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2026 DAILYLAW 8992 (PNJ)

VEERBHAN ALIAS VIRBHAN v. JAGAT SINGH AND OTHERS

RSA/3211/2025 · 2026-04-29

Deepak Gupta

body2026

Judgment text

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CM-4840-C-2026 in/and RSA-3211-2025 (O&M) [1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CM-4840-C-2026 in/and RSA-3211-2025 (O&M) Date of decision: 29.04.2026 Veerbhan @ Virbhan ...Appellant Versus Jagat Singh and others ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Present: Mr. Sarun Hans, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Yashveer Kharb, Advocate for the caveators/respondents. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) CM-4840-C-2026 This is an applica7on under Order XLI Rule 19 CPC for restora7on of the main case i.e. RSA-3211-2025, which was dismissed in default for want of prosecu7on on 11.03.2026. No7ce of the applica7on. Mr. Yashveer Kharb, Advocate for the caveators/respondents has put in appearance and has no objec7on to allow the applica7on. For the reasons men7oned in the applica7on and no objec7on on behalf of counsel for the caveators/respondents, order dated 11.03.2026 is hereby recalled. Applica7on is allowed. RSA-3211-2025 is hereby restored. It be registered at its original number. The main case is taken up today itself for hearing. RSA-3211-2025 The present appeal has been preferred by defendant No.1 YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.30 14:21 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CM-4840-C-2026 in/and RSA-3211-2025 (O&M) [2] assailing the order dated 22.07.2025 passed by the learned Addi7onal District Judge, Hisar, whereby the applica7on filed by the appellant under Sec7on 5 of the Limita7on Act, 1963 seeking condona7on of delay of 427 days in filing the appeal was dismissed and, as a natural consequence thereof, the appeal itself was rejected as barred by limita7on. 2. The factual matrix, in brief, is that the respondent–plain7ff had ins7tuted a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 04.10.1999 against the defendants including the present appellant. Upon contest, the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 21.07.2018 decreed the suit and directed the defendants to execute the sale deed in favour of the plain7ff. 3. Aggrieved against the said judgment and decree, the appellant preferred an appeal before the first Appellate Court along with an applica7on seeking condona7on of delay of 427 days. 4. The case set up by the appellant before the Court below was that the delay was neither inten7onal nor deliberate. It was pleaded that the counsel engaged by him had not informed him about the outcome of the case and that he came to know about the judgment only upon receipt of summons in execu7on proceedings. It was further pleaded that the appellant had been suffering from serious ailments, namely CVA and cervical spondylosis, which prevented him from pursuing the maIer diligently. 5. The aforesaid applica7on was opposed by the respondent– plain7ff, who asserted that the explana7on furnished was vague, unsubstan7ated and an aJerthought, and that the appellant was well aware of the judgment much earlier. 6. The learned Addi7onal District Judge, upon considera7on of YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.30 14:21 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CM-4840-C-2026 in/and RSA-3211-2025 (O&M) [3] the pleadings and the material on record, dismissed the applica7on for condona7on of delay holding that the appellant had failed to show “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Sec7on 5 of the Limita7on Act, and consequently dismissed the appeal as 7me-barred. 7. Assailing the said order, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the Court below adopted a hyper-technical approach and failed to advance substan7al jus7ce. It is contended that the delay was bona fide and occurred due to circumstances beyond the control of the appellant. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the par7es and upon perusal of the record, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. 9. It is a seIled principle that though the expression “sufficient cause” occurring in Sec7on 5 of the Limita7on Act deserves a liberal construc7on, such liberal approach cannot be extended to condone inordinate delay where the explana7on is neither cogent nor convincing. The law of limita7on is founded upon sound public policy to ensure finality in li7ga7on and to prevent stale claims from being agitated aJer an unreasonable lapse of 7me. 10. In the present case, the delay of 427 days is admiIedly substan7al. The first ground taken by the appellant is that his counsel did not inform him about the decision of the case. Such a plea, in the absence of any suppor7ng material, par7cularly an affidavit of the concerned counsel, cannot be accepted. It is by now well seIled that a li7gant is expected to remain vigilant about his case and cannot absolve himself of responsibility by merely cas7ng blame upon his counsel. Acceptance of such a plea, without strict scru7ny, would render the law of limita7on o7ose. 11. The second ground regarding illness is equally untenable. The YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.30 14:21 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CM-4840-C-2026 in/and RSA-3211-2025 (O&M) [4] appellant has failed to place on record any medical evidence to substan7ate his claim. On the contrary, the record reveals that the appellant had ac7vely par7cipated in the proceedings before the trial Court, which belies his asser7on that he was incapacitated to such an extent as to be unable to pursue the appeal. 12. Significantly, it has also come on record, as no7ced by the appellate court that the appellant had knowledge of the impugned judgment much earlier, as he had appeared through counsel in earlier proceedings arising out of the same judgment. This circumstance clearly demolishes the plea of ignorance and further establishes lack of bona fides. 13. The cumula7ve effect of these circumstances unmistakably points towards negligence and lack of due diligence on the part of the appellant. The explana7on furnished is vague, unsupported by evidence and does not inspire confidence. The discre7on to condone delay, being equitable in nature, cannot be exercised in favour of a party who has failed to act with reasonable diligence. 14. The learned Addi7onal District Judge has, thus, rightly appreciated the facts and applied the correct legal principles while declining to condone the delay. No perversity, illegality or material irregularity can be said to have been commiIed in the impugned order warran7ng interference by this Court. 15. Consequently, finding no merit in the present appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. The impugned order dated 22.07.2025 passed by the learned Addi7onal District Judge, Hisar, is affirmed. No order as to costs. 29.04.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No YOGESH MEHTA 2026.04.30 14:21 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document