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2026 DAILYLAW 9168 (CHH)

Ramesh Kumar Padhi v. State Of Chhattisgarh and Ors.

SA/93/2015 · 2026-04-28

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

Civil Appealbody2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 2026:CGHC:19801 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 93 of 2015 Ramesh Kumar Padhi S/o Laikhan Padhi Aged About 59 Years R/o Vill.- Peethapur, Tah.- Jagdalpur, Civil And Revenue District-Bastar C.G. , Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Bastar, Place- Jagdalpur, Civil And Revenue District- Bastar C.G., Chhattisgarh 2. Smt. Durputa W/o Lt. Baidhnath Aged About 61 Years R/o Vill.- Peethapur, Tah. Jagdalpur, Civil And Revenue District- Bastar C.G. , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3. Kamalsingh S/o Lt. Baidhnath Aged About 45 Years R/o Vill.- Peethapur, Tah. Jagdalpur, Civil And Revenue District- Bastar C.G. , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate For Respondent/ State : Mr. Atanu Ghosh, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 29.04.2026 1. The plaintiff/appellant has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.04.29 17:01:14 +0530 2 CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 15.10.2014 passed by the Learned Second District Judge, Jagdalpur, Bastar, C.G. in Civil Appeal No. 12-A/2012 (Ramesh Kumar Padhi Vs. State of C.G. & Ors.) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 27.02.2008 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 13-A/2006 (Ramesh Kumar Padhi Vs. State of C.G. & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/ appellant. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit seeking declaration of title over the suit land bearing Khasra No.164/29, recovery of possession and declaration that the order dated 15.06.1996 passed in Revenue Case No.793/94 be declared null and void pleading inter alia that the land comprised in Khasra No.164 originally stood recorded in the name of his ancestor Rikheshwar, son of Shyamsundar, and upon allotment made during the years 1944-45 to 1955-56, Khasra No.164/29 admeasuring 0.70 acre and Khasra No.164/30 admeasuring 0.90 acre came to be recorded in his ancestor’s name. It was pleaded that a pond had been constructed over Khasra No.164/29 and possession thereof remained with the plaintiff’s predecessor, and after his death, the plaintiff’s name was mutated in the revenue records and patta was 3 granted to him on 28.10.1975. According to the plaintiff, during settlement proceedings in the year 1992-93, he came to know that the suit land had been altered and shown as Khasra No.164/28 and allotted in favour of defendant No.2(a) (b), legal heirs of Baijnath, without notice to him. Though the plaintiff preferred an application for correction before the Assistant Settlement Officer, the same was dismissed by order dated 15.03.1996. Alleging that the said order was illegal and that discrepancies existed in the maps supplied by the Patwari, the plaintiff filed the present suit seeking the aforesaid reliefs. 3. (i) Defendant Nos. 2(a) & 2(b), in their written statement filed before the trial Court, admitted the averments contained in paragraph 1 of the plaint and denied the remaining pleadings. It was contended that the suit was based on contradictory and self-destructive averments and, therefore, was not maintainable. The defendants pleaded that they, and before them their father and grandfather, had been in continuous cultivating possession of the suit land since long and that the plaintiff had instituted the suit on false allegations with an intention to grab the land belonging to members of a Scheduled Tribe. It was further pleaded that actual possession over the land admeasuring 0.82 acre had always remained with defendant No. 3 and his predecessors, and the 4 same had devolved upon them through lawful partition. (ii) The defendants also set out their genealogy and stated that during the settlement proceedings, the competent authority had conducted measurement and survey of the village lands, whereafter extracts of the record of rights in Form “K” were supplied to their father. It was contended that land bearing Khasra No. 164/28 admeasuring 0.82 acre was thereafter measured and renumbered as Khasra Nos. 225/1 and 226/1, and corresponding revenue entries were duly recorded in their favour, thereby conferring lawful title upon them as successors of their ancestors. It was further submitted that the plaintiff’s allegations were baseless and had already been examined by the Assistant Settlement Officer, who, after due enquiry, rejected the plaintiff’s application by a reasoned order dated 15.03.1996. (iii) Lastly, an objection as to jurisdiction was raised by contending that in view of Sections 251 and 257 of the Land Revenue Code, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate the challenge made against the said revenue order, and therefore, the suit deserved dismissal. 4. After framing the issues, the learned trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence, dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the suit land bearing Khasra No. 164/29 was his ancestral property, as no cogent 5 documentary evidence of title, inheritance, or revenue entries was produced. It was further held that the allegation of illegal renumbering of Khasra No. 164/29 as Khasra No. 164/28 was not substantiated by any reliable record. The trial Court also found that the order dated 15.03.1996 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, declaring the land to be a public pond vested in the State, was passed after due enquiry and had attained finality, as the plaintiff had not challenged the same before the competent revenue authority. The plaintiff also failed to establish possession or dispossession within limitation. It was further held that in view of Sections 251 and 257 of the Land Revenue Code, the civil Court’s jurisdiction was barred. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed with costs. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 27.02.2008, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgments are contrary to law and evidence on record, and the findings recorded by both the Courts are perverse. It is contended that the oral and documentary evidence has not 6 been properly appreciated and material evidence has been ignored. He further submits that the ancestral property of the plaintiff bearing Khasra No. 164/29 has been wrongly merged with another Khasra number and thereafter illegally allotted to a third person. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 8. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. Mere assertion that the ancestral property bearing Khasra No. 164/29 was wrongly merged with another Khasra number and thereafter allotted to some other person is not sufficient in absence of cogent documentary evidence. If the appellant was aggrieved with regard to the identity, location, or boundaries of the land, he ought to have moved an application for demarcation before the competent authority and placed the outcome thereof before the learned trial Court. In absence of such material, the contention remains unsubstantiated and no interference on that basis is warranted in the present second appeal. 9. Further, both the Courts, upon proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, concurrently held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the suit land 7 bearing Khasra No. 164/29 admeasuring 0.70 acre was his ancestral property. No reliable revenue record, partition deed, patta, or genealogical evidence was produced in support of title. The allegation that the suit land was illegally renumbered as Khasra No. 164/28 and allotted to the defendants was also found unsubstantiated, there being no competent demarcation or official determination to that effect. On the contrary, the record revealed that the land had been treated as a public pond and vested in the State by order dated 15.03.1996 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, which was never challenged before the competent revenue forum and had thus attained finality. It was further held that the suit, insofar as it sought declaration of title and possession, was not proved to be within limitation, and in view of Sections 251 and 257 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, the civil suit was not maintainable Accordingly, the First Appellate Court concluded that the Trial Court had committed no legal or factual error in dismissing the suit. 10. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with 8 unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 11. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellants/ plaintiffs failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 12. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 14. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading 9 of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 15. Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has held thus at paras 31 to 35 :- “31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails. 32. Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan 10 Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs., wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 33. In Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others, a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 34. Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion. 35. Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial 11 Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors., it was emphasized that the fact remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it stands vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for interference has been made out in the present case.” 16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 17. On perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, as it does not involve any question of law, much less any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 12 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 18. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti