2026:JHHC:3853 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 465 of 2021 ----- John Dahanga, aged about 61 years, son of Late Joseph Dahanga, resident of Road No.-04, Village Prem Nagar, Hesag, P.O.- Hatia, P.S. Jagarnathpur, Hatiya, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand)-834003. ....Petitioner(s). Versus 1. Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited, through its Chairman-cum Managing Director, having its office at Plant Plaza Road, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand) 834004. 2. Director (Personnel)-cum-Appellate Authority, Director (Personnel) Secretariat, having its office at Plant Plaza Road, P.O.- Dhurwa, P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand) 834004. 3. Chief of Township-cum-Disciplinary Authority, Township Administrative Division, having its office at Plant Plaza Road, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Dhurwa, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand) 834004. …Respondent(s). ------ CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. ------ For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate : Ms. Shilpi Sandil Gadodia, Advocate : Ms. Shruti Shekhar, Advocate : Ms. Nidhi Lal, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Shushant Kumar, AC to Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Sr. Advocate. ------- 08/09.02.2026: By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioner has sought for the following reliefs:- 1. For issuance of an appropriate writ/order(s)/direction(s) including a writ of certiorari, for quashing/setting aside the Order No.- Disc/AA/Ord-46, dated 10.02.2020 (Annexure-9), passed by the Respondent No. 2 ie., Appellate Authority, whereby the Respondent No. 2 has wrongfully dismissed the appeal filed by the Petitioner against the order of the Respondent No. 3 i.e. Disciplinary Authority dated 21.10.2019 (Annexure-7/1) on the alleged ground that the appeal has been preferred beyond the time limit of one month from the date of communication of the said order of the Disciplinary Authority as prescribed under Rule 32 of the HEC Employees’ Conduct, Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1981; 2. For issuance of an appropriate writ/order(s)/direction(s) including a writ of certiorari, for quashing/setting aside the Order No.- COT/PS/Disciplinary Proceed/2019-78 dated 21.10.2019 (Annexure—7/1), passed by the Respondent No. 3, whereby the Respondent No. 3 has held the Petitioner guilty of the charges of misconduct leveled against him under the Memorandum of Charges dated 14.06.2018, and also imposed penalty under Rule 23(f) of the HEC Employees’ Conduct, Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1981 by reducing Petitioner’s basic pay from Rs. 25,050/ to Rs, 23,610/- in the pay scale of Rs. Page No. 1 2026:JHHC:3853 20,600- Rs. 46,500 (E-2) for the period from 19.05.2018 to 30.03.2019, and further denied the Petitioner increment during the aforesaid period, and also directed the period of suspension to be treated as dies non, as being unreasonable and perverse especially because the same is based on no evidence or irrelevant evidence; 2. The petitioner was posted as an Assistant Manager in Town Administrative Division who was working as Town Warden and was responsible for allotting staff quarters. One quarter was officially allotted to an employee named Kamal Ram in May 2018. According to the petitioner when he went to hand over the quarter, he discovered that it was already occupied by two employees. The occupants filed a complaint against the petitioner, accusing him of giving them the keys earlier and taking illegal rent from them. Based on this complaint, the petitioner was suspended. A departmental inquiry was started against the petitioner and the disciplinary authority punished the Petitioner. His pay was reduced, increments were denied, and the suspension period was treated as “dies non” (not counted in service). During this period, the petitioner retired from service. The petitioner filed an appeal and which was rejected by the appellate authority. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the punishment order dated 21.10.2019 is arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in law. He further submits that the petitioner’s pay was reduced, his increments were stopped, and the suspension period was treated as “dies non,” which affected his service and retirement benefits. He also submits that the charges against him were proved without any documents or independent witnesses to support the allegations. Even the Enquiry Officer noted that there was no proof of payment of illegal rent. He further submits that the disciplinary proceedings were not conducted properly, and the appeal was wrongly rejected as time-barred despite being filed within time. 4. The learned counsel for respondents submits that the petitioner, being the Town Warden, was fully responsible for proper handling and allotment of quarters after issuance of allotment orders. A complaint was received from Ankur Yadav and Sunil Kumar alleging that the petitioner had earlier given them the keys of the said quarter in February 2018 and had taken illegal rent of Rs.3,000 each per month. The petitioner was given full opportunity to submit his written reply and the competent authority took time to examine the matter before passing the final order. The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is as per the rules under HEC Employees Conduct, Page No. 2 2026:JHHC:3853 Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1981. The case of the petitioner was rejected by the appellate authority on the basis of evidences as the charges were proved against the petitioner. 5. After hearing both the parties and upon perusal of the records, I find that the petitioner, being the Town Warden and custodian of estate locks and keys, was entrusted with the responsibility of proper allotment and safeguarding of staff quarters. The departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the applicable service rules after granting the petitioner full opportunity of hearing. In the present case, the petitioner was issued a memorandum of charges in accordance with the HEC Employees’ Conduct, Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1981. Allegation is that he unauthorizedly handed keys of quarter to the complainant and use to take money from them each month. The petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to submit his written defence and to participate in the departmental inquiry. The Articles of Charges were supported by documents. The petitioner was examined. Witnesses were also examned from both sides in support of the charges. The Inquiry Officer, after considering the evidence on record, submitted his findings, and the Disciplinary Authority, upon due consideration, imposed penalty. 6. The Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction, does not act as an Appellate Authority over departmental proceeding, unless perversity or gross illegality is shown, which is absent in the present case. Further, it is well settled that the punishment awarded to the petitioner, unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review by the court. In the present case, the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the prescribed rules, and the petitioner was granted reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The findings cannot be said to be based on no evidence, nor can the punishment imposed be termed shockingly disproportionate so as to warrant interference. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372, in paragraph 19 has held as under- 19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of Page No. 3 2026:JHHC:3853 disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co- delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge- sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable. 7. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “Krishna District Coop. Central Bank Ltd. v. K. Hanumantha Rao, reported in (2017) 2 SCC 528 at paragraph No.7.2 has held as under:- “7.2. Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the court, that the court steps in and interferes.” 8. In view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts of the case, I find that the punishment given to the petitioner commensurate with the proved charge. The penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate to the Page No. 4 2026:JHHC:3853 misconduct proved against the petitioner, particularly considering that he was holding a position of trust as custodian of estate locks and keys. Thus no ground made out to interfere with the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority, which are under challenge. 9. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. 10. Pending interlocutory application, if any, also stands disposed of. (ANANDA SEN, J.) February 09, 2026 Anu/- Cp2. Uploaded on:16.2.2026 Page No. 5