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2026 DAILYLAW 8738 (UTT)

Birendra Prasad Badoni v. Atul Bhatt

2026-02-18

Ashish Naithani

body2026
JUDGMENT : Ashish Naithani, J. The present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the Petitioner, an octogenarian landlord aged about 88 years, assailing the judgment and order dated 30.11.2021 passed by the learned District Judge, Pauri Garhwal in Rent Appeal No. 01 of 2019, “Atul Bhatt and Others vs. Birendra Prasad Badoni”, whereby the Appellate Court set aside the order dated 03.12.2018 passed by the Prescribed Authority and rejected the release application filed by the Petitioner under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 2. The Petitioner seeks restoration of the order of the Prescribed Authority, contending that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction, re- appreciated evidence in a manner impermissible in rent control proceedings, and substituted its own subjective view in place of well- reasoned findings on bona fide need and comparative hardship. 3. The Petitioner is the landlord of a residential house situated at Ward No. 4, Upper Bazar, Pauri Garhwal, recorded as House No. 177 (New No. 196) in the municipal records. The property is ancestral in nature and has been in the possession of the tenants’ family for nearly six decades. 4. The Petitioner retired from service in 1992 and was residing in Mumbai. After the death of his wife in 2016, and considering his advancing age, health requirements, and social roots in Pauri Garhwal, the Petitioner decided to permanently settle in the suit premises. 5. A release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, 1972 was filed on the ground of bona fide residential need. It was specifically pleaded that the Petitioner had no other reasonably suitable accommodation available for his residence, as another ancestral house had been allotted to his nephew under a family arrangement for livelihood and residence. 6. The respondents-tenants contested the release application, disputing the Petitioner’s bona fide need and raising pleas relating to alleged maintenance of the Petitioner’s mother, repairs carried out by them, availability of alternate accommodation, and comparative hardship. 7. Upon consideration of pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and settled legal principles, the Prescribed Authority, by order dated 03.12.2018, allowed the release application, recording categorical findings in favour of the Petitioner on both bona fide need and comparative hardship, and directed eviction of the tenants. 8. 7. Upon consideration of pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and settled legal principles, the Prescribed Authority, by order dated 03.12.2018, allowed the release application, recording categorical findings in favour of the Petitioner on both bona fide need and comparative hardship, and directed eviction of the tenants. 8. Aggrieved, the respondents preferred Rent Appeal No. 01 of 2019, which came to be allowed by the learned District Judge on 30.11.2021, setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority and rejecting the release application, primarily on the ground that the Petitioner had failed to establish bona fide need and that alternative accommodation was available.It is this appellate order dated 30.11.2021 which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the appellate court, while passing the impugned judgment dated 30.11.2021, exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating evidence and substituting its own view for the reasoned findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, 1972. 11. It was contended that the Prescribed Authority had returned clear findings on bona fide need and comparative hardship, which were neither perverse nor illegal, and therefore could not have been interfered with in appeal. 12. Learned counsel argued that the appellate court committed a manifest error in questioning the genuineness of the Petitioner’s residential need, despite the undisputed facts that the Petitioner is an aged, widowed, and retired person seeking to permanently settle at his native place. 13. It was further submitted that the appellate court acted beyond jurisdiction in dictating the choice of accommodation to the landlord by relying upon an ancestral property allotted to a nephew under a family arrangement, which was neither vacant nor legally available to the Petitioner. 14. On comparative hardship, it was urged that the appellate court ignored the finding that the respondents, despite long tenancy, made no effort to seek alternative accommodation, whereas denial of eviction would cause grave hardship to the Petitioner. 15. Per Contra, learned counsel for the Respondents supported the impugned appellate order and submitted that the Petitioner failed to establish a genuine bona fide need, as alternative accommodation was available. 16. It was argued that the respondents would suffer greater comparative hardship in the event of eviction and that the appellate court committed no jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. 17. 16. It was argued that the respondents would suffer greater comparative hardship in the event of eviction and that the appellate court committed no jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. 17. At the outset, it requires emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in nature. Interference is warranted where the subordinate court has acted in excess of jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or where the decision suffers from manifest perversity or patent illegality. At the same time, where the appellate court itself travels beyond the statutory limits governing its jurisdiction, supervisory correction becomes not only permissible but necessary. 18. In the present case, the Prescribed Authority, while allowing the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, 1972, undertook a detailed examination of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and the settled legal position governing bona fide need and comparative hardship. Specific findings were recorded that the Petitioner, an aged and widowed person, had a genuine residential requirement and that denial of release would cause greater hardship to him than to the tenants. 19. The appellate court, however, did not demonstrate that these findings were either perverse or unsupported by evidence. Instead, it proceeded to re-appreciate the factual matrix, reassess the suitability of accommodation, and substitute its own view regarding how and where the landlord ought to reside. Such an exercise travels beyond the permissible scope of appellate scrutiny under the Act. 20. The law is well settled that the landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement, and neither the tenant nor the court can compel him to adjust in an accommodation which, according to him, is unsuitable. The appellate court erred in treating an ancestral property allotted to a nephew under a family arrangement as an available alternative accommodation, despite there being no finding that such accommodation was vacant or legally available to the Petitioner. 21. Equally untenable is the approach adopted by the appellate court on the issue of comparative hardship. The Prescribed Authority had categorically recorded that the respondents-tenants, despite occupying the premises for several decades, had made no discernible effort to secure alternative accommodation. This material finding was neither reversed on cogent reasoning nor displaced by evidence. Instead, the appellate court relied upon extraneous considerations which are not determinative of hardship under Section 21(1)(a). 22. The Prescribed Authority had categorically recorded that the respondents-tenants, despite occupying the premises for several decades, had made no discernible effort to secure alternative accommodation. This material finding was neither reversed on cogent reasoning nor displaced by evidence. Instead, the appellate court relied upon extraneous considerations which are not determinative of hardship under Section 21(1)(a). 22. The appellate court also failed to accord due weight to the advanced age and personal circumstances of the Petitioner, which were central to the assessment of bona fide need. The impugned judgment reflects a subjective reassessment of facts rather than a judicial scrutiny of legality or perversity in the order of the Prescribed Authority. 23. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the impugned appellate judgment dated 30.11.2021 suffers from jurisdictional overreach and misapplication of settled principles, and cannot be sustained. The Prescribed Authority’s order dated 03.12.2018, having been passed upon proper appreciation of evidence and in accordance with law, warrants restoration. ORDER The Writ Petition is allowed The judgment and order dated 30.11.2021 passed by the learned District Judge, Pauri Garhwal, in Rent Appeal No. 01 of 2019 are set aside. The order dated 03.12.2018 passed by the Prescribed Authority in Rent Case No. 01 of 2018, allowing the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, is restored. The respondents shall vacate the suit premises within three months from today, subject to filing an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within four weeks.