HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 364 of 2026 Court No. - 93 HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J. 1. Heard Shri Dhiraj Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Vinod Pandey, learned counsel for opposite party nos.2 and 3 and learned AGA for the State. 2. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellant against the impugned order dated 14.11.2025 passed by learned Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Deoria in Criminal Misc. Application No.308 of 2024 (Ram Awadh Gond vs. Abhay Kushwaha and another), Police Station- Khukhundu, District- Deoria, by which the complaint filed by the appellant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was rejected. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant had initially moved an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. dated 06.06.2024 against opposite parties nos. 2 and 3, which was treated as a complaint. The appellant and his witnesses, namely Tej Bahadur Singh and Dhananjay, supported the allegations before the learned trial court. It is submitted that the appellant had also placed on record applications dated 22.05.2024 and 27.05.2024, specifically disclosing that on 26.05.2024 at about 6:00 p.m., opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 came to his house, abused him in filthy language and extended threats. However, the learned Special Judge, without considering the said material and without assigning proper reasons, rejected the complaint vide order dated 14.11.2025. It is further submitted that the allegations and the statements of the witnesses disclose the commission of offences under the SC/ST Act and, therefore, the impugned order has been passed without proper Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : Dhiraj Singh Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A., Vinod Pandey Ram Awadh Gond .....Appellant(s) State Of U.P. And 2 Others .....Respondent(s) application of judicial mind. It is also submitted that the criminal antecedents relied upon against opposite parties nos. 2 and 3 support the appellant's apprehension, whereas the appellant himself has no criminal history. Hence, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the complaint proceedings be restored in accordance with law. 4. Learned AGA and learned counsel for opposite parties nos.2 and 3, on the other hand, submit that the learned Special Judge has rightly rejected the complaint and that the proceedings initiated by the appellant are not sustainable in law. It is submitted that the allegations made by the appellant are not supported by any cogent and reliable material sufficient to constitute an offence under the SC/ST Act. The mere allegation of use of abusive or filthy language, without satisfying the statutory requirements of the alleged offence, does not by itself make out an offence under the SC/ST Act. It is further submitted that the proceedings have been initiated against the opposite parties despite the absence of sufficient material and that the impugned order does not warrant interference. The opposite parties, therefore, pray for dismissal of the appeal. 5. The application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was moved by the victim-complainant against the accused-opposite parties, namely, Abhay Kushwaha and Haribansh Kushwaha. The said application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was treated as a complaint. In the first page of the application, the date of the alleged incident has been mentioned as 26.05.2024 at about 6:00 p.m. However, in the body of the complaint, there is no specific mention of the date of the alleged incident for which the complainant had submitted an application to the Superintendent of Police, Deoria, on 22.05.2024, which forms the basis of the proceedings arising out of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. treated as a complaint. 6. Initially, the accused-opposite parties were summoned. Thereafter, the accused-opposite parties preferred an application under Section 528 BNSS, being Application U/S 528 BNSS No. 27549 of 2025, which was partly allowed. The relevant paragraph of the said order is extracted below: CRLA No. 364 of 2026 2 "Resultantly, instant application succeeds and is partly allowed. The order impugned dated 1.7.2025 passed by the Special Judge, SC/ST Act, in aforementioned case, is hereby quashed. Parties are relegated before the court below and the proceedings of the complaint is restored to its original number. Learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Deoria is hereby directed to decide the issuance of summons in the complaint de novo after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned, as per law, discussed above, and make an endevaour to decide the same within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order." 7. Thereafter, the trial court, after providing an opportunity of hearing in terms of Sections 223 and 225 of the BNSS, dismissed the complaint under Section 226 of the BNSS. It is noteworthy that in the initial part of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., it was alleged that a sum of Rs. 8,000/- was due to the complainant and had not been paid by the accused-opposite parties. The same version was reiterated in the statements recorded under Section 225 of the BNSS. However, in the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 223 of the BNSS, it was stated that the wages had been fixed at Rs. 335/- per day and there is no specific averment in the said statement that a sum of Rs. 8,000/- was due to the complainant or that the same had not been paid. Admittedly, one of the witnesses, namely, Dhananjay, is the son of the complainant. The alleged incident is stated to have taken place in the 'gothe' i.e., the cattle shed, which is not a place within the public view. 8. There is no specific allegation against the accused-opposite party nos.2 and 3 that any casteist slur or words were used with an intention to insult or humiliate the complainant-victim on the sole ground that he belongs to SC/ST community. Admittedly, neither in the statement recorded under Section 223 BNSS nor in the statement recorded under Section 225 BNSS has any specific averment been made that the accused-opposite party nos.2 and 3 caused any injury to the complainant-victim or that the complainant-victim sustained any injury. No injury report was prepared in the present case and there is admittedly no medical evidence or injury report on record. Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the opposite party nos.2 and 3 have drawn the CRLA No. 364 of 2026 3 attention of the Court to the application dated 22.05.2024 submitted to the Superintendent of Police, Deoria, by the victim-complainant, wherein a controversy relating to taking out some bricks was mentioned. However, the said issue does not find any mention either in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. or in the statements of the complainant and the witnesses recorded under Sections 223 and 225 of the BNSS. 9. In the case of Swaran singh Vs State, (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Hon'ble Apex Court drew a clear distinction between the expressions "public place" and "any place within public view." A private place may still be a place within public view if the incident is visible to members of the public. Conversely, merely because an incident occurs in a public building does not automatically satisfy the requirement if it is not within public view. The Supreme Court held that words such as "Chamar", though originally denoting a caste, may amount to an offence if used as a casteist abuse with intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Castes. The Court emphasized that words should be understood in their popular and social meaning, not merely their etymological meaning. For attracting Section 3(1)(x) (now Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s)), there must be intentional insult or intimidation; and intent to humiliate the victim because he or she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Mere abuse or quarrel, without the requisite intention contemplated by the Act, is insufficient. The Court reiterated that criminal proceedings should continue only where the allegations disclose a prima facie offence against the particular accused. Proceedings may be quashed where the FIR does not disclose the essential ingredients against an accused. 10. In the case of Shajan Skraria vs. State of Kerala and another, 2024 SCC Online SC 2249, the Hon'ble Apex Court by quoting the cases of Hitesh Verma (Supra) has held as under: "13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve CRLA No. 364 of 2026 4 the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste." In Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763 "15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member for the reason that he belongs to such community. In other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would attract Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is committed against a person who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. I say so because the object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status." CRLA No. 364 of 2026 5 11. In Gorige Pentaiah Vs state of AP & Ors 2009 Cri.L.J. 350, Honble Apex court held "when the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law." In the case of Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 10 SCC 710, the Hon'ble Suprme Court held that 'a dispute that arose inside the private house of a complainant over the possession of the land without the presence of independent public witnesses, does not satisfy the statutory threshold of Section 3(1)(r). 12. 12. Thus, having considered the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the material and evidence available on record, the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed herein above, this court is of the considered opinion that the learned trial court has rightly rejected the application of the appellant filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The impugned order dated 14.11.2025 does not suffer from any illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. 13. The appeal, being devoid of merits, is accordingly dismissed. 14. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate the instant order to the court concerned through District and Sessions Judge, Deoria by e- mail/FAX within 48 hours. September 23, 2026 Ankit. CRLA No. 364 of 2026 6 (Santosh Rai,J.) Digitally signed by :- ANKIT VISHWAKARMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad