2026:JHHC:10918 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (S) No. 4646 of 2022 -- Jay Prakash Pathak, aged about 34 years, son of Akshyawar Pathak, resident of Dhaiya, Dhanbad, Post I.S.M., Police Station Dhanbad, District Dhanbad ..Petitioner Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand; 2. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Singhbhum(Kolhan) Region, Chaibasa officiating from Chaibasa, Post Chaibasa, Police Station Chaibasa, District West Singhbhum; 3. The Superintendent of Police, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa officiating from Chaibasa, Post Chaibasa, Police Station Chaibasa, District West Singhbhum ..Respondents -- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Samavesh Bhanjdeo, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Anil Kumar Singh, A.C to G.P.-I -- 18/08.04.2026 The writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner for the following reliefs: I. For quashing the order contained in Memo No. 130 dated 12.01.2018 (Annexure-9) issued under the signature of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Singhbhum (Kolhan) Region, Chaibasa rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner and upholding the order of punishment of dismissal. II. For quashing the order contained in Memo No. 1989 dated 12.07.2017 (Annexure-8) issued under the signature of the Superintendent of Police, West Singhbhum, Chaibasa whereby and whereunder the petitioner has been dismissed from service with immediate effect. 2. Briefly stated, the petitioner being fully eligible was legally appointed on the post of Constable and gave his joining at Chaibasa. A case being Sadar P.S. Case No. 127/2015 was registered under sections 188/268/379 of Indian Penal Code read with section 30 of Arms Act against the petitioner on 29.12.2015. A preliminary enquiry was 2026:JHHC:10918 2 made on 30.12.2015 and a report was submitted for initiation of a departmental proceeding against the petitioner. It is very surprising that all past proceedings of the petitioner was annexed with the preliminary enquiry report. On 28.04.2016 the petitioner was undergoing treatment at RINPAS and was also admitted there. He was granted regular bail on 16.06.2016 by this Court. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet on 11.07.2016, and another charge-sheet was issued on 18.08.2016 for the same charges. On 31.05.2017 a Departmental Proceeding No. 41/ 16 was initiated against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer submitted his Enquiry Report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was dismissed from service with immediate effect vide Memo dated 12.07.2017. Thereafter, on 12.01.2018 the petitioner preferred appeal, which has been rejected. However, the petitioner has been acquitted in Sessions Trial No. 85/2018/CNR No.JHCB-01-000789-2018. On request to the respondents by the petitioner, he was suggested to get an order from competent court of law. Hence, this writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on the same set of charges a departmental proceeding was initiated and also criminal proceeding was started. In the 2026:JHHC:10918 3 departmental proceeding, the witnesses, who produced the proof of charges were also part and parcel of the criminal case; and in the departmental proceeding, on the basis of evidence the petitioner has been dismissed from service, but surprisingly all the departmental proceedings’ witnesses, who were also witnesses of criminal case, have admitted in the cross-examination that they have not seen the petitioner in committing the offence and based on this, the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case; as such, the impugned order may be quashed and the petitioner should be reinstated in service in view of the settled legal proposition that when the charges in criminal case and departmental proceeding are same and similar, and moreover, when the witnesses, who were examined in the departmental proceedings, were also examined in criminal case as prosecution witnesses; then, certainly acquittal in the criminal case will have direct bearing in the result of departmental proceeding. 4. By relying upon the aforesaid contentions, learned counsel submits that the impugned order may be quashed and the petitioner be reinstated in service. 5. In response to that, learned counsel for the Respondent-State and learned counsel for the Respondent- University support the impugned order of dismissal and submits that the departmental proceeding and criminal proceeding cannot be equated in the similar footing. In 2026:JHHC:10918 4 departmental proceeding, the punishment is imposed on preponderance of probability but in the criminal case, it is to be proved beyond the reasonable doubt. He further submits that enough opportunity was given to the petitioner and there is no procedural irregularity; Accordingly, the impugned order of dismissal does not require any interference. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed with the respective affidavits and the averments made therein; this Court is having no disagreement with the submission of respondents to the effect that in departmental proceeding punishment is imposed on preponderance of probability and in criminal case it is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt; but in the case at hand, the witnesses, who were examined in departmental proceeding were almost same and similar in the criminal case. For example, one Mr. Dharmendra Ram, who was departmental witness no. 4 supported the case of the department; whereas; in the criminal case he was examined as P.W.4 and categorically admitted in cross-examination that he had not seen anything. Needless to say, he was also the informant. Likewise, another witness who was also roped in departmental proceeding namely Pawan Kumar who was examined as P.W.-1 has also supported the departmental case in the departmental proceeding; 2026:JHHC:10918 5 however, categorically admitted that he had not seen anything and based on this the learned trial court passed a judgment in the case of the petitioner being Sessions Trial no. 85/2018, the relevant portion of the same is extracted hereinbelow: “17. On the basis of above reasons, moreover, PW 5 has clearly stated in his cross examination that the Jay Prakash Pathak was mentally disturb and I.O. has also revealed in court question that he admitted that at the time of occurrence the mental condition of the accused was not good. Therefore, he was referred to Sadar Hospital, Chaibasa and where his mental condition is not found good, therefore, he had been admitted RINPAS, Ranchi and prior to the occurrence his treatment was going on. Moreover, one thing is in the glaring that according to written report the accused Jay Prakash Pathak has been handed over along with seized articles to O/C Sadar PS Chaibasa but on perusal of the lower court record, it appears that he has not been produced before the Ld. C.J.M., Chaibasa at that time nor any information has been given by the I.O that he has been admitted in mental hospital. Later on, it appears that he has filed Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 22/2016 and A. B. A. No. 714 of 2016, it means he has not been taken into custody on the date of occurrence then how it can be said that he has been handed over to the O/C, Sadar P.S. or he was present at the time of occurrence holding Insas service Rifle. ` 18. So, on the basis of above arguments it can be said that it has not been proved by the prosecution that it was the accused who had doing firing indiscriminately by the Insas service Rifle. It can also been said that if, he was that person, then it can be said that he was mentally not fit. 19. So, considering the above facts, I find that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against the accused Jay Prakash Pathak, there is complete paucity of the evidence against him. Hence, he is hereby order to be acquitted from this case. His bailors are also discharged from their respective liabilities.” 7. The purpose of referring the judgment is only to indicate that the charges were same and similar in the departmental proceeding with that of the criminal case and the witnesses who have supported the departmental proceeding have diagonally made statement against the 2026:JHHC:10918 6 department and categorically admitted that they had not seen anything. Few examples have already been indicated hereinabove, so the contention of the respondents that in departmental proceeding punishment is imposed on preponderance of probability and in criminal case it is after proving of charge beyond reasonable doubt is not applied in the instant case. 8. In view of the fact that the witnesses were same and similar in both the proceedings and in criminal case they have categorically admitted that they had not seen the occurrence, this court cannot shut its eyes from paragraph 18 of the judgment passed in the criminal case, wherein there is a specific finding of the learned trial court that “It can also be said that if he was that person; then it can be said that he was mentally not fit”. Therefore, learned trial court has gone to the extent of observing that even if it is proved that the accused was involved in commission of crime; then, also after going through the evidence both documentary and oral, the learned trial court has opined that the accused might be mental person. 9. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment rendered in the case of Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and others 1 having similar type of case, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: 1 (2024) 1 SCC 175 2026:JHHC:10918 7 “25. With this above background, if we examine the criminal proceedings the following factual position emerges. The very same witnesses, who were examined in the departmental enquiry were examined in the criminal trial. Jagdish Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan Lal, Raj Singh and Karan Sharma were examined as PW 2, PW 3, PW 6, PW 9 and PW 13 respectively at the criminal trial. Apart from them, eight other witnesses were also examined. The gravamen of the charge in the criminal case was that the appellant had submitted an application for recruitment along with his marksheet and he, by making alteration in his date of birth to reflect the same as 24-4-1972 in place of 21-4-1974, and obtained recruitment to the post of Constable. 26. Though the trial court convicted the appellant under Section 420IPC, the appellate court recorded the following crucial findings while acquitting the appellant: “…Mainly the present case was based on the documents to this effect whether the date of birth of accused is 21-4-1972 or 21- 4-1974. Ext. P-3 is original marksheet, in which, the date of birth of accused has been shown as 21-4-1972 and same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. Whatever the documents have been produced before the court regarding the date of birth of 21-4-1974 are either the letters of Principal or are duplicate TC or marksheets. Neither the prosecution has produced any such original documents in the subordinate court to this effect that when the admission form of accused was filled, what date of birth was mentioned by the accused in it, what was the date of birth in Roll Register of School, what date of birth was mentioned by accused in the examination form of Secondary, and nor after bringing the original records from the witnesses concerned, same were got proved in the evidence. In these circumstances, this fact becomes doubtful that date of birth of the accused was 21-4-1974, and the accused is entitled to receive its benefit. In the considered opinion of this Court, the conviction made by the learned subordinate court merely on the basis of oral evidence and letters or duplicate documents, is not just and proper. It is justifiable to acquit the accused. Resultantly, on the basis of aforesaid consideration, the present appeal filed by the appellant-accused is liable to be allowed.” (emphasis supplied) 27. What is important to notice is that the Appellate Judge has clearly recorded that in the document Ext. P-3 — original marksheet of the 8th standard, the date of birth was clearly shown as 21-4-1972 and the other documents produced by the prosecution were either letters or a duplicate marksheet. No doubt, the Appellate Judge says that it becomes doubtful whether the date of birth was 21-4-1974 and that the accused was entitled to receive its benefit. However, what we are supposed to see is the substance of the judgment. A reading of the entire judgment clearly indicates that the appellant was acquitted after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and after noticing that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge (see S. Samuthiram [State of T.N. v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] ). 28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review 2026:JHHC:10918 8 is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. 29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved” — in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” (see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P.). 30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank . 31. Apart from the above, one other aspect is to be noted. The enquiry officer's report makes a reference to the appellant passing 10th standard, and to a 10th standard marksheet exhibited as Ext. P-4 referring to the date of birth as 24-7-1974. Jagdish Chandra PW 1 (in the departmental enquiry) clearly deposed that since the appellant was regularly absent from Class 10, his name was struck off and he did not even pass 10th standard. The appellant has also come out with this version before the disciplinary authority, stating that the 10th class certificate of Ram Lal produced before the enquiry officer, is of some other Ram Lal. 32. This issue need not detain us any further because it is not the case of the department that the appellant sought employment based on 10th standard marksheet. It is their positive case that the appellant sought employment on the basis of his 8th standard marksheet. Shravan Lal, PW 4 in the departmental enquiry had also furnished the 10th standard marksheet procured from the Secondary Education Board, Ajmer. In cross-examination, on being asked, he admitted that the appellant was recruited on the basis of 8th standard marksheet, and he admitted that there was no alteration in the 8th standard marksheet. 33. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 31-3-2004; the order of the appellate authority dated 8-10- 2004; the orders dated 29-3-2008 and 25-6-2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty respectively, are all illegal and untenable. 34. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of DB Special Appeal (Writ) No. 484 of 2011 dated 5-9-2018 [Ram Lal Choudhary v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3031] . We direct that the appellant shall be reinstated with all consequential benefits including seniority, notional promotions, fitment of salary and all other benefits. As far as back wages are concerned, we are inclined to award the appellant 50% of the back wages. The directions be complied with within a period of four weeks from today”. 10. Having regard to the above, and looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned 2026:JHHC:10918 9 orders dated 12.07.2017 (Annexure-8) and 12.01.2018 (Annexure-9) are, hereby, quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service. However, it is made clear that the petitioner will not be entitled for any back wages because it is not the fault on the part of the respondents that the petitioner is out of service; rather it was due to the reason that a criminal case was lodged. 11. Accordingly, the instant writ application stands allowed. Pending I.A(s), if any, also stands closed. (Deepak Roshan, J.) 8th April, 2026 Jk Uploaded on 23/04/2026