2026:HHC:16300 THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.231 of 2024 Date of Decision: 12.05.2026 _______________________________________________________ Purab Ram …….Petitioner Versus Shyam Lal & another … Respondents _______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the Petitioner : Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Chandresh Pal, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General, for respondent No.2/State. _______________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral): Instant Criminal Revision petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C, lays challenge to judgment dated 01.04.2024, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in Criminal Appeal No.105 of 2023, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.11.2023, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Court No.III, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, in criminal complaint No.903 of 2015, titled as Shyam Lal vs. Purab Ram, whereby 1Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2026:HHC:16300 learned trial Court, while holding petitioner-accused (hereinafter referred to as the ‘accused’) guilty of his having committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act(for short ‘Act’), convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of four months and pay compensation to the tune of Rs.6,00,000/- to the respondent- complainant. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings as well as other documents adduced on record by the respective parties, are that the respondent-complainant (hereinafter referred to as the ‘complainant’) filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the competent Court of law, alleging therein that cheque bearing No.402800, dated 10.05.2015, amounting to Rs. 3, 50,000/- of Punjab National Bank, Branch Aut, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, issued by the accused in favour of the complainant towards discharge of lawful liability was dishonoured vide return memo dated 02.06.2015 with the remarks “funds insufficient”. Immediately, after receipt of aforesaid return memo, complainant served accused with legal notice dated 10.06.2015, thereby demanding sum of Rs. 3, 50,000/- within a span of fifteen days, but since petitioner failed to do the needful, complainant had no option, but to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the 3 2026:HHC:16300 competent Court of law, which subsequently, on the basis of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, held accused guilty of his having committed offence punishable under S. 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per description given herein above. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by learned trial Court, present petitioner-accused preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh, but same was dismissed vide judgment dated 01.04.2024. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his acquittal after quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence recorded by Courts below. 4. At the time of issuance of notice, this Court was apprised by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner is in process of settling his dispute with the respondent/complainant and as such, matter was repeatedly adjourned, enabling petitioner to place on record compromise, but in vain. On 08.10.2025, this Court, having taken note of the statement made by learned counsel for the petitioner that parties are in process of settling their dispute amicably interse them, stayed the substantive sentence imposed of learned trial 4 2026:HHC:16300 Court, subject to petitioner-accused depositing 30% of the compensation amount and furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety in the like amount, but fact remains that even afore order never came to be complied with. Court file reveals that more than 10 opportunities came to be granted to the petitioner to comply with orders passed by this Court or settle the matter with the complainant, but in vain and as such, this Court has no option, but to decide the petition on its own merits. 5. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the judgment passed by learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, upholding the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court, this Court is not persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, rather this Court finds that both the Courts below, having taken note of the pleadings as well as evidence led on record by the respective parties, have rightly held petitioner- accused guilty of his having committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. 6. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, accused admitted factum with regard to his having issued cheque as well as signature thereupon. He attempted to carve out a case that he 5 2026:HHC:16300 had issued the blank security cheque and complainant misused the same. He further stated that complainant paid sum of Rs. 90,000/- to him, which was returned by him and no payment is due. Though, he was given due opportunity to lead evidence, but he failed to avail the same. 7. Complainant, with a view to prove his case, examined himself as CW-1 and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. CW-1/A, wherein he specifically reiterated the averments contained in the complaint. He successfully proved on record cheque Ex. CW-1/B, return memos Ex. CW-1/C & Ex. CW-1/D, copy of legal notice Ex. CW-1/E and postal receipt Ex. CW-1/F. Cross-examination conducted upon afore witness, nowhere suggests that accused was able to extract anything contrary to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief, rather suggestion put to the complainant in his cross-examination, clearly establish factum with regard to accused having issued cheque as well as signatures thereupon. 8. Though, accused attempted to carve out a case that he had only taken Rs. 90,000/-, which was though returned, but yet cheque was not returned, but such plea of him never came to be proved in accordance with law. He also attempted to carve out a case that cheque in question is a security cheque, but such plea of him was not supported with any evidence. 6 2026:HHC:16300 9. Since factum with regard to issuance of cheque as well as signatures thereupon was duly acknowledged by the petitioner, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Courts below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque that cheque was issued towards discharge of lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to the documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or presumption can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any. However, in the instant case, despite sufficient opportunities, petitioner-accused failed to lead any evidence and as such, he otherwise failed to probablize the defence, sought to be raised by him, while deposing under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor is able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable 7 2026:HHC:16300 Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the 8 2026:HHC:16300 receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy. 11. Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Similarly, factum with regard to signatures and issuance of cheque by the accused towards discharge of lawful liability stands duly established on record. 12. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any 9 2026:HHC:16300 finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 13. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below, while passing impugned judgments, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 14. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 10 2026:HHC:16300 15. Consequently, in view of the discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld. 16. Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court within a period of 15 days to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner are cancelled. Interim direction, if any, stands vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Sandeep Sharma), Judge May 12,2026 (shankar)