Page No.# 1/26 GAHC040000302024 2026:GAU-AP:625 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : Crl.A./2/2024 Oku Taku Son of Tanyo Taku, resident of Village Sumsing, PO Katan, PS Yingkiong, Upper Siang District, AP VERSUS The State of AP and Anr represented by the PP 2:XXX Age: 0 Occupation : Daughter of Lum Paron resident of Jeru Village PO Katan PS Yingkiong Upper Siang District A Advocate for the Petitioner : Orin Modi, Noni Nobeng,Pura Khongkhung Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, Amicus Curiae,Chorpok Modi Page No.# 2/26 BEFORE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MITALI THAKURIA Advocate for the Appellant : Mr. Orin Modi. Advocate for the Respondent No.1 : Mr. G. Tado Addl. P.P., A.P. Advocate for the Respondent No.2 : Mr. Chorpok Modi Amicus Curiae Date on which judgment is reserved : 03-06-2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 23-06-2026 Whether the Pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? : ___N/A_____ Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : ___Yes_____ JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) Heard Mr. Orin Modi, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. G. Tado, learned Public Prosecutor for the State. Also heard Mr. Chorpok Modi, learned Amicus Curiae for the informant/respondent. 2. This appeal is filed under Section 374(2) of CrPC, 1973 against the judgment and order dated 30.12.2021 passed by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Pasighat in PSG Sessions Case No. 05/2015 in connection with Yingkiong P.S. Case No. 23/2015 under Section 376 (2)(f)/506 IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act. Page No.# 3/26 3. In brief, the case of the prosecution is that a complaint was filed before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class in Yingkiong by the informant namely, one Lum Paron against the appellant on 29.05.2015 with the allegation of forceful rape on his 8 years old daughter on several occasions. It is also alleged that the accused had committed similar kind of forceful sexual intercourse with many other minor child of Sumsing village with further allegation that after the commission of such offence the appellant threatened them with dire consequences due to which the victims could not report about the incident to their parents and relatives out of fear. 4. After receipt of the complaint the leaned Judicial Magistrate, First Class passed an order under Section 156(3) of CrPC dated 29.05.2015 and the O/C of Yingkiong Police Station was directed to register a regular case and to do the needful for investigation. 5. The said complaint was treated as the First Information Report(FIR) and Yingkiong P.S. Case No. 23/2015 under Section 376 (2)(f)/506 of IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act was registered. 6. After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the charge sheet against the accused appellant under Section 376/506 of the IPC, read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 7. After considering the relevant record and on hearing the both sides, the learned Special Judge had framed charge against the accused appellant under Section 376(2)(f)/506 IPC on 22.01.2016. Further no charge was framed against the accused appellant under the POCSO Act as the alleged offence was committed prior to enactment of the POCSO Act. The charges were read over and explained to the accused to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be Page No.# 4/26 tried. 8. To bring home the charges against the accused appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 15 witnesses in support of the case and also exhibited 8 documents. The appellant took the plea of total denial while recording his statement under Section 313 CrPC but did not adduce any evidence in support of his defence. 9. After hearing the arguments put forwarded by the parties, the learned Special Judge had passed the judgment and order dated 30.12.2021 convicting the accused appellant under Section 376(2)(f)/506 IPC and accordingly sentenced him to undergo R. I. for 7 years with fine of Rs.5,000/- for the convicted sections with default stipulation. Further the accused was also found guilty for the offence under Section 506 IPC, and thereby sentenced him to undergo R.I. for 2 years with fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation. 10. On being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Special Judge, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant. 11. It is the basic contention of the appellant that the instant case was lodged due to instigation of the sister of the informant who had filed a divorce proceeding against the accused appellant. Initially the marriage was dissolved between the accused and his wife by the decision of Kebang dated 18.05.2015 but thereafter, another Kebang was held wherein the earlier Kebang decision dated 18.05.2015 was reversed vide its order dated 22.05.2015 and thereafter, on the instigation of the sister of the informant, the present FIR has been lodged with some false and concocted allegation. 12. Mr. Modi, learned counsel further raised the issue that as per complaint, Page No.# 5/26 the incident of rape had happened with the victim in the year 2011-2012 but the FIR was lodged only on 29.05.2015, i.e., more than 4 years after the incident without any proper explanation of delay. Thus such delay is fatal for the prosecution case and on that count only the appeal is liable to be allowed and the appellant is entitled for the order of acquittal. 13. Mr. Modi, learned counsel further submitted that the judgment was passed solely on the evidence of the prosecutrix, who is 8 years old child and admittedly there is no eye witness to the prosecution. More so, there are sufficient discrepancies in the evidence of the PWs which is not at all believable to pass the order of conviction against the accused appellant. 14. He further submitted that as per allegation, the accused appellant had committed rape on the victim on three occasions, first in the house of one Romia, her aunt, secondly he again committed rape on her in the house of another aunt, namely Aso Ejing and thirdly, he committed rape on her in his own house. But the persons in whose house the accused alleged to have committed rape on the victim were not examined by the prosecution who were the vital witnesses of the prosecution to prove the fact that the accused committed rape on the victim in their houses. 15. Mr. Modi, learned counsel further submitted that the medical evidence of the doctor does not support the case of the prosecution and there is no evidence of rape found while examining the victim by the doctor. From her evidence it is also seen that she was asked to depose everything by her parent and thus, the chance of tutoring the child witness also cannot be denied and there is every chance of tutoring a child witness in which case, the evidence of the child witness may be dangerous and without proper scrutinizing the evidence of the child witness also cannot be considered. But in the instant case, Page No.# 6/26 the order of conviction is based solely on the statement made by the prosecutrix who is 8 years old child. Accordingly, it is submitted by Mr. Modi, that the evidence so far adduced by the prosecution witnesses is not at all sufficient to pass any order of conviction as the FIR was lodged only due to grudge of the sister of the informant who was the wife of the accused appellant. But the learned Trial Court did not consider all these aspects of the case and had passed the order without proper appreciation of evidence on record. 16. He further submitted that it is a settled proposition of law that conviction can be based solely on the evidence of the prosecutrix, if it is of sterling quality, reliable and inspires confidence. But here in the instant case there are sufficient material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecutrix and thus, she cannot be considered as a witness of sterling quality. In that context he relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Radhu Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2007 (6) Supreme 196 wherein it has been expressed the view “that order of conviction cannot be based if the evidence of prosecutrix is full of discrepancies and does not inspire confidence.” 17. In the same context he relied on another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Santosh Prasad @ Santosh Kumar Vs. The State of Bihar reported in 2020 2 Supreme 313 wherein he relied on para 6 of the said judgment, which read as under: “6. Having gone through and considered the deposition of the prosecutrix, we find that there are material contradictions. Not only there are material contradictions, but even the manner in which the alleged incident has taken place as per the version of the prosecutrix is not believable…………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….Ther efore, when we tested the version of PW5 -prosecutrix, it is unfortunate that Page No.# 7/26 the said witness has failed to pass any of the tests of “sterling witness”. There is a variation in her version about giving the complaint. There is a delay in the FIR. The medical report does not support the case of the prosecution. FSL report also does not support the case of the prosecution. As admitted, there was an enmity/dispute between both the parties with respect to land. The manner in which the occurrence is stated to have occurred is not believable. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the solitary version of the prosecutrix – PW5 cannot be taken as a gospel truth at face value and in the absence of any other supporting evidence, there is no scope to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant and accused is to be given the benefit of doubt.” 18. In regards to acceptance of child witness also he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Panchhi & Ors. etc. Vs. State of U.P. reported in 1998 (6) Supreme 420 and emphasized on para 11 of the said judgment which read as under: “11. Shri RK Jain, learned Senior Counsel, contended that it is very risky to place reliance on the evidence of PW1 being a child witness. According to the learned counsel, evidence of a child witness is generally unworthy credence. Bu we do not subscribe to the view that the evidence of a child witness would always stand irretrievable stigmatized. It is not the law that if a witness is a child his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is a found reliable. The law is that evidence of a child witness must be evaluated more carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is susceptible to be swayed by what others toll them and thus a child witness is an easy prey to tutoring.” 19. Citing the above referred judgment it is submitted by Mr. Modi that the order of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge is liable to be set aside and quashed due to absence of any believable evidence of the prosecutrix and at the same time, the order was passed without proper scrutiny of the evidence of the victim who is admittedly a child witness of 8 years old. 20. Mr. Tado, learned PP raised objection and submitted that the learned Sessions Judge had passed the order of conviction against the present accused appellant after proper appreciation of the evidence and considering all aspect and situation of the case and hence, there is no need of interference from this Court in the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Page No.# 8/26 21. He further submitted that the victim is consistent in every stages while recording her statements under Section 161 and 164 CrPC as well as while adducing her evidence before the Court. There is no material contradiction to disbelieve the statement of the prosecutrix as she remains consistent. 22. During investigation the I.O. has found that the accused is close relative of the victim and was staying as a neighbor and as per statement of the witness also the accused is habituated in molesting the minors and fact of sexually assaulting some other minors of the village was also admitted by the accused in front of many villagers and relatives of the accused. Further it is also found that the hymen of the victim was found ruptured at the time of medical examination which has been brought by the I.O. while narrating brief history of the prosecution case. 23. He further submitted that as per Pw-14, i.e., the doctor found an old torn hymen and also opined that as there is a torn hymen, vaginal penetration cannot be ruled out and in his cross evidence also he stated that the age of torn hymen cannot be established as it heals within a week. He further submitted that the probability of finding any injury mark on the private part of the victim is also not possible as the child undergone for medical examination after 3/4 years of incident as the incident reported to be occurred in the year 2011-2012. 24. Further he submitted that from the evidences of Pw-2, the informant/father of the victim it also reveals that they came to know about the incident only in the year 2015 when it was informed by his sister over telephone that the accused had committed rape on his daughter and she also asked him to avoid the company of the accused. Thereafter, only he came to the village to enquire about the same with his wife and came to know about the incident, which had happened with his daughter and then the FIR was lodged. Page No.# 9/26 25. It also reveals from the evidence of Pw-7 that a Kebang held for the said incident wherein the accused denied the allegation, however, in the said Kebang it had imposed fine of Rs. 2,50,000/- upon the accused on being insisted by the family members of the victim. Further from the evidence of other witnesses also it reveals that the accused is a habitual offender and molested many minor children but out of fear they did not disclosed the incident to anyone. 26. Mr. Tado further submitted that the Kebang decision which has been annexed in the memo of appeal also reveals that against the present appellant there were several allegation of molestation of the small children wherein, he was also imposed a fine of Rs.2,00,000/- wherein cases of other minor children was decided by the Kebang which otherwise reveals the character of the accused appellant that he not only molested the victim of this case, but he used to molest the other children of the village also. 27. Mr. Tado further submitted that it is a settled principle of law that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim, if her evidence is reliable and inspires confidence. He also submitted that the victim may be a minor child but her evidence is found consistent in every stages and there, found no material contradictions in her evidence to disbelieve or to discard her evidence. Thus, the learned Sessions Judge had committed no mistake or error while passing the judgment basing on the evidence of the prosecutrix. He also stressed on Section 118 of the Evidence Act, which speaks about the competency of the witness and accordingly submitted that a child can also be considered as a competent witness, but proper scrutiny is required in that regard. 28. Mr. Tado, submitted that the evidence of the child victim should be treated as gospel truth and accused can be convicted on the basis of the evidence, if Page No.# 10/26 the evidence of the child witness is found to be trustworthy. In that context he relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sanjay Kumar @ Sunny reported in (2017) 2 SCC 51 and basically emphasized on para 30 and 31 of the said judgment, which read as under: “30. By no means, it is suggested that whenever such charge of rape is made, where the victim is a child, it has to be treated as a gospel truth and the accused person has to be convicted. We have already discussed above the manner in which testimony of the prosecutrix is to be examined and analysed in order to find out the truth therein and to ensure that deposition of the victim is trustworthy. At the same time, after taking all due precautions which are necessary, when it is found that the prosecution version is worth believing, the case is to be dealt with all sensitivity that is needed in such cases. In such a situation one has to take stock of the realities of life as well. Various studies show that in more than 80% cases of such abuses, perpetrators have acquaintance with the victims who are not strangers. The danger is more within than outside. Most of the time, acquaintance rapes, when the culprit is a family member, are not even reported for various reasons, not difficult to fathom. The strongest among those is the fear of attracting social stigma. Another deterring factor which many times prevent such victims or their families to lodge a complaint is that they find whole process of criminal justice system extremely intimidating coupled with absence of victim protection mechanism. Therefore, time is ripe to bring about significant reforms in the criminal justice system as well. Equally, there is also a dire need to have a survivor centric approach towards victims of sexual violence, particularly, the children, keeping in view the traumatic long lasting effects on such victims. 31. After thorough analysis of all relevant and attendant factors, we are of the opinion that none of the grounds, on which the High Court has cleared the respondent, has any merit. By now it is well settled that the testimony of a victim in cases of sexual offences is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of a statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the victim of a sexual assault alone to convict the accused. No doubt, her testimony has to inspire confidence. Seeking corroboration to a statement before relying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, would literally amount to adding insult to injury. The deposition of the prosecutrix has, thus, to be taken as a whole. Needless to reiterate that the victim of rape is not an accomplice and her evidence can be acted upon without corroboration. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness does. If the court finds it difficult to accept her version, it may seek corroboration from some evidence which lends assurance to her version. To insist on corroboration, except in the rarest of rare cases, is to Page No.# 11/26 equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars, as in the case of an accomplice to a crime. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The plea about lack of corroboration has no substance {See Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh[4]}. Notwithstanding this legal position, in the instant case, we even find enough corroborative material as well, which is discussed hereinabove. 29. Mr. Tado, learned PP accordingly submitted that no interference is required in the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 30. Mr. C. Modi, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the informant/respondent submitted that the present appellant is a habitual offender which reveals from the Kebang decision which was held for molestation of 2/3 other children wherein he was also imposed with a fine of Rs.2,00,000/-. 31. Mr. Modi further submitted that it is not a case as projected by the appellant that the case was lodged only due to grudge of divorce between the appellant and his wife, who is the sister of the informant. Rather, from the evidence of Pw-12, i.e., the wife of the accused it reveals that she wanted to divorce the accused after coming to know about his character and the entire incident was reported to the informant and his family members only in the year 2015 and as per request of his sister there was delay of 15 days only in lodging the FIR after information received by him. It is not a case that the FIR was lodged on instigation of the wife of the appellant, rather, wife of the appellant wanted to give divorce to the accused for his conduct wherein she came to know that her own niece was sexually assaulted by the accused appellant. More so, the statement of the prosecutrix is also found consistent in every stages of the proceeding and there is nothing to disbelieve the prosecutrix to discard her Page No.# 12/26 evidence. Her evidence also cannot be discarded being a child witness, as it is found that she was quite confident to adduce her evidence and accordingly her statement was also recorded by the learned Trial Court. The appellant has also not challenged the ground of delay in the memo of appeal and the learned Sessions Judge dealt with the issue of delay in para 20 of the judgment. The accused also did not prefer any appeal against the Kebang decision wherein he was charged that he molested the other minor girls also. 32. Accordingly, Mr. C. Modi submitted that there is no reason for any interference in the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge from this Court and the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 33. In that context Mr. O. Modi submitted that on the allegation of molestation of other minor children, an FIR was also lodged which was registered under the POSCO Act and in the said case the accused got the order of acquittal. 34. So hearing the submission made by the learned counsel for both sides, it is seen that as per the appellant, false and concocted allegation has been brought against him only with the grudge after the divorce between the appellant and his wife and the wife being the own sister of the informant, he had lodged the FIR on her instigation. 35. On the other hand it is the case of the prosecution that there is no connection between the divorce of the accused appellant and his wife and rather, after coming to know about the incident of rape with the minor girl who is the niece of the wife of the appellant, she decided not to live along with the accused appellant, who committed rape on her own niece. After coming to know about the incident only, she lodged a complaint before the Kebang seeking decree of divorce. Initially, the divorce decree was also in favour of the wife of Page No.# 13/26 the appellant but subsequently in the Kebang meeting the order was reversed. 36. It is the case of the prosecution that there is a delay of 4 (four) years as the informant came to know only in the year 2015 though the incident of rape took place in the year 2011-12. The victim disclosed the entire incident, which had happened in three occasions only after coming to know that there was disclosure of the allegation of molestation by other victims, everything was disclosed by her before her family members. 37. To arrive at a just decision, let us scrutinize briefly the evidences of the PWs. 38. Pw-1 is the victim/prosecutrix, whose statement is recorded after judging her mental understanding and also satisfying that she has the capability of giving rational answers and for that some preliminary questions were also put to her which is reflected in the deposition sheet. Thereafter, the statement of the victim, who is a minor girl of 8 years, was recorded by the Court. From her evidence it is seen that the accused is her own uncle and she addressed her as Jeru Pakbo. She described the first incident when she was staying in the house of her uncle, one day the accused called her to the house of her aunt Romia and taken her inside a room and committed rape on her. The accused led her down on the floor thereafter he undressed her and had sex with her. Thereafter, the accused also threatened her that she will be hanged, if she shouted for help. As she got afraid, she could not even shout. At that moment, her aunt Romia was outside the Adi house. The accused again committed rape on her for the second time in the house of her aunt Aso Ejing and third time in his own house. She also deposed that at the time of committing rape on her by the accused appellant for the third time in his own house, some minor children were also present in his house. Thereafter, her aunt apprised her that the accused Page No.# 14/26 had told everybody about the rape which he has committed to her then only she disclosed the entire episode to her family members. Police officer and one more officer have recorded her statement and the officer who recorded her statement was wearing dress like an advocate. 39. She accordingly exhibited her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC as P. Ext. 1 and she also recognized her signature. 40. From her cross examination it is seen that her parents asked her to narrate the entire incident to the Court but she could not remember the day and time when the offence was committed. 41. Pw-2 is the father of the victim and informant of the case and from his evidence it is also seen that on 15.05.2015 when he was along with the accused in his own house, the sister i.e., the wife of the accused had informed that the accused had committed rape on his daughter and asked him to avoid the accused. Hearing the same, he immediately went to the village and enquired about the same from his wife and then only his wife told him that everyone in the area also knows about the incident. His wife also told that his daughter has narrated the entire incident to her. Thereafter, he immediately wanted to lodge an FIR, but the wife of the accused, i.e., his sister requested not to lodge the complaint till Kebang gives a decision of divorce, as she is reluctant to stay with the accused hearing about the incident of rape. The Kebang decision was on 18.05.2015 and 19.05.2015 and thereafter, on 29.05.2015 he lodged the complaint before the police station. 42. From his cross evidence it is seen that on the next day i.e., on 22.05.2015 there was another Kebang between his sister and the accused wherein the Kebang again asked them to stay together. He denied when suggested that he Page No.# 15/26 lodged the complaint only with an intention to get a divorce of his sister from the accused appellant. He further explained that he could have filed the complaint earlier but he was making enquiry from women organization about the fate of the case and then only he lodged the FIR and also stated that at the time of institution of the FIR his daughter was 9 years old. 43. Pw-3 is the mother of the victim and as per her statement also the victim reported about the incident of rape on her but she did not disclose about the incident earlier as she was afraid of the accused appellant. 44. Pw-4 is one of the co-villager of the accused appellant had submitted that the accused committed rape on three minor girls and he heard about the incident from the wife of the accused. He also mentioned the name of the victims who was molested by the appellant. He was also present at the time of Kebang and then only he heard that the accused had committed same offence with three other minor girls. 45. Pw-5 is another witness from the village and he also heard about the incident of rape. He further deposed that the victim disclosed before him that the offence took place in the house of her aunt at Geko and another incident had taken place in Sumsing village. He then immediately informed about the incident to the father of the victim. 46. Pw-6 was also present at the time of Kebang proceeding where he heard that the accused had committed rape on the victim girl. 47. In his cross he submitted that the Kebang was conducted at the initiation of the informant and he further stated that the accused also confessed that he had committed rape on three minor girls before the Kebang. 48. Pw-7 was also present at the time of Kebang proceeding and during the Page No.# 16/26 Kebang proceeding the accused vehemently denied of commission of alleged offence, but the accused was imposed with a fine of Rs.2,50,000/- as per insistment of the victim and her family members. 49. Pw-8 is the school teacher who was also present at the Kebang and wherein the victim told the Kebang as to how she was raped by the accused and the accused also confessed before the Kebang headed by the Chairman wherein other Gaon Bura of the villages also attended the Kebang. 50. Pw-9 (numbered as Pw-8) was also present at the time of Kebang and the victim was staying in his house during the relevant period of time and subsequently he came to know from the father of the victim that accused had committed rape on her. The accused also confessed before the Kebang that he committed rape on the victim. 51. Pw-10 (numbered as Pw-9) did not support the case of the prosecution and as per him he has no idea about the incident. 52. Pw-11 (numbered as Pw-10) also did not support the case of the prosecution and he also has no idea about the incident. 53. Pw-12 (numbered as Pw-11) is the paternal uncle of the accused and he did not support the prosecution case stating that he has no idea about the same. 54. Pw-13 (numbered as Pw-12) is the wife of the accused and she stated that she heard from the family meeting that accused had committed rape on the victim. 55. In her cross evidence she stated that there was a Kebang on 18.05.2015 in regards to divorce case between her and the accused wherein it was decided that the marriage should be dissolved. But the accused was aggrieved to the Page No.# 17/26 said decision of Kebang dated 18.05.2015 and hence another Kebang was held on 22.05.2015 in which, the earlier Kebang decision dated 18.05.2015 was reversed. 56. She denied when suggested that the present rape case is instituted against the accused appellant only by her because of the decision of Kebang dated 22.05.2015. She further submitted that before lodging of the FIR against the accused, her relationship with the accused was not cordial. The informant is her own cousin brother and the Kebang was initiated by her family including the informant for dissolution of their marriage. 57. Pw-14 (numbered as Pw-13) only attended the Kebang which was between the accused and his wife for divorce and he also heard in the said Kebang that the accused raped a minor girl, but it is not known as to with whom, the accused committed rape. 58. Pw-15 (numbered as Pw-14) is the medical officer who examined the victim the year 2015 and from his evidence it is seen that the girl was examined more than one year after the incident and during her examination he did not find any injury mark or sign of any recent sexual intercourse but found an old torn hymen. He further opined that as there was a torn hymen, vaginal penetration cannot be ruled out. 59. However, from his cross evidence, it is seen that the age of tearing cannot be established because the torn hymen heals within a week time. 60. Pw-16 (numbered as Pw-15) is the I.O. of the case who conducted the investigation of the case as endorsed to him. He deposed that he examined the complainant/informant and other witnesses, sent the victim for medical examination and the victim stated before him that the accused person had Page No.# 18/26 sexually assaulted her on both places, once in Sumsing and twice in Geko. He then visited both the places and drawn sketch map and thereafter he also collected the MLC report wherein it was stated that the hymen was ruptured. He also obtained the birth certificate to ascertain the age of the victim and as per the birth certificate also the victim was a minor and there was a Kebang decision in the village authority which was also been annexed along with the charge sheet. The victim was also sent for recording her statement before the Magistrate and the accused was also sent for recording of his confessional statement, but he refused to make any confession. 61. In his cross evidence it is stated that there was delay in lodging the FIR as the victim was threatened by the accused and thus, he found the genuine reason of delay. The parents of the victim came to know about the incident on 14.05.2015 and FIR was lodged on 29.05.2015. This delay of 15 days was made because in between said 15 days there was Kebang conducting. The said Kebang was called by some other person wherein it was revealed about the present case. Subsequently, on the basis of decision of the Kebang, statement of the witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC and relying on other documents he submitted the charge sheet. 62. So from the discussion made above, it is seen that there is admittedly no eye witness to the case of prosecution and it is only the prosecutrix who alleged that the accused had committed rape on her in three occasions. 63. She also brought the allegation that the accused had threatened that he would hang her if she disclosed anything about the incident to others and out of fear she remained silent for long 4 years, but when it has come to her knowledge that the accused had confessed about the sexual assault on some other victims as well as on her, she had the courage and disclosed everything in Page No.# 19/26 detail as to how and in which manner, she was sexually assaulted by the accused appellant on three occasion. 64. From the evidence of the prosecutrix it is seen that there is nothing to disbelieve the evidence of the prosecutrix, who was a child witness and there is nothing to in the record to hold that she deposed on being tutored by her parents. She only stated in her evidence that the parents had asked her to narrate everything as to what had happened to her and there is no evidence that she gave her statement/evidence only as per instructions of her parents. 65. However, it is an admitted fact that except the victim, there is no eye witness to the incident and out of three occasions, on two occasions he committed rape on the victim in two houses of her aunt and on third occasion he committed rape on the victim in his own house. The father of the victim/informant as well as her mother came to know about the incident only in the year 2015, when the informant was told by his sister, i.e., Pw-12 (wife of the accused appellant) in regards to confession of the accused appellant that he had committed rape on her own niece, i.e., the victim. The other Pws, i.e., PWs 4 and 5 also heard about the incident and the minor victim disclosed about the incident to Pw-5 as to how she was raped in the house of her aunt as well as in the house of the accused appellant. 66. After coming to know about the incident, he immediately informed the father of the victim, who accordingly called for a Kebang and PWs 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12 (wife of the accused appellant) were present in the Kebang wherein the accused also confessed about his guilt. It is also seen from the evidence on record that it is not only the case that the accused had sexually molested the victim, but there are other 3/4 numbers of victim who are also being molested by the accused appellant and accordingly, another Kebang was held for the Page No.# 20/26 other victims, wherein the accused was also imposed with a fine of Rs, 2,00,000/- and subsequently, the victim also lodged an FIR against the accused appellant. 67. Though the other PWs have not seen the occurrence and are not the eye witness, but they were very much present in the Kebang and there is nothing to disbelieve those witnesses, who came to know about the incident at the time of Kebang as well as some of the witnesses also heard about the same from the victim/her parents. However, PWs-9, 10 and 11 did not support the case of the prosecution, but the other witnesses had supported the case of the prosecution and their evidence to the extent that they heard about the incident of rape as well as their presence in the Kebang could not be rebutted by the defence or there is no such contradictory statement made by those witnesses to disbelieve them. 68. The other issue raised by the defence is that the case was lodged only as per the instigation of PW-12 (wife of the accused appellant) who sought for divorce from the appellant and as per her instigation only the informant/PW-2 had instituted a false case against the accused appellant. But from the analysis of the evidence on record, it reveals that she sought for a divorce only after coming to know about the incident which had happened with her own niece as well as some of the other minor girls of the village. There found no relation in lodging of the FIR with the Kebang decision of divorce for the sister of the informant, i.e., the wife of the accused appellant. 69. Further it cannot be denied that after the Kebang decision, the informant immediately wanted to lodge the FIR, but as per the request of the sister, i.e., PW-12 (wife of accused appellant), he lodged the FIR only after the Kebang decision of divorce for his sister and thus, there was some days of delay in Page No.# 21/26 lodging the FIR after coming to know about the incident in the year 2015. 70. It is also an admitted fact that though the three incident of rape alleged committed by the accused appellant was in the year 2011-12, but the FIR of the incident was lodged in the year 2015 and thus, there was a delay of 3/4 years in lodging the FIR. But from the evidence on record as well as from the other materials, it is seen that the parents of the victim were not aware about those incident which had taken place with their 8 year old daughter, while she was staying in the house of the accused appellant, who is her own uncle in relation. The minor girl also could not gather any courage to report about the incident to her parents as she was threatened to be killed by the appellant, who is her own uncle in relation. She was undergone such a mental suffering that she could not even report about the three incidents of rape committed by her own uncle, i.e., the accused appellant. However, subsequently, when it was informed to her that the accused had confessed about the molestation with her and some other minor girls, she had the courage and accordingly, reported about the three incidents which had happened with her. 71. Further from the evidence on record, it also reveals that though the PW-2 got the information on 15.05.2015, but as they waited for Kebang decision in between as well as they also waited for Kebang decision on divorce of his sister, there was some delay in lodging the FIR after receiving the information of rape with his minor daughter. But from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, it is seen that there is reasonable explanation about the delay in lodging the FIR. 72. Coming to another issue raised by the accused appellant is that the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be believed as she was being tutored by her parents. It is also risky to believe the child witness as they can be influenced easily or can be tutored. Page No.# 22/26 73. But here in the instant case, as discussed above, it is seen that the defence could not rebut the evidence of the prosecutrix or no evidence could be produced by the defence that the child witness was tutored at the time of giving her statement before the Court. It is the only version of the prosecutrix at the time of cross examination that “my parents asked me to narrate the entire incident to the Court” and from this sentence it cannot be inferred that she was tutored by her parents, rather, it is the only statement made by her that her parents asked her to narrate the entire incident to the Court. 74. Further her evidence is also found to be consistent and there is no reason to disbelieve the child witness/prosecutrix only because of her age at the time of recording her statement. At the time of the alleged incident she was hardly about 8 years of age and it is well settled that conviction can be based even on the basis of a child witness and his/her testimony can be relied upon even in absence of oath, if the victim has the capacity of understanding and give rational answers. The child witness also can be considered as a competent witness under Section 118 of the Evidence Act and there is no legal principle that a child would not be able to recapitulate facts in his/her memory. However, the probability of tutoring a child witness cannot be denied, but that cannot be the only reason to disbelieve the child witness, who is otherwise considered as a competent witness. 75. Further, regarding the acceptance of evidence of child witness, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Hemmat Sukhadeo Wahurwagh Vs State of Maharashtra, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 712 (FB), has held that “… though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and molded, but it is also accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the court Page No.# 23/26 comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness.” 76. Further as relied by the learned APP, Mr. Tado as referred above, in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Sanjay Kumar @ Sunny reported in (2017) 2 SCC 51 also had the observation that -whenever charge of rape is made, where the victim is a child, it has to be treated as a gospel truth if the deposition of the child victim is found to be trustworthy. 77. Coming the medical evidence, it is found that at the time of examination of the victim, the doctor did not find any injury mark or sign of recent sexual intercourse, but found an old torn hymen and the doctor accordingly opined that there is an old torn hymen, vaginal penetration cannot be ruled out. 78. It is seen that the victim was medically examined only after 3/4 years of the incident and hence, question of finding recent sign of sexual intercourse or injury mark on per private parts does not arise. Further from the evidence of the doctor as well as from the report it clearly reveals that a mark old torn hymen was found at the time of her examination and on the basis of which it had been opined by the doctor that vaginal penetration cannot be ruled out. Thus, it is seen that the medical evidence also supports the case of the prosecution to the extent of probability of vaginal penetration. 79. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Moti Lal (supra) has held in paragraph Nos. 7 & 9 as under: “7. It is settled law that the victim of sexual assault is not treated as accomplice and as such, her evidence does not require corroboration from any other evidence including the evidence of a doctor. In a given case even if the doctor who examined the victim does not find sign of rape, it is no ground to disbelieve the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In normal course a victim of sexual assault does not like to disclose such offence even before her family members much less before public or before the police. The Indian women as tendency to conceal such offence because it involves her prestige as well as prestige of her family. Only in few cases, Page No.# 24/26 the victim girl or the family members has courage to go before the police station and lodge a case. In the instant case the suggestion given on behalf of the defence that the victim has falsely implicated the accused does not appeal to reasoning. There was no apparent reason for a married woman to falsely implicate the accused after scatting her own prestige and honour. 9. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge leveled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix. There is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short Evidence Act) similar to illustration (b) of Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case discloses that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash kewalchand Jain (1990 91) scc 550).” 80. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622; 1993 SCC (Cri) 674, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by the honourable Supreme Court in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 9; AIR 2010 SC 1, placing reliance an earlier judgment in Rameshwar S/o kalian Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 Sc 54. Thus the Page No.# 25/26 law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The Court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. 81. Further in the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 CrPC also he only took the plea of innocence and stated that because of his matrimonial dispute with his wife and for some political rivalry, he was implicated falsely in this case. But to substantiate his plea, he did not adduce any evidence nor any suggestion has been made to the extent that due to any previous grudge or enmity the false case is lodged against him. 82. So from the entire discussion made above, it is seen that the prosecution has been able to prove that the accused appellant had committed rape on the victim/prosecutrix who was a minor girl of 8 years of age at the relevant time of incident and the prosecution also could establish that he threatened the victim not to disclose about the incident and for which the girl remained silent for about 3/4 years after the incident. 83. The learned Sessions Judge made a detailed discussion while imposing the sentence on the accused appellant and also considered all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances at the time of passing the order on conviction and while imposing sentence on the accused appellant. 84. In view of above and considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that sentenced imposed upon the accused appellant by the learned Session Judge is justified and hence, no interference is required in the judgment and order dated 30.12.2021 passed by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Pasighat in PSG Sessions Case No. 05/2015 in connection with Yingkiong P.S. Case No. 23/2015 under Section 376 (2)(f)/506 Page No.# 26/26 IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act convicting and sentencing the accused appellant under Section 376(2)(f)/506 IPC. 85. Accordingly, this appeal being devoid of any merit stands dismissed. JUDGE Comparing Assistant Rupa m Das Digitally signed by Rupam Das Date: 2026.06.24 13:24:23 +05'30'