and the said driver. It is further contended that the Circle Officer, Tarak Lengdi, lodged an FIR before the Officer-in-Charge, Palin Police Station, on false allegations that the petitioner Page No.# 4/10 had entered into his Government quarter at around 6:30 a.m. and had damaged his Gypsy vehicle, the Republic Day pandal, the under-construction Circle Office building and the Circle Officer's quarter building by taking advantage of his position as the administrative head of the Circle. Pursuant thereto, a case being Palin P.S. Case No. 01 of 2020 under Sections 447/427/ 506 of the IPC, read with Section 3 of the PDPP Act, 1984, was registered against the petitioner. The petitioner was arrested and remained in custody from 27.01.2020 till 11.02.2020, whereafter he was released on bail. Thereafter, by a communication dated 09.03.2020 issued by the Deputy Director of School Education, Kra-Daadi District, the petitioner was informed that the Secretary, Education-cum-State Project Director (SPD), ISSE, had terminated his service and a copy of the impugned termination order dated 14.02.2020 was enclosed with the said communication. 5. It is contended that the termination order dated 14.02.2020 reveals that it was reported by the Superintendent of Police, Kra-Daadi District that a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner at Palin Police Station under the aforesaid sections, including Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. Solely, on the basis of the said report, the competent authority terminated the services of the petitioner in exercise of the power conferred under sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. It is the contention of the petitioner that although the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 has been resorted to while issuing the impugned order, no notice was served upon the petitioner, nor was any amount equivalent to the petitioner's pay and allowances for the prescribed notice period was paid to him, as contemplated under the aforesaid Rules. It is further contended that the Page No.# 5/10 impugned termination order is punitive in nature, having civil consequences, and, as such, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities to issue a show-cause notice to the petitioner, providing him with an opportunity to put forward his version of the facts. However, no show-cause notice was issued, and as such, the impugned action is in clear violation of the principles of natural justice, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 6. It is contended that since the petitioner had been serving as a Primary Teacher since the year 2008, having been appointed through a due selection process, he could not have been terminated from service without conducting any enquiry, informing him of the charges against him, and providing him with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Therefore, the action of terminating the service of the petitioner is in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. 7. Mr. D. Panging, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order dated 14.02.2020 itself reveals that it was passed solely on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police stating that a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the respondent authorities to provide the petitioner with an opportunity of being heard. It is further submitted that merely because an FIR had been lodged and a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner under various provisions of law, the services of the petitioner could not have been terminated solely on the basis of the allegations made in the FIR, and without there being any completion of the trial and conviction of the petitioner. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Although a departmental proceeding can be initiated on the basis of the allegations, Page No.# 6/10 pursuant to which an appropriate punishment can be imposed, the same has to be conducted by following the principles of natural justice, as no person should be condemned unheard. The said principle is intended to prevent the authority from acting arbitrarily and affecting the rights of a person, particularly when its action entails civil consequences. 8. Mr. Panging, learned Senior Counsel, submits that the respondent authorities, in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, have terminated the services of the petitioner in purported exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, which itself provides for the issuance of notice before any order of termination can be passed. Since the service of the petitioner was terminated merely on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police to the effect that a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner, and as the said report formed the basis for the termination of the petitioner's service, without an opportunity of being heard was provided to the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned order, being in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, is unsustainable in law and as such, liable to be set aside and quashed. 9. Mr. Panging, learned Senior Counsel, by placing reliance on the judgment and order dated 13.12.2024 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ziro, submits that in any event, after the conclusion of the trial in G.R. Case No. 63 of 2022, corresponding to Palin P.S. Case No. 01 of 2020, the petitioner has been honourably acquitted of the criminal charges. Therefore, the very foundation of the termination of the petitioner's services stands removed in accordance with law. 10. In support of his submission, Mr. Panging has placed reliance on the Page No.# 7/10 judgment and order of this Court in the case of Dharmeswar Baishya v. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2004 (2) GLT 253 to contend that the services of the petitioner have not been dispensed with by way of termination simpliciter, but have been terminated by way of a punitive order, as the termination is primarily based on the report of the Superintendent of Police to the effect that a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner and that he was subsequently arrested and detained in judicial custody for 14 days. 11. Mr. T. Tagum, learned Standing Counsel for the Education Department, submits that a case of a very serious nature was registered against the petitioner, pursuant to which a charge-sheet was filed against him, although the petitioner was ultimately acquitted after being tried, which took place after the termination of his services. He further submits that it is true that the termination order was issued on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police on the very fact that a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner and that he had been arrested and remained in custody for 14 days. He further submits that for contractual employees, no departmental enquiry or departmental proceeding is required to be initiated, as such employees are governed by the terms and conditions of their contractual engagement. 12. Mr. Tagum, learned Standing Counsel, fairly submits that the provision under which the services of the petitioner was terminated, particularly proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, would not be applicable. However, the termination would be governed by the terms and conditions of the contractual appointment. There may have been an unintentional procedural lapse on the part of the respondents, but the fact that a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner cannot be denied. Mr. Tagum further submits that the post against which the petitioner Page No.# 8/10 was working has already been filled up; therefore, it would not be possible to reinstate the petitioner at this point of time, in the event the writ is allowed as the service of the petitioner was terminated in the year 2020. 13. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. 14. Uncontroverted facts of the present case is that the petitioner, who was working as a Primary Teacher on a contractual basis, having initially been appointed under the SSA and thereafter, under the ISSE in the Department of Education, has been terminated from service on the basis of a report submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Kra-Daadi District, to the effect that a case had been registered against the petitioner in Palin P.S. Case No. 01 of 2020 under Sections 447/427/506 of the IPC, read with Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, and the petitioner had been arrested and remanded to judicial custody for 14 days. 15. It transpires that the impugned termination order was issued in exercise of the power conferred under the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the competent criminal court, namely, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ziro, by judgment and order dated 13.12.2024, acquitted the petitioner of the criminal charges in G.R. Case No. 63 of 2022, corresponding to Palin P.S. Case No. 01 of 2020, registered under Sections 447/427/506 of the IPC, read with Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. 16. There is no dispute that, before the issuance of the impugned termination order dated 14.02.2020, no notice whatsoever was issued to the petitioner, Page No.# 9/10 although the action of the respondent authorities in terminating the services of the petitioner entails civil consequences. More so, sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 itself provides for the issuance of notice, thereby affording an opportunity to the petitioner before an order of termination is passed and the proviso provides for payment of a sum equivalent to the amount of pay plus other allowances for the period of notice before termination or for a period which such notice falls short of one month. 17. Having regard to the submissions of the learned Standing Counsel for the Education Department that the petitioner, being a contractual employee, his termination or dispensing with his services would be governed by the terms and conditions of his contractual appointment, it is noticed that no document has been brought on record to show that the services of the petitioner could be terminated in terms of the conditions of his contractual appointment, merely on the ground of his alleged involvement in a criminal case. Even assuming that the termination was affected on the basis of the purported terms and conditions of the contractual appointment, which may have provided for termination or dispensing with the services of the petitioner, the same could not have been affected without affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard, as the terms of the contractual appointment cannot exclude the application of the principles of natural justice. Thus, in the considered view of this Court, the impugned order of termination is stigmatic and illegal. 18. As is evident from the impugned order itself, the services of the petitioner was terminated solely on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Kra-Daadi District, to the effect that a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner and he had been arrested and remanded to judicial custody for 14 days. Such circumstances, by themselves, could not have constituted a valid Page No.# 10/10 basis for terminating the services of the petitioner without first providing him with an opportunity of being heard, particularly when the action entails civil consequences. 19. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, I am of the considered opinion that the termination of the services of the petitioner solely on the basis of the report of the Superintendent of Police, Kra-Daadi District, stating that a criminal case had been registered against the petitioner and that he had been arrested and remanded to judicial custody for 14 days, is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, the impugned termination order dated 14.02.2020 passed by the Deputy State Project Director, Samagra Shiksha/Integrated Scheme for School Education (ISSE), Itanagar, conveying the approval of the competent authority for the immediate termination of the services of the petitioner and order of termination, is hereby set aside and quashed. 20. Consequently, the petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith. However, it is made clear that the respondent authorities shall be at liberty to initiate such action against the petitioner as may be permissible in law but strictly in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions. 21. The writ petition stands disposed of, in terms above. No order as to cost(s). JUDGE Comparing Assistant