Page No.# 1/18 GAHC010119582026 2026:GAU-AS:8996-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/3175/2026 DELOWAR HUSSAIN S/O-ABDUL KARIM, R/O- VILL- PASCHIM DEULDI, MOUZA- BAGHBAR, P.S.- BAGHBAR, DIST- BARPETA ASSAM. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND 5 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOVT. OF INDIA, SHASTRI BHAWAN, TILOK MARG, NEW DELHI- 1. 2:THE STATE OF ASSAM REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM DEPARTMENT OF HOME AND POLITICAL DISPUR GUWAHATI-6 3:THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER OF BARPETA P.O. AND DISTRICT- BARPETA ASSAM PIN-781301 4:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (BORDER) BARPETA P.O. AND DIST.- BARPETA ASSAM PIN-781301 5:THE ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA NEW DELHI-1. Page No.# 2/18 6:THE STATE CO-ORDINATOR OF NRC OF ASSAM BHANGAGARH GUWAHATI-5 Advocate for the Petitioner : MD A ALI, MR. M HOQUE Advocate for the Respondent : DY.S.G.I., SC, NRC,SC, F.T,SC, ECI,GA, ASSAM BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KALYAN RAI SURANA HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SHAMIMA JAHAN ORDER Date : 22.06.2026 (K.R. Surana, J) Heard Mr. A. Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. U. Borthakur, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of Mr. S. Kakoty, learned CGC for respondent no.1; Mr. J. Payeng, learned standing counsel for FT and Border matters, for respondent nos. 2, 4 and 6; Mr. N. Kalita, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of Mr. A.I. Ali, learned standing counsel for respondent no.5; and Mr. P. Sarmah, learned Addl. Senior Govt. Advocate for respondent no. 3. 2) By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, namely, Delowar Hussain, has assailed the opinion dated 13.11.2019, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal No.6, Barpeta, in Case No. F.T. 47/ 2016 [arising out of Ref. Case No. 1202(A) dated 09.07.98], by which it was held the petitioner to be a foreigner who has entered into India illegally after 25.03.1971. It may be mentioned that in the impugned opinion, the name of the petitioner is spelt as Deluwar Hussain. 3) As the impugned opinion dated 13.11.2019 has been assailed after more than 6 years, 6 months, 29 days (or 2402 days), by filing this writ Page No.# 3/18 petition on 11.06.2026, the learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to address the Court on the point of delay and laches. 4) The learned counsel for the petitioner, has made his submissions on merit as well as on the point of delay and laches. 5) On the point of delay, it was submitted that the petitioner could not challenge the opinion dated 13.11.2019 because he was suffering from abdominal pain and vomiting and was on bed rest for 4 (four) years. In the meantime, there was Covid-19 pandemic and ultimately, the petitioner had been diagnosed of duodenal perforation and he had to undergo a surgery called “Laparoscopic Grahams Patch Repair” on 26.02.2026. 6) On merit, it has been submitted that the petitioner is a bona fide citizen of India by birth and the name of his grandfather, Shairaji Mondal, was enrolled in the voter list of 1966 and 1970 from Paschim Deuldi, Mouza and P.S.- Baghbar, in the district of Barpeta. The name of his father, Abdul Karim was enrolled in the voter list of 1997 and 2010 from same village. His own name was enrolled in the voter list of 1997 from same village, but with ‘D’ mark. The petitioner has Family Identity Card (i.e. ration card), land documents, PAN Card, job card, etc. It was submitted that the name of his grandfather was Shairaji Mondal, which was correctly recorded in the voter list of 1966 and 1970, but his name was wrongly written as Sairuddin in the voters list of 1997 and 2010. Accordingly, it was submitted that to establish that Shairaji Mandal and Sairuddin are same and one person, the petitioner had sworn an affidavit. 7) In order to support his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner had referred to the written statement and it was submitted that the same was reiterated in the evidence-on-affidavit filed as DW-1. Page No.# 4/18 8) It was submitted that the evidence of the petitioner and Abdul Karim, his father, were mechanically discarded for no valid reason. It was submitted that there was no cross-examination by the State and no rebuttal evidence against the petitioner was disclosed by the State. It was submitted that the voter’s lists and the evidence of the petitioner was discarded merely because of spelling discrepancies, which is not permissible. 9) To support his submissions that the opinion was passed during Covid-19 period and therefore, time when there was Covid-19 pandemic is liable to be omitted in calculating delay, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the case of Cognizance For Extension of Limitation: In Re., (2022) 3 SCC 117. 10) Per contra, the learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters has opposed the admission of this writ petition on the ground of extraordinary delay and laches in approaching the Court. It was also submitted that the case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no application under the facts and circumstances of the case as Covid-19 pandemic did not exist when the impugned opinion was passed. 11) At the outset, from the discussions above, it is seen that there is total absence of any cogent and reliable explanation of delay, but the said point shall be discussed a little later. The merit of the case is also examined because the petitioner has projected that he is a bona fide citizen of the Country. 12) In support of his defence that he is not a foreigner, the petitioner has examined two witnesses including himself and Abdul Karim, his projected father. Both the said witnesses were cross-examined and discharged. The petitioner has exhibited the following documents:- Page No.# 5/18 a. Voter list of 1966 (Ext.A), containing the name of Shairaji Mondal; b. Voter list of 1970 (Ext.B), containing the name of Shairaji Mondal; c. Voter list of 1997 (Ext.C), containing the name of Abdul Karim; d. Voter list of 2010 (Ext.D), containing the name of Abdul Karim; e. Petitioner’s PAN Card (Ext.E); f. Certificate by Gaonburah of village- Paschim Deuldi (Ext.F); g. Affidavit (Ext.G); h. Land revenue receipt (Ext.H) i. Land revenue receipt (Ext.I) j. Land revenue receipt (Ext.J); k. Elector Voter Identity Card of Abdul Karim (Ext.M) (EPIC for short). 13) It may be stated that as per the statement made in the sub- paragraph of paragraph 15, of the evidence-on-affidavit of the DW-2, it has been mentioned that Ext.K and Ext.L are the photocopies of land revenue paid receipt. Thus, as the exhibited document is admittedly a photocopy and the original was not proved, the said exhibit has not been discussed either by the learned Tribunal or by this Court. 14) The petitioner in his cross-examination as DW-1 had stated that he does not know the date and year of his birth. He had stated that he was born and brought up at Jahanara Pathar. The petitioner had stated that he had seen his grandfather, who had died when he was 10/12 years of age, but he does not know the date of his death of his age at the time of death. His mother had died 2 (two) years before. His father is alive and casting his vote and was 55-60 years old. He had obtained his PAN Card through a neighbour. For getting PAN Card, he had given the voter list of 1997 and copies of three other voters’ lists. He did not have a EPIC and so he had made a PAN Card. He does not have a bank account. To submit his link with his parents and grandparents, he had submitted voters list and his own voter list of 2017. He had not submitted up-to- date land revenue record and the ones which were exhibited were very old and Page No.# 6/18 worn-out and cannot be read properly and he does not know who had paid the land revenue. 15) Abdul Karim, the projected father of the petitioner, who was examined as DW-2, had stated in his cross-examination that he had exhibited his EPIC as Ext.M. He does not know the date of year of his birth. The B.L.O. had entered his age and address in the EPIC. He had submitted that he does not know on what basis his age as 63 years as on 01.10.2013 was entered. He had stated that he had not disclosed the name of his grandparents in his affidavit. He had stated that Mahiruddin is his eldest brother, who was 5 years older to him and Akkabar Ali, his younger brother, is 5 years younger to him. He had not stated about his parents death and did not know when they died or at what age they had died. He does not remember whether they had casted vote after 1970. He had casted vote for the first time in 1997 when his age was 25 years. He was married then and his wife name is also entered in the voter list with ‘D’ mark and now she is not alive. No case was registered against his wife. He had not mentioned when she had died. He had not mentioned the name of mother of the petitioner. Though he had stated about his children, but he had not stated that when they were born and what were their present age and where they were residing now. He had not mentioned whether apart from the petitioner his brother’s children were casting their vote regularly. He does not remember how many times he had casted his vote till date. He had not stated the reason of shifting of petitioner’s family in 1997 from Paschim Deuldi to village- Jahanara Pathar. He was presently residing at village- Borbala in Goalpara district. His son, Dilowar Hussain is a farmer and resides at village- Deuldi. He had not submitted any other land revenue receipt except for 1973, 1983 and 1980. Delowar may be about 50 years now. He had not stated the Page No.# 7/18 name of petitioner’s wife or when he got married. The petitioner was residing separately for 4/5 years. They were not separated but residing in different places. The actual name of his father was Chairuddin by which he is called by the villagers and his name was entered in the voter list of 1966 and 1970 as Chairaji Mondal. He does not know if in relation to him, his father’s name was written as Chairuddin in the voters lists of 1997 and 2010. He had not taken steps to correct the name of his father in subsequent voters’ lists. He had denied that he was not the father of the petitioner or that he was not a citizen of India by birth or that his parents had not casted vote in the year 1966 and 1970 or that he was not a permanent resident of village- Paschim Deuldi. He had denied that his son was not an Indian citizen or that he had given false evidence. 16) The learned Tribunal had discussed the pleadings and evidence and observed that there was non-disclosure of material facts relating to the petitioner and his maternal and paternal family. The identities of his parents are not known. The petitioner had not disclosed where his grandparents and parents were born and brought up, where they had resided and how many children they had and whether they were alive or not. The petitioner had also remained silent about himself and in his affidavit, he had not disclosed his age, date of birth and about siblings, if any, which was within his special knowledge and had to be pleaded. 17) The learned Tribunal had rejected the Gaonburah’s certificate (Ext.F) for two reasons, firstly, because of unauthorized use of State Emblem and secondly, because the author of the document was not examined. In this regard, reliance was placed on the case of Sultana Begum v. Union of India & Ors., WP(C) 7115/2016. It was held that the DW-2 had not been able to Page No.# 8/18 establish his linkage with Shairaji Mondal, the voter in voters’ lists of 1966 and 1970 and no reliable and cogent documentary material was placed to establish his linkage. PAN card (Ext.E), was discarded as its entries were not proved. Moreover, the said document contained date of birth of the petitioner has 03.07.1975, but in his written statement and evidence-on-affidavit, the petitioner had stated that he did not know the date of his birth. But, as entries in Ext.E was on the basis of information given by the petitioner, it was not safe to rely on the PAN Card. The learned Tribunal examined the evidence to see if the DW-2, the projected father of the petitioner has been able to link himself with Shairaji Mondal, the DW-2 had exhibited his EPIC (Ext.M). In this regard, referring to the evidence of DW-2 it was observed that as per his statement, he did not know on what basis the B.L.O. had entered the particulars. The DW-2 also did not know about any relevant facts regarding his date of birth, age and other particulars. In the EPIC, the relation name was Soyruddin and not Shairaji Mondal. Accordingly, it was held that the DW-1 and DW-2 did not exhibit any document showing DW-2 as son of Shairaji Mondal. Accordingly, it was held that the EPIC (Ext.M) did not hold any evidentiary value. Accordingly, it was held that the petitioner was trying to set up a false defence. 18) So far as projected elder brother of DW-2 is concerned, the learned Tribunal found glaring discrepancies in age of Mohiruddin and as per his age in the voters lists of 1966 (Ext.A) and 1970 (Ext.B), his year of birth would be in the year 1939. But no voters list of Akkabar Ali, projected younger brother of DW-2 was exhibited and there was no explanation why his name was not entered in the voters’ lists. The learned Tribunal found that in the voter list of 1997, there were two voters namely, Abdul Karim and Akabar Ali, but their age were 47 years and 32 years, which was contradictory to the statement by DW-2 Page No.# 9/18 in his cross-examination that his age was 25 years in 1997. Thus, truthfulness of the evidence of DW-2 was doubted. 19) The mere exhibiting of land revenue receipts (Ext.H, Ext.I and Ext.J) was held of no value without supporting land revenue records. Moreover, through the evidence-on-affidavit of DW-2 referred to land at Jahanara Pathar, but no such document was filed or exhibited. The DW-2 had disclosed the petitioner’s son as 50 years in his cross-examination, but the petitioner (DW-1) had disclosed his age as 40 years in his examination on 06.06.2018. While the petitioner (DW-1) had stated that he was born in Jahanara Pathar, as per the evidence of DW-2, his son was born in Paschim Deuldi. As DW-2 could not state anything about the petitioner regarding the date of his marriage, age at the time of marriage, how many children he had, except stating that for last 4/5 years, the petitioner was living separately, the testimony of DW-2 was not found trustworthy. It was also held that a self-serving affidavit (Ext.G) would not help the petitioner. 20) It was held that entries of voter list of 1997 (Ext.C) could not be linked with voter list of 1966 (Ext.A) and 1970 (Ext.B). It was held that the petitioner had failed to prove that DW-2 was the son and the petitioner was the grandson of Shairaji Mondal, the voter in the voters lists of 1966 (Ext.A) and 1970 (Ext.B). Accordingly, the learned Tribunal had relied on the decision of the State of Bihar v. Radhakrishna Singh & Ors., (1983) 3 SCC 118, where the Supreme Court of India had held that When a case was to be decided on the basis of genealogy, consisting of links, it is incumbent upon the party to prove every link thereof and even if one link is found to be missing then in the eye of law the genealogy cannot be said to have been fully proved. Hence, it was held that narration of the petitioner suffers from multiple material omissions and Page No.# 10/18 contradictions rendering the entries in the voters list pertaining to his parents as Indian citizens are not believable and trustworthy. It was held that mere entry of the name in the voter’s lists would not make a person an Indian citizen. Hence, it was held that the petitioner is not a citizen of India by birth or under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955. It was also held that as regards the petitioner being a foreigner, it was held that the petitioner had failed to discharge his burden to prove that he is an Indian citizen and not a foreigner. 21) Accordingly, it was held that the petitioner is a foreigner/ illegal migrant who had entered into Assam on or after 25.03.1971. 22) In this appeal, the petitioner has not annexed a copy of (i) his PAN Card (Ext.E); (ii) Gaonburah’s certificate (Ext.F); and (iii) EPIC of his projected father (Ext.M). Moreover, the copy of land revenue receipt (Ext.H) is not at all legible and/or readable and the copies of other two land revenue receipts (Ext.I and Ext.J) have not been annexed. No reason has been assigned as to why the said four exhibited documents were withheld. According to the learned Tribunal, the PAN Card of the petitioner contained his date of birth. Moreover, the learned Tribunal had found the land revenue receipts (Ext.H, Ext.I and Ext.J) to be illegible and in the EPIC of DW-2, his age was 63 years as on 01.10.2013. Therefore, the only presumption that can be drawn by the Court is under Section 119, Illustration (g) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, is that the said document, if produced, would be unfavourable to the petitioner. 23) The petitioner has not pleaded the names of (a) his grandmother, (b) his grandfather’s siblings, (c) his father’s siblings, and (d) his own siblings. In his evidence-on-affidavit sworn on 03.07.2017, the age of petitioner was 41 years. Therefore, his year of birth would be 1976 and he would have been eligible to be a voter in the 1997 on attaining the age of 21 Page No.# 11/18 years, but as per his evidence, his age was 25 years when his name was entered in the voter list of 1997. As per his cross-examination, he saw his grandfather and he died when he was 10/12 years of age and therefore, as the year of birth of the petitioner is 1976, his grandfather had died in the year 1986/1988. However, the projected grandfather had completely vanished after 1970, with no explanation about him thereafter. He had stated in his cross- examination that the age of his father is 55-60 years, but DW-2 had declared his age as 68 years in his evidence-on-affidavit and in his cross-examination on 06.06.2018. Therefore, DW-2 was born in the year 1950 and had become eligible to cast his vote in the year 1971. But he had cast his vote in the year 1997, when his age is 47 years, with no explanation why his name was not entered in any voter list after 1971 and before 1997. As per the entries in the voter list of 1997 (Ext.C), Abdul Karim is the concerned voter and the name of his father is Soiruddin. Thus, the link of Soiraji Mondal, who was a voter in 1966 (Ext.A) and 1970 (Ext.B), with Soiruddin, father of Abdul Karim, whose name appears in the voter list of 1997 (Ext.C) and voter list of 2010 (Ext.D) is not proved. It may be stated that Soiruddin is spelt as Sairuddin in voter list of 2010 (Ext.D). 24) The petitioner (DW-1) and Abdul Karim (DW-2) have neither pleaded and nor tendered any explanation in their respective evidence-on- affidavit as to what happened to Abdul Karim (DW-2) (i) between 1971 and 1997 [i.e. 26 (twenty six) years, (ii) between 1997 and 2010; and (iii) after 2010 till he came to tender his evidence in the year 2018. The name of the petitioner, namely, Delowar Hussain, does not appear in any document with his projected father and mother in village- Paschim Deuldi. 25) The voter list of 1966 (Ext.A) has three voters, but the petitioner Page No.# 12/18 has pleaded only about Shairaji Mondal, his projected grandfather. It is presumed that the second voter of Ext.A, namely, Abiran Nessa is the mother of the grandmother of the petitioner, who is aged 40 years. Mohiruddin, who is the third voter in Ext.A is aged 27 years, which is not acceptable because the age difference between mother and son would be 13 years. Moreover, as per the statement of the DW-2 in his cross-examination, age difference between him and Mahiruddin was 5 years and therefore, Mahiruddin, who is a voter in Ext.A, cannot be the projected elder brother of the petitioner. Thus, the learned Tribunal has correctly appreciated that Ext.C has no link with the voters in Ext.A and Ext.B. Thus, the reliance on the ratio of the case of Radhakrishna Singh & Ors. (supra), is found to be justified. 26) In the case of Basiron Nessa v. Union of India & Ors., 2018 (4) GLT 692, the Gaonburah’s certificate (Ext.A) was exhibited. The Gaonburah was examined as witness. In the said certificate it was stated that Basiron Nessa is the daughter of Late Abdul Barek and Rabia Khatun. The Gaonburah had stated in his cross examination that he had issued the certificate after looking at the voters lists of 1966 and 1971. Under the said facts, it was held that documentary evidence must be proved from record and not solely by oral testimony. In this case, the learned Tribunal had held the certificate issued by the Gaonburah of Paschim Deuldi (Ext.F) as inadmissible because of unauthorized use of State Emblem. It has been stated hereinbefore that the petitioner has withheld the said document from the Court by not annexing the same in this writ petition. Therefore, the petitioner has prevented the Court from examining the said document. Moreover, in this case, the author of the document had not been examined as witnesses. 27) In the case of Bijoy Das v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 4 GLR Page No.# 13/18 599: 2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court has held that it is trite that mere filing of written statement and oral testimony in a proceeding under Foreigners Act, 1946 would not be enough. The fact-in-issue would have to be proved by the proceedee by adducing documentary evidence which are admissible and relevant. In the case of Rashminara Begum v. Union of India, 2017 (4) GLT 346, this Court has held that material facts pleaded would have to be proved by adducing cogent and admissible evidence. In the case of Ayesha Khatun v. Union of India, (2017) 3 GLR 820, this Court has held that failure to disclose material facts would lead to adverse presumption. 28) Thus, oral evidence of OPW-2, stating that the petitioner is his son, is not sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner is his son and that he is a citizen of India. 29) Thus, on merit, the impugned opinion passed by the learned Tribunal cannot be faulted with or held to be perverse by non-consideration of relevant evidence, or for taking into consideration extraneous materials. 30) The point of delay and laches, is now taken up for consideration. 31) It is apparent that the petitioner was declared to be a foreigner by the learned Foreigners Tribunal by opinion dated 13.11.2019. The petitioner has applied for certified copy of the opinion only on 19.02.2026, which was made over to the petitioner on 05.03.2026. Thus, on 1.06.2026, when this writ petition was filed, there has been an inordinate delay of 6 years, 6 months, 29 days (or 2402 days) in assailing the impugned opinion. 32) In this case, the petitioner has not provided any verifiable information as to how he was working for gain from 13.11.2019 till he filed this writ petition. Except for a discharge certificate dated 02.03.2026, there is no Page No.# 14/18 other supporting medical prescriptions that the petitioner was in complete bed rest after 13.11.2019. When the petitioner can obtain his PAN card through a neighbour, as per the statement of DW-2, he has three sons and two daughters, there was no reason why other members of his paternal family would not render assistance to him in filing a writ petition to assail the impugned opinion. 33) The decision of the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Cognizance For Extension of Limitation: In Re (supra), could have come to the aid of the petitioner had the writ petition been filed immediately after extension of period of limitation from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 for Covid-19 period was over. 34) Thus, when the petitioner is aware of the consequences of the impugned opinion dated 13.11.2019, the explanation for the delay is not found to be acceptable as a cogent explanation for the extraordinary delay and laches of 6 years, 6 months, 29 days (or 24-2 days) in assailing the said opinion. If such vague explanation, as given by the petitioner is accepted, then in every case the delay and laches has to be condoned as if the principle of “delay defeats equity” is no longer an acceptable legal principle in this Country. 35) In respect of inordinate delay and laches in assailing the impugned opinion after a lapse of 6 years, 6 months, 29 days (or 2402 days), it may be stated that there is no period limitation prescribed for filing a writ petition. However, unless the petitioner demonstrates good and cogent reason, delay and laches would disentitle the petitioner to equitable relief on the principle that delay defeats equity. If one needs any authority on the point, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 INSC 314: (2024) 0 Supreme(SC) 351, and Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. V. Ram Gopal, (2020) 13 SCC 225: (2020) Page No.# 15/18 0 Supreme(SC) 93 (Full Bench) may be referred to. In the later case, while approving the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 and S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479, it was held to the effect that limitation does not strictly apply to a proceeding under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time and the High Courts were cautioned by observing that prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been overlooked or condoned. Paragraph 16 thereof [as extracted from (2020) 0 Supreme(SC) 93 ] is quoted below:- “16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 this Court observed thus: "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". ...It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment." (emphasis supplied).” 36) The Supreme Court of India, in paragraph 46 of the case of Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 INSC 980: (2024) 0 Supreme(SC) 1189, has reiterated the law that undue delay in approaching the Court can be a ground for refusing relief and it has been expressed that that only in exceptional cases, delay can be condoned. The said paragraph 46 Page No.# 16/18 [extracted from (2024) 0 Supreme(SC) 1189 ] is quoted below:- “46. As regards the appellant’s challenge to the inordinate delay of 21 years in filing of the writ petitions by the respondents, we are of the view that the same needs to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is true that the courts have consistently held that undue delay in approaching the court can be a ground for refusing relief, the courts have also recognized that in exceptional cases, where the impugned action is patently illegal or affects fundamental rights, the delay must be condoned.” 37) In respect of the legal proposition that delay and laches is fatal to belated challenge to the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunals, it may be relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Jonali Das v. Union of India, 2018 (5) GLT 492: (2018) 0 Supreme (Gau) 1186. Paragraph 9 thereof is as follows:- “9. In Azmat Ali @ Amzad Ali Vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No.4971/2018, disposed of on 01.08.2018], this Court had observed as follows:- "It is more than three decades that the issue of influx of foreign nationals has been in public domain in the State of Assam and has engaged the attention of the people. Interest of the State is of paramount importance in that unabated influx has the potential to affect the integrity and sovereignty of the country. Citizenship of a person, no doubt, is a very valuable right and should be zealously guarded. There is no gainsaying the fact that a person who is alleged to be a foreigner must be given due and reasonable opportunity to establish that he is a citizen of India. However, if a person does not take steps for safeguarding his interest, he does so at his own risk and peril as grant of opportunity cannot be an endless exercise. Right to a fair hearing or principles of natural justice cannot be permitted to lead to a farcical situation and to be an engine for defeating the very object of identification and deportation of foreigners." 38) The Supreme Court of India, in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104: 2025 Supreme(SC) 1679, while dealing with the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has laid down certain guidelines. Though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to a writ petition, but in the considered opinion of the Court, Page No.# 17/18 when a writ petition is filed to assail the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunals, under certiorari jurisdiction, the same principles should apply, requiring the petitioner to provide at least some cogent and acceptable explanation for the inordinate delay in assailing the opinion. 39) Moreover, this Court, in the case of Ajbahar Ali v. Union of India, (2025) 0 Supreme (Gau) 763, had held to the effect that the plea of compliance of the principles of natural justice cannot be permitted to lead to a farcical situation and to be an engine for defeating the very object of identification and deportation of foreigners. Similar opinion has also been expressed by this Court in the case of Abu Bokkor Siddique v. Union of India, 2019 (1) GLT 813. 40) It must be taken note of the fact that the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665, in paragraph 73, had held to the effect that the procedure under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 is just, fair and reasonable and does not offend any constitutional provision. In paragraph 63, the Supreme Court of India had observed that there can be no manner of doubt that the State of Assam is facing external aggression and internal disturbance on account of large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals and that it, therefore, becomes the duty of the Union of India to take all measures for protection of the State of Assam from such external aggression and internal disturbance as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 70, it was observed that the influx of Bangladeshi nationals who have illegally migrated into Assam pose a threat to the integrity and security of the North Eastern region and that their presence has changed the demographic character of that region and the local people of Assam have been reduced to a status of minority in certain districts. Page No.# 18/18 41) Be that as it may, as the issue of citizenship has been raised, notwithstanding the delay and laches, the Court has carefully examined the materials available in the writ petition and on merit, the opinion expressed by the learned Tribunal cannot be faulted with on any count. Thus, the challenge to the impugned opinion dated 13.11.2019, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal, No. 6, Barpeta, in Case No. F.T. 47/2016 [arising out of Ref. Case No. 1202(A) dated 9/7/98], by which it was held that the petitioner is an illegal migrant of post 25.03.1971, fails. 42) Consequently, on merit, as well as on the ground of inordinate delay and laches of 6 years, 6 months, 29 days (or 2402 days), in assailing the impugned opinion, this writ petition filed by Delowar Hussain is dismissed at the motion stage without issuing notice upon the respondents. The consequences of the said opinion shall follow. 43) There shall be no order as to cost. 44) The learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC shall communicate a downloaded copy of this order to the Home and Political (B) Department, so as to send a copy of this order to be made a part of the record of the learned Foreigners Tribunal for future reference. JUDGE JUDGE. Comparing Assistant