Research › Search › Judgment

Uttarakhand High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 8752 (UTT)

Praveen Tandon v. State of Uttarakhand

2026-02-18

Ashish Naithani, Subhash Upadhyay

body2026
JUDGMENT : Ashish Naithani, J. 1. These three writ petitions, namely WPSB No. 710 of 2024, WPPIL No. 70 of 2025 and WPSB No. 295 of 2025, arise out of a common issue relating to the appointment of respondent no.3 to the post of Managing Director of a State Corporation governed by the Selection and Appointment of Managing Directors & Directors in the Three Corporations Rules, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules, 2021”). 2. Since the core issue involved in all three petitions is substantially identical, they were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 3. Brief facts of the case are as follows; the Rules, 2021 were framed by the State Government to regulate the selection and appointment of Managing Directors and Directors in three specified State Corporations. The Rules prescribe eligibility conditions, educational qualifications, experience requirements and procedural safeguards for appointment. 4. By amendment dated 28.05.2021, the Rules were modified, inter alia, to prescribe specific educational qualifications for the post of Managing Director. Under Rule 9 and Rule 9A, as amended, certain technical and professional qualifications, including possession of an Engineering Degree, were made part of the eligibility framework. 5. Subsequently, an advertisement was issued by the State Government inviting applications for the post of Managing Director of the concerned corporation. The advertisement reflected the qualifications as provided under the amended Rules. 6. Respondent no.3 applied pursuant to the advertisement. After the selection process, respondent no.3 came to be appointed as Managing Director by order of the State Government. 7. WPSB No. 710 of 2024 was filed challenging the legality of the appointment primarily on the ground that respondent no.3 did not fulfil the mandatory educational qualification prescribed under Rule 9A of the Rules, 2021. 8. During the course of proceedings, this Court called upon the State Government to clarify whether any decision regarding “equivalence” in terms of the proviso to Rule 9A(4) had been taken prior to the appointment of respondent no.3, and if so, to place the same on record. 9. The Public Interest Litigation also questions whether the power of exemption or equivalence under the proviso to Rule 9A(4) can be exercised in an unguided manner, and whether such discretion must be circumscribed by objective standards. 10. 9. The Public Interest Litigation also questions whether the power of exemption or equivalence under the proviso to Rule 9A(4) can be exercised in an unguided manner, and whether such discretion must be circumscribed by objective standards. 10. WPSB No. 295 of 2025 was filed by another petitioner asserting individual grievance, contending that the appointment of respondent no.3 is arbitrary, violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and contrary to the express mandate of the Rules, 2021. 11. In response to the writ petitions, the State Government filed its counter-affidavit asserting that the appointment of respondent no.3 was made in accordance with the Rules, 2021. It is stated that respondent no.3 possesses substantial administrative and technical experience and that the Government, in exercise of powers under the proviso to Rule 9A(4), treated the qualification of respondent no.3 as equivalent. 12. This Court also directed the Chief Secretary to file an affidavit clarifying the understanding of Rule 9 and Rule 9A, and to state whether the qualifications prescribed under Rule 9A were mandatory in nature and whether any exemption or equivalence had been granted in the case of respondent no.3. 13. The affidavits placed on record disclose that while the State Government asserts the existence of discretion under the proviso, the precise nature, timing and reasoning of the decision determining equivalence form the central dispute in the present matters. 14. Thus, the foundational facts are not in serious dispute. The controversy primarily centres around the interpretation of the statutory Rules, the nature of the qualification prescribed, the scope of the proviso to Rule 9A(4), and the legality of the appointment of respondent no.3 in light thereof. 15. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 16. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submit that the appointment of respondent no.3 is ex facie illegal, being contrary to the express mandate of Rule 9 and Rule 9A of the Rules, 2021. 17. It is argued that by virtue of the amendment dated 28.05.2021, the Rules clearly prescribe possession of an Engineering Degree as a mandatory qualification for appointment to the post of Managing Director. The language of the Rule, according to the petitioners, is couched in mandatory terms and admits of no relaxation except in strict compliance with the proviso. 18. 17. It is argued that by virtue of the amendment dated 28.05.2021, the Rules clearly prescribe possession of an Engineering Degree as a mandatory qualification for appointment to the post of Managing Director. The language of the Rule, according to the petitioners, is couched in mandatory terms and admits of no relaxation except in strict compliance with the proviso. 18. Learned counsel contend that eligibility conditions prescribed in statutory rules have the force of law and cannot be diluted by executive discretion. Once the Rules prescribe a qualification, neither the advertisement nor the Government can override it. 19. It is further submitted that respondent no.3 does not possess the Engineering Degree required under Rule 9A and was therefore ineligible for consideration at the threshold. It is further submitted that eligibility constitutes a threshold requirement and cannot be substituted by considerations of suitability, experience or administrative competence. 20. With regard to the proviso to Rule 9A(4), it is argued that the proviso permits consideration of “equivalent qualification”, but equivalence cannot be presumed or inferred post facto. It must be: (i) Based on objective criteria, and (ii) Recorded by a reasoned decision. 21. The petitioners submit that no such determination of equivalence exists on record. It is contended that the determination of equivalence, if any, must necessarily precede the selection and appointment process, and cannot be retrospectively invoked to validate an otherwise ineligible candidature. 22. Learned counsel submit that the proviso cannot be used as a tool to bypass mandatory qualifications. A proviso must be construed narrowly and cannot override the substantive provision. 23. It is also contended that if equivalence is to be determined, the same must be done by an appropriate expert body and not merely by executive assertion. 24. The petitioners further argue that allowing such appointments would render statutory qualifications illusory and defeat the object of the Rules, 2021, which were framed precisely to ensure professional competence and transparency in appointments to key public posts. 25. It is submitted that the appointment violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as similarly placed eligible candidates were denied equal opportunity when an ineligible candidate was appointed. 26. Learned counsel appearing in the Public Interest Litigation submit that the issue involved transcends individual grievance and concerns the integrity of public institutions. 27. 25. It is submitted that the appointment violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as similarly placed eligible candidates were denied equal opportunity when an ineligible candidate was appointed. 26. Learned counsel appearing in the Public Interest Litigation submit that the issue involved transcends individual grievance and concerns the integrity of public institutions. 27. It is contended that Managing Director of a State Corporation holds a position of significant public responsibility involving financial, administrative and technical decision-making affecting public resources. 28. Learned counsel submit that statutory qualifications are introduced to ensure minimum professional competence and cannot be treated as decorative or directory provisions. 29. It is argued that if equivalence or exemption can be invoked in an unguided manner, the entire rule-based framework collapses and appointments become vulnerable to arbitrariness. 30. The petitioner in PIL further submits that discretion under the proviso must be exercised in accordance with well-defined principles, and the absence of objective guidelines renders the exercise arbitrary. 31. It is also contended that in matters of public appointment, transparency is a constitutional requirement flowing from Article 14. Any relaxation of qualification must be demonstrably justified and recorded. 32. Learned counsel emphasise that judicial review in such cases is not about substituting executive wisdom but about ensuring fidelity to statutory prescription. 33. Learned Advocate General and learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State submit that the appointment of respondent no.3 was made after due deliberation and in accordance with the Rules, 2021. 34. It is argued that Rule 9A(4) expressly contains a proviso empowering the State Government to consider equivalence of qualifications. The existence of such a proviso indicates legislative intent to confer flexibility. It is submitted that the proviso is enabling in nature and intended to provide reasonable latitude to the State in assessing equivalent competence, and therefore cannot be construed in a rigid or restrictive manner. 35. Learned counsel for the state submit that strict literal interpretation would defeat the object of the Rule, which is to appoint competent and experienced professionals. 36. It is contended that respondent no.3 possesses extensive experience in the relevant sector and that practical experience may, in appropriate cases, be treated as equivalent to formal technical qualification. 37. 35. Learned counsel for the state submit that strict literal interpretation would defeat the object of the Rule, which is to appoint competent and experienced professionals. 36. It is contended that respondent no.3 possesses extensive experience in the relevant sector and that practical experience may, in appropriate cases, be treated as equivalent to formal technical qualification. 37. Learned counsel for the State submits that the decision to treat respondent no.3 as eligible falls within executive domain and is not amenable to microscopic judicial scrutiny unless shown to be mala fide or perverse. 38. It is further argued that courts have consistently held that judicial review in matters of appointment is limited to examining the decision- making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is further submitted that judicial interference is warranted only where the decision is demonstrably arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to statutory prescription. 39. Learned counsel for the State also contends that the petitioners cannot insist upon a hyper-technical interpretation of the Rules where the larger objective of ensuring effective administration has been served. 40. It is submitted that the proviso would become otiose if interpreted in the restrictive manner suggested by the petitioners. 41. Learned senior counsel for respondent no.3 adopt the submissions of the State and further contend that the writ petitions are motivated and lack bona fides. 42. It is argued that respondent no.3 was selected after due consideration and possesses qualifications and experience that substantially satisfy the requirements of the post. 43. Learned counsel for respondent no.3 submit that equivalence does not require identity of degree but substantial similarity in competence and expertise. 44. It is further contended that the Rules do not mandate consultation with any particular expert body for determining equivalence and that the State Government is competent to take such decision. 45. It is argued that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners and that the appointment has already been acted upon. Interference at this stage would disrupt administrative functioning. 46. It is finally submitted that unless the petitioners establish violation of a mandatory provision in a clear and demonstrable manner, the Court ought not to invalidate the appointment 47. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of judicial review in matters of appointment to public office. Interference at this stage would disrupt administrative functioning. 46. It is finally submitted that unless the petitioners establish violation of a mandatory provision in a clear and demonstrable manner, the Court ought not to invalidate the appointment 47. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the scope of judicial review in matters of appointment to public office. The Court does not sit as an appellate authority over executive decisions, nor does it reassess comparative merit or substitute its own view for that of the appointing authority. Questions of administrative wisdom, evaluation of experience, and choice between candidates ordinarily lie within the executive domain. 48. The present case, however, concerns an appointment governed by the Selection and Appointment of Managing Directors and Directors in the Three Corporations Rules, 2021. Where an appointment is regulated by statute, the executive must act strictly within the statutory framework. Judicial review in such cases is confined to ensuring compliance with the governing Rules. 49. The distinction between suitability and eligibility is fundamental. While suitability involves subjective assessment of merit, eligibility pertains to objective statutory conditions. The Court may not examine who is the better candidate, but it must examine whether the appointee was legally eligible to be considered. 50. Eligibility constitutes a jurisdictional fact. If the foundational statutory requirement is absent, the exercise of power is rendered ultra vires, irrespective of the merits of the decision. Such requirement must be demonstrable from the record and cannot be supplied by subsequent justification. 51. The controversy, therefore, is limited yet significant. The Court is not concerned with the competence of respondent no. 3, nor with comparative merit, but with whether the appointment conforms to Rule 9 and Rule 9A of the Rules, 2021. 52. The petitioners contend that the educational qualification prescribed under Rule 9A is a mandatory condition and that respondent no. 3 lacked such qualification. It is further urged that no lawful determination of equivalence existed at the relevant time. The State, on the other hand, asserts that the proviso permits flexibility and that respondent no. 3 was rightly treated as possessing an equivalent qualification. 53. The issue thus turns on the interpretation of Rule 9A and the legality of its application. The central question is whether the appointment satisfies the statutory eligibility requirement, either directly or through a valid invocation of the proviso. 3 was rightly treated as possessing an equivalent qualification. 53. The issue thus turns on the interpretation of Rule 9A and the legality of its application. The central question is whether the appointment satisfies the statutory eligibility requirement, either directly or through a valid invocation of the proviso. The Court now proceeds to examine the nature and effect of the qualification prescribed under Rule 9A. 54. Having identified the core issue, the Court must now examine the nature of the educational qualification prescribed under Rule 9A of the Rules, 2021. If the qualification is mandatory, any departure must find a clear sanction within the statutory framework. Judicial review in this sphere remains limited to cases of arbitrariness or breach of statutory prescription. 55. Rule 9A, as amended, prescribes specific educational qualifications for appointment as Managing Director. The language employed is clear and affirmative, laying down a minimum threshold of eligibility rather than a matter of preference. It thus establishes an objective condition precedent to the exercise of discretion. 56. Ordinarily, where statutory rules prescribe qualifications for public office, such prescription is treated as mandatory unless the scheme indicates otherwise. The purpose of incorporating educational qualifications is to ensure objectivity, minimum competence, and protection against arbitrary selection. If such requirement were treated as merely directory, the discipline of statutory governance would stand diluted. 57. In the present case, Rule 9A requires possession of an Engineering Degree. The Rule does not employ expressions suggestive of flexibility. On a plain reading, therefore, the qualification operates as a condition of eligibility. 58. The Rules, however, contain a proviso to Rule 9A(4), permitting consideration of equivalence. The presence of the proviso indicates limited flexibility, but it does not render the main qualification directory. The eligibility condition remains mandatory, subject only to lawful invocation of the proviso. 59. The controversy thus narrows to the scope and operation of the proviso. A proviso cannot override the main provision; it carves out a limited exception. Equivalence cannot amount to exemption. It must relate to the substance of the prescribed qualification and cannot operate as a device to dispense with the requirement altogether. 60. The determination of equivalence is an exercise of discretion, but such discretion must be structured, reasoned, and demonstrable from the record at the time of appointment. Subsequent explanations cannot cure the absence of statutory compliance. 61. It must relate to the substance of the prescribed qualification and cannot operate as a device to dispense with the requirement altogether. 60. The determination of equivalence is an exercise of discretion, but such discretion must be structured, reasoned, and demonstrable from the record at the time of appointment. Subsequent explanations cannot cure the absence of statutory compliance. 61. While this Court does not sit in appeal over an administrative assessment, it must be satisfied that the proviso was consciously and lawfully invoked on relevant material. A bare assertion of equivalence is insufficient. 62. In the present case, though the State asserts that respondent no. 3 was treated as possessing an equivalent qualification, the critical question is whether the record discloses a reasoned decision invoking the proviso to Rule 9A(4) as part of the appointment process. 63. Experience and administrative competence, however valuable, cannot substitute a statutory qualification unless the Rules permit such substitution through a legally sustainable mechanism. The proviso recognises equivalence, not exemption. The Court must therefore examine whether the invocation of equivalence in the present case satisfies the statutory discipline embodied in Rule 9A. 64. Continuing the above discussion, the Court is conscious that the proviso to Rule 9A(4) embodies necessary administrative flexibility. It is not redundant and must be given effect where genuine equivalence exists. Yet, such flexibility must operate within the discipline of law. Discretion affecting statutory eligibility must be traceable to the record; otherwise, judicial review cannot meaningfully assess compliance. 65. The central inquiry, therefore, is whether the requirement under Rule 9A stood lawfully satisfied through a valid invocation of the proviso. In the absence of material disclosing a conscious and identifiable decision invoking Rule 9A(4) during the appointment process, the eligibility condition cannot be treated as fulfilled. 66. The matter, however, does not rest at the statutory level alone. State action in public appointments must also conform to the constitutional guarantees of equality and non-arbitrariness under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 67. Article 14 forbids arbitrariness in State action. Discretion must be structured, reasoned, and founded on discernible material. Likewise, Article 16 ensures a level playing field in public employment. Where statutory qualifications are prescribed, all prospective candidates are entitled to expect adherence to that norm. 68. 67. Article 14 forbids arbitrariness in State action. Discretion must be structured, reasoned, and founded on discernible material. Likewise, Article 16 ensures a level playing field in public employment. Where statutory qualifications are prescribed, all prospective candidates are entitled to expect adherence to that norm. 68. If a departure from the prescribed qualification is made without a demonstrable and reasoned invocation of the proviso, the process risks arbitrariness and unequal treatment. Experience and competence, however valuable, cannot replace a statutory qualification unless the Rules themselves permit such substitution through a lawful mechanism. 69. This Court is not examining the sufficiency of the Government’s satisfaction on equivalence, but only whether the record reflects any identifiable exercise of discretion under the proviso. In the present case, though such discretion is asserted, the material placed on record does not disclose a reasoned invocation of Rule 9A(4). 70. Legality must be judged on the basis of the record as it existed at the time of appointment. Post facto explanation cannot cure absence of statutory compliance. In the absence of demonstrable satisfaction of the eligibility requirement, the appointment cannot be insulated from judicial scrutiny. 71. The Court is conscious that interference with an appointment already acted upon is not to be undertaken lightly. Stability of administration is an important consideration. Nevertheless, where a statutory mandate is shown to have been departed from without lawful justification, the Court cannot decline to enforce the discipline of law. Judicial restraint does not extend to condoning illegality. 72. The Court must therefore determine the appropriate legal consequence of this infirmity, bearing in mind the statutory framework, the constitutional mandate, and the necessity of maintaining both legality and institutional stability. 73. In the present case, the absence of a demonstrable and reasoned invocation of the proviso to Rule 9A(4) strikes at the root of statutory eligibility. Eligibility being a condition precedent to appointment, its absence renders the exercise of power ultra vires. The defect is not procedural but foundational. Once the statutory mandate is not shown to have been complied with on the record, considerations of administrative convenience or experience cannot sustain the appointment. The discipline of statutory governance, reinforced by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, leaves no room for sustaining an appointment made in derogation of the prescribed qualification. 74. Once the statutory mandate is not shown to have been complied with on the record, considerations of administrative convenience or experience cannot sustain the appointment. The discipline of statutory governance, reinforced by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, leaves no room for sustaining an appointment made in derogation of the prescribed qualification. 74. In view of the finding that the appointment itself is not in conformity with Rule 9A of the Rules, 2021, the ancillary challenges relating to extension of tenure, continuance as Director (HR), and holding of additional charge do not survive for independent adjudication and are rendered academic. ORDER In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that the educational qualification prescribed under Rule 9A of the Selection and Appointment of Managing Directors & Directors in the Three Corporations Rules, 2021 is a mandatory condition of eligibility, subject to the proviso contained therein. The material placed on record does not disclose a lawful and reasoned invocation of the proviso to Rule 9A(4) during the selection process. The appointment is, therefore, not in conformity with the statutory framework and is legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the appointment of respondent no. 3 to the post of Managing Director is set aside. The State Government is at liberty to reconsider the matter strictly in accordance with the Rules, 2021. If the proviso to Rule 9A(4) is sought to be invoked, the determination of equivalence shall be made on objective material forming part of the decision-making record. Such exercise shall be completed within eight weeks. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the comparative merit, competence or suitability of respondent no. 3. Till a fresh decision is taken, the State may make an interim arrangement in accordance with law. WPSB No. 710 of 2024, WPPIL No. 70 of 2025 and WPSB No. 295 of 2025 stand allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.