JUDGMENT : ASHISH NAITHANI, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the judgment and order dated 14.12.2012 passed by the learned District Judge, Dehradun in Rent Control Appeal No. 81 of 2012, whereby the appellate court interfered with and set aside the order dated 08.11.2011 passed by the Prescribed Authority, Dehradun in P.A. Case No. 21 of 2008 under the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 2. By means of the present petition, the petitioners seek judicial scrutiny of the appellate order reversing the release of accommodation earlier granted in their favour by the Prescribed Authority. 3. The dispute in the present case pertains to a residential accommodation bearing property No. 11-A, also known as 11/2, situated at Chukkuwala, Dehradun, which is owned by the petitioners. The said accommodation was originally under the tenancy of Smt. Durga Devi. 4. Smt. Durga Devi expired on 27.03.2008 leaving behind her legal heirs. After her death, the petitioners instituted a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 seeking release of the accommodation on the ground of their personal requirement. The said proceedings were registered as P.A. Case No. 21 of 2008 before the Prescribed Authority, Dehradun. 5. During the pendency of the release proceedings, respondent no. 1 moved an application claiming himself to be the adopted son of the deceased tenant. The Prescribed Authority, by order dated 25.03.2009, impleaded him as a party in the proceedings. It is also borne from the record that during the pendency of the proceedings, a compromise was entered into through the grandmother of respondent no. 1 regarding vacation of the premises, however, the proceedings continued thereafter before the Prescribed Authority. 6. The Prescribed Authority, after considering the material on record, passed judgment and order dated 08.11.2011 allowing the release application and directing release of the accommodation in favour of the petitioners. 7. Aggrieved by the said order, respondent no. 1 preferred Rent Control Appeal No. 81 of 2012 before the learned District Judge, Dehradun. The appellate court, by judgment and order dated 14.12.2012, set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority, which has led to the filing of the present writ petition before this Court. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 9.
1 preferred Rent Control Appeal No. 81 of 2012 before the learned District Judge, Dehradun. The appellate court, by judgment and order dated 14.12.2012, set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority, which has led to the filing of the present writ petition before this Court. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Prescribed Authority, upon due appreciation of the evidence on record, had rightly allowed the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, holding the bona fide need of the petitioners established and comparative hardship in their favour. It was contended that the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the well-reasoned findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority. 10. It was further submitted that the appellate court travelled beyond the scope of the appeal and virtually set up a new case, particularly on the issue of vacancy and the status of the respondent. According to the petitioners, the finding regarding vacancy is contrary to settled law and ignores the distinction between actual and deemed vacancy. 11. Learned counsel also contended that upon the death of the original tenant, tenancy rights could devolve only upon lawful heirs in accordance with law, and the respondent could not claim any superior right merely on the basis of alleged adoption. It was argued that the Prescribed Authority had properly appreciated the material on record and the appellate court erred in reversing the findings without cogent basis. 12. It was further submitted that the appellate court failed to confine itself to the statutory parameters governing release under Section 21(1)(a), particularly with respect to bona fide requirement and comparative hardship, and the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error and perversity. 13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents supported the appellate order and submitted that the Prescribed Authority had failed to correctly appreciate the evidence and had erroneously recorded findings regarding vacancy and entitlement. It was contended that the appellate court, being the final court of fact, was fully empowered to re-appreciate the evidence and correct such errors. 14. It was further argued that the appellate court considered the material on record and arrived at its conclusions in accordance with law, and no interference is warranted under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
It was contended that the appellate court, being the final court of fact, was fully empowered to re-appreciate the evidence and correct such errors. 14. It was further argued that the appellate court considered the material on record and arrived at its conclusions in accordance with law, and no interference is warranted under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The respondents submitted that supervisory jurisdiction is limited and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of findings merely because another view is possible, and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 15. At this juncture, it would be apposite to examine the scope of interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, particularly in the context of findings recorded by the statutory authorities under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 16. The present matter arises out of proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, wherein the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application filed by the petitioners, which was subsequently reversed by the appellate court in exercise of its statutory jurisdiction. The question that falls for consideration is whether the appellate court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and in accordance with law while interfering with the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority. 17. It is well settled that the appellate court, being the final court of fact under the statutory scheme, is competent to re-appreciate the evidence and examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority. However, such power is required to be exercised within the framework of the statute and upon due consideration of the material available on record. The appellate court is obligated to record reasons reflecting proper application of mind and to base its conclusions on evidence and legal principles governing release proceedings. 18. The petitioners have contended that the appellate court travelled beyond the scope of the appeal, particularly on the issue of vacancy and the status of the respondent, and improperly interfered with the findings regarding bona fide requirement and comparative hardship. However, a perusal of the impugned appellate order indicates that the appellate court has examined these aspects within the framework of the appeal and on the basis of the material available on record.
However, a perusal of the impugned appellate order indicates that the appellate court has examined these aspects within the framework of the appeal and on the basis of the material available on record. The question of vacancy, as considered by the appellate court, was examined in light of the circumstances arising after the death of the original tenant, and the conclusions drawn cannot be said to be based on no evidence or irrelevant considerations. Likewise, the issue relating to the status and entitlement of the respondent was assessed by the appellate court only to the extent necessary for determining the rights flowing from the tenancy, and such consideration does not amount to travelling beyond jurisdiction. 19. It further transpires that the appellate court, while reversing the order of the Prescribed Authority, has undertaken an independent evaluation of the material relating to bona fide requirement and comparative hardship. The appellate court, being the final court of fact under the statutory scheme, was competent to re-appreciate the evidence and arrive at its own conclusions. The reversal of findings by itself does not render the order perverse unless it is demonstrated that the conclusions are wholly unreasonable, unsupported by evidence, or based on misapplication of law. From the record, it does not appear that the findings of the appellate court suffer from such infirmity. 20. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is confined to ensuring that courts and tribunals act within the bounds of their authority and in accordance with law. Interference is warranted only in cases of patent illegality, jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice, or findings so perverse that no reasonable person could have arrived at such conclusions. A mere possibility of a different view, or a preference for the reasoning adopted by the Prescribed Authority, cannot be a ground for interference in exercise of such limited jurisdiction. 21. In the present case, the appellate court cannot be said to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, nor does the impugned order disclose any manifest procedural irregularity or patent illegality. The findings recorded by the appellate court are based on consideration of the material available on record and reflect an independent application of mind to the issues involved.
21. In the present case, the appellate court cannot be said to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, nor does the impugned order disclose any manifest procedural irregularity or patent illegality. The findings recorded by the appellate court are based on consideration of the material available on record and reflect an independent application of mind to the issues involved. Even if another view may be possible on the same material, the view taken by the appellate court being a plausible one, this Court would not substitute its own opinion in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. Accordingly, no case for interference is made out. ORDER : Accordingly, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order dated 14.12.2012 passed by the learned District Judge, Dehradun in Rent Control Appeal No. 81 of 2012 does not warrant any interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. There shall be no order as to costs Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.