1 2026:CGHC:17996 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 64 of 2017 1 - Bisaram Yadav S/o Late Bhukhu Ram Yadav, Aged About 70 Years R/o Laxman Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Prakash Yadav S/o Bisram Yadav, Aged About 45 Years R/o Laxman Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ..................Defendants ... Appellants versus Rajesh Yadav S/o Ramkhilawan Yadav, Aged About 35 Years R/o Laxman Nagar, Raipur, Tahsil And District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ................Plaintiff, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent ____________________________________________________ For Appellants : Mr. Sandeep Patel, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 21.04.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellants/defendants challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 25/10/2016 passed by the learned 9th Additional District Judge, Raipur, C.G. in Civil Appeal No.67A/2015 (Bisaram Yadav & Anr Vs. Rajesh Yadav) arising out of the judgment and decree dated 27/07/2015 passed by the learned AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Digitally signed by AMARDEEP CHOUBEY Date: 2026.04.22 11:19:11 +0530 2 13th Civil Judge Class-II, Raipur, C.G. in Civil Suit No.347A/2008 (Rajesh Yadav Vs. Bisaram Yadav & Anr). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. The plaintiff preferred a suit seeking for declaration of title and a permanent injunction, pleading inter alia that the plaintiff is the owner of land bearing Khasra No. 828/1 and 830/1, admeasuring 1400 sq. ft., situated at Village Chirhul Deeh, P.H. No.106 "B", Tahsil and District Raipur. His name is recorded in the revenue records and he is in possession thereof. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff purchased the suit land from the vendor on 13.04.2007, obtained possession, and uses it for supplying building material by storing grit and sand thereon. He duly pays taxes for the same to the Municipal Corporation, Raipur. The said land is recorded in the name of the plaintiff in government records. For the protection of the said plot, the plaintiff obtained due license from the Municipal Corporation, Raipur and, on 29.09.2008, began digging pits for construction of a boundary wall. At that time, the defendants came to the suit land, abused the plaintiff, and stopped him from carrying out the work. 3. The defendants in their written statement, denied all the plaint averments. They submitted that that, as per para 2 of the plaint, the land bearing Khasra No. 828/1 admeasuring 0.17 acre and Khasra No. 830 admeasuring 0.50 acre, situated at Village 3 Chirhuldeeh, P.H. No. 106 "B", Tahsil and District Raipur, was originally in the ownership and possession of Gangaram s/o Veersing Sonkar and others of Chirhuldeeh, Raipur in the year 1954–55. The original landowner Gangaram s/o Veersing Sonkar and others sold a portion of their owned and possessed agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 828/1 and 830 to Smt. Rajkumari w/o Omprakash Bahal, Raipur, vide registered sale deed dated 30.07.1968. Similarly, land measuring 2500 sq. ft. out of Khasra No. 828/1 was sold to Bhagwati, Ramcharan, Ramsagar, Raipur on 30.07.1968. Further, a portion of Khasra No. 830 admeasuring 0.29 acre was sold to Nanku s/o Buddhji Talmale, Jorapara, Raipur on 08.07.1970. They stated that The plaintiff has not clarified from whom and which Khasra number was purchased under the registered sale deeds dated 13.04.2007, 10.04.2007 and 03.04.2007. The defendants have never entered into any dispute with the plaintiff; rather, the plaintiff himself is attempting to forcibly take possession of the land in question. The plaintiff’s claim of title and possession over the said land is baseless. 4. The learned Trial Court, after framing the issues and upon due consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, as well as the material available on record, allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff. The Court observed that the plaintiff deposed that he carries on the business of supplying building material and stores grit, sand, etc., on the suit land. As the land is 4 open from all sides, theft of material is frequent, necessitating construction of a boundary wall. On 29.09.2008, when he commenced excavation for the boundary wall, the defendants, accompanied by 25–30 persons, came to the site, abused him, claimed the plot as their own, and obstructed the work. Despite the plaintiff producing title documents, the defendants refused to acknowledge them and, when asked to show their own documents, assaulted the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s mother and relatives intervened to rescue him. On 25.12.2008, when the plaintiff again attempted construction, the defendants once more obstructed the work and hurled abuses. The plaintiff lodged a complaint with the Superintendent of Police, Raipur on 08.10.2008, certified copy whereof is Ex. P/7, regarding the defendants’ conduct in creating obstruction whenever construction is undertaken. The plaintiff’s testimony coupled with Ex. P/7 prima facie shows interference by the defendants with the plaintiff’s land. The Trial Court further observed that the plaintiff has proved his title through Sale Deed Ex. P/2 dated 03.04.2007, property tax receipts Ex. P/3 to P/5, police complaints Ex. P/6– P/7 regarding obstruction, and municipal building permits Ex. P/10 to P/12 for 2007–2010. The documentary evidence collectively establishes the plaintiff’s ownership and possession of 1400 sq. ft. in Khasra Nos. 828/1 and 830/1. 5. Against the said judgment and decree, the defendants filed the Civil Appeal before the learned First Appellate Court who by the 5 judgment and decree impugned, dismissed the Civil Appeal by maintaining the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, this appeal by the appellant/defendants. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the learned trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have committed grave error in law and on facts in decreeing the suit of the plaintiff, as the findings recorded are perverse and contrary to the evidence available on record. Learned counsel further submits that the plaintiff has failed to furnish essential particulars such as boundaries, survey numbers, extent, and the source of title. In absence of these foundational facts, no effective adjudication of title could have been undertaken, and the suit ought to have been dismissed. Learned counsel further submits that the findings recorded by the learned both the Courts are perverse, being contrary to the pleadings and evidence on record. Both the Courts have failed to properly appreciate the specific objections raised in the written statement as well as the evidence adduced by the defendants. He further submits that the trial Court ought to have got the land demarcated by appointing a Commissioner, as the dispute is about demarcation of land and he relied on a judgment of High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Ramlal Vs. State of M.P. through Collector and Ors 2024 SCC OnLine MP 2334. Therefore, it is prayed that the appeal filed on behalf of the defendants be allowed, and the impugned judgment and decree may be set aside. 6 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record. 8. In the case at hand, upon appreciation of the evidence on record, the plaintiff has duly proved his title and possession over the suit land admeasuring 1400 sq. ft. comprising Khasra Nos. 828/1 and 830/1, situated at Village Chirhuldeeh, P.H. No. 106 "B", Tahsil & District Raipur, through Sale Deed Ex. P/2 dated 03.04.2007, property tax receipts Ex. P/3 to P/5, and building permissions Ex. P/10 to P/12 issued by the Municipal Corporation, Raipur. The plaintiff’s testimony regarding interference by the defendants on 29.09.2008 and 25.12.2008 stands corroborated by police complaint Ex. P/7 dated 08.10.2008. The defendants have failed to establish any right, title, or interest in the suit land, nor have they produced any documentary evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s title. The plea raised by the defendants regarding prior sale deeds of 1968 and 1970 does not pertain to the suit Khasra numbers or the specific 1400 sq. ft. purchased by the plaintiff, and hence is of no assistance. 9. In view of the cogent and reliable documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff and the admission of obstruction by the defendants, the Trial Court has rightly held that the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit land and that the defendants have unlawfully interfered with his possession. The defendant never prayed for demarcation of the land and both the Courts 7 found the possession and title of plaintiff proved and decreed the suit. 10. Very recently the Supreme Court in the matter of Russi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bhavna Seth & Ors. in C.A. No. 109/2010 decided on 09.04.2026 has held thus at paras 31 to 35 :- “31. It is settled in law that the findings of fact howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon the substantial question of law, if any, arising therein. Thus, the argument that the High Court in second appeal ought to have examined the evidence to ensure the correctness of the findings of the First Appellate Court has no legs to stand and fails. 32. Long back in 1981, three judges of this Court in the case of Bholaram Vs. Ammerchand (1981) 2 SCC 414 had ruled that even if findings of facts by courts below are wrong or grossly inexcusable that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC in the absence of clear error of law. A similar view was reiterated in Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by Lrs. (2005) 10 SCC 553, wherein it has been laid down that even if the First Appellate Court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground 8 for the High Court to upset the same. 33. In Kashibai w/o Lachiram and Another vs. Parwatibai w/o Lachiram and others (1995) 6 SCC 213, a similar proposition of law was laid down by this Court and it was held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless a substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 34. Similar is the situation in the case at hand. The High Court has not found any substantial question of law or a question of law worth consideration in the second appeal and, therefore, there was no occasion for it to have reappreciated the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion. 35. Again, in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. Vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (dead) by Lrs & Ors. AIR (2001) SC 1273, it was emphasized that the fact remains that in a second appeal, a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will not be disturbed unless it is found that it stands vitiated for want of perversity. No such case for interference has been made out in the present case. 11. The scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 12. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/s failed to establish its case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 13. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 14. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 15. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is 10 entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 16. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as by the learned First appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 17. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Gowri/ Amardeep