Page No.# 1/18 GAHC020003662025 2026:GAU-NL:70 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : C. REVN/3/2025 SHRI KEVISENYU ZATSU AND ANR SON OF SUOLEHIE ZATSU, R/O T. KHEL, KOHIMA VILLAGE, KOHIMA DISTRICT, NAGALAND 2: SHRI MEDOVILIE KHRUOMO ALIAS KENEIU KHRUOMO SON OF KEPELHOUCHA R/O L.KHEL KOHIMA VILLAGE KOHIMA NAGALAN VERSUS N. LAO SOLO NORTH BLOCK, NEAR NORTH POLICE STATION, KOHIMA VILLAGE, KOHIMA DISTRICT, NAGALAND Advocate for the Petitioner : T. KHEZHIE, THEJA VITSU,ROVIMENO THOU,ALEZO KIRE Advocate for the Respondent : R. IRALU, SR. ADV, MHABENI,MENOSIENO,L. IRALU BEFORE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE YARENJUNGLA LONGKUMER O R D E R 17.02.2026 Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. T. Khezhie. Also heard Page No.# 2/18 learned senior counsel, Mr. R. Iralu assisted by learned counsel, Ms. Mhabeni for the sole respondent. 2. The instant revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India R/W Rule 32 of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1937) has been preferred by the petitioner assailing the Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima in Civil Appeal No. 2/2023 and the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2022 passed by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner in Civil Appeal No. 2/2019. 3. The facts leading to the filing of the present petition is that the petitioners had purchased a plot of land said to be situated at Daklane, Kohima for a sum of Rs. 58,000/- (Rupees Fifty-eight thousand only). The land was an ancestral property jointly possessed by three grandfathers namely: Late Welhoulie Solo, Late Pfupie Solo and Late Neivilie Solo. After the death of the three grandfathers, the land was inherited by their descendants and jointly owned by them. Sometime in 2007, one of the descendants of one of the three grandfathers decided to sell the plot and the petitioners herein purchased the said plot of land. An agreement dated 28.02.2007 was drawn up, which was signed by one of the descendants representing one of the three grandfathers. In the Agreement dated 28.02.2007, it was indicated that the plot of land measured 120Ft X 68Ft. 4. The case of the petitioner is that he had already bought the said plot Page No.# 3/18 of land by executing an affidavit on 28.02.2007. It is also stated that the petitioners bought the land from one Shri Viketoulie Solo, S/o Kesuochühie Solo of T-Khel, Kohima, Village. It is also stated by the petitioners that his ownership of the suit property was certified by the Kohima Village Council vide Land Ownership Certificate dated 06.11.2018. It is stated that the seller, Shri Viketoulie Solo, had stated that the suit land being a joint property of three grandfathers, he had consulted other elders, including Shri Visielie Solo. 5. Petitioners further stated that sometime in the year 2008, they came to know that the respondent’s son had started carrying out construction work in the suit land. The petitioners raised objections and informed the respondent that the suit land was already purchased by them and as such the respondent must refrain from carrying out any developmental works in the suit land. However, the petitioners were informed that the respondent had also purchased the suit land by executing an Agreement dated 30.09.2007, claiming that he had bought it from the descendants of the three grandfathers. 6. The petitioners therefore approached the Kohima Village Gaonbura’s Court (GB’s Court) challenging the encroachment/illegal action of the respondent. The GB’s Court passed the Judgment and Order dated 08.06.2019 in favour of the respondent. 7. Being aggrieved by the decision rendered by the GB’s Court of the Kohima Village, the petitioners approached the Deputy Commissioner and Page No.# 4/18 submitted application dated 27.06.2019, which was meant to be an Appeal against the decision of the GB’s Court. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner referred the matter to the Dobashi’s Court and the Dobashi’s Court proceeded to hear the matter by registering the case as Pol.Case No. 07/2019. Consequently, on 12.09.2019, the Dobashis along with the parties, inspected the suit land and passed a decision dated 12.09.2019 in favour of the petitioners. 8. The respondent thereafter challenged the Dobashi’s Court Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2019 by filing an Appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima under Rule 31 of the Rules of 1937. 9. The case was referred to the Sub Divisional Officer (Civil)/Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima, wherein the petitioners were given the opportunity of filing an affidavit. Thereafter, the case was fixed for hearing and submissions were advanced by the petitioners. It is stated that the petitioners were of the impression that the case was fixed for hearing to decide whether the case merits a de novo trial or not. However, without any further opportunity, the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner passed the impugned Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2022, stating that the Dobashi’s decision was bad in law on the ground that there is no provision for review of the decision of a lower court by the DB’s court under Rule 31 of the Rules. 10. The Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner in the Judgment dated 10.06.2022 held that the sale of the joint property by a single individual is Page No.# 5/18 bad in law and is void from the very beginning and also that the appeal was hit by delay and laches and there was no complaint by the petitioner till 2013 whereas the respondent had started the construction work in 2008. The learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner also held that there was no defined boundary shown by the petitioners except for the measurement. 11. Aggrieved by the Judgment dated 10.06.2022, the petitioners preferred a civil revision petition, registered as C.REVN/1/2023 before this Court, assailing the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2022. 12. A Coordinate Bench of this Court, while disposing of the C.REVN/1/2023 by Order dated 16.10.2023, held that the only pertinent issue is to determine the legality of the jurisdiction of the Dobashi’s Court, Kohima. This Court held that the Dobashi’s Court does not have the power to review or sit in appeal over the decision of a GB’s Court. And, therefore, the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2022 passed by the learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima in Civil Appeal No. 2/2019 was upheld. However, the petitioners were given the opportunity to avail the remedy of appeal as provided under the Rules, if so advised. 13. The petitioners, therefore, preferred an Appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima under Rule 29(1) of the Rules of 1937 challenging the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2022, passed in Civil Appeal No. 2/2019 by the learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima. Page No.# 6/18 14. The Deputy Commissioner, Kohima dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2025. Being aggrieved, the petitioners have preferred the present revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution r/w Rule 32 of the Rules. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima has dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 2/2023 solely on technical grounds by simply observing that the Dobashi’s Court does not have the power to entertain a review or sit in appeal over the judgment of the GB’s Court under the relevant provisions of the Rules of 1937. 16. Learned counsel submits that this Court had already held that the Dobashi’s Court does not possess the power to review or sit in appeal over the decision of the GB’s Court. However, the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima dismissed the appeal without addressing the specific grounds raised and there is a total absence of recording any independent findings on the contentions and issues raised by the petitioners. It is stated that the petitioners, as appellant, had produced all the documents including the land ownership documents issued by the Kohima Village. However, the same were never considered by the learned Court below. 17. Learned counsel submits that the provisions of Rule 31 of the Rules of 1937 provide for an appeal from the decision of the Dobashis to the Deputy Commissioner or his Assistant. He submits that the Appellate Court has to try the case de novo or refer it to a panchayat as provided in Rule 31. And the learned Court below should have exercised the Page No.# 7/18 jurisdiction vested in it by law to decide the matter on merits. However, the learned Court below has abstained from examining any of the substantive issues, evidence and rival contentions of the parties thereby rendering the entire exercise incomplete and invalid. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the learned Court below had acted in a manner contrary to the well-settled principle of law that technicalities must not override substantial justice, more so when a higher court has expressly given the petitioners the liberty to file appeal against the decision of the Assistant to Deputy Commissioner. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that the instant dispute involves substantial question of property laws, relating to title over immovable property, which falls within the domain of a regular civil court, having competent jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Code. He has, therefore, prayed that the matter may be transferred to the regular civil court for effective determination on merits of the case. 20. Another submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the legality of the Land Ownership Certificate issued by the Kohima Village Council on 06.11.2018 has not been determined by any court till date. He has submitted that the respondent has also not been able to show any registered sale deed by which he had bought the disputed suit land. Page No.# 8/18 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the case of Padma Sundara Rao and Others Versus State of T.N. and Others reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had held that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. While interpreting a provision, the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. It was held that the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the learned Deputy Commissioner should have referred the case for de novo trial as provided in Rule 31 of the Rules of 1937. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on the case of R. Nagaraj through Lrs. And Another Versus Rajmani and Others reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 762. By relying on the aforementioned judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cited judgment has held that procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the determination of justice. He submits that procedural and technical considerations should not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner could not have dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 2/2023 merely on technical grounds without adjudicating on merits. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on the case of Rokozel Yoho Versus Neitho-O Sorhie in C.REVN/5/2019, wherein a Page No.# 9/18 Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide Judgment and Order dated 08.03.2022, had observed that in another case, i.e., Civil Appeal No. 1/2015, the case was transferred from the court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kohima to the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Kohima. And, therefore, even in the present case, this Court has the power to transfer the Civil Appeal No. 2/2023 from the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima to the Court of the District Judge, Kohima. 24. In view of the above submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioners prays that the impugned Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima in Civil Appeal No. 2/2023 may be set aside, as well as the Judgment Order dated 10.06.2022 passed by the Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Kohima and additionally to transfer the Civil Appeal No. 2/2023 from the Court of Deputy Commissioner, Kohima to the competent civil court for adjudication. 25. Learned senior counsel, Mr. R. Iralu appearing for the sole respondent submits that the entire claim of the petitioners to the suit land is the purported sale deed/Agreement dated 28.02.2007. He submits that the said Agreement only indicates that the land is 120ft x 68ft. There are no boundaries indicated and the location of the plot is also not indicated. Therefore, the petitioners have not been able to show where the land is located. Learned senior counsel submits that the suit land is a joint property and cannot be sold by an individual. The respondent had clearly stated in his appeal memo before the Asst to Deputy Commissioner, i.e., Page No.# 10/18 Civil Appeal No. 2/2019 that the land was the ancestral property jointly owned and possessed by three grandfathers. And, after the death of the three grandfathers, the land was inherited by the descendants and jointly possessed by them. This statement of the respondent has never been denied or rebutted by the petitioners in their reply before the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner. Even in their para-wise reply in Civil Appeal No. 2/2019, the petitioners also admitted that the land was jointly owned by the descendants of three grandfathers. It is also stated in their reply that the said land was purchased from one Mr. Viketoulie Solo, who is one of the descendants of one of the three grandfathers. By referring to the impugned Order dated 10.06.2022, passed by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima, the learned senior counsel submits that the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner had arrived at a clear finding that the sale of jointly owned property by a single individual is bad in law and, therefore, the sale of the plot of land by Mr. Viketoulie Solo to the petitioners is void from the very beginning. Another finding of the Assistant to Deputy Commissioner in Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2022 is that the plot of land bought by the petitioners is without any demarcation and could be in any part of Kohima, which without defined boundaries, the Court could not acknowledge in the interest of justice. The Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner also held that the Dobashi’s Court could not have reversed the Judgment of the GB’s Court as it did not have the jurisdiction to either consider a review or appeal against the order of the GB’s Court under the Rules of 1937. 26. Learned senior counsel submits that when an appeal is filed under Page No.# 11/18 Rule 31, the Deputy Commissioner shall affirm and enforce the decision of the lower court as its own if the decision appears to be just. Only if the appellate court sees reason to doubt the justice of the decision it will try the case de novo or refer it to a panchayat as provided in the Rule. In the present case, the Deputy Commissioner did not find any infirmity in the Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2022 passed by the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner and has, therefore, upheld the said judgment. The learned senior counsel states that the petitioners are also aware that the land was ancestral property belonging to the descendants of the three grandfathers and is very much aware of the fact that ancestral property cannot be sold by one individual and, therefore, there was no necessity to frame any issues in this regard. 27. By referring to the Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2025, the learned senior counsel submits that the observations and findings of the appellate court are recorded at paragraph nos. 7 and 8 of the Judgment dated 11.03.2025. At paragraph no. 7(C), the Court below has observed that the GB’s Court, Kohima, while deciding the matter by Judgment dated 08.06.2019 had held that the land is the common property of three grandfathers and the sale of land to the respondent by the descendants of three grandfathers is not disputed. The Court also observed that by Order dated 08.06.2019 it was directed that Mr. Viketoulie Solo and other descendants of late Welhoulie Solo (one of the three grandfathers) were to give one alternative piece of land to the petitioners herein or to pay the petitioners interest for 12 (twelve) years along with the principle amount amounting to Rs. 4,75,600/- (Rupees Four lakhs Seventy-five thousand Six Page No.# 12/18 hundred only). 28. It is also submitted that the learned court below had also considered that the petitioners herein had also acknowledged the fact that the land in question is a common property. The learned court below agreed with the finding of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner that the sale of joint property by a single individual is bad in law and the sale of the plot of land by the vendor to the appellants is void. After examining all the relevant factors and after perusing the records, the learned court below came to the conclusion that the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner had rightly quashed and set aside the Order dated 12.09.2019 passed by the Dobashi’s Court and the Judgment dated 10.06.2022 was therefore upheld. 29. The learned senior counsel has further submitted that the Deputy Commissioner had also rightly agreed with the conclusion that an individual cannot sell the land of three forefathers. He also submitted that the respondent is in possession of the suit land and the petitioners are in fact not aggrieved parties as the GB’s Court had directed Mr. Viketoulie Solo and the descendants of his grandfather to give one alternative plot of land to the petitioners and had also directed that if they cannot give the alternative plot they shall pay interest and principle for 12 (twelve) years amounting to Rs. 4,75,600/- to the petitioners. Learned senior counsel submits that if at all aggrieved by the decision of the GB’s Court, it should be the seller of the plot, i.e., Mr. Viketoulie Solo. However, it is surprising as to why said Viketoulie Solo is not aggrieved by the order of the GB’s Page No.# 13/18 Court dated 08.06.2019. The learned senior counsel, therefore, submits that the petitioners have already got their relief through the Order dated 08.06.2019 passed by the GB’s Court. 30. The learned senior counsel, therefore, prays that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima in Civil Appeal No. 2/2023 or the impugned Judgment dated 10.06.2022 passed by the learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner in Civil Appeal No. 2.2019 and prays that the same may be upheld by this Court. 31. This Court has given its due consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. 32. In the case of Rajendra Diwan vrs Pradeep Kumar Ranibala, reported in (2019) 20 SCC 143, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised ‘in the cloak of an appeal in disguise’. 86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers. The High Court does not reassess or re-analyse the evidence and/or materials on record….The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of the law.” 33. In Muslim Ali and Anr Vrs Ashok Leyland Finance Ltd. and Ors reported in Page No.# 14/18 (2012) 4 GLR 839, the coordinate bench of this Court held: “The High Court's power of revision under Article 227 of the Constitution would be restricted to interference in cases of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law, and would be exercised most sparingly, in cases where grave injustice would be done unless the High court interfere. It cannot be used as appellate or revisional power. The power would not be exercised to correct an error of fact or of law, not being an error of law apparent on the face of the record, of an irregularity or illegality of procedure, unless such error affects the jurisdiction or involves a breach of principles of natural justice; or to re- apprise the evidence.” Similarly in Amar Kumar Sinha and Others vrs Binoy Kumar Singha and Others, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Gau 5505, it was held that : “It is a settled law that the powers and jurisdiction of a revisional court is circumscribed and would be available only on certain conditions which are broadly, exercise of powers without jurisdiction, taking account of materials which are irrelevant and extraneous and not taking into account relevant and germane materials before the court”. 34. The facts of the case is now examined in the light of the law as referred hereinabove with regard to the revisional power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. A perusal of Rule 31 of the Rules of 1937 indicates that an appeal shall lie from the decision of the DB’s or in other recognized valid authority to the Deputy Commissioner or his Assistant. Rule 31 of the Rules of 1937 being relevant, is reproduced herein below: “An appeal shall lie from the decision of the mauzadar, gaonbura, chief, headman of khels, dobashis or other duly recognized village authority to the tribal court whenever constituted on otherwise to the Deputy Commissioner or his Assistant. A record shall be made of the matter in dispute and the decision of the village authorities. If necessary, the Court shall examine the parties, and if the decision appears to be just, shall affirm and enforce it as one of its own. If the Court sees reason to doubt the justice of the decision, it will try the cases denovo, or refer it to a panchayat as above.” Page No.# 15/18 35. Rule 31 provides that the appellate court/Deputy Commissioner shall examine the parties only if necessary. If the appellate court/Deputy Commissioner is of the view that the decision of the lower court is just it shall affirm and enforce it as its own. Only if the appellate court sees reason to doubt the decision of the lower court it will try the cases de novo or refer to a panchayat as provided in the Rule. 36. I have perused the impugned Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2022 as well as the impugned Judgment and Order dated 11.03.2025. This Court has also gone though the Trial Court Records. The Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner in the Order dated 10.06.2022 had come to a finding that the sale of joint property by a single individual is bad in law and that the sale of the plot to the petitioners was void from the very beginning. Another finding of the learned Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner is that the plot of land belonging to the petitioners is without any demarcation and without any location and, therefore, it could have been in any part of Kohima and without defined boundaries, the Court could not acknowledge the same. It was, also held that the Dobashi’s Court could not have entertained any review or appeal against the decision of the GB’s Court as per Rule 31 of the Rules of 1937. 37. This Court has also examined the impugned Judgment dated 11.03.2025 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Kohima in Civil Appeal No. 2/2023. The observations and findings of the Deputy Commissioner have also been perused. It is seen that the Deputy Commissioner had also agreed with the finding of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner that Page No.# 16/18 the suit land was a common property of the lineage of three grandfathers and that the sale of the land to the present respondent by the descendants of three grandfathers was never disputed nor questioned. The learned court below also agreed with the finding of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner that under customary law, ancestral property could not be sold by an individual without obtaining consent from all shareholders of the property. The Deputy Commissioner also observed that the present petitioners/appellants had also acknowledged the fact that the land in question is a common property. Thereafter, the learned court below after considering all the facts and after examining the judgment of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner minutely, had come to a conclusion that the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner had rightly quashed and set aside the Order dated 12.09.2019 passed by the Dobashi’s Court. 38. In the case of Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan Vrs Tuffail Mohammed, reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 270, the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated: “3. It is well settled position in law that under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence and cannot set aside the concurrent findings of the courts below by taking a different view of the evidence. The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact if the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken, is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction”. Therefore, the settled law is that when there are concurrent finding of two lower courts, this Court should be slow to interfere unless the findings are Page No.# 17/18 perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the courts below. 39. This Court has also taken note of the fact that the courts below have taken all relevant issues into consideration; i.e., that the purported sale deed/affidavit produced by the petitioners does not show any demarcation nor does it show location where the land is situated, that the petitioners have also not disputed the fact that the respondent has bought the suit land from the descendants of all three grandfathers, whereas they bought the same only from one descendant of one grandfather, and most pertinently, that the petitioners have not denied that the suit land is the ancestral property of the descendants of three grandfathers. 40. This Court after examining the impugned judgment and orders dated 10.06.2022 and 11.03.2025 is of the view that the findings are not perverse nor there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the courts below. There is also no grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law. This Court under an application under Article 227 of the Constitution is concerned not with the decision but the decision making process. This Court only has to see whether the lower courts had the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and if so, whether the impugned orders are vitiated by material irregularity. A judgment containing valid reasons cannot be set aside in exercise of the limited jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 unless the same is perverse and without jurisdiction. Page No.# 18/18 41. In the light of the above discussion I do not find any infirmity in the well reasoned judgments passed by the learned courts below. Consequently, there is no merit in this Revision petition and it is accordingly dismissed. 42. The petition is disposed. The Registry shall send back the Trial Court Records without delay. JUDGE Comparing Assistant