2026:HHC:17408-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 208 of 2017 Date of decision : 15.05.2026. Santosh Kumar Kaushal ...Petitioner. Versus State Bank of India & others ...Respondents. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner : Mr. Adarsh K. Vashista, Advocate. For the respondents : Ms. Devyani Sharma, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Arvind Sharma & Mr. Shivam Sharma, Advocates. Bipin Chander Negi, Judge: The petitioner in the case at hand was initially appointed as a Probationary Officer on 19.12.1983. Post completion of the two year probation, the petitioner was confirmed as a Junior Management Grade Scale-I on 9.12.1985. 2. By way of the present petition, filed on 21.01.2017, a challenge is sought to be made to the non-grant of promotion of the petitioner against the post of Middle Management Grade Scale-II from Junior Management Grade Scale-I for the period year 1990 till October 1998. The promotion to the Middle 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? -2- Management Grade Scale-II was allowed in favour of the petitioner on 01.11.1998. Thereafter, Middle Management Grade Scale-III was granted to the petitioner w.e.f. 3.9.2005 and subsequent thereto promotion to Middle Management Grade Scale-IV was made on 12.9.2013. 3. Aggrieved by the delayed promotion made in the year 1998, admittedly, petitioner represented his case before the National Commission of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. The representation was made in this respect on 20.4.1999 (Annexure P-19). The information with respect to ACRs w.e.f. 1.4.1992 to 31.3.2008 was solicited by the petitioner in August/September, 2010(Annexure P-22). 4. It is in the aforesaid backdrop, following prayer has been made in the writ petition:- “That a writ in the nature of mandamus may kindly be issued directing the respondents to consider the candidature to the petitioner for promotion from the post of Junior Management Grade Scale-I to the post of Middle Management Grade Scale-II in the year 1990 1.8.1990, Middle Management w.e.f. Grade Scale-III from Middle Management Grade Scale-II w.e.f. 1.11.1993, the Senior Management Grade Scale-IV from Middle Management Grade Scale-III w.e.f. 1.11.1997, Senior Management Grade Scale-V from Senior Management Scale-IV w.e.f. 1.11.2001, Top Executive Grade Grade Scale-VI from Senior Management Grade Scale-V w.e.f. 29.8.2005, Top -3- Executive Grade Scale-VII from Top Executive Grade Scale-VI w.e.f. 23.7.2009, Top Executive Grade Special Scale-I from Top Executive Grade Scale-VII w.e.f. 3.9.2013 and Top Executive Grade Special Scale-II from Top Executive Grade Special Scale-I w.e.f. 23.4.2014 alongwith all consequential benefits of due and admissible pay and allowances alongwith due and admissible arrears with due and admissible interest, in the interest of justice.” 5. In the aforesaid backdrop, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has raised preliminary objections with respect to delay and laches in filing of the present petition. It is vehemently contended that the claim involved relates to the issue of promotion, affecting others. Besides the petition raises a highly belated service related claim. Hence delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applicable. Per contra it is contended that the petitioner belongs to a reserved category and since benefit of reservation has not been granted to the petitioner therefore his fundamental right has been affected and therefore there arises no occasion for invocation of delay and laches in the case at hand. 6. To buttress the aforesaid submission learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to (2023) 20 SCC 817, titled as, State of Uttar Pradesh -4- &others vs. Rajmati Singh. The relevant extract thereof reads as follows:- “18. In “Union of India and Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh” (2008) 8 SCC 652, this Court summarized the settled principles in the following manner: “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the -5- consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 7. There is merit in the aforesaid submission of the respondent. Besides the aforesaid, it is also a well settled position of law that if one is aggrieved by non-promotion, then the individual so aggrieved should approach the Court at the earliest. Stale claims made in this respect are not to be entertained as grant of relief qua the same would lead to the serious administrative complications both to the employer and to the other employees, as it would disturb the settled position of seniority and promotions, which had been granted over the years. In this respect, reference can be made to (2010) 14 SCC 389 titled as, Union of India & others vs. Durairaj (Dead) by LRs., which reads as under:- “13.It is well settled that anyone who feels aggrieved by non-promotion or non-selection should approach the court/tribunal as early as possible. If a person having a justifiable grievance allows the matter to become stale and approaches the court/tribunal belatedly, grant of any relief on the basis of such belated application would lead to serious administrative complications to the employer -6- and difficulties to the other employees as it will upset the settled position regarding seniority and promotions which has been granted to others over the years. Further, where a claim is raised beyond a decade or two from the date of cause of action, the employer will be at a great disadvantage to effectively contest or counter the claim, as the officers who dealt with the matter and/or the relevant records relating to the matter may no longer be available. Therefore, even if no period of limitation is prescribed, any belated challenge would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches”. 8. Relief in the case at hand is being sought under the discretionary jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has been sleeping over the matter for long. Hence also no relief can be granted to the petitioner. In this respect, it would be relevant to refer (2022) 2 SCC 25 titled as, Union of India & others vs. N. Murugesan & others. The relevant extract reads as under:- “28.We would not dwell deep into the extraordinary and discretionary nature of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This principle is to be extended much more when an element of undue delay, laches and acquiescence is involved. The following decisions of this Court would suffice: “8. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya [(1996) 6 SCC 267 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1488] . In that case the respondents woke up to -7- claim the relief which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Therefore, the state approached this Court and this Court after considering the matter observed as under “Although it is not necessary to give an explanation for the delay which occurred within the period mentioned in sub- sections (1) or (2) of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper. In the instant case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub- sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay.” 9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryanathis Court reaffirmed the rule that if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the Court, then such person -8- cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) “The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case [Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1995) 31 ATC 813] . The appellants desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage. 10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharaguptait was observed as follows: “9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi [R.P. Joshi v. Union of India, OA No. 497 of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987] gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief.” 11. In Govt. of WB v. Tarun K. Roy Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: “34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the -9- respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law.” 28.2 Eastern Coalfields Ltd. vs. Dugal Kumar:- “24. As to delay and laches on the part of the writ petitioner, there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant Company. It is well settled that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds to refuse relief by a writ court is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is -10- imperative, where the petitioner invokes extraordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that he should come to the court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant. 25. Under the English law, an application for leave for judicial review should be made “promptly”. If it is made tardily, it may be rejected. The fact that there is breach of public law duty does not necessarily make it irrelevant to consider delay or laches on the part of the applicant. Even if leave is granted, the question can be considered at the time of final hearing whether relief should be granted in favour of such applicant or not. 26. In R. v. Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal, ex p Caswell the House of Lords stated [Ed.: Quoting from O'Reilly v. Mackman, “The public interest in good administration requires that public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision-making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary in -11- fairness to the person affected by the decision.” 27. 27. The underlying object of refusing to issue a writ has been succinctly explained by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd “Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either -12- party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 28. This Court has accepted the above principles of English law in TilokchandMotichand v. H.B. Munshiand Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India this Court ruled that even in cases of violation or infringement of fundamental rights, a writ court may take into account delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching the court. And if there is gross or unexplained delay, the court may refuse to grant relief in favour of such petitioner.” 28.3 State of J&K v. R.K. Zalpuri “20. Having stated thus, it is useful to refer to a passage from City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. DosuAardeshirBhiwandiwala [City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. DosuAardeshirBhiwandiwala, (2009) 1 SCC 168] , wherein this Court while dwelling upon jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has expressed thus: “30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty-bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; -13- (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.” 21. In this regard reference to a passage from Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791] would be apposite: “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party.” After so stating the Court after referring to the authority in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements, which is to the following effect: (SCC p. 326, para 9) -14- “9. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 22. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar [State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683] a three-Judge Bench laid down that: (SCC p. 692, para 19) -15- “19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.” 23. Recently in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babuit has been ruled thus: (SCC p. 117, para 16 “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to -16- scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant—a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, ‘procrastination is the greatest thief of time’ and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 24. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the question of delay and laches in all kinds of cases would not curb or curtail the power of the writ court to exercise the discretion. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC it has been ruled that: “12. … Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, -17- And again And again: (Tukaram Kana Joshi case, (SCC p. 360, para 14) “14. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non- deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have in fact emerged by delay on the part of the petitioners.” 9. Other than the aforesaid, reference can be made to (2022) 12 SCC 579 Ajay Kumar Shukla & others vs. Arvind Rai & others, wherein it has been laid down that three to four years would be a reasonable period to challenge a seniority list and also that any challenge beyond the aforesaid period would -18- require satisfactory explanation. The relevant extract reads as under:- “In Dayaram Asanand Gursahani, there was a delay of 9 years. In the case of B.S. Bajwa , there was a delay of more than a decade. In Malcom Lawrence Cecil D’Souza, the delay was of 15 years and in R.S. Makashi, there was a delay of 8 years. In all these cases, this court has recorded that the delay has not been explained. Shiba Shankar Mohapatra is a judgment of 2010, which has laid down that, three to four years would be a reasonable period to challenge a seniority list and also that any challenge beyond the aforesaid period would require satisfactory explanation.” 10. The petition is a case of clever drafting as a cause of action is sought to be created where there is none. Promotions are being sought from the year 1990. Seeking promotions would definitely affect other people in the cadre and the individuals affected by the promotion are required to be impleaded, hence on the count of non-joinder of necessary parties also, the petition must also fail. 11. A right to reservation is not a fundamental right rather it is in the nature of an enabling provision. (See Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, Mukesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 3 SCC 1). Hence the plea that on account of non-grant of benefits of -19- reservation to the petitioner his fundamental right has been violated and hence delay and laches would not come into play is without merit and rejected. 12. For the aforesaid reasons there is merit in the submissions of the respondent and in view thereof the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. (Bipin Chander Negi) Judge 15th May, 2026. (kck)