1 2026:CGHC:15187 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 113 of 2016 Smt. Kunjlata D/o Late Sunder, Aged About 59 Years W/o Shri Basant Pradhan, Caste- Kolta, Occupation- Agriculturist, R/o Village- Bagardarha, Revenue Circle Sankra, Tahsil- Pithaora, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, At Present R/o Village- Kotna, Tahsil- Jharband, District Bargar Odisa ...........Plainti昀昀 ... Appellant versus 1 - Krishnacharan Sahu And Ors. S/o Shri Palau Kolta, Aged About 72 Years R/o Village- Bagardarha, Patwari Halka No. 42, Revenue Circle Sankra, Tahsil- Pithaora, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, 2 - Satyaraj S/o Shri Lingraj, Aged About 23 Years R/o Village- Bagardarha, Patwari Halka No. 42, Revenue Circle Sankra, Tahsil- Pithaora, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, 3 - Naveen Kumar S/o Shri Krishnacharan Sahu, Aged About 42 Years R/o Village- Bagardarha, Patwari Halka No. 42, Revenue Circle Sankra, Tahsil- Pithaora, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh, 4 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector Mahasamund, District- Mahasamund, Chhattisgarh ..........Defendants, ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) For Appellant : Shri R.S. Patel, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Shri Lekhram Dhruv, Panel Lawyer SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.04.06 11:24:45 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru , Judge Judgment on Board 02.04.2026 1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/plainti昀昀 challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 27.11.2015 passed by the Learned Additional District Judge (FTC), Mahasamund (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. H- 94/2014 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 23.04.2011 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class- II, Pithora District Mahasamund (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 26-A/2009 (Kunjlata vs. Krishnacharan Sahu & Others). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court. 2. (a) The Civil suit has been instituted by the plainti昀昀 against the defendants seeking a declaration that the order dated 03.02.1996 passed by the Settlement O昀케cer, Raipur in Revenue Case No. 11-अ/6- अ for the year 1995-96 be declared null, void and illegal pleading inter alia that her father died about 20 years ago and her mother about 15 years ago, and she is the sole legal heir of her parents. The plainti昀昀 is in 3 exclusive ownership and possession of the agricultural lands situated at Village Bagardarha, Revenue Circle Sankara, bearing Khasra Nos. 176, 195, 332, 476/1 and 476/3, admeasuring 5.21, 0.10, 0.04, 0.92 and 0.62 hectares respectively. It is pleaded that Khasra Nos. 476/1 and 476/3 are parts of old Khasra No. 209/3 admeasuring 1.885 hectares, which is evident from the settlement records prepared in the year 1987 and the subsequent revenue entries. (b) It is further averred that upon an application 昀椀led by Defendant No. 1, the Assistant Settlement O昀케cer, Saraipali Camp Pithora, without a昀昀ording proper opportunity to the plainti昀昀, conducted ex parte proceedings and passed an order dated 18.10.1995, whereby the land bearing Khasra No. 476 (area 1.89 hectares) was partitioned and recorded partly in the names of Defendant No. 1 to 3 and partly in the name of the plainti昀昀. (c) On coming to know of the said order, the plainti昀昀 昀椀led a review application on 24.10.1995 before the Assistant Settlement O昀케cer. Upon inquiry, it was found that the map had been prepared incorrectly, showing excess land in favour 4 of Defendant No. 1 and not re昀氀ecting the correct position of the plainti昀昀’s land. Accordingly, the matter was referred to the Settlement O昀케cer, Raipur, who granted permission for review on 27.10.1995. Thereafter, spot inspection was conducted on 05.11.1995 in the presence of the parties and villagers, and based on actual possession and cultivation, a corrected order dated 09.11.1995 was passed, directing proper recording of the lands in the names of the respective parties and correction of the map and revenue entries. However, the Settlement O昀케cer, Raipur, by order dated 03.12.1996, set aside the said order dated 09.11.1995 and restored the earlier order dated 18.10.1995. Thus, the plainti昀昀 preferred the suit for declaring the order dated 03.12.1996 as null and void. 3. (A) The defendants, in their written statement, contended that the order dated 18.10.1995 was passed in accordance with due legal procedure and after proper consideration of possession. They contended that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit, as the order passed by the Settlement O昀케cer could only be challenged before the competent revenue authorities. It is also pleaded that the suit is barred under Section 34 of the Speci昀椀c Relief Act and 5 Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for want of maintainability. (B) Additionally, the defendants have asserted that they are bona 昀椀de purchasers and are in lawful possession of the disputed land, having purchased the same through registered sale deeds dated 04.06.1968 and 16.02.1972 from one Purnachandra Kolta, a family member of the plainti昀昀. It is submitted that the disputed land forms part of a larger area of about 18 acres purchased by the defendants, and they have been in peaceful possession thereof. 4. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 23.04.2011 dismissed the suit of the plainti昀昀 holding that the order passed by the Settlement O昀케cer, Raipur was legal and valid, observing that the Assistant Settlement O昀케cer had decided the matter merely on assumptions regarding the alleged erroneous map without conducting an independent spot inspection, without recording independent evidence, and without properly considering the evidence of both parties; therefore, the Settlement O昀케cer, Raipur rightly set aside the order dated 6 09.11.1995 and restored the earlier order dated 18.10.1995, and since the plainti昀昀 failed to prove that the order dated 03.12.1996 was illegal or void, the same could not be declared null and void, and accordingly, the issue was decided against the plainti昀昀. Thereagainst, the Civil Appeal preferred by the plainti昀昀, which has been dismissed vide the impugned judgment and decree by the learned First Appellate Court. Thus, this appeal by the plainti昀昀. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court are illegal and perverse, as they have been rendered without proper appreciation of facts and law. It is contended that the appellant is the lawful owner of the disputed land, as re昀氀ected in the revenue records, and has been in continuous and peaceful possession for several decades. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court failed to frame proper issues, particularly regarding ownership of Khasra No. 209/3, and ignored material evidence, including the Patwari’s spot inspection report and oral evidence of witnesses supporting the appellant’s possession. It is further submitted that there is no registered sale deed evidencing 7 transfer of the disputed land to the respondents, especially when the property is ancestral in nature. Hence, the 昀椀ndings recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are unsustainable, giving rise to substantial questions of law for consideration. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record. 7. This Court has carefully considered the record and the concurrent 昀椀ndings recorded by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. The Trial Court, after detailed appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence, has categorically held that the plainti昀昀 failed to prove her exclusive ownership and lawful possession over the disputed land. Though the plainti昀昀 relied upon settlement entries showing her name over Khasra No. 209/3 (new Khasra No. 476), the evidence on record, particularly the renumbering records and the report of the Revenue Inspector, clearly established that certain portions of land belonging to the defendants were wrongly included in the plainti昀昀’s holding during settlement proceedings due to map errors. 8 8. The Trial Court further examined the orders passed by the revenue authorities and found that the Assistant Settlement O昀케cer, in the subsequent order, acted merely on assumptions regarding alleged map errors without conducting proper spot inspection, without preparing an independent enquiry report, and without considering the evidence of both parties. In contrast, the Settlement O昀케cer, Raipur, while passing the order dated 03.12.1996, took into account these material irregularities and rightly set aside the defective order dated 09.11.1995, restoring the earlier well-reasoned order dated 18.10.1995. The Trial Court, therefore, held that the said order of the Settlement O昀케cer was legal, valid and binding, and the plainti昀昀 failed to establish that the same was void or illegal. 9. The Trial Court also considered the admissions made by the plainti昀昀 during cross-examination, wherein she acknowledged that the lands purchased by the defendants from prior owners were adjoining her father’s land, thereby supporting the defence case. The documentary evidence in the shape of registered sale deeds further strengthened the defendants’ claim over the adjoining lands. On the basis of such evidence, 9 the Trial Court recorded a clear 昀椀nding that the plainti昀昀 had failed to discharge the burden of proof. 10. The First Appellate Court, being the 昀椀nal court of facts, re- appreciated the entire evidence and concurred with the 昀椀ndings of the Trial Court, holding that there was no illegality or perversity in the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court. 11. In the present second appeal, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the 昀椀ndings recorded by both the courts su昀昀er from perversity, misreading of evidence, or any substantial error of law. The issues raised pertain purely to questions of fact, which have already been concurrently decided against the plainti昀昀. No substantial question of law, as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arises for consideration by this Court. 7. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent 昀椀ndings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such 昀椀ndings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 10 8. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded 昀椀ndings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant failed to establish their case by placing cogent and su昀케cient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the 昀椀ndings so recorded. 9. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent 昀椀ndings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. It is well established that when there is a concurrent 昀椀nding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said 昀椀nding. 11. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent 昀椀nding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any 11 provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 12. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and in昀椀rmity at all. 13. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib/Gowri