[2026:RJ-JP:22455] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14904/2024 1. Mohit, Aged About 13 Years S/o Late Nandkishore, Child Through Guardian Mother Smt. Rajani W/o Late Nandkishore, R/o Jain Gali, Town Bayana, Tehsil Bayana, Distt. Bharatpur (Rajasthan) 2. Rajni, Aged About 34 Years, W/o Late Nandkishore, R/o Jain Gali, Town Bayana, Tehsil Bayana, Distt. Bharatpur(Rajasthan). ----Plaintiffs/Petitioners Versus 1. Sunita, Aged About 53 Years, D/o Late Hariram W/o Late Hetram, R/o Kaman, Tehsil Kaman, Presently Jain Gali, Town Bayana, Tehsil Bayana, Distt. Bharatpur(Rajasthan). ----Original Defendant/Respondent 2. Sushila, Aged About 87 Years, W/o Late Hariram, R/o Jain Gali, Town Bayana, Tehsil Bayana, Distt. Bharatpur(Rajasthan). ----Formal Defendant/Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sukhdev Singh Solanki with Ms. Barsha Kumari For Respondent(s) : Ms. Shazadi Bano with Mr. R.Babu HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA Judgment Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments 19.05.2026 Date on which the judgment was reserved 19.05.2026 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced Full Judgment Date of pronouncement 27.05.2026 1. The present writ petition has been filed assailing the order dated 28.05.2024, passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Bayana, Bharatpur, in Civil Suit No. 18/2023, whereby the [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (2 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] application filed by the plaintiffs-petitioners under Order VI Rule 17 CPC for amendment of plaint has been dismissed. 2. The genesis of the present petition, inter-alia, leading to the present petition is that the plaintiffs-petitioners instituted a suit for partition and permanent injunction against the defendants- respondents. Pursuant thereto, the learned Trial Court issued notice to the defendants-respondents on 14.07.2023. In response, the defendants-respondents filed their written statement on 28.07.2023, denying the averments made in the plaint, and also produced certain documents contending that the property in dispute had already been transferred in favour of defendant No. 1 by virtue of an agreement to sell dated 25.03.2021. He further stated that, on the basis of the said agreement, defendant No. 1 had obtained a patta from Nagar Palika, Bayana. 2.1 Upon perusal of the aforesaid documents, the plaintiffs- petitioners promptly filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC on 07.10.2023 seeking amendment of the plaint. The defendants-respondents filed their reply to the said application. 2.2 After hearing both the parties, the learned Trial Court dismissed the application vide order dated 28.05.2024. 2.3 Aggrieved by the order dated 28.05.2024, the plaintiffs- petitioners have preferred the present writ petition before this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the impugned order dated 28.05.2024 passed by the learned Trial Court is wholly illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to the facts and material available on record, inasmuch as the learned [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (3 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] Trial Court failed to appreciate the settled principles governing amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. He submitted that the plaintiffs-petitioners instituted a suit for partition and permanent injunction in respect of ancestral property situated at Jain Gali, Bayana, District Bharatpur, seeking partition by metes and bounds and protection of their possession over the suit property. During pendency of the suit, defendants No.1 and 2, in their written statements dated 28.07.2023, for the first time produced an alleged agreement to sell dated 25.03.2021 and patta dated 07.02.2022 registered on 15.02.2022, claiming defendant No.1 to be the sole owner of the suit property and further contending that the suit was not maintainable without cancellation of the said patta. 3.1 Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that immediately after gaining knowledge of the aforesaid documents, the petitioners filed an application dated 07.10.2023 under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint for incorporation of a relief declaring the agreement to sell dated 25.03.2021 and patta dated 07.02.2022 registered on 15.02.2022 as null, void, ineffective and not binding upon the rights of the plaintiffs. The amendment was sought at the initial stage of the proceedings, prior to framing of issues and before commencement of Trial; therefore, no prejudice whatsoever could have been caused to the defendants. 3.2 Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the proposed amendment neither changes the nature of the suit nor introduces any new cause of action, as the original suit itself [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (4 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] pertains to partition and protection of the petitioners’ rights in the ancestral property. The challenge to the alleged agreement and patta is directly connected with and incidental to the relief of partition, since the defendants are relying upon the said documents to defeat the lawful rights of the petitioners in the suit property. He argued that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the petitioners were not seeking independent cancellation of the patta, but only a declaration that the alleged documents produced by the defendants are forged, fabricated, ineffective and not binding upon their rights. The amendment was bona fide and necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the real controversy involved in the suit. 3.3 Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that it is a settled proposition of law that amendment of pleadings can be permitted at any stage of the proceedings if such amendment is necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute and does not prejudice the opposite party. He also submitted that the suit property is an ancestral residential house wherein the plaintiffs and defendant No.2 were residing separately pursuant to an oral family arrangement, though no partition by metes and bounds had taken place. Defendant No.1 threatened the plaintiffs-petitioners with dispossession, compelling them to institute the suit for partition and permanent injunction. 3.4 Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the plaintiffs have already lodged FIR No.724/2023 at Police Station Bayana for offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC regarding the alleged forged and fabricated agreement to sell [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (5 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] dated 25.03.2021 and patta dated 07.02.2022 registered on 15.02.2022, and the matter is presently under investigation. He contended that defendants No.1 and 2, being mother and daughter, acted in collusion with each other with the intention to deprive the plaintiffs of their lawful rights in the ancestral property. He further argued that the alleged agreement to sell dated 25.03.2021 is unregistered, does not properly disclose the consideration amount and was never acted upon by execution of a registered sale deed, which clearly indicates that the said document is forged and fabricated. Similarly, the patta dated 07.02.2022 was allegedly obtained from Nagar Palika, Bayana by concealing material facts regarding the ancestral nature of the property and the rights of the plaintiffs therein. 3.5 Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that despite the amendment application having been filed immediately after knowledge of the disputed documents and before commencement of Trial, the learned Trial Court rejected the same on erroneous and perverse findings by wrongly observing that the amendment would change the nature of the suit. 3.6 Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy & Sons & Ors.; (2009) 10 SCC 84. 3.7 Learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, prayed that the impugned order dated 28.05.2024 be quashed and set aside and the amendment application filed by the petitioners under Order VI Rule 17 CPC be allowed. [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (6 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the proposed amendment sought by the plaintiffs-petitioners is wholly misconceived, untenable in law, and liable to be rejected. He further contended that the application has been moved solely with an intent to delay the proceedings of the suit and to protract the litigation unnecessarily. 4.1 Learned counsel for the respondents argued that the proposed amendment cannot be permitted in the present suit as the plaintiffs-petitioners, through the said amendment, are seeking declaratory reliefs in respect of the agreement to sell dated 25.03.2021 and the patta dated 07.02.2022. According to the respondents, allowing such an amendment would fundamentally alter the nature and character of the original suit for partition and permanent injunction, and would introduce an entirely new cause of action, which is impermissible in law. 4.2 Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that if the proposed amendment is allowed, it would substantially enlarge the scope of the suit and give rise to fresh issues, thereby resulting in unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. He also contended that the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiffs- petitioners cannot be adjudicated without proper valuation of the suit and payment of the requisite Court fees. However, since the plaintiffs-petitioners have neither amended the valuation clause nor deposited the appropriate Court fees, the application is legally defective and not maintainable. [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (7 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] 4.3 In view of the above submissions, learned counsel for the respondents prayed that the present writ petition be dismissed and the order dated 28.05.2024 be upheld. 5. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be apposite to examine the scope of interference available to this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is extremely limited in nature. 6.1 The said position of law has been reiterated time and again by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments of Sadhana Lodh vs National Insurance Company Limited & Anr.; 2003 (3) SCC 524 and Ranjeet Singh vs Ravi Prakash; 2004 (3) SCC 682, wherein the Court has held that the interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is warranted only in cases where there is flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of law or justice, or where there is a patent error, not requiring elaborate examination. Thus, the Court ought not to re-appreciate or re- evaluate evidence as if it were exercising appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the Court is vested with limited role and cannot interfere in findings of fact unless the same are shown to be perverse, patently illegal or vitiated by a jurisdictional error. Keeping these principles in mind, the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the parties have been considered. [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (8 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] 7. Before adverting to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and the principal question arising for consideration in the present matter, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of Order VI Rule 17 CPC, for the sake of convenience and ready reference: “17. Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” 7.1 It is a settled proposition of law that although amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is to be considered liberally in appropriate cases, such amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The underlying object of the provision is to advance substantial justice and to avoid multiplicity of litigation; however, the discretionary power vested in the Court is circumscribed by settled legal principles. The Court, while considering an application for amendment, is required to examine whether the proposed amendment is bonafide, necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties, and whether such amendment can be permitted without causing serious prejudice or injustice to the opposite side. Equally, the [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (9 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] Court must ensure that the amendment does not alter the fundamental nature and character of the original proceedings. 7.2 This Court finds that in the case of Life Insurance Corporation ofIndia vs Sanjeev Builders Private Limited &Anr.; reported in 2022 (16)SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that amendments should ordinarily be permitted where they do not alter the nature of the suit, are not barred by limitation, and do not cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant paragraph reads as under: “71. Our final conclusions may be summed up thus: 71.1. Order II Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure operates as a bar against a subsequent suit if the requisite condi- tions for application thereof are satisfied and the field of amendment of pleadings falls far beyond its purview. The plea of amendment being barred Under Order II Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure is, thus, misconceived and hence negatived. 71.2. All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word "shall", in the latter part of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 71.3. The prayer for amendment is to be allowed. 71.3.1. If the amendment is required for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties. 71.3.2. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided (a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side (b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment does not seek to withdraw any clear [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (10 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] admission made by the party which confers aright on the other side and (c) the amendment does not raise a time barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations). 71.4. A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless: 71.4.1 By the amendment, a time barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration. 71.4.2.The amendment changes the nature of the suit. 71.4.3.The prayer for amendment is malafide, or 71.4.4.By the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence. 71.5. In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hyper technical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs. 71.6. Where the amendment would enable the court to pin- pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed. 71.7. Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an additional or a new approach without introducing a time barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation. 71.8. Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint. 71.9. Delay in applying for amendment alone is not aground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision. 71.10. Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (11 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed. 71.11. Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed.” (Emphasis Supplied) 7.3 In the present matter, it is not in dispute that the plaintiffs- petitioners had initially instituted the suit merely seeking relief of partition and permanent injunction in respect of the disputed property. Subsequently, by way of the impugned amendment application, the plaintiffs-petitioners sought incorporation of an entirely new and substantive relief praying that the agreement dated 25.03.2021, the lease deed dated 07.02.2022, and the registered deed dated 15.02.2022 be declared null and void qua their alleged share in the suit property. 7.4 The learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated that the proposed amendment was not merely clarificatory or ancillary in nature, but rather sought to introduce a completely distinct cause [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (12 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] of action involving adjudication upon the legality and validity of registered documents. Such amendment would inevitably transform the nature of the suit from one simpliciter for partition and injunction into a suit for declaration and cancellation of documents. It is trite law that an amendment which changes the “nature and complexion” of the suit cannot ordinarily be permitted, particularly where the relief sought was available to the party at the time of institution of the suit itself. The maxim “mutatio libelli” which means ‘change in the nature of pleadings’ squarely applies in the present case. 7.5 In the instant case, the material available on record clearly demonstrates that the plaintiffs-petitioners were fully aware, or at the very least deemed to be aware, of the transactions in question long prior to institution of the suit. The agreement sought to be challenged was executed on 25.03.2021, whereas the lease deed was executed on 07.02.2022 and registered on 15.02.2022. Despite such knowledge, the suit itself came to be instituted only on 11.07.2023. Significantly, the husband of plaintiff No.2 Rajni wife of Nandkishore, had himself signed the agreement dated 25.03.2021 as a witness. The parties admittedly being close relatives, the plea of ignorance raised by the plaintiffs-petitioners is wholly implausible and contrary to the record. 7.6 The conduct of the plaintiffs clearly attracts the maxim “vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt”, meaning thereby that the law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. Having failed to seek the declaratory relief at the appropriate stage despite having knowledge of the relevant [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (13 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] transactions, the plaintiffs cannot subsequently seek to reopen the entire controversy by way of amendment. 7.7 Moreover, the proposed amendment appears to be a clear attempt on the part of the plaintiffs-petitioners to fill up lacuna in the original pleadings after disclosure of the defence by the defendants. It is a settled principle of law that amendments cannot be permitted where the same are intended to overcome weaknesses in the case originally set up or to introduce an altogether new foundation for the suit. The law does not permit a litigant to improve or reconstruct his case at a belated stage so as to prejudice the accrued rights of the opposite party. 7.8 The learned Trial Court has also rightly observed that allowing the proposed amendment would necessitate a de novo adjudication regarding the genuineness and validity of the agreement and registered deeds, thereby substantially enlarging the scope of the suit and causing serious prejudice to the defendants. The proposed amendment, therefore, fails the settled test of balancing equities between the parties. At this stage, permitting such amendment would also run contrary to the well- established legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, meaning thereby that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation. Parties cannot be permitted to indefinitely alter or expand the scope of proceedings in a manner that prolongs adjudication and causes prejudice to the opposite side. 7.9 So far as the contention of the plaintiffs-petitioners regarding registration of FIR No.724/2023 at Police Station Bayana for [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (14 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 IPC concerning the alleged forged and fabricated agreement and patta is concerned, the same does not advance their case in the present civil proceedings. It is trite law that criminal proceedings and civil proceedings operate in distinct and independent spheres and are governed by altogether different standards of proof and adjudication. Mere pendency of a criminal investigation neither validates the proposed amendment nor dispenses with the mandatory statutory requirements contemplated under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Therefore, the pendency of the criminal proceedings cannot be construed as a valid ground for permitting amendment of the plaint at such a belated stage. 7.10 The plaintiffs-petitioners further failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstance warranting exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in their favour. The proposed amendment does not satisfies the test of bonafides and instead seeks to fundamentally alter the structure and scope of the original suit. Therefore, the learned Trial Court, upon proper appreciation of the pleadings, material available on record, and settled principles governing amendment of pleadings, rightly concluded that the application was devoid of merit and liable to be rejected. 7.11 Accordingly, the impugned order dated 28.05.2024 does not suffer from any illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or material irregularity warranting interference in its supervisory jurisdiction. The dismissal of the application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case and calls for no interference by this Court. [2026:RJ-JP:22455] (15 of 15) [CW-14904/2024] 7.12 The learned Trial Court is expected to decide the matter expeditiously and strictly in accordance with law, after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned. 7.13 Consequently, the present writ petition stands dismissed. The impugned order dated 28.05.2024 is affirmed. 7.14 Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (BIPIN GUPTA),J Sudha/97