Date of reserved for orders : 21.07.2026 Date of pronouncement : 25.08.2026 Date of uploading : .08.2026 APHC010287492025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3331] TUESDAY, THE 25th DAY OF AUGUST 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1351/2025 Between: 1. BRM CHANDRAMOHAN, S/O B.M.GOVINDASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS. 2. BANDARLAPALLI REVATHI,, W/O B.R.M.CHANDRAMOHAN, AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS. BOTH ARE RESIDENTS OF H.NO.2-3-382, K.VENKATARAMANA LAYOUT, BEHIND LIC OFFICE, TIRUPATHI. ...PETITIONER(S) AND 1. SRI BLVG JAGAN MOHAN, S/O B.R.M.CHANDRA MOHAN, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/O H.NO.2-3-382, K.VENKATARAMANA LAYOUT, BEHIND LIC OFFICE, TIRUPATHI, CHITTOOR DISTRICT. 2. P PADMAVATHI, W/O P.G.GOPPALAPPA, R/O POOGANAHALLI VILLAGE, N.G.HULKUR POST, VIA BETHAMANGALA, KARNATAKA. 3. B L V K G SUMANMOHAN, S/O B.R.M.CHANDRAMOHAN, FLAT NO.G7, AISHWARYA HEIGHTS, NEAR CHAITANYA COLLEGE, KNR PARK, NIZAMPET, HYDERABAD. 4. B GNANA PRASUNA, W/O D.RAJESH, R/O FLAT NO.303, SOWMYA SAROJ APARTMENTS, AYYAPPA NAGAR, 4TH CROSS, KRISHNARAJAPURA, BANGALORE, KARNATAKA STATE. ...RESPONDENT(S): Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein,the High Court may be pleased to set-aside the order and decree dated 7.4.2025 passed in I.A.No.72 of 2022 in O.S.No.263 of 2018 by the Court of the III Additional District Judge, Tirupati and pass IA NO: 1 OF 2025 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to stay all further proceedings in O.S.No.263 of 2018 on the file of the Court of the III Additional District Judge, Tirupati, pending disposal of the CRP and pass Counsel for the Petitioner(S): 1. J UGRANARASIMHA Counsel for the Respondent(S): 1. SAI AKASH N 2. PEDDIBHOTLA VENKATA SAI RAJESH The Court made the following: ORDER Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit O.S.No.263 of 2018 filed the above Civil Revision Petition (revision) against the order dated 07.04.2025 in I.A.No.72 of 2022 in O.S.No.263 of 2018 on the file of the learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati. Page 3 of 18 2. Respondent No.1, being the plaintiff, filed the suit O.S.No.263 of 2018 on the file of the learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati, seeking partition of the plaint schedule properties into five equal shares and to allot one such share to the plaintiff. 3. For better understanding of the facts, it is appropriate to draw a genealogy as mentioned in the plaint. 4. The plaintiff is the son of defendants 1 and 2; defendants 4 and 5 are his brother and sister respectively; defendant 3 is his paternal aunt; and B.M. Radhakrishnaiah and B. Venkatalakshmi @ Venkatamma are his grandparents. 5. (i) In the plaint, it was averred that the plaint schedule items 1 to 4 are self-acquired properties of B. Venkatalakshmi and items 5 to 8 are self- acquired properties of B.M. Radhakrishnaiah. They were in absolute B. Venkatalakshmi @ Venkatamma B.M. Radhakrishnaiah B.R. Munichandra Mohan (son) D1 Wife of D1 (D2) Bandarlapalli Revathy P.Padmavathi (daughter) D3 B.L.V.G. Jagan Mohan (son-1) Plaintiff B.L.V.K.G. Suman Mohan (son-2) defendant No.4 B. Gnana Prasuna (daughter) defendant No.5 possession and enjoyment of the respective properties, jointly along with the plaintiff and the defendants, till their last breath. B. Venkatalakshmi and B.M. Radhakrishnaiah died intestate on 19.01.2007 and 21.01.2007 respectively, leaving behind the plaintiffs and the defendants. The plaintiff, on several occasions, demanded that the defendants divide the plaint schedule properties and allot his share. (ii) The plaintiff‟s parents, defendants 1 and 2, filed O.P.No.185 of 2017, before the Tribunal for maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens, Tirupati. Through the proceedings in O.P.No.185 of 2017, the plaintiff came to know that defendant No.1 executed a sham, nominal and collusive registered gift settlement deed bearing document No.3218 of 2010, dated 24.06.2010 in favour of defendant No.2. The plaintiff is contesting O.P.No.185 of 2017. Defendants 1 and 2 set up forged and fabricated Wills purported to have been executed by B.M. Radhakrishna and B. Venkatalakshmi. The Wills have not seen the light of day. Defendants 1 and 2, with active collusion with other defendants, are acting detrimentally to the interest of the plaintiff and are attempting to alienate the plaint schedule properties to third parties. The plaintiff got issued legal notice, dated 07.07.2018, demanding partition. Defendants 1 and 2 got issued a reply and are depriving the plaintiff of getting his share in the plaint schedule properties. With these averments, the plaintiff instituted the suit. 6. Defendants 1, 3 and 5 filed separate written statements. 7. Pending the suit, defendants 1 and 2 filed I.A.No.72 of 2022 under Order VII Rule 11 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (C.P.C.), seeking rejection of the plaint for want of cause of action and being barred by the law of succession i.e. under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short „the Act‟). 8. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it was contended that the plaintiff is their elder son. In the plaint, it was pleaded that items 1 to 4 are self-acquired properties of B. Venkatalakshamma @ Venkatamma and items 5 to 8 are self-acquired properties of B.M. Radha Krishnaiah. 9. Defendants 1 and 3 are the son and daughter of B. Venkatalakshamma and B.M. Radha Krishnaiah. The suit schedule properties are self-acquired properties of B. Venkatalakshamma and B.M. Radha Krishnaiah. The plaintiff and defendants 4 and 5 have nothing to do with the suit schedule properties. The plaintiff has no subsisting right to sue for partition. A grandson will not get a birthright in self-acquired property of grandfather or grandmother during the lifetime of the father. 10 As per Section 8(a) of the Act, the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve firstly upon the heirs being the relatives specified in class I of the schedule. As per Section 15(a) of the Act, the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband. Therefore, as per the provisions of the Act, during the lifetime of the father, neither the plaintiff nor their children would get any share in the intestate property. Defendant No.1 also pleaded with the Wills dated 25.02.2005 and 30.12.2006 executed in his favour and in favour of defendant No.2. Thus, defendant No.1 prayed to the court to reject the plaint. 11. The plaintiff filed a counter and opposed the application. It was contended, inter alia, that defendant No.1 filed a written statement, setting up title over the suit schedule property through the Will purported to be executed by B.M. Radha Krishnaiah and B. Venkata Lakshmamma. Having set up ownership, filed the application to reject the plaint. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the petition. 12. Respondent No.3/defendant No.4 filed a separate counter, with similar averments to those set out by the plaintiff in his counter. 13. The trial court, by order dated 07.04.2025, dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the same, the above revision is filed 14. Heard Sri J. Ugra Narasimha, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri N. Sai Akash, learned counsel for respondent No.1. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that there is no cause of action to file the suit. The suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by Sections 8 and 15 of the Act. According to the plaintiff, the plaint schedule properties are self-acquired properties of B.M. Radha Krishnaiah and B. Venkata Lakshmamma. The title devolved upon defendants 1 and 3, being son and daughter, after the death of their father and mother, B.M. Radha Krishnaiah and B. Venkata Lakshmamma. They became tenants in common. As long as defendant No.1 is alive, the plaintiff cannot ask for partition of the properties. The plaint was cleverly drafted by using the word „jointly‟ and prayed to consider the plaint. The trial court failed to consider these aspects and dismissed the application. Learned counsel relied upon i. Uttam v. Saubhag Singh and Others1; ii. Bobbili Municipality v. K. Sugunamma2; 1 (2016) 4 SCC 68 iii. Manoj Sharma vs. Pankaj Sharma3; iv. Krithika Jain v. Rakesh Jain4; v. Harvinder Pal Singh vs. Laj Pal Singh & Ors.5 16. Learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff, on the other hand, would contend that in para 3 of the plaint, it was specifically averred that B.M. Radha Krishnaiah, B. Venkata Lakshmamma and others were in joint possession till the last breath of the grandparents. Neither Section 8 nor Section 15 of the Act bars the suit. Section 8 of the Act specifies a class of heirs, and it does not apply to the fact situation. Eventually, prayed to dismiss the revision. Learned counsel relied on: i. Shaifali Gupta v. Vidya Devi Gupta and Others6; ii. Kum. Geetha, D/o Late Krishna and Ors. v. Nanjundaswamy & Ors.7 17. The points for consideration are: 1. Whether the plaint in O.S.No.263 of 2018 on the file of the learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC? 2. Whether the order dated 07.04.2025 in I.A.No.72 of 2022 in O.S.No.263 of 2018 suffers from irregularity warranting interference by this Court? 2 (2008) 5 ALD 409 3 S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.164/2016 4 CS (OS)679/2024 and I.A.No.37445 of 2024, dated 09.09.2025 5 CS(0S) 2668/2014 and I.A.No.16929/2014 dated 12.10.2015 6 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1181 7 Civil Appeal No. 7413 of 2023 arising out of S.L.P.No.8147 of 2016, 2023 INSC 964 18. The facts pleaded in the plaint need no reiteration. In the case at hand, taking the plaint averments on their face value, the plaint schedule items 1 to 4 are expressly admitted by the plaintiff to be the self-acquired properties of his grandmother, late B. Venkatalakshmamma and plaint schedule items 5 to 8 are the self-acquired properties of his grandfather, late B.M. Radhakrishnaiah. 19. The plaintiff is the grandson, while Defendant No.1 (the son) and Defendant No.3 (the daughter) are the immediate surviving Class-I legal heirs of the deceased grandparents. 20. Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act provides the general rules of succession in the case of a male Hindu dying intestate. The property devolves firstly upon the heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule. A bare reading of Class I of the Schedule reveals that the “Son” is a Class-I heir, whereas a “Grandson” (son‟s son) is not a Class-I heir in his own independent capacity if his father is alive. A grandson is included in Class I only as the “son of a predeceased son”. 21. Going by the pleadings in the plaint, defendants 1 and 3, son and daughter of the deceased are alive to date when the plaint was presented. The property is the self-acquired property of the parents of defendants 1 and 3. Then, the natural consequence would be, upon their death in the year 2007, the property would devolve upon defendants 1 and 3, being the Class-I heirs. 22. The landmark three-Judge Bench judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur vs Chander Sen,8 reaffirmed 8 (1986) 3 SCC 567 in Yudhishter vs Ashok Kumar9 and Uttam vs Saubhag Singh,10 settled that property devolved under Section 8 of the Act is held by the heir as his separate and individual property, and his own son does not acquire any birthright (coparcenary interest) in such inherited property. 23. In Chander Sen’s (supra) judgment, a partial partition having taken place in 1961 between a father and his son, their business was divided and thereafter carried on by a partnership firm consisting of the two of them. The father died in 1965, leaving behind his son and two grandsons, and a credit balance in the account of the firm. The question before the Apex Court was whether the credit balance left in the account of the firm could be said to be joint family property after the father‟s share and had been distributed among his Class I heirs in accordance with Section 8 of the Act. The Court examined the legal position and held as under: “21. It is necessary to bear in mind the Preamble to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Preamble states that it was an Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. 22. In view of the Preamble to the Act i.e. that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and does not include son‟s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. The Gujarat High Court [CIT v. Babubhai Mansukhbhai, 1975 SCC OnLine Guj 77 : (1977) 108 ITR 417] view noted above, if accepted, would mean that though the son of a predeceased son and not the son of a son who is intended to be 9 (1987) 1 SCC 204 10 (2016) 4 SCC 68 excluded under Section 8 to inherit, the latter would by applying the old Hindu law get a right by birth of the said property contrary to the scheme outlined in Section 8. Furthermore as noted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court [CWT v. Mukundgirji, 1983 SCC OnLine AP 288 : (1983) 144 ITR 18] that the Act makes it clear by Section 4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. It would be difficult to hold today the property which devolved on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-à-vis his own son; that would amount to creating two classes among the heirs mentioned in Class I, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu family property and vis-à-vis son and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class I of Schedule under Section 8 of the Act included widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son, etc. 23. Before we conclude, we may state that we have noted the observations of Mulla‟s Commentary on Hindu Law, 15th Edn. dealing with Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act at pp. 924-26 as well as Mayne Hindu Law, 12th Edn., pp. 918-19. 24. The express words of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be ignored and must prevail. The Preamble to the Act reiterates that the Act is, inter alia, to ‘amend’ the law, with that background the express language which excludes son’s son but includes son of a predeceased son cannot be ignored. (emphasis is mine) 25. In the aforesaid light the views expressed by the Allahabad High Court [CIT v. Ram Rakshpal Ashok Kumar, 1966 SCC OnLine All 429 : (1968) 67 ITR 164] , the Madras High Court [CIT v. P.L. Karuppan Chettiar, 1978 SCC OnLine Mad 30 : (1978) 114 ITR 523] , the Madhya Pradesh High Court [Shrivallabhdas Modani v. CIT, (1982) 138 ITR 673 (MP)] , and the Andhra Pradesh High Court [CWT v. Mukundgirji, 1983 SCC OnLine AP 288 : (1983) 144 ITR 18] , appear to us to be correct. With respect we are unable to agree with the views of the Gujarat High Court [CIT v. Babubhai Mansukhbhai, 1975 SCC OnLine Guj 77 : (1977) 108 ITR 417] noted hereinbefore.” 24. Similarly, in Uttam’s case (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex court dealt with the question whether the application of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 causes the ancestral/joint family property in the hands of the surviving heirs to cease to be joint family property, thereby disentitling a grandson born after the grandfather‟s death from claiming a share by birth in a suit for partition. The Hon‟ble Apex Court laid down the principles for joint family property as under: “18. … The law, therefore, insofar as it applies to joint family property governed by the Mitakshara School, prior to the amendment of 2005, could therefore be summarised as follows: (i) When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, having at the time of his death an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property will devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary (vide Section 6). (ii) To proposition (i), an exception is contained in Section 30 Explanation of the Act, making it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary property is property that can be disposed of by him by will or other testamentary disposition. Page 12 of 18 (iii) A second exception engrafted on proposition (i) is contained in the proviso to Section 6, which states that if such a male Hindu had died leaving behind a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative surviving him, then the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, and not by survivorship. (iv) In order to determine the share of the Hindu male coparcener who is governed by Section 6 proviso, a partition is effected by operation of law immediately before his death. In this partition, all the coparceners and the male Hindu‟s widow get a share in the joint family property. (v) On the application of Section 8 of the Act, either by reason of the death of a male Hindu leaving self-acquired property or by the application of Section 6 proviso, such property would devolve only by intestacy and not survivorship. (vi) On a conjoint reading of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act, after joint family property has been distributed in accordance with Section 8 on principles of intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold the property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants.” 25. Like that, as per section 15(1)(a) of the Act, which deals with succession to the self-acquired property of a Hindu female dying intestate, provides that the property shall devolve: “(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband;” 26. Therefore, during the lifetime of defendants 1 and 3, the plaintiff cannot be termed as a legal heir under Section 15 of the Act. The grandmother‟s properties devolved upon defendants 1 and 3 as set out in Sec 15(1)(a) of the Act, being the son and daughter. 27. It is pertinent to observe that as per the legal maxim Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which translates to “the express mention of one thing excludes all others,” is squarely applicable to the present facts of the case since the explicit inclusion of the son and the children of a predeceased son in the statutory scheme deliberately and unambiguously excludes the living son‟s children from the line of succession. 28. The Hon‟ble Apex Court explains the interpretation of this maxim in the case of Gram Panchayat v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings,11 as under: “16. We have already extracted Section 42 of the Act and Rule 18 of the Rules. It would be clear that though Section 42 envisaged orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition separately, Rule 18 provides for limitation only in respect of an application under that section in a proceeding where an order was passed. There is the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius — expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law an intention to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. When mention has been made only of “orders”, the inference would be that preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition are excluded. Again, ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio. The best interpretation is made from the context. As we have seen, while Sections 11 1989 Supp (2) SCC 465 19 and 20 did not envisage passing of any order Section 21 envisaged passing of orders. Section 42 deals with applications against orders, preparation or confirmation of scheme and repartition. Rule 18 mentions only orders and hence by inference excludes “preparation and confirmation of scheme and repartition”. We have accordingly no doubt in approving the Full Bench decision in Jagtar Singh v. Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings [1988 Punj LJ 535].” 29. This being the legal regime, let this court analyse the contents of the plaint. It is contended in the plaint that the plaintiff and defendants were in “joint possession and enjoyment” of the properties along with the grandparents till their last breath. Except for the word “joint possession”, a careful reading of the plaint doesn‟t indicate any other right like birthright etc., of the plaintiff. This is a classic example of clever drafting made to create an illusory cause of action where none exists in law. The plaintiff, having no right, cannot create a cause of action for partition through the mere pleading of “joint possession.” 30. The respondent relied on the judgments of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Kum. Geetha (supra) and Shaifali Gupta (supra). In both cases, the Apex Court dealt with the issue involving ancestral coparcenary properties. The ratio in those cases would not apply to the present facts at hand since the suit- scheduled properties are the self-acquired properties of grandparents and they died intestate leaving behind a son and daughter. In the plaint, there is no assertion of an ancestral coparcenary of the properties. Page 15 of 18 31. The Apex Court in T. Arivandandam Vs T. V. Satyapal and Another12, while considering the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC at para 5 observed as follows: 5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentently resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X, C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. 32. Again, the apex Court in Madanuri Sri. Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal13, the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and observed in para 7 as follows: 7. The plaint can be rejected Under Order VII Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power Under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an 12 (1977) 4 SCC 467 13 (2017) 13 SCC 174, entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power Under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated Under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the Defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the Defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when, the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power Under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage. (emphasis is mine). 33. Keeping in view the expressions of the Apex Court concerning the scope of Sec 8 and 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Order VII Rule 11 CPC, this Court is of the firm opinion that the plaintiff has no right to sue. The plaint doesn‟t disclose a cause of action and the cause of action pleaded is a clear drafting and illusory. Permitting such a suit to proceed to trial would be an abuse of the process of law and an exercise in futility, subjecting the senior citizen parents to vexatious litigation. Page 17 of 18 34. The Trial Court committed a jurisdictional error and material irregularity in dismissing the application. In fact, the trial court failed to consider the relevant aspects while dealing with an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It proceeded on the untenable premise that the defence of the defendants cannot be looked into, completely failing to appreciate that the plaint, on its own admissions, is barred by law. 35. This Court is conscious that while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, normally this Court will not act as an appellate court and substitute its opinion. However, when the trial court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and if such an order is allowed to continue, it would become a miscarriage of justice. 36. The Apex Court in Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. and Another Vs. B. Gurappa Naidu and Others14, considered the scope of jurisdiction under Art 227 of the Constitution of India by referring to the decisions reported in Shalini Shyam Shetty Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil15; Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.16, and Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel17 and summarised the principles as follows: “35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters, is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. 14 2026 SCC OnLine SC 745 15 (2010) 8 SCC 329 16 (2001) 8 SCC 97 17 (2022) 4 SCC 181 b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal.” 37. Given the discussion supra, the order under revision brooks interference. The revision is allowed. Consequently, I.A.No.72 of 2022 in O.S.No.263 of 2018 on the file of the learned III Additional District Judge, Tirupati stands allowed. The suit O.S.No. 263 of 2018 is rejected as barred under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, specially clauses (a) and (d). No order as to costs. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed. ___________________________ JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI Date: 04.08.2026 IKN Whether the order is: Speaking Yes/No / Recorded Yes/No Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No