1 2026:CGHC:8729 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR (Order Reserved on 19/11/2025) (Order Delivered on 18/02/2026) (Order Uploaded on 20/02/2026) CRMP No. 376 of 2025 1 - Deepak Gupta S/o Mahaveer Gupta Aged About 51 Years R/o Plot No. 7/27 & 8/28 Civil Lines Raipur District - Raipur (C.G.) Currently R/o Plot No. 46 Road No. 72 West Punjabi Bagh New Delhi District - West Delhi, Delhi (Details Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order ) 2 - Smt. Premlata Gupta W/o Mahabir Prasad Gupta Aged About 80 Years R/o Plot No. 7/27 And 8/28 Civil Lines Raipur District - Raipur C.G. Currently R/o Plot No. 46 Road No. 72. West Punjabi Bagh New Delhi District - West Delhi , Delhi (Detail Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order) 3 - Mahabir Prasad Gupta S/o Mouji Ram Gupta Aged About 82 Years R/o Plot No. 7/27 And 8/28 Civil Lines Raipur District - Raipur C.G. Currently R/o Plot No. 46 Road No. 72. West Punabi Bagh New Delhi District - West Delhi , Delhi (Detail Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order) 4 - Anil Gupta S/o Mahabir Prasad Gupta Aged About 56 Years R/o 501 B Elegant Business Park Andheri Kurla Road J.B. Nagar Andheri East District - Mumbai Maharashtra 400009 (Details Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order ) 5 - Smt. Sangeeta Gupta W/o Anil Gupta Aged About 54 Years R/o 501 B Elegant Business Park Andheri Kurla Road J.B. Nagar Andheri East District - Mumbai Maharashtra 400009 (Details Wrongly Mentioned Without District And Age In Impugned Order Annexure P/ 1 ) ASHUTOSH MISHRA Digitally signed by ASHUTOSH MISHRA 2 6 - Smt. Hemlata Gupta W/o Praveen Kumar Gupta Aged About 61 Years R/o House No. 26 Road No. 25 Punjabi Bagh New Delhi District - West Delhi . Delhi (Details Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order) 7 - Smt. Renu Gupta W/o Naresh Kumar Garg Aged About 59 Years R/o House No. 220 Sharda Niketan Pitampura New Delhi District - North West Delhi Delhi (Details Wrongly Mentioned In Impugend Order ) 8 - Madhu Gupta W/o Nilesh Kumar Gupta Aged About 53 Years R/o B- 6 C.C. Colony In Front Of Rana Pratap Bag New Delhi District - North Delhi Delhi (Details Wrongly Mentioned Without District - And Age In Impugned order Annexure P/ 1 ) ... Petitioners versus 1 - Smt. Sonu Gupta W/o Deepak Gupta Aged About 50 Years R/o Building No. 42 Pent House Number 1201 11th Floor N. I. R. Complex Seawoods Estates Nerul Navi Mumbai 400706 District - Thane (Maharashtra) (Details Wrongly Mentioned In Impugned Order) (Present Respondent No. 1 Was The Revisionist/ Applicant Before Learned Revisional Court) 2 - Shri Ramniwas S/o Ratan Singh The Then Inspector General of Police Current A.D. G.P. Police Headquarters Raipur District - Raipur C.G. Current Address House No. 65, HUDA District - Gurgaon Haryana (Details As Derived From Impugned Order Annexure P/ 1 ) (Present Respondent No. 2 Was The Respondent No. 9 Before Learned Revisional Court) ... Respondents For Petitioners : Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. Malay Jain, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Ms. K. Tripti Rao, Advocate For Respondent No.2: Mr. Anand Kujur, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma, Judge 3 C A V Order 1. The instant petition under Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been preferred against the order dated 19/11/2024 passed by the learned Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, C.G. in Criminal Revision No.28 of 2024 whereby the learned Sessions Judge has set aside the order dated 22/11/2023 passed by the learned JMFC, Raipur, C.G. 2. By way of the instant petition, the petitioners have prayed for the following prayers:- i. To Call for the entire records pertaining to the case of Petitioners vis-a-vis Complaint Case No.1213/2011 registered before Learned Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur C.G. and also Criminal Revision Case No.28/2024 passed by the Learned Court of IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, C.G. or permit the petitioners to file the necessary documents at later stage of hearing; ii. To set aside and quash the impugned order dated 19/11/2024 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Learned Court of IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, C.G. in Criminal Revision Case No.28/2024, in the interest of justice. iii. In the alternative and as a corollary hold that the accused persons vis-a-vis Petitioners and Respondent 4 No.2 had been rightfully discharged u/s 245 of CrPC by the Learned Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur in Complaint Case No.1213/2011 vide order dated 22/11/2023; iv. To grant any other relief in favour of the Petitioners, which this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of Justice. 3. The brief facts of the case as projected by the petitioners are that Petitioner No. 1 and present Respondent No. 1 had solemnized their marriage on 11/02/1997 and subsequently have two children borne out of their wedlock. It is a matter of fact that the parties have had a chequered legal history and have been undergoing protracted litigations arising out of their acrimonious matrimonial relations. Previously in 2001 the Respondent No. 1 had preferred complaints to various officials regarding alleged torture and harassment by Petitioners for dowry as well as for giving birth to a girl child, however, owing to compromise and amicable settlement the Respondent No. 1 withdrew her allegations. 4. Subsequently on 07/12/2010 a criminal complaint had been filed by Respondent No. 1 against the present Petitioners and present Respondent No. 2 before the Learned Trial Court seeking prosecution and conviction of Petitioners and Respondent No. 2 for the alleged offence(s) u/s 463, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120-B & 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. The said complaint case was registered as Complaint Case No. 1213/2011. In the 5 said complaint case it has been alleged by Respondent No. 2 that the Petitioners in active connivance with Respondent No. 2 had got an FIR fraudulently lodged at her behest i.e. The Petitioners anticipating further legal action by Respondent No. 1 with regard to matrimonial disputes and allegations of mental torture/harassment at the hands of Petitioner No. 1 and his relatives, the Petitioners with a malafide intention used one of Respondent No. 1's earlier letters of complaint to some police officials and they (Petitioners) tampered with its contents as such in order to make out a weak case against themselves, which was bound to fail. Subsequently, it has been further alleged that the Petitioners as well as Respondent No. 2 on the basis of the said letter, got an FIR registered bearing FIR No. 73 of 2002 on 06/10/2002 at Mahila Thana, Raipur, C.G. It is also submitted by Respondent No.1 before the Learned Trial Court that the concerned said FIR No. 73 of 2002 was neither filed by her nor signed by her and it was the Petitioners and Respondent No. 2 who got it registered which was done so that the said FIR would ultimately favour the Petitioner No. 1 and his relatives in the long run and as a consequence of which they even successfully obtained anticipatory bails not only in FIR No. 73 of 2002 but also in other cases filed by Respondent No. 1 u/s 498-A, 406 of IPC before Women's Cell, Kirti Nagar, Delhi which had been registered as Complaint No. 372 of 2004 on 15-6-2004. 5. The learned trial Court considering the entire facts and circumstances and the evidence recorded prior to framing of charge held that there is an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 7 years in preferring the 6 complaint case and further held that no case is made out against the accused persons i.e. the Petitioners and Respondent No.2 and accordingly discharged them by order dated 22/11/2023. Thereafter, the said order dated 22/11/2023 was subject of challenge before the Sessions Court and the sessions Court allowed the said revision and set aside the order dated 22/11/2023. Hence this petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the impugned revisional order deserves to be set aside as it suffers from patent illegality, perversity and complete misapplication of settled principles governing discharge in a complaint case under Section 245 CrPC, inasmuch as the entire prosecution against the petitioners rests purely on conjectures, suspicion and afterthoughts of respondent no.1 without any legally admissible incriminating evidence. He would next contend that the alleged forged complaint dated prior to 06.10.2002 was admittedly never produced either before the CID during investigation or at the time of filing the instant complaint on 07.12.2010 and was brought on record for the first time only after a lapse of nearly ten years, clearly demonstrating that it was always in possession of respondent no.1 and was deliberately withheld till she realised that her frivolous case would not survive judicial scrutiny. He would next contend that the conduct of respondent no.1 in refusing to cooperate with the investigation in Crime No.73/02, leading to acceptance of the Khatma report on 29.08.2003 on her express statement that she desired no action against the petitioners, completely demolishes the theory that the petitioners orchestrated a weak FIR against themselves, particularly when the success of the 7 Khatma was entirely contingent upon the complainant’s cooperation and not within the control of the petitioners, who had no conceivable reason to risk incarceration by lodging a false FIR against themselves and their entire family. He would next contend that the subsequent volte-face of respondent no.1, who denied lodging the FIR before the JMFC Raipur and shortly thereafter raised identical allegations before the Delhi Police under the same provisions, coupled with her demand of ₹100 crores and exorbitant maintenance shortly prior to filing the instant complaint, unmistakably reveals a clear intent to harass, arm-twist and falsely prosecute the petitioners rather than seek justice. He would next contend that the heavy reliance placed by respondent no.1 on the CID report and the letter dated 29.11.2024 is wholly misconceived, as the authors thereof were never examined and even otherwise the said documents do not attribute any role to the petitioners in forging or using the alleged complaint, but merely record a non-incriminating opinion that respondent no.1 allegedly did not lodge the FIR, which by itself does not establish any offence against the petitioners. He would next contend that the explanation offered for the inordinate delay of seven years in filing the complaint is demonstrably false, as respondent no.1 had already levelled identical allegations against the petitioners as early as 29.10.2002 in her letter to the IG, and her subsequent attempt to shift the blame for delay on pendency of writ proceedings or non-availability of documents is an abuse of process, since she applied for the CID report only in June 2010 and consciously chose not to pursue such relief earlier. Even on merits, the essential ingredients of Sections 467, 468, 471, 120- 8 B and 34 IPC are conspicuously absent, as the alleged document is not a “valuable security”, was never used or relied upon by the petitioners, and there is no evidence whatsoever of conspiracy, common intention or presence of all petitioners at the alleged place of occurrence, many of whom were admittedly residing in different cities. He would next contend that the entire case is thus founded on mere suspicion and biased imagination fuelled by vendetta, which falls far short of the legal threshold required under Section 245 CrPC, where evidence, if unrebutted, must be sufficient to warrant conviction. He placed reliance upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ajoy Kumar Ghose Vs. State of Jharkhand {(2009) 14 SCC 115}; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujarat {(2019) 16 SCC 547}; Sheila Sebastian Vs. R. Jawahraj {(2018) 7 SCC 581} and would lastly contend that the learned Trial Court, after full consideration of the complainant’s own evidence, rightly discharged the petitioners, whereas the Revisional Court mechanically applied principles relatable to Sections 227/239 CrPC, ignored the fundamental distinction between police-report cases and complaint cases, and travelled far beyond its limited revisional jurisdiction and in these circumstances, the continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would amount to gross abuse of the process of law, warranting interference by this Court, setting aside of the impugned revisional order dated 19/11/2024. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No.1 would contend that he present criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the petitioners is wholly 9 misconceived, misleading and an abuse of the process of law, as the learned Sessions Court, Raipur has rightly set aside the discharge order dated 22.11.2023 passed by the learned JMFC, Raipur, having correctly held that the material available on record raises strong suspicion sufficient to warrant trial against the petitioners and Respondent No.2 for serious offences under Sections 463, 465, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 34 of the IPC, and that at the stage of framing of charge or consideration of discharge, the sufficiency of material for conviction is not the test. He would next contend that the specific and consistent case of Respondent No.1 is that FIR No.73/2002 dated 06.10.2002 was fraudulently registered on the basis of an undated, unsigned photocopy of a complaint falsely attributed to her, without her knowledge or consent, when she had not even travelled to Raipur since April 2001, and that such a forged document could not have been ignored in view of the CID investigation and surrounding circumstances. She would next contend that the petitioners, in collusion with Respondent No.2, a highly placed police officer, misused their power, wealth and political influence to get the said FIR registered in her name with a deliberate design to create false grounds for future litigation, to malign her reputation, cause immense mental agony and social humiliation, and to prevent her from initiating legitimate proceedings thereafter. She would next contend that the conduct of the petitioners in obtaining anticipatory bail within two days of lodging of the FIR, followed by their attempt to influence the closure proceedings, filing applications to be heard before acceptance of the Khatma report, and simultaneously projecting Respondent No.1 as a 10 silent spectator, clearly establishes manipulation of the criminal justice system. Despite Respondent No.1 repeatedly writing to the IG Police, JMFC, higher constitutional authorities including the Chief Justice of India and the President of India, and raising her grievance even at CM Jandarshan, no effective enquiry was conducted initially to identify the real culprits behind the forged FIR, compelling her to pursue a CID enquiry. She would next contend that the CID enquiry, ordered by the State Government, categorically found that Respondent No.1 was not behind the lodging of the FIR and that the same had been fraudulently registered in her name, and the petitioners’ attempt to suppress or selectively rely upon such material only highlights their lack of bona fides. She would next contend that the explanation of delay sought to be projected by the petitioners is wholly false, as Respondent No.1 was continuously pursuing remedies since 2002 and only filed the complaint case in 2010 after the CID enquiry report and persistent inaction of authorities, whereas the petitioners themselves have deliberately prolonged the proceedings for over two decades by filing frivolous applications and concealing material orders to mislead the Court. She would next contend that the narrative that the petitioners lodged a false FIR against themselves is inherently absurd, contrary to human conduct, and exposed by their subsequent conduct of using the said FIR to their advantage in matrimonial and other litigations, including divorce proceedings. She would next contend that the learned Sessions Court has therefore rightly exercised revisional jurisdiction by correcting the patently erroneous discharge order, and the present petition, which seeks 11 to re-appreciate disputed facts and stifle a legitimate prosecution at the threshold, deserves to be dismissed. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No.2 would contend that the present proceedings, insofar as they relate to Respondent No.2/Accused No.9, constitute a clear abuse of the process of Court and warrant interference to secure the ends of justice, as the scope of interference under Section 528 CrPC, though limited, is unequivocally meant “to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice” as held in Mohammad Wajid Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 and State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 and the peculiar facts of the present case squarely attract such jurisdiction. He would next contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that the basic ingredient of offences under Sections 463 and 471 IPC is “forgery” as defined in Section 463 IPC (Mohd. Ibrahim Vs. State of Bihar, 2009 8 SCC 751; Monica Bedi Vs. State of A.P., (2011) 1 SCC 284), which in turn requires proof of making of a false document with requisite intent, as clarified in Sushil Suri Vs. CBI, (2011) 5 SCC 708, and further that Section 471 IPC is not attracted in the absence of wrongful loss or gain even if a false document is alleged (Jibrial Dewan Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 3424). He would next contend that in the present matter, the original alleged forged document was never secured, seized, or forensically examined, despite being admittedly in custody of Mahila Thana, Raipur, and no application under Section 156(3) CrPC was pursued for securing the original, rendering conviction legally impossible. He would next contend 12 that the refusal of the District Public Prosecutor, Raipur to prosecute on the basis of the CID enquiry was a decisive turning point, and without overturning such refusal or directing further investigation, no private complaint ought to have been permitted to proceed. 9. He would next contend that “grave suspicion” suffices at the stage of framing of charge cannot be read in isolation, as grave suspicion must exist with respect to each constitutive element of the offence, a substantial question of law which has repeatedly escaped judicial determination due to factual confusion. Even otherwise, the evidence relied upon fails to establish either making or fraudulent use of any forged document by Respondent No.2, whose role was limited to forwarding the complaint through proper official channel and issuing a routine reminder, a standard administrative act protected by the statutory embargo under Section 197 CrPC, which cannot be lightly brushed aside. He would next contend that the mens rea necessary for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC is wholly absent, and it is inherently improbable that a senior IPS officer, legally trained and holding an LLB degree, would conspire to fabricate a weak Section 498- A case conferring no legal advantage whatsoever, particularly when no quid pro quo is alleged. He would next contend that it is a settled position of law that a second FIR on same facts is permissible where subsequent incidents occur or where full facts could not be placed earlier as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Krishna Vs. State of Karnataka, 1999 3 SCC 247; Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat, 2010 12 SCC 254; Shiv Shankar Singh Vs. State of Bihar, 2012 1 SCC 130 13 which further demolishes the theory of fabricated motive attributed to Respondent No.2. Matrimonial jurisprudence prevailing in 2001 also recognises that dismissal of a dowry harassment case does not extinguish civil or matrimonial remedies (H.S. Mulgonkar Vs. Sunanda, 2001 4 SCC 125; Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121; S. Hanumantha Rao Vs. S. Ramani, 1999 3 SCC 620; Jagdish Mitter Vs. June Soni, 1978 MLR 208 Delhi; V. Bhagat Vs. D. Bhagat, 1994 1 SCC 337), thereby negating any alleged incentive for manipulation by Respondent No.2. He would therefore submit that in these circumstances, continuation of proceedings against Respondent No.2 would violate constitutional guarantees, perpetuate judicial inefficiency, and unjustly criminalise routine official conduct, and therefore the impugned revisional order deserves to be set aside and the discharge order of the learned JMFC restored at least to the extent of Respondent No.2. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents with utmost circumspection. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon a careful perusal of the entire material placed on record, including the complaint, statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, CID enquiry report, closure (Khatma) report accepted by the competent court, and the statement recorded under Section 244 of the Cr.P.C. 12. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.1 got married on 11.02.1997 and two children were born out of the said 14 wedlock. Thereafter, disputes arose between the husband and wife in the year 2002, pursuant to which FIR No.73/2002 dated 06.10.2002 was registered against the petitioners under Section 498-A of the IPC at Mahila Thana, Raipur. The said FIR was based on an undated photocopy of a complaint in which Respondent No.1 was shown as the complainant and the petitioners as accused. In the said matter, the petitioners were granted anticipatory bail. It is further undisputed that investigation in Crime No.73/2002 was carried out, wherein a closure report was filed and the same was accepted by the competent Court. 13. Respondent No.1 thereafter addressed a letter dated 29.10.2002 to the Inspector General of Police, Raipur stating that she had not filed the complaint against the petitioners and had not made any allegations against them. It is also pertinent to note that the alleged forged complaint, which forms the basis of Complaint Case No.1213/2011, surfaced for the first time in the year 2012. Subsequently, pursuant to directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. was recorded before the competent Magistrate, wherein Respondent No.1 examined herself and the complainant failed to produce any independent witness or documentary evidence and closed the evidence herself. 14. Upon appreciation of such evidence, the learned Magistrate passed an order under Section 245(1) Cr.P.C. holding that even if the testimony of the complainant (Respondent No.1) was accepted in its entirety, no incriminating material existed which, if unrebutted, would warrant conviction. The Magistrate further noted that none of the authors or 15 custodians of the disputed documents were examined, no CID officers were examined, no police officials connected with FIR No.73/2002 were examined, and no handwriting expert was examined. 15. From the material on record, it is undisputed that Crime No.73/2002 was subjected to investigation and a closure (Khatma) report was filed and accepted by the competent court. The acceptance of the closure report was not on technical grounds but on the basis of material available, including the conduct of the complainant and lack of prosecutable evidence. The said closure attained finality at that stage. The subsequent complaint case does not demonstrate discovery of any new, legally admissible, substantive evidence which could dislodge the conclusions arrived at during the investigation culminating in the closure report. A complaint instituted merely to re-agitate the same allegations, without curing the fundamental defects noticed during investigation, cannot be permitted to proceed, as the criminal process cannot be used as a tool for endless prosecution. 16. Perusal of the documents further clearly shows that the FIR was registered on the basis of a photocopy of a complaint, which was undated and did not bear the original signature of the complainant. The original document was never seized, produced, or subjected to forensic or handwriting examination. This fact is not only evident from the CID enquiry material but also from the absence of any primary document on record. The complaint on the basis of a mere photocopy, without verification of its origin, authorship or authenticity, strikes at the root of the prosecution case. When the very foundation of the criminal 16 proceedings is a secondary document, the burden lies heavily on the complainant to establish, by cogent and admissible evidence, the existence and genuineness of the original. In the present case, such burden has not been discharged. 17. The complainant herself stated that she did not know who wrote, typed, or sent the alleged forged complaint to the police authorities. On this basis, the petitioners were discharged on 22.11.2023 by the Trial Court under Section 245(1) Cr.P.C. However, the Revisional Court set aside the discharge order by applying the “strong suspicion” test applicable to proceedings under Sections 227/239 Cr.P.C. 18. This Court is of the considered view that there is a clear distinction between proceedings under Sections 244–245 Cr.P.C. and those under Sections 227/239 Cr.P.C. 19. Section 245 Cr.P.C., which deals with discharge in warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report. Section 245 Cr.P.C., reads as under: 245. When accused shall be discharged.- (1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous 17 stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless. 20. The statute deliberately uses the expression “shall discharge”, thereby making it obligatory for the Magistrate to discharge the accused where the evidence led under Section 244 Cr.P.C., even if unrebutted, does not make out a case warranting conviction. 21. Thus, discharge under Section 245(1) Cr.P.C. is not based on mere suspicion but on an evaluation of evidence already recorded. Although Sections 227, 239, and 245 Cr.P.C. deal with discharge, they operate at different procedural stages. The stage under Section 245(1) Cr.P.C. is post-evidence and requires judicial satisfaction based on material already on record. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ajoy Kumar Ghose Vs. State of Jharkhand and Another {(2009) 14 SCC 115} has held thus in para 24 which is reproduced hereinbelow:- 24. Now, there is a clear difference in Sections 245(1) and 245(2) of CrPC. Under Section 245(1), the Magistrate has the advantage of the evidence led by the prosecution before him under Section 244 and he has to c consider whether if the evidence remains unrebutted, the conviction of the accused would be warranted. If there is no discernible incriminating material in the evidence, then the Magistrate proceeds to discharge the accused under Section 245(1) CrPC. 23. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujarat {(2019) 16 SCC 547} has held thus in para 21 which is reproduced hereinbelow:- 21. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, 18 what the Court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The Court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the Court dons the mantle of the Trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the Court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence. 24. In the present case, the allegation of conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC remains unsupported. There is no evidence of prior meeting of minds, and Respondent No.1 herself admitted that the petitioners were residing in Delhi/Mumbai at the relevant time. Further The complainant has failed to establish who authored the undated complaint. The offences alleged pertain primarily to forgery, use of forged document and conspiracy. However, from the evidence adduced under Section 244 CrPC it shows that there is no proof of making of a false document as required under Section 463 IPC; there is no evidence of use of a forged document as genuine by the petitioners within the meaning of Section 471 IPC; there is no material demonstrating mens rea or meeting of minds so as to attract Section 120-B IPC. Respondent No.1 admitted in her deposition under Section 244 Cr.P.C. that she does not know who typed or sent the complaint. On these grounds, the learned Trial Court 19 rightly discharged the petitioners under Section 245(1) Cr.P.C. 25. Respondent No.1 preferred a revision before the Sessions Court, which remanded the matter on the observation that a prima facie case exists. Section 397 Cr.P.C. reads as under: 397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.- (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. (3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. R. Soundirarasu and others {(2023) 6 SCC 768} has laid down the scope 20 of powers of the revisional Court at para 52 & 53 which read as under:- 52. The provisions which deal with the question of framing of charge or discharge, relatable to: (i) a sessions trial or, (ii) a trial of warrant case, or (iii) a summons case, are contained in three pairs of sections under the CrPC. These are Sections 227 and 228 respectively, insofar as, the sessions trial is concerned; Sections 239 and 240 respectively, relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and Sections 245(1) and 245(2) respectively, in respect of summons case. The relevant provisions read as follows: "227. Discharge.- If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. 228. Framing of charge. (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which- (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of 21 Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first call and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or, as the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. * * * 239. When accused shall be discharged. If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the 22 prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. 240. Framing of charge.(1) If, upon such consideration, examination, if any, and hearing, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried. * * * 245. When accused shall be discharged.-(1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would 23 warrant his conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless." 53. The aforestated sections indicate that the CrPC contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in a case triable by it, cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. As per Section 227. the trial Judge is required to discharge the accused if "the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when "the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless". The power to discharge under Section 245(1) is exercisable when "the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction". 24 27. Therefore, applying the aforesaid principles in the facts of the present case, it is crystal clear that the revisional jurisdiction is supervisory in nature. It permits interference only to correct Incorrectness, Illegality, or Material irregularity. It does not authorise re-appreciation of evidence, or Substitution of the Revisional Court’s view merely because another view is possible. 28. Therefore, in the absence of these foundational elements, the continuation of the proceedings would amount to compelling the accused to face a full-fledged trial on speculation alone, which is impermissible under Section 245 CrPC. The learned court below proceeded to frame charges under Section 246 CrPC without recording a finding that the evidence, if unrebutted, would warrant conviction. The approach adopted reflects application of standards applicable to police-report cases, which is legally erroneous. The distinction between Sections 227/239 CrPC and Section 245 CrPC has not been kept in mind. 29. Having perused the impugned order, it shows that the Revisional Court while adjudicating a well reasoned order of discharge, failed to examine that the evidence produced by the prosecution was not showing the ingredients of the offence alleged. The trial Court has applied correct legal proposition by assessing the sufficiency of evidence under Section 245 (1) Cr.P.C., therefore, the revisional Court has committed the jurisdictional error. 30. Section 528 of the BNS empowers the High Court to pass such orders as may be necessary to give effect to prevent abuse of process of law. The 25 revisional Court’s order is patently illegal hence the same is unsustainable in the eyes of law. 31. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that the prosecution is founded upon a photocopy of an alleged complaint, the original of which has never been produced or proved. The closure (Khatma) report, having been accepted, has not been displaced by any new legally admissible evidence. Accordingly, applying the mandate of Section 245 CrPC, the petition deserves to be allowed. 32. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 19/11/2024 passed by the learned Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, C.G. in Criminal Revision No.28 of 2024 is set aside and the order dated 22/11/2023 passed by the learned JMFC, Raipur, C.G. is affirmed and restored. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) JUDGE ashu