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2026 DAILYLAW 8621 (UTT)

Mohan Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand

2026-01-03

Ashish Naithani

body2026
JUDGMENT : ASHISH NAITHANI, J. 1. The present Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by the Applicant seeking quashing of the charge-sheet dated 14.03.2024 and the summoning order dated 03.04.2024 passed in Session Trial No. 16 of 2024, arising out of FIR No. 10 of 2024, registered at Police Station Kotwali, District Almora, for offences punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 5(j)(ii) and 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Applicant has also prayed for compounding of the offences on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the Applicant and Respondent No.2. 2. The State’s case, as borne out from the FIR and the material collected during investigation, is that Respondent No.2, a minor girl aged about 17 years, was taken to the hospital by her mother after she complained of abdominal pain, whereupon medical examination revealed that she was pregnant. On the basis of the said information, the FIR came to be lodged on 24.01.2024 alleging that the Applicant had subjected the prosecutrix to repeated sexual intercourse. During investigation, the date of birth of Respondent No.2 was found to be 13.03.2007, thereby establishing that she was below the age of 18 years at the time of the alleged incident. 3. Upon completion of investigation, statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded, medical and forensic evidence was collected, and a charge-sheet was submitted against the Applicant for offences under Section 376 IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii) and 6 of the POCSO Act. 4. The learned trial court took cognizance and summoned the Applicant, leading to registration of Session Trial No. 16 of 2024. During the pendency of proceedings, the Applicant moved the present petition asserting that the relationship between the parties was consensual, that both families have amicably settled the dispute, and that there is an intention to solemnize marriage once Respondent No.2 attains majority, and on that basis sought quashing of the criminal proceedings. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant submitted that the criminal proceedings have arisen out of a consensual relationship between the Applicant and Respondent No.2, who were known to each other and whose families were on cordial terms. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant submitted that the criminal proceedings have arisen out of a consensual relationship between the Applicant and Respondent No.2, who were known to each other and whose families were on cordial terms. It was argued that both families had mutually decided to solemnize the marriage of the Applicant and Respondent No.2 once she attains the age of majority, and that during this interregnum period physical relations took place, which later resulted in registration of the FIR. 7. Learned counsel contended that there was no element of coercion, force or exploitation and that the continuation of the criminal proceedings would serve no useful purpose. 8. It was further submitted that the matter has now been amicably settled between the parties and their families, as reflected from the joint affidavits and the compounding application filed on record. Learned counsel argued that Respondent No.2 and her legal guardian do not wish to pursue the case any further and that the Applicant is facing incarceration, causing undue hardship to his family. 9. On these premises, it was urged that this Court may exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the charge-sheet, the summoning order and the entire criminal proceedings in order to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of the court. 10. Per contra, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State opposed the application and submitted that the offences alleged are grave and serious in nature. It was argued that the prosecutrix was admittedly a minor at the time of the incident, and her date of birth has been clearly established during investigation. Learned State counsel submitted that once the age of the prosecutrix is below eighteen years, her consent is immaterial in the eyes of law and the provisions of the POCSO Act are squarely attracted. 11. It was further contended that the FIR, medical examination and investigation material disclose that the prosecutrix was found pregnant, which prima facie establishes commission of sexual assault. Learned counsel submitted that offences under Section 376 IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii) and 6 of the POCSO Act are non-compoundable and cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise or future promise of marriage. Learned counsel submitted that offences under Section 376 IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii) and 6 of the POCSO Act are non-compoundable and cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise or future promise of marriage. It was urged that permitting quashing in such cases would defeat the object of the special legislation enacted to protect children from sexual offences. 12. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 also opposed the application and adopted the submissions advanced on behalf of the State. It was argued that the statutory mandate of the POCSO Act does not permit dilution of criminal liability on the basis of settlement, and that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to indirectly permit compounding of non-compoundable offences involving a minor. 13. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submitted that the application is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 14. Upon due consideration, this Court finds that the core issue for consideration is whether the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash criminal proceedings arising out of offences under Section 376 IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii) and 6 of the POCSO Act, on the basis of a compromise between the accused and the victim, who was admittedly a minor at the time of the incident. 15. From the FIR and the investigation material, it clearly emerges that Respondent No.2 was medically examined after she complained of abdominal pain and was found to be pregnant. During investigation, her date of birth was verified and recorded as 13.03.2007, which establishes that she was below eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged incident. The age of the prosecutrix is thus not in dispute and stands conclusively established from the record. 16. The statements of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. during investigation and under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate have also been placed on record. A perusal of the said statements reveals that the prosecutrix has admitted to having physical relations with the Applicant over a period of time. However, even if the version of the prosecutrix is taken at its face value, the same does not advance the case of the Applicant in view of the settled legal position that consent of a minor is legally irrelevant. However, even if the version of the prosecutrix is taken at its face value, the same does not advance the case of the Applicant in view of the settled legal position that consent of a minor is legally irrelevant. Once the prosecutrix is found to be below eighteen years of age, any sexual act with her constitutes an offence under the POCSO Act irrespective of consent or willingness. 17. This Court is also conscious of the submissions advanced on behalf of the Applicant that the relationship was consensual and that there was an intention to solemnize marriage after the prosecutrix attains majority. Such considerations, however, cannot override the statutory mandate of the POCSO Act. The Act has been enacted as a special legislation to protect children from sexual exploitation, and the courts are duty-bound to give full effect to its object and purpose. A promise of marriage or a future settlement between the families cannot dilute criminal liability arising out of sexual offences against a minor. 18. So far as the Compounding Application filed under Section 320 Cr.P.C. is concerned, this Court finds that the offences alleged under Section 376 IPC and Sections 5(j)(ii) and 6 of the POCSO Act are non-compoundable by law. The inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised to indirectly permit compounding of offences which the legislature has expressly declared to be non-compoundable. Acceptance of such a compromise would not only be contrary to law but would also defeat the larger societal interest involved in prosecution of offences against children. 19. The scope of interference at the stage of exercise of inherent jurisdiction is well settled. This Court is not expected to undertake a meticulous examination of evidence or to conduct a mini-trial. At this stage, the Court is only required to see whether the allegations, if taken at their face value, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In the present case, the FIR, medical evidence, statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., and the material collected during investigation clearly disclose a prima facie case against the Applicant for the offences alleged. 20. This Court further finds that the continuation of prosecution in the present case cannot be said to amount to abuse of the process of law. In the present case, the FIR, medical evidence, statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., and the material collected during investigation clearly disclose a prima facie case against the Applicant for the offences alleged. 20. This Court further finds that the continuation of prosecution in the present case cannot be said to amount to abuse of the process of law. On the contrary, quashing of proceedings at this stage, particularly in a case involving a minor victim and serious sexual offences, would result in miscarriage of justice and would undermine the protective framework envisaged under the POCSO Act. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that no ground is made out for exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the charge-sheet, summoning order or the criminal proceedings pending against the Applicant. The Compounding Application also deserves to be rejected. ORDER: For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is dismissed The Compounding Application filed under Section 320 Cr.P.C. is also stand rejected The interim orders, if any, stand vacated.